1. Chapter 13 Strategic Decision Making in Oligopoly Markets

7. Prisoners’ Dilemma (Table 13.1) 13- J J B B Bill Don’t confess Confess Jane Don’t confess A 2 years, 2 years B 12 years, 1 year Confess C 1 year, 12 years D 6 years, 6 years

9. Successive Elimination of Dominated Strategies (Table 13.3) 13- C P Payoffs in dollars of profit per week. C C P P Palace’s price High ($10) Medium ($8) Low ($6) Castle’s price High ($10) A $1,000, $1,000 B $900, $1,100 C $500, $1,200 Medium ($8) D $900, $400 E $400, $800 F $350, $500 Low ($6) G $1,200, $300 H $500, $350 I $400, $400

10. Successive Elimination of Dominated Strategies (Table 13.3) 13- C P P C Reduced Payoff Table Payoffs in dollars of profit per week. Palace’s price Medium ($8) Low ($6) Castle’s price High ($10) B $900, $1,100 C $500, $1,200 Low ($6) H $500, $350 I $400, $400 Unique Solution

14. Sequential Pizza Pricing (Figure 13.3) 13- Panel B – Roll-back solution

16. First-Mover Advantage in Technology Choice (Figure 13.4) 13- Panel A – Simultaneous technology decision S S M M Motorola’s technology Analog Digital Sony’s technology Analog A $10, $13.75 B $8, $9 Digital C $9.50, $11 D $11.875, $11.25

17. First-Mover Advantage in Technology Choice (Figure 13.4) 13- Panel B – Motorola secures a first-mover advantage

20. Pricing Dilemma for AMD & Intel (Table 13.5) 13- I I A A Payoffs in millions of dollars of profit per week. Cooperation Noncooperation AMD’s price High Low Intel’s price High A: $5, $2.5 B: $2, $3 Low C: $6, $0.5 D: $3, $1 AMD cheats Intel cheats

24. Limit Pricing: Entry Deterred (Figure 13.7) 13-

25. Limit Pricing: Entry Occurs (Figure 13.8) 13-

27. Excess Capacity Barrier to Entry (Figure 13.9) 13-

28. Excess Capacity Barrier to Entry (Figure 13.9) 13-