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PS 474 Political Psychology
 Why do people (citizens & policy 
makers) make “bad” decisions? 
 Why did things go so wrong in the wars 
in Vietnam & Iraq? 
 How do people make decisions? 
 Two competing decision-making 
theories: 
 Political economists worship Anthony 
Downs 
 Political psychologists worship Herbert 
Simon & Daniel Kahneman
1. 1-to get out of bed; rest is sleep-walking 
2. 10-20 
3. 50-100 
4. 100’s 
5. 1000’s
1. 3 (Little Debbie's) 
2. 10-20 
3. 50-100 
4. 100’s 
5. 1000’s
 We’re aware of only a small fraction of the 1,000s of 
choices we make each day 
 We think we make only 15 food choices each day when 
we actually make 100s (At the table or in the chair? All 
or save half?) 
 Bad decisions can have important consequences 
 Medical decision errors (misdiagnoses) by trained 
professionals are the 6th most common cause of death 
in the U.S., behind breast cancer, suicide & homicide. 
 Judges, juries make life and death decisions 
 War and peace, genocide, sexual harassment, 
discrimination and altruistic actions are all decisions 
with huge consequences 
 Clearly, we need to study how we make decisions!
 Judgments: perceiving objects or events as 
good or bad or likely to occur. 
 Decisions: commitment to an option or a 
course of action selected from a set of 
options.
ANTHONY DOWNS 
 Economist, Senior Fellow at the 
Brookings Institution in 
Washington D.C. 
 Famous for: Writing the first application 
of economic rational choice theory to 
elections (his dissertation). 
HERBERT SIMON 
 1916-2001, Nobel prize, Economics 
 Carnegie Mellon: Cognitive 
Psychology, Computer science & 
Political Science 
 Famous for: Bounded rationality, actual 
decision making. 
 Simon was among the founding fathers of artificial intelligence, 
information processing, decision-making, problem-solving and 
more.
Anthony Downs vs. Herbert Simon (& Daniel Kahneman)! 
The secret ingredient? 
The American voter:
Anthony Downs, The Economic Theory of Democracy
 Definition of Rationality: 
 Rational behavior is purposive behavior directed toward 
the attainment of goals. 
 To be rational, one selects the alternative course of action 
(means) that most efficiently reaches one’s goal (ends). 
 Rationality is assessed more by how people choose 
between alternative actions (means) than by what their 
goals are. However, Downs considers only political & 
economic goals. 
▪ In economics, people value money so the option that yields the 
most money is taken. 
 Requires a very high estimation of the average 
individual's capacity for reason, choice, cognition, 
and conscious calculations.
 People make a decision by determining the likelihood that 
each option’s outcome will occur and the value of the 
outcome in question. Then they multiply the likelihood and 
value for each option, which equals its expected value, and 
whichever option has the highest score is the option people 
should choose because it brings them the most utility or 
expected value. 
 Option 1: End the game now & keep the $32,000. 
 Expected value = outcome X likelihood ($32,000 * 1.0) = $32,000. 
 Option 2: Play another round where you must answer 
correctly a multiple choice question with 4 possible answers 
to receive $64,000. 
 Expected value of answering the additional question = outcome X 
likelihood of getting it right ($64,000 * 0.25) = $16K 
+ outcome X likelihood of getting it wrong ($32,000 * 0.75) = $24K 
$40,000. 
▪ $16K + $24K = $40,000. 
 Decide to play another round!
Alternative A 
(End Game) 
1.0 
0.25 
0.75 
Alternative B 
Another Round 
$32,000 
$64,000 
$32,000 
EVA = 1.00*($32,000 ) = $32,000 
EVB = 0.25*($64,000) + 
0.75*($32,000) 
= $16,000 + $24,000 = $40,000 
•Decision nodes – squares = choice points 
•Chance nodes – circles = intervening uncertain events between choices and outcomes 
•Probabilities – the likelihood that an outcome will occur 
•Expected benefit – payoffs – the consequences of a given combination of choices and chances 
This decision is a no-brainer but it still involves difficult calculations!
 Deductive theories: the analyst makes 
simplifying, "as if" assumptions about how the 
world works and then deduces an actor's 
behavior in a given situation. 
 Theories are tested by the accuracy of their 
predictions rather than the validity of their 
assumptions. 
 The end of science is prediction, rather than 
explanation. 
 Preference for producing "elegant models of 
irrelevant universes" vs. "data dredging," inductive 
methods. Parsimony vs. complexity.
 Citizens vote if PB > C, (expected benefits outweigh the 
costs), where: 
 B = the extent to which the individual feels that one party 
(candidate) will benefit him or her more than the other 
party (i.e., "expected party differential"). 
 C = costs associated with voting. 
 P = probability that a citizen's vote will affect the outcome 
of the election. 
▪ The probability that any national election will be decided by a single 
vote is effectively 0. Close votes that come down to 200 votes will 
be decided in a recount or in the courts. 
 Therefore, according to Downs, deciding not to vote is 
perfectly rational. (“Rational abstention”) 
 If there is a positive benefit of voting it’s psychological, not 
rational. 
 Rational ignorance: cost of becoming informed > 
benefits because we can’t affect the outcome of 
political issues. It’s rational to be politically ignorant!
 Adopting Downs’ purely instrumental model 
or its variants, either everyone or no one 
votes! 
 "The Paradox that Ate Rational Choice 
Theory”
 What are the goals/means of candidates and 
of voters? 
 Spatial theory 
 What are the predictions of the model? 
 Rational candidates can create irrational voters 
(who rely on Party ID or candidate personalities 
instead of issues) because: 
▪ Candidates often won’t tell voters where they stand on 
the most important issues. 
▪ Candidates often converge on important issues and so 
don’t offer voters a choice.
Two-party system with unimodal distribution
 Issue voting usually ranks dead last as a 
determinant of the vote choice. 
 Rational choice models provide poor 
explanations (and predictions) of actual 
voting behavior.
 Voting is an expressive vs. an instrumental act, 
with an intrinsic value of expressing one’s 
preferences. 
 Throw out the P term because people aren’t good at 
probability calculations. B includes psychological 
gratification. 
 Example of Iraqi or Miami voters waiting in lines for hours. 
 Voting is very different from economic 
consumption: 
 Voting is a collective action, and the Voter isn’t 
guaranteed anything from voting. She doesn’t necessarily 
get the candidate she wants. 
 An election is a public good that is made available to 
everyone, regardless of whether or how they voted. 
 In contrast to the market, instrumental decision-making 
is less relevant because in elections the outcome depends 
only marginally on the individual’s actions.
VOTING 
Expressive act, with intrinsic 
value of expressing one’s 
preferences 
Voting is a collective action, 
with the outcome in doubt. 
She doesn’t necessarily get 
the candidate she wants. 
An election is a public good 
that is made available to 
everyone, regardless of 
whether or how they voted. 
ECONOMIC CONSUMPTION 
Instrumental act. 
Consumption is a private 
act, and the consumer alone 
determines the outcome 
(either pays for the good or 
not). 
 Consumer goods are 
private goods.
 The simple idea of small costs outweighing even smaller 
expected benefits C > B helps to “explain” and predict 
behavior even if people do not make decisions the way 
rational choice theorists claim they do. 
 Implications for election laws: even small increases in costs 
outweigh even smaller perceived benefits of voting. 
Examples: 
 In the U.S., with so many elections and so many offices, the costs of 
voting are higher than European countries. 
 Mandatory voting would increase turnout! 
 Motor voter registration decreases costs and increases turnout. 
 Tighter registration requirements increase the costs of voting and can 
be expected to depress voting, especially among…?
 Half the states have them. Some laws blocked 
by Obama admin for 2012. “Emerging 
research” (2000 to 2006) shows: 
 The strictest forms of voter identification 
requirements — combination requirements of 
presenting an identification card and positively 
matching one’s signature with a signature either 
on file or on the identification card, as well as 
requirements to show picture identification — 
have a negative impact on the participation of 
registered voters relative to the weakest 
requirement, stating one’s name. 
 We also find evidence that the stricter voter 
identification requirements depress turnout to a 
greater extent for less educated and lower 
income populations, but no racial differences.
 Studying candidate behavior, which is more 
instrumental. 
 Studying the interactions between different 
types of actors (e.g., candidates and voters in 
spatial models), if we don’t have to take into 
account lots of individual variation in the way 
actors actually make decisions. 
 Thinking about a normative model of 
decision making; how to make “best” or 
optimal decisions.
Rick Lau, “Models of Decision Making,” pp. 19-38.
 Unrealistic: “homo economicus” voters 
must seek out all relevant information on all 
issues and all candidates, where each 
candidate proposal is an alternative 
associated with a range of outcomes and 
probabilities. 
 Ignores constraints in ability & motivation. 
 Very limited cognitive capacity (small working 
memory) 
 Motivation: P*B rarely > C 
▪ Rational abstention, ignorance 
 Dismisses departures from rational choice. 
Treats people’s “irrational” decisions as 
noisy and bothersome “errors” that are 
meaningless and should be ignored.
Alternative A 
.25 
.75 
.6 
.4 
.2 
.8 
.7 
.3 
.4 
.6 
.1 
.9 
Alternative B 
$500.00 
$200.00 
$300.00 
$400.00 
$100.00 
$600.00 
$650.00 
$50.00 
•Decision nodes – squares = choice points 
•Chance nodes – circles = intervening uncertain events between choices and outcomes 
•Probabilities – the likelihood that an outcome will occur 
•Expected benefit – payoffs – the consequences of a given combination of choices and chances
 EVA1=.25*.2*$500.00=$25.00 
 EVA2=.25*.8*$200.00=$40.00 
 EVA3=.75*.7*$300.00=$157.50 
 EVA4=.75*.3*$400.00=$90.00 
 EVA=$312.50 
 EVB1=.6*.4*$100.00=$24.00 
 EVB2=.6*.6*$600.00=$216.00 
 EVB3=.4*.1*$650.00=$26.00 
 EVB4=.4*.9*$50.00=$18.00 
 EVB=$284.00
 Many models of rational choice view 
the mind as if it were a supernatural 
being possessing demonic powers of 
reason, boundless knowledge, and 
all of eternity with which to make 
decisions. 
 Humans make inferences about their 
world with limited time, knowledge, 
and computational power. 
Simon 
Kahneman
 Instead of a fully rational decision making 
process (i.e., an optimal choice with full 
information), 
 Decisions made only after simplifying the choices 
in a variety of ways because the decision maker is 
a satisficer seeking a satisfactory solution versus 
an optimal one 
 Herbert Simon developed computer models of 
actual decision making, artificial intelligence 
 Known for the concepts of “bounded rationality” 
and “satisficing” in realistic models of decision 
making. 
 Herbert Simon was a political scientist as well as a 
psychologist and computer scientist
Bounded Rationality: 
Herbert Simon 
 The (toilet paper) example
 Limitations 
 Cognitive limitations on rationality: Limited working memory means 
limited attention, calculations, limited & biased retrieval from 
memory, and so on. 
 Motivation: 
 Ways of coping: i.e., simplifying decision-making in 
“Bounded rationality,” fast & frugal decision making 
(Herbert Simon) 
 Use heuristics (Simon & Kahneman) 
▪ Use prior beliefs to make sense of new information 
▪ What other cognitive shortcuts? 
 Decompose decisions into smaller parts, 
 Edit (ignore) some aspects of decision. 
 Goals of boundedly rational decision makers 
 Make “good” decisions (though not the “best” possible) 
 Use minimal cognitive effort 
 Costs: while humans often make “good enough” decisions, 
we often make poor decisions and are unaware of our 
limitations.
1. Stands on the issues 
2. Ideology 
3. Past or future economic performance 
4. Partisan affiliation 
5. Personal characteristics 
6. Spouse, Dog
1. Prospective issue voting 
2. Retrospective performance voting 
3. Partisan affiliation 
4. Personal characteristics 
22% 
8% 
57% 
14%
RATIONAL CHOICE 
 Strengths 
 Normative model 
 Studying interactions among 
different types of actors 
 Better for elites than masses 
 Parsimony 
 Weaknesses 
 Ignores individual differences 
 Highly unrealistic explanation 
 Less applicable to political vs. 
economic behavior 
HEURISTIC CHOICE 
 Strengths 
 Realistic explanation of actual human 
decision making 
 Explains “good” as well as “bad,” error-prone 
decision making 
 Suited to masses & elites 
 Applicable to many behavioral domains, 
including politics 
 Weaknesses 
 Difficult to aggregate individuals to 
macro level behavior (reductionist) 
 Complexity makes precise predictions 
difficult

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474 2014 rat choice & psych dec making 2014-up

  • 1. Peffley PS 474 Political Psychology
  • 2.  Why do people (citizens & policy makers) make “bad” decisions?  Why did things go so wrong in the wars in Vietnam & Iraq?  How do people make decisions?  Two competing decision-making theories:  Political economists worship Anthony Downs  Political psychologists worship Herbert Simon & Daniel Kahneman
  • 3. 1. 1-to get out of bed; rest is sleep-walking 2. 10-20 3. 50-100 4. 100’s 5. 1000’s
  • 4. 1. 3 (Little Debbie's) 2. 10-20 3. 50-100 4. 100’s 5. 1000’s
  • 5.  We’re aware of only a small fraction of the 1,000s of choices we make each day  We think we make only 15 food choices each day when we actually make 100s (At the table or in the chair? All or save half?)  Bad decisions can have important consequences  Medical decision errors (misdiagnoses) by trained professionals are the 6th most common cause of death in the U.S., behind breast cancer, suicide & homicide.  Judges, juries make life and death decisions  War and peace, genocide, sexual harassment, discrimination and altruistic actions are all decisions with huge consequences  Clearly, we need to study how we make decisions!
  • 6.  Judgments: perceiving objects or events as good or bad or likely to occur.  Decisions: commitment to an option or a course of action selected from a set of options.
  • 7. ANTHONY DOWNS  Economist, Senior Fellow at the Brookings Institution in Washington D.C.  Famous for: Writing the first application of economic rational choice theory to elections (his dissertation). HERBERT SIMON  1916-2001, Nobel prize, Economics  Carnegie Mellon: Cognitive Psychology, Computer science & Political Science  Famous for: Bounded rationality, actual decision making.  Simon was among the founding fathers of artificial intelligence, information processing, decision-making, problem-solving and more.
  • 8. Anthony Downs vs. Herbert Simon (& Daniel Kahneman)! The secret ingredient? The American voter:
  • 9. Anthony Downs, The Economic Theory of Democracy
  • 10.  Definition of Rationality:  Rational behavior is purposive behavior directed toward the attainment of goals.  To be rational, one selects the alternative course of action (means) that most efficiently reaches one’s goal (ends).  Rationality is assessed more by how people choose between alternative actions (means) than by what their goals are. However, Downs considers only political & economic goals. ▪ In economics, people value money so the option that yields the most money is taken.  Requires a very high estimation of the average individual's capacity for reason, choice, cognition, and conscious calculations.
  • 11.  People make a decision by determining the likelihood that each option’s outcome will occur and the value of the outcome in question. Then they multiply the likelihood and value for each option, which equals its expected value, and whichever option has the highest score is the option people should choose because it brings them the most utility or expected value.  Option 1: End the game now & keep the $32,000.  Expected value = outcome X likelihood ($32,000 * 1.0) = $32,000.  Option 2: Play another round where you must answer correctly a multiple choice question with 4 possible answers to receive $64,000.  Expected value of answering the additional question = outcome X likelihood of getting it right ($64,000 * 0.25) = $16K + outcome X likelihood of getting it wrong ($32,000 * 0.75) = $24K $40,000. ▪ $16K + $24K = $40,000.  Decide to play another round!
  • 12. Alternative A (End Game) 1.0 0.25 0.75 Alternative B Another Round $32,000 $64,000 $32,000 EVA = 1.00*($32,000 ) = $32,000 EVB = 0.25*($64,000) + 0.75*($32,000) = $16,000 + $24,000 = $40,000 •Decision nodes – squares = choice points •Chance nodes – circles = intervening uncertain events between choices and outcomes •Probabilities – the likelihood that an outcome will occur •Expected benefit – payoffs – the consequences of a given combination of choices and chances This decision is a no-brainer but it still involves difficult calculations!
  • 13.
  • 14.  Deductive theories: the analyst makes simplifying, "as if" assumptions about how the world works and then deduces an actor's behavior in a given situation.  Theories are tested by the accuracy of their predictions rather than the validity of their assumptions.  The end of science is prediction, rather than explanation.  Preference for producing "elegant models of irrelevant universes" vs. "data dredging," inductive methods. Parsimony vs. complexity.
  • 15.  Citizens vote if PB > C, (expected benefits outweigh the costs), where:  B = the extent to which the individual feels that one party (candidate) will benefit him or her more than the other party (i.e., "expected party differential").  C = costs associated with voting.  P = probability that a citizen's vote will affect the outcome of the election. ▪ The probability that any national election will be decided by a single vote is effectively 0. Close votes that come down to 200 votes will be decided in a recount or in the courts.  Therefore, according to Downs, deciding not to vote is perfectly rational. (“Rational abstention”)  If there is a positive benefit of voting it’s psychological, not rational.  Rational ignorance: cost of becoming informed > benefits because we can’t affect the outcome of political issues. It’s rational to be politically ignorant!
  • 16.
  • 17.  Adopting Downs’ purely instrumental model or its variants, either everyone or no one votes!  "The Paradox that Ate Rational Choice Theory”
  • 18.  What are the goals/means of candidates and of voters?  Spatial theory  What are the predictions of the model?  Rational candidates can create irrational voters (who rely on Party ID or candidate personalities instead of issues) because: ▪ Candidates often won’t tell voters where they stand on the most important issues. ▪ Candidates often converge on important issues and so don’t offer voters a choice.
  • 19. Two-party system with unimodal distribution
  • 20.  Issue voting usually ranks dead last as a determinant of the vote choice.  Rational choice models provide poor explanations (and predictions) of actual voting behavior.
  • 21.  Voting is an expressive vs. an instrumental act, with an intrinsic value of expressing one’s preferences.  Throw out the P term because people aren’t good at probability calculations. B includes psychological gratification.  Example of Iraqi or Miami voters waiting in lines for hours.  Voting is very different from economic consumption:  Voting is a collective action, and the Voter isn’t guaranteed anything from voting. She doesn’t necessarily get the candidate she wants.  An election is a public good that is made available to everyone, regardless of whether or how they voted.  In contrast to the market, instrumental decision-making is less relevant because in elections the outcome depends only marginally on the individual’s actions.
  • 22. VOTING Expressive act, with intrinsic value of expressing one’s preferences Voting is a collective action, with the outcome in doubt. She doesn’t necessarily get the candidate she wants. An election is a public good that is made available to everyone, regardless of whether or how they voted. ECONOMIC CONSUMPTION Instrumental act. Consumption is a private act, and the consumer alone determines the outcome (either pays for the good or not).  Consumer goods are private goods.
  • 23.  The simple idea of small costs outweighing even smaller expected benefits C > B helps to “explain” and predict behavior even if people do not make decisions the way rational choice theorists claim they do.  Implications for election laws: even small increases in costs outweigh even smaller perceived benefits of voting. Examples:  In the U.S., with so many elections and so many offices, the costs of voting are higher than European countries.  Mandatory voting would increase turnout!  Motor voter registration decreases costs and increases turnout.  Tighter registration requirements increase the costs of voting and can be expected to depress voting, especially among…?
  • 24.  Half the states have them. Some laws blocked by Obama admin for 2012. “Emerging research” (2000 to 2006) shows:  The strictest forms of voter identification requirements — combination requirements of presenting an identification card and positively matching one’s signature with a signature either on file or on the identification card, as well as requirements to show picture identification — have a negative impact on the participation of registered voters relative to the weakest requirement, stating one’s name.  We also find evidence that the stricter voter identification requirements depress turnout to a greater extent for less educated and lower income populations, but no racial differences.
  • 25.  Studying candidate behavior, which is more instrumental.  Studying the interactions between different types of actors (e.g., candidates and voters in spatial models), if we don’t have to take into account lots of individual variation in the way actors actually make decisions.  Thinking about a normative model of decision making; how to make “best” or optimal decisions.
  • 26. Rick Lau, “Models of Decision Making,” pp. 19-38.
  • 27.  Unrealistic: “homo economicus” voters must seek out all relevant information on all issues and all candidates, where each candidate proposal is an alternative associated with a range of outcomes and probabilities.  Ignores constraints in ability & motivation.  Very limited cognitive capacity (small working memory)  Motivation: P*B rarely > C ▪ Rational abstention, ignorance  Dismisses departures from rational choice. Treats people’s “irrational” decisions as noisy and bothersome “errors” that are meaningless and should be ignored.
  • 28. Alternative A .25 .75 .6 .4 .2 .8 .7 .3 .4 .6 .1 .9 Alternative B $500.00 $200.00 $300.00 $400.00 $100.00 $600.00 $650.00 $50.00 •Decision nodes – squares = choice points •Chance nodes – circles = intervening uncertain events between choices and outcomes •Probabilities – the likelihood that an outcome will occur •Expected benefit – payoffs – the consequences of a given combination of choices and chances
  • 29.  EVA1=.25*.2*$500.00=$25.00  EVA2=.25*.8*$200.00=$40.00  EVA3=.75*.7*$300.00=$157.50  EVA4=.75*.3*$400.00=$90.00  EVA=$312.50  EVB1=.6*.4*$100.00=$24.00  EVB2=.6*.6*$600.00=$216.00  EVB3=.4*.1*$650.00=$26.00  EVB4=.4*.9*$50.00=$18.00  EVB=$284.00
  • 30.  Many models of rational choice view the mind as if it were a supernatural being possessing demonic powers of reason, boundless knowledge, and all of eternity with which to make decisions.  Humans make inferences about their world with limited time, knowledge, and computational power. Simon Kahneman
  • 31.  Instead of a fully rational decision making process (i.e., an optimal choice with full information),  Decisions made only after simplifying the choices in a variety of ways because the decision maker is a satisficer seeking a satisfactory solution versus an optimal one  Herbert Simon developed computer models of actual decision making, artificial intelligence  Known for the concepts of “bounded rationality” and “satisficing” in realistic models of decision making.  Herbert Simon was a political scientist as well as a psychologist and computer scientist
  • 32. Bounded Rationality: Herbert Simon  The (toilet paper) example
  • 33.  Limitations  Cognitive limitations on rationality: Limited working memory means limited attention, calculations, limited & biased retrieval from memory, and so on.  Motivation:  Ways of coping: i.e., simplifying decision-making in “Bounded rationality,” fast & frugal decision making (Herbert Simon)  Use heuristics (Simon & Kahneman) ▪ Use prior beliefs to make sense of new information ▪ What other cognitive shortcuts?  Decompose decisions into smaller parts,  Edit (ignore) some aspects of decision.  Goals of boundedly rational decision makers  Make “good” decisions (though not the “best” possible)  Use minimal cognitive effort  Costs: while humans often make “good enough” decisions, we often make poor decisions and are unaware of our limitations.
  • 34. 1. Stands on the issues 2. Ideology 3. Past or future economic performance 4. Partisan affiliation 5. Personal characteristics 6. Spouse, Dog
  • 35. 1. Prospective issue voting 2. Retrospective performance voting 3. Partisan affiliation 4. Personal characteristics 22% 8% 57% 14%
  • 36. RATIONAL CHOICE  Strengths  Normative model  Studying interactions among different types of actors  Better for elites than masses  Parsimony  Weaknesses  Ignores individual differences  Highly unrealistic explanation  Less applicable to political vs. economic behavior HEURISTIC CHOICE  Strengths  Realistic explanation of actual human decision making  Explains “good” as well as “bad,” error-prone decision making  Suited to masses & elites  Applicable to many behavioral domains, including politics  Weaknesses  Difficult to aggregate individuals to macro level behavior (reductionist)  Complexity makes precise predictions difficult