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Who’s Next? Identifying Risk Factors
    for Subjects of Targeted Attack.
    Martin Lee
    Senior Analyst
    Symantec.cloud

VB 2012                                    1
Characteristics of Targeted Attacks
   “GCHQ now sees real and credible threats to cyber security of an unprecedented
   scale, diversity and complexity. We've seen determined and successful efforts to:

   steal intellectual property;

   take commercially sensitive data, such as key negotiating positions;
   access government and defence related information;

   disrupt government and industry service; and,

   exploit information security weaknesses through the targeting of
   partners, subsidiaries and supply chains at home and abroad.”



     Iain Lobban, Director GCHQ

Source:
Executive Companion, 10 Steps to Cyber Security. Pub. Cabinet Office (2012)

VB 2012                                                                                2
Characteristics of Targeted Attacks

Targeted                                    Non-Targeted

Attack relevant to interests of recipient   No regard to recipient
Low copy number                             High copy number
Bespoke malware                             Often kit based
Obscure business model                      Clear revenue stream




 VB 2012                                                             3
How Do We Identify Them?
Remove high volume attacks.

Semi-manually analyse remainder:

          False positives      Proof of concepts       Targeted attacks

     Emailed executables    Botnet prototypes      Evidence of target
     ‘Broken’ documents     Script kiddies         selection
                                                   Sophistication




VB 2012                                                                   4
Context
 April 2008 – January 2012:


          72500 targeted attack emails.
          Sent to 28 300 email addresses.


                              ~500 000 email malware / day.
                              11 million email addresses.




VB 2012                                                       5
Annual Targeted Attack Risk
Customers being sent at least 1 targeted attack during 2011:


                Type                                               Ratio Attacked
                All Customers                                      1 : 50.07
                SME Customers (<=250 users)                        1 : 88.93
                Large Customers (>5000 users) 1 : 1.45



Annual office fire risk: 1/588 – 1/161




Source:
Fires in workplace premises: risk data. Holborn et. al.( 2002) Fire Safety Journal 37 303-327.

 VB 2012                                                                                         6
Frequency of attack, 2011
                          1

                        0.9

                        0.8                                                         70% received no more than 4.
                        0.7
Cumulative fraction




                        0.6                                                         6% received more than 50.
                        0.5

                        0.4                                                         4 receive >1000 attacks.
                        0.3

                        0.2

                        0.1

                          0
                              0   0.5       1     1.5   2     2.5   3     3.5   4


                                        Log10 number of attacks in 2011


                      VB 2012                                                                                      7
Building a Risk Based Model



VB 2012                           8
Identifying Risk Factors
        Case Control Study

           “Diseased” group
                                     Factor

                                No. with factor
Similar Population




                               No. without factor
                                                    Compare likelihood of finding factor in
                                                    diseased group with that of control group.


                                No. with factor

                               No. without factor


           Unafflicted group

        VB 2012                                                                           9
Odds Ratio
Calculate strength of association of factor with
‘diseased’ state by comparing probabilities.

                                                     Control
                                    Diseased
                                                   (unafflicted)
           With Risk Factor            p11             p10
           Without Risk Factor         p01             p00




Odds ratio >1 => positive correlation
              <1 => negative correlation

 VB 2012                                                           10
Odds Ratio – Standard Error

                                                    Control
                                  Diseased
                                                  (unafflicted)
           With Risk Factor         n11               n10
           Without Risk Factor      n01               n00




                                   logeOR + (1.96 SE(logeOR))
Upper 95% confidence interval = e
Lower 95% confidence interval = e
                                  log OR - (1.96 SE(log OR))
                                      e                e



 VB 2012                                                          11
Risk Factors & Protective Factors


                               OR                  95% CI
          Factor 1              x                  a-b
          Factor 2              y                  c-d


Lower 95% CI > 1.0 positive correlation => Risk factor
Upper 95% CI < 1.0 negative correlation => Protective factor




VB 2012                                                        12
Case Control Study Design

Criteria for inclusion in ‘diseased’ and ‘control’ groups.


Match the two groups to minimise differences.


Set of defined factors to test.




VB 2012                                                      13
Case Control Study Design

      “We've seen determined and successful efforts to:
      steal intellectual property;”



           What intellectual property is at risk?




VB 2012                                                   14
Academic Profile

                   Dr. Firstname Surname
                   Senior Lecturer in Subject
                   Department of Subject
                   name@university.edu

                   Recent Publications:




VB 2012                                         15
Taxonomy of Higher Education

                              Joint Academic Coding System
                              (JACS) Version 3.0




                                    Long Code                       Short Code
          Computer Science              II00
                                                Computer Sciences        I
          Software Engineering          I300


          International Relations       L250
                                                  Social Studies         L
          War Studies                   L252


VB 2012                                                                          16
Group Classification

                                Received a targeted    Received a non-
                                  attack email (n0)    targeted attack
                                Jan 2010 – Dec 2011   malware email (n1)

          Classified with              p11                   p10
          subject X
          Not classified with          p01                   p00
          subject X



          X= JACS3 codes + ‘staff’ + ‘unknown’ + ‘mailbox’

      n0 = 182,
          n1 = 188


VB 2012                                                                    17
Recipient Classification – Long Subject Code
            60




            50




            40
Incidence




            30

                                                           Targeted
                                                           Control
            20




            10




             0




                                   Long Subject Code


            VB 2012                                        18
Recipient Classification – Short Subject Code
            60




            50




            40
Incidence




            30

                                                            Targeted
                                                            Control
            20




            10




            0




                                  Short Subject Code

            VB 2012                                                    19
Results
     Subject Code                                   Odds Ratio      95% CI
     L (Social Studies)                               11.79      (5.21 – 26.70)
     T
     (Eastern, Asian, African, American, Australa     12.03      (1.54 – 94.16)
     sian Studies)
     I (Computer Sciences)                             2.63      (0.50 – 13.72)
     G (Mathematical Sciences)                         0.17      (0.02 – 1.41)
     A (Medicine & Dentistry)                          0.15      (0.03 – 0.67)
     D (Veterinary Science, Agriculture and
     Related Subjects)
                                                        0

     K (Architecture Building & Planning)               0
     Staff                                             0.25      (0.12 – 0.48)
     Mailbox                                           0.30      (0.13 – 0.68)

VB 2012                                                                           20
Conclusions



VB 2012           21
Conclusions
Apply epidemiological analysis to identify those at risk.



Inform those at greatest risk.




Enforce policy where most needed.




VB 2012                                                     22
Thank you!

Martin Lee
martin_lee@symantec.com                                                                  Thanks: Tony Millington, Prashant Gupta,
+44 7775 823 278                                                                         Steve White, Alistair Johnson, Paul Dominjon.


Copyright © 2010 Symantec Corporation. All rights reserved. Symantec and the Symantec Logo are trademarks or registered trademarks of Symantec Corporation or its affiliates in
the U.S. and other countries. Other names may be trademarks of their respective owners.

This document is provided for informational purposes only and is not intended as advertising. All warranties relating to the information in this document, either express or
implied, are disclaimed to the maximum extent allowed by law. The information in this document is subject to change without notice.


                                                                                                                                                                                  23

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Who's at Risk? Identifying Factors for Targeted Cyber Attacks

  • 1. Who’s Next? Identifying Risk Factors for Subjects of Targeted Attack. Martin Lee Senior Analyst Symantec.cloud VB 2012 1
  • 2. Characteristics of Targeted Attacks “GCHQ now sees real and credible threats to cyber security of an unprecedented scale, diversity and complexity. We've seen determined and successful efforts to: steal intellectual property; take commercially sensitive data, such as key negotiating positions; access government and defence related information; disrupt government and industry service; and, exploit information security weaknesses through the targeting of partners, subsidiaries and supply chains at home and abroad.” Iain Lobban, Director GCHQ Source: Executive Companion, 10 Steps to Cyber Security. Pub. Cabinet Office (2012) VB 2012 2
  • 3. Characteristics of Targeted Attacks Targeted Non-Targeted Attack relevant to interests of recipient No regard to recipient Low copy number High copy number Bespoke malware Often kit based Obscure business model Clear revenue stream VB 2012 3
  • 4. How Do We Identify Them? Remove high volume attacks. Semi-manually analyse remainder: False positives Proof of concepts Targeted attacks Emailed executables Botnet prototypes Evidence of target ‘Broken’ documents Script kiddies selection Sophistication VB 2012 4
  • 5. Context April 2008 – January 2012: 72500 targeted attack emails. Sent to 28 300 email addresses. ~500 000 email malware / day. 11 million email addresses. VB 2012 5
  • 6. Annual Targeted Attack Risk Customers being sent at least 1 targeted attack during 2011: Type Ratio Attacked All Customers 1 : 50.07 SME Customers (<=250 users) 1 : 88.93 Large Customers (>5000 users) 1 : 1.45 Annual office fire risk: 1/588 – 1/161 Source: Fires in workplace premises: risk data. Holborn et. al.( 2002) Fire Safety Journal 37 303-327. VB 2012 6
  • 7. Frequency of attack, 2011 1 0.9 0.8 70% received no more than 4. 0.7 Cumulative fraction 0.6 6% received more than 50. 0.5 0.4 4 receive >1000 attacks. 0.3 0.2 0.1 0 0 0.5 1 1.5 2 2.5 3 3.5 4 Log10 number of attacks in 2011 VB 2012 7
  • 8. Building a Risk Based Model VB 2012 8
  • 9. Identifying Risk Factors Case Control Study “Diseased” group Factor No. with factor Similar Population No. without factor Compare likelihood of finding factor in diseased group with that of control group. No. with factor No. without factor Unafflicted group VB 2012 9
  • 10. Odds Ratio Calculate strength of association of factor with ‘diseased’ state by comparing probabilities. Control Diseased (unafflicted) With Risk Factor p11 p10 Without Risk Factor p01 p00 Odds ratio >1 => positive correlation <1 => negative correlation VB 2012 10
  • 11. Odds Ratio – Standard Error Control Diseased (unafflicted) With Risk Factor n11 n10 Without Risk Factor n01 n00 logeOR + (1.96 SE(logeOR)) Upper 95% confidence interval = e Lower 95% confidence interval = e log OR - (1.96 SE(log OR)) e e VB 2012 11
  • 12. Risk Factors & Protective Factors OR 95% CI Factor 1 x a-b Factor 2 y c-d Lower 95% CI > 1.0 positive correlation => Risk factor Upper 95% CI < 1.0 negative correlation => Protective factor VB 2012 12
  • 13. Case Control Study Design Criteria for inclusion in ‘diseased’ and ‘control’ groups. Match the two groups to minimise differences. Set of defined factors to test. VB 2012 13
  • 14. Case Control Study Design “We've seen determined and successful efforts to: steal intellectual property;” What intellectual property is at risk? VB 2012 14
  • 15. Academic Profile Dr. Firstname Surname Senior Lecturer in Subject Department of Subject name@university.edu Recent Publications: VB 2012 15
  • 16. Taxonomy of Higher Education Joint Academic Coding System (JACS) Version 3.0 Long Code Short Code Computer Science II00 Computer Sciences I Software Engineering I300 International Relations L250 Social Studies L War Studies L252 VB 2012 16
  • 17. Group Classification Received a targeted Received a non- attack email (n0) targeted attack Jan 2010 – Dec 2011 malware email (n1) Classified with p11 p10 subject X Not classified with p01 p00 subject X X= JACS3 codes + ‘staff’ + ‘unknown’ + ‘mailbox’ n0 = 182, n1 = 188 VB 2012 17
  • 18. Recipient Classification – Long Subject Code 60 50 40 Incidence 30 Targeted Control 20 10 0 Long Subject Code VB 2012 18
  • 19. Recipient Classification – Short Subject Code 60 50 40 Incidence 30 Targeted Control 20 10 0 Short Subject Code VB 2012 19
  • 20. Results Subject Code Odds Ratio 95% CI L (Social Studies) 11.79 (5.21 – 26.70) T (Eastern, Asian, African, American, Australa 12.03 (1.54 – 94.16) sian Studies) I (Computer Sciences) 2.63 (0.50 – 13.72) G (Mathematical Sciences) 0.17 (0.02 – 1.41) A (Medicine & Dentistry) 0.15 (0.03 – 0.67) D (Veterinary Science, Agriculture and Related Subjects) 0 K (Architecture Building & Planning) 0 Staff 0.25 (0.12 – 0.48) Mailbox 0.30 (0.13 – 0.68) VB 2012 20
  • 22. Conclusions Apply epidemiological analysis to identify those at risk. Inform those at greatest risk. Enforce policy where most needed. VB 2012 22
  • 23. Thank you! Martin Lee martin_lee@symantec.com Thanks: Tony Millington, Prashant Gupta, +44 7775 823 278 Steve White, Alistair Johnson, Paul Dominjon. Copyright © 2010 Symantec Corporation. All rights reserved. Symantec and the Symantec Logo are trademarks or registered trademarks of Symantec Corporation or its affiliates in the U.S. and other countries. Other names may be trademarks of their respective owners. This document is provided for informational purposes only and is not intended as advertising. All warranties relating to the information in this document, either express or implied, are disclaimed to the maximum extent allowed by law. The information in this document is subject to change without notice. 23

Notes de l'éditeur

  1. select count(customerid) from Customers where users2&gt;=5000;select count(distinct(a.customerid)) from confirmed a, Customers b where b.users2&gt;=5000 and a.customerid=b.customerid;