Learning for knowledgeable action: A mini presentation Nov 6 2013
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Foundational ideas that underpin rethinking of Epistemic Fluency and Knowlegeable Action in Professional Learning. Learning as creating epistemic environment and conci(ienci)ous self
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Learning for knowledgeable action: A mini presentation Nov 6 2013
- 1. Learning for knowledgeable action and innovation: An epistemic fluency perspective Things and thoughts in progress, 6 Nov 2013 Lina Markauskaitė Acknowledgements: Peter Goodyear, Agnieszka Bachfischer Working presentation @CoCo
- 2. Three “orders” of learning 1st Order Teaching as telling Teaching as facilitation Learning by listening Learning by doing Teaching as design 2nd Order Learning by consci(enti)ous inhabiting Teaching as co-configuration 3rd Order
- 3. So why? Some trends and expectations from HE 1. Evidence generating practice 2. Relational expertise 3. Second-hand knowledge 4. Open innovation & co- configuration What does it mean for HE? Knowledge Flexibility, Adaptability ? Moving away from knowledge Dynamic & grounded ways to think about knowledge
- 4. Epistemic fluency defined Epistemic fluency through epistemic games • Epistemic games are patterns of inquiry that have characteristic forms, moves, goals and rules used by different epistemic communities • Epistemic fluency is an ability “to use and recognise a relatively large number of epistemic games” (Morrison & Collins, 1996, 108) But… • “...decision making, problem solving, and like kinds of thinking do not have specifically epistemic goals -- goals of building knowledge and understanding” (Perkins, 1997, 55)
- 5. SidewaysForward UpDownIn Epistemic fluency (re)defined Epistemic fluency as a capacity… 1. To integrate different kinds of knowledge 2. To coordinate different ways of knowing 3. To assemble epistemic environment 4. To construct consci(enci)ous self Learning as growing…
- 6. Theoretical perspective: Rethinking “deep learning” Five approaches in psychology 1. Phenomenological 2. Neuro-psychological 3. Environmentalist 4. Situated or sociocultural 5. Mentalist “Closing escape routes” for mind “Opening escape routes” for mind • Foundations: Pragmatic environmental existentialism • Mental architecture: Grounded cognition
- 7. Some key concepts Epistemic practice view • A multimodal assemblage that characterises the “machinery” for knowledge construction (Knorr-Cetina, 2007) A multimodal view Epistemic assemblage • “…the amalgam of places, bodies, voices, skills, practices, technical devices, theories, social strategies and collective work, that together constitutes techno-scientific knowledge practices” (Turnbull, 2000, 44) (Meta) cognitive Social Embodied & Embrained Material Epistemic
- 8. Some key concepts Grounded, modal view of conceptual knowledge 1. selected properties 2. information about the background settings 3. possible actions 4. perceptions of internal states: affects, motivations, AND cognitive states and operations Multimodal dynamic view of epistemic affordances Disease Symptoms Tests Evidence Treatment Aspirin Barsalou Zhang; Kirsh; Duguid; Knappett
- 9. Playing & weaving epistemic games Epistemic games Examples Propositional games A taxonomy of a disease, nursing “best practice” guidelines Problem-solving games A lesson plan, a pharmacy layout Meta- professional discourse Evaluation of a teaching resource, reflection Trans-professional discourse Pharmacist–doctor’s conference Public discourse Communication strategies for dispensing medications “Weaving” games Administering reading proficiency test
- 10. Constructing epistemic environment • Agi: Um two things you could put in the lesson plan. (…) we could do the nametags. • (…) Nat: Do you reckon ((seems confused about using nametags))? • Agi: It means when you look at a student, you do – you can use their name. • Nat: I felt so bad for that kid that I was like – I picked her out (…) Tweaking physical environment to compensate for the lack of situated knowledge [Epistemic environment] [Epistemic environment] [Self-Emotions] [Self-Cognition] [Epistemic environment] [Self-Emotions]
- 11. Constructing epistemic environment and conscious-self Tweaking an epistemic form to scaffold ones knowledgeable decisions
- 12. Coordination: Linking mind, body, social and environment • Agi: And so they’ve got four – I don’t know how many layers in a nappy. This is layer A, B, C, D. So then they test A, B, C, D, for … [4 seconds] I don’t know what it is, like hard err waterproof I think. Maybe we can divide them into groups. Maybe so, group 1 // test = • (…) • Jill: // And then we also need less stuff, we don’t need to like have… [4 seconds] and if there’s three [groups], are there three things that are being tested then one of us can be in each of these groups. Coordinating and blending modalities: Designing a worksheet for a “scientific experiment” [Material] [Symbolic] [Cognitive] [Social] [Cognitive] [Material] [Social] [Cognitive] [Self-Body] [Social]
- 13. How do concepts become “actionable”? 13 Grounding concepts: Integrating Formal concepts (Model view) Culture Functional concepts (Module view) Context Situated concepts Experience (Modal view ) C C C C Based on Greeno, 2012; Barsalou, 2009; DiSessa, 2000
- 14. Integration: Constructing grounded concepts S2: You could have a jigsaw kind of thing happening. (…) Where you take, so if you’ve got groups, you’ve got everyone in their individual groups and then you switch it around so that you share it with the other people that were not in your group.(….) S2: It could get messy, I know, I know, but just as theoretical – it sounds like it could work, but I don’t know in practice. (….) S2: Yeah, but kids, I don’t think there’s gonna be that much discussion, I just think that’s gonna be more “show me your thing” and then ((shows writing gesture)) copy, copy, copy ((all laugh)). You know how it is. (….) S3: But maybe … [4 seconds] (…) ‘cause I remember with – when we did jigsaw – like the kids ‘d actually test, like we were tested like when we did it in a tutorial, we were tested on it, so it wasn’t just procrastination. They must have actually done something. 14 From pre-service teachers conversation: “Jigsaw” [Formal] [Functional] [Formal] [Functional] [Functional] [Situated] [Functional] [Situated] [Functional] [Situated] [Functional]
- 15. So…skill for actionable knowledge & knowledgeable action Consci(enti)ous inhabiting of environment and self 1. Epistemic resourcefulness 2. Conceptual resourcefulness 3. Skill to assemble epistemic environment 4. Skill to coordinate environment and self Learning as growing… Some lineages • Dewey; Pierce; Ryle; Deluge; Clark • Knorr-Cetina; Turnbull; Rheinberger; Star • Nersessian, Hutchins • Orlikowski; Leonardi; Nicolini • Latour; Ingold; Knappett; • Suchman; Greeno; Kirsh; Zhang, • Collins; Perkins, Ohlsson • Disessa; Elby, Hammer; Lobato; Schwartz • Barsalou; Damasio; Smith; E Gibson SidewaysForward UpDownIn
- 16. Learners as designery minded second-order cyberneticians • “I feel the need to add that design is a basic human activity and far more common than the search for abstract propositions. When someone arranges her furniture at home, she designs the arrangement. When someone makes a promise to someone else, a relationship is created. <…> Design is indispensably human, if not a basic human right. <…> Preventing people from designing their world, whether by requiring them to wear a uniform, putting them on an assembly line, or forcing them to merely look at the world, the prisoners in Plato’s Cave or television addicts, robs them of what is essentially human.” Krippendorff, The cybernetics of design, 2007
- 17. Do students want to design their learning? • I think it’s important to have clear instructions on what needs to be done on the task, but, sort of, left alone after that... I think it’s important to figure things out for yourself [P09]. • Personally I prefer it when you are given a goal and you are let loose and you can call on the instructor or the manager as a resource... [P09]. • ...and more tools are available the better the learning experience and best the collaboration because if somebody doesn’t like to use a particular thing, they can show their thinking in a different way in the same space [P06]. (Limbu, Markauskaite, under review)
Notes de l'éditeur
- Our focus is learning of actionable knowledge
- The view is informed by the three orders of cybernetics. Learner as a system that has no intrinsic capacity for learning and creating own understanding. Thus, teacher is the source of learning and knowledge. (This view works pretty well in stable environment. A learner has a misconception or lack of knowledge, thus teacher comes and fixes) Learner as a system that has an adaptive capacity for learning in response to changes in environmental conditions. Thus, teacher is the main creator of “environmental conditions” conducive to learning and then learners are already capable to create understanding (This view works pretty well in a changing environment that simultaneously provide scaffolds for learning. Once the learning environment is created, the learners should be able to create their understanding. But it does not have capacity to innovate) Learner as a system that has intrinsic capacities to create conditions for its own learning and constructing understanding. Thus, teacher as a co-configurer of learning (Innovation and knowledgeable action – action that is informed by fine tuned understanding of the situation - requires ones capacity to learn in the dynamically in a moment-to-moment interaction and it would be difficult to expect that teacher could follow and create environment for learning throughout the life) The metaphor for such learning that has emerged from our work lets for now call as: Learning by consci(enti)ous inhabiting And the metaphor for teaching as co-configuration, by which we mean dynamic entanglement and convergence of design and facilitation into one conscientious inhabiting teaching-learning flow.
- A summary in a more formal language Why do we need this: Demands of what is expected from future professionals and higher education Knowledge work: evidence- informed and evidence generating practice Teamwork: multi-disciplinary work, relational expertise (Edwards) Contributory expertise and interactional expertise Information exposure and the complexity of first-hand knowing (e.g in sciences): First-hand knowledge vs second-hand knowledge Open innovation: From mass customisation to open innovation and co-configuration
- Epistemic games – patterns of inquiry that have characteristic forms, moves, goals and rules. “When people engage in investigations - legal, scientific, moral, political, or other kinds - characteristic moves occur again and again” (Perkins, 1997, 50) “Different contexts (communities of practice) support different ways of knowing, and therefore different kinds of epistemic games...” (Morrison & Collins, 1996, 108) Schemas as a powerful kind of knowledge that allows to understand claims without details of content. Claims in mid 80s An important goal of a school is to help people to become epistemically fluent, i.e., to be able to use and recognise a relatively large number of epistemic games” (Morrison & Collins, 1996, 108)
- Four aspects of eFluency as conscientious inhabiting To integrate different ways of knowing. Play different epistemic games in a standard sense and not standard sense To coordinate multimodal affordances of self- and environment To assemble epistemic environment to supports ones knowledgeable action To construct conscious self
- Ohlsson identified five broad approaches in psychology that tried to explain how human mind works: Phenomenological (Consciousness) Neuro-psychological (Brain) Environmentalist (Perceptions) Situated or sociocultural (Context, culture) Mentalist (Mind) “Mind cannot be reduced to conscious experience, the brain, the material environment or socio cultural factors” (28) Only the mentalist views aim to provide an explicit account of what kind of system mind is. Our view: Foundations: Pragmatic (Piaget) environmental (from Nersessian, to Hutchins, to Ingold) existentialism (broadly Heideggerian take) Mental & neuro-psychological architecture: Grounded cognition (Barsalou, Smith) “How mind overrides experience” (Ohlsson) vs. “how mind constructs resourceful self from and through experience” (our take)
- We take an epistemic practice view conceptualising what “epistemic” is. Key point Epistemic is not only cognitive and not only culture Our key point that we adding to epistemic very explicitly non-cognitive (body and brain, in sense of the organism) and meta-cognitive and material tools All they enter machinery through which humans come to know and construct knowledge Also add to this Rheinbereger, 1997
- Grounded concepts Key point, brain utilises modality specific systems when mind simulates conceptual categories. This view is fundamentally different from the semantic memory (IP) view Barsalou specifically identified four types situated information that is stored together with conceptual categories: a) selected properties of the conceptual category relevant to the current situation; b) information about the background settings; c) possible actions that could be taken; d) perceptions of internal states that one might have experienced during precious encounters of the conceptual phenomena, such as affects, motivations, cognitive states and operations. Barsalou (2009) argued that the conceptual system is not abstract and detached, rather it “constructs conceptualizations dynamically, tailoring them to the current needs of situated action” (251) “experiences of being there with category members” (251) These packages prepare humans for situated action and can be used to guide a goal directed activity that unfolds in a new situation. The concept is not separated from the conceptualiser. The conceptualizer is in the representation, he is conceptually “being there”. Point here to the importance of abstract categories in professional work (TO DO: add concepts from Barsalou YouTube lecture on Abstract conceptual categories and Language. There were great concepts that support legal reasoning, anticipation etc. Crime, Case, verdict, defence, sentence, etc, etc) Dynamic, distributed affordances (key bit) Z&P observe that affordances could be seen not as one homogenous mode of visual perception, but as distributed systems that extend across multiple external and internal representations – the knowledge and structure - in the environment and in the organism. Broadly, the external representations are diverse kinds of the attributes of the objects in the environment, such as chemical processes, physical configurations, spatio-temporal layouts and symbolic structures. They correspond to the certain internal features (or abilities) of the organism - such as biological mechanisms inside the body, the physique of the organism, the perceptual system, and cognitive structures and processes of the mind, respectively – creating distinct categories of affordances. This includes biological affordances that are based on the biological functions of the organism (e.g., an appropriate medication affords healing); physical affordances that are provided and constrained by physical structures (e.g., a layout of a lecture room affords one-to-many communication); perceptual affordances which mainly are provided by spatial mappings (e.g., a pictorial depiction of a flame on an inhaler affords to convey the meaning of a flammable substance); cognitive affordances that are provided for and constrained by cultural conventions (e.g., a red cross on a car affords to understand that this is an ambulance, a chemical symbol system affords to convey the chemical structure of substances) and mixed affordances that include various combinations of the above (e.g., a mailbox is a mix of the physical affordance that affords dropping letters into it and the cognitive affordance that conveys culturally agreed functions of the mailbox). Also Pragmatic actions and epistemic actions (Kirsh) Dynamic affordances (Duguid)
- Epistemic games , Task examples Propositional games Representing professional knowledge in a propositional generalised form, incl. tools A taxonomy of symptoms for a disease Guidelines for nursing using “best practice” evidence Weaving games Coordinating perception, expert mental resources, bodily skills, discourse Administering reading proficiency assessment test Teaching a lesson: adjusting pitch, selecting pedagogically sound responses, etc. Problem-solving games Using of representational systems of the profession and a full range of conceptual devices Creating a lesson plan, a pharmacy layout, designing an online learning resource. (Trans-, Meta-) Professional discourse Recognising & applying domain frameworks & concepts to reflect, compare, judge, etc A report on aboriginal officer’s role in a school; evaluation of a teaching resource; medicine information report; reflections; portfolios Public discourse Discourse games with clients Communication strategies with clients, producing lesson handouts, worksheets, pamphlets
- Data from a study for constructing inquiry based lessons: A Nappy
- Task – create a worksheet for doing “scientific experiment” in a class. Pure “conceptual” task and theoretically should demand pure ”cognitive” skill, max standard epistemic of “scientific experiment”. But teachers draw on all modalities - material, social, body. Coordination & blending: [Symbolic] = [Epistemic Thing] [Cognitive] = [Conceptual]
- Back o the centrality of the concepts Key point: not a replacement, but linking, or integration of all three into one firmly grounded formal construct Next is the illustration of how students move between formal concepts semi-abstracted p-prim constructs to situated experiential concept
- How do concepts become “actionable”
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- “I feel the need to add that design is a basic human activity and far more common than the search for abstract propositions. When someone arranges her furniture at home, she designs the arrangement. When someone makes a promise to someone else, a relationship is created. When someone customizes his computer, he designs a world he can work in. Selecting clothes to wear is to identify oneself in the world of others. Design is indispensably human, if not a basic human right. I would venture to say that, in everyday life, scientific propositions are not taken for their truths but for what they enable, what one can do with them. Preventing people from designing their world, whether by requiring them to wear a uniform, putting them on an assembly line, or forcing them to merely look at the world, the prisoners in Plato’s Cave or television addicts, robs them of what is essentially human.” Krippendorff, The cybernetics of design, 2007, 1390-1390 But also pint out to a more Heideggerian perspective as coping rather rational decision making
- I think it’s important to have clear instructions on what needs to be done on the task, but, sort of, left alone after that... I think it’s important to figure things out for yourself [P09]. Personally I prefer it when you are given a goal and you are let loose and you can call on the instructor or the manager as a resource... [P09, Category C]. ...and more tools are available the better the learning experience and best the collaboration because if somebody doesn’t like to use a particular thing, they can show their thinking in a different way in the same space [P06].