1. IN THE HIGH COURT OF DELHI AT NEW DELHI
SUBJECT : PFA Act
Crl.App.428/1998
Date of Reserve : 10.02.2009
Date of decision : 18.02.2009
STATE …Appellant
Through: Mr. Arvind Kumar Gupta, APP
Versus
ANIL KUMAR SODHI and ANR. ..Respondents
Through: Mr. M.L. Alwadhi, adv.
MOOL CHAND GARG, J.
1. The present appeal was filed by Delhi (Administration) under section
378(4) of C.r.P.C against the judgement dated 6.03.1997 passed in appeal by
Ld. ASJ acquitting the respondent of the charges under section 7 and 16 of
the Prevention of Food Adulteration Act, 1954 (hereinafter referred to as the
PFA Act) by reversing the judgment of the Metropolitan Magistrate New
Delhi dated 13.3.96 whereby the respondent was convicted for having sold
600 Grams of Atta which as per the report of Public Analyst was found to
have contained some living and dead insects though it met the standards
fixed by the rules for ATTA. Leave to file appeal was granted on
07.10.1998. Arguments were heard on 10.02.2009 and the appeal was
dismissed. Now I supply the reasons.
2. Briefly stating the facts giving rise to filing of this appeal are; that on
20.02.1987 a team of food inspectors visited M/s. Sodhi Flour Mill, at C-35,
Okhla Industrial Area New Delhi and purchased 600 gms of Atta on
payment of Rs.1.50p as price for sample analysis as per the provisions of the
PFA Act and Rules. The sample was taken out of hundered Kilo bag. After

2. following the procedure of mixing, sealing and fastening in accordance with
the Act, one part of the sample was sent to P.A, Delhi for analysis. The P.A
analysed the sample and vide her report dated 26.2.1987 opined that the
sample of the Atta was adulterated because she found 3 living and 3 dead
insects in approx. 200 gms of sample which was sent for analysis. On that
basis a complaint was filed against the respondent alleging violation of the
provisions of section 2(ia)(a)(f)(i) of the PFA Act punishable under section 7
read with section 16 of the PFA Act.
3. The aforesaid provision reads as under: 2.(ia) ``adulterated'`’an article of
food shall be deemed to be adulterated’(a) if the article sold by a vendor is
not of the nature, substance or quality demanded by the purchaser and is to
his prejudice, or is not of the nature, substance or quality which it purports
or is represented to be; (f) if the article consists wholly or in part of any
filthy, putrid, , rotten, decomposed or diseased animal or vegetable
substance or is insect-infested or is otherwise unfit for human consumption;
(i) if the container of the article is composed, whether wholly or in part, of
any poisonous or deleterious substance which renders its contents injurious
to health.
4. The Metropolitan Magistrate convicted the respondents by observing
that,’ no purchaser would have ever demand Atta containing 3 living or 3
dead insects or any Egg or Larva of insect which are the earlier stages for the
development of insects. Moreover, under the PFA Act, it is not prescribed
that the sampled commodity like Atta can contain such number of insects.
Thus, it is clearly established that nature, substance or quality of the sampled
commodity in the present case, was not the same as demanded by the FI and
the Atta containing 6 insects is prejudicial to the interest of purchase.
Accordingly, the case was covered within the provisions of section 2(ia) (a)
of the PFA Act’ and thus the respondent was convicted despite the fact that
Atta otherwise met the standards under the PFA Rules.
5. However in Appeal filed by the respondent the Additional Session Judge
held that the whole purpose of the Prevention of Food Adulteration Act was
that unadulterated food articles should ultimately reach the consumer. It was
observed that and in the present case since Atta is a standardised commodity
and the standards have been complied with, it cannot be said that the food
article was adulterated. Thus the findings of the Trial Court were held to be
erroneous on this point and reversed the Judgment of conviction. The
learned ASJ after hearing both the parties also observed , ‘ Keeping in view

3. the fact that Atta is a standardised article for which the standard has been
prescribed as per the PFA Rules and admittedly there has been no violation
of the said standards, in such circumstances it cannot be said that there has
been any violation of the nature, quality or substance demanded by the
purchaser and no evidence has been led to establish as to what kind or
prejudice has been caused to him. It is only in those cases where no
standards have been prescribed that the question or nature, substance or
quality of the food article sold by the vendor can be gone into. Even
otherwise, the department has failed to lead any evidence or establish as to
how the nature, quality or substance of the sample Atta prejudiced to
consumer.’ And accordingly allowed the appeal and acquitted the
respondent. Hence this appeal.
6. The State/ Appellant has assailed the aforesaid Judgment on the ground
that the Ld. ASJ has not considered the evidence on record properly which
shows that the Atta sold by the respondents was insect infested and that as
per the report of the PA contained 3 living and 3 dead insects in a sample of
200 Gms. and thus was not of the prescribed standards. It is also submitted
that the ASJ also ignored the law laid down in 1976(2) FAC 53 and in 1984
(2) FAC 215.
7. However ld. Counsel for the respondents submitted a judgement reported
as 2008 (2) FAC 6., where criteria to deal with an appeal against acquittal
has been laid down in the following words; ‘27. An appeal against acquittal
is also an appeal under the Code and an appellate Court has every power to
re-appreciate, review and reconsider the evidence as whole before it. It is, no
doubt true that there is presumption of innocence in favour of the accused
and the presumption is reinforced by an order of acquittal recoded by the
trial court. But that is not the end of the matter. It is for the appellate court to
keep in view the relevant principles of law, to re-appreciate and re-weight
the evidence as a whole and to come to its own conclusion on such evidence
in consonance with the principles of criminal jurisprudence 28. In Shivaji
Sahbrao Bodade Vs. State of Maharashtra, (1973) 2 SCC 793, dealing with a
similar situation, a three Judge bench Speaking through V.R.Krishna Iyer J,
Stated: ‘Even at this stage we may remind ourselves of a necessary social
perspective in criminal case which suffers from insufficient forensic
appreciation. The dangers of exaggerated devotion to the rule of benefit of
doubt at the expense of social defence and to the soothing sentiment that all
acquittals are always good regardless of justice to the victim and the
community, demand especial emphasis in the contemporary context of

4. escalating crime and escape. The judicial instrument has a public
accountability. The cherished principles or golden thread of proof beyond
reasonable doubt which runs through the web of our law should not be
stretched morbidly to embrace every hunch, hesitancy and degree of doubt.
The excessive solicitude reflected in the attitude that a thousand guilty men
may go but one innocent martyr shall not suffer is a false dilemma. Only
reasonable doubts belong to the accused. Otherwise any practical system of
justice will then break down and lose credibility with the community. The
evil of acquitting a guilty person light-heartedly as a learned author has
sapiently observed, goes much beyond the simple fact that just one guilty
person has gone unpunished. If unmerited acquittals become general, they
tend to lead to a cynical disregard of the law, and this in turn leads to a
public demand for harsher legal presumptions against indicated 'persons' and
more severe punishment of those who are found guilty. Thus too frequent
acquittals of the guilty may lead to a ferocious penal law, eventually eroding
the judicial protection of the guiltless. For all these reasons it is true to say,
with Viscount Simon, that ``a miscarriage of justice may arise from the
acquittal of the guilty no less than from the conviction of the innocent....'` In
short, our jurisprudential enthusiasm far presumed innocence must be
moderated by the pragmatic need to make criminal justice potent and
realistic. A balance has to be struck between chasing enhance possibilities as
good enough to set the delinquent free and chopping the logic of
preponderant probability to punish marginal innocents. 29. Recently, in
Chandrappa v. State of Karnataka (2007) 4 SCC 415: JT (2007) 3 SC 316,
after considering the relevant provisions of the old Code (Code of Criminal
Procedure, 1898) and the present Code (Code of Criminal Procedure, 1973)
and referring to decisions of the Privy Council and of this Court, one of us
(C.K. Thakker, J.) laid down certain general principles regarding powers of
Appellate Court in dealing with appeal against an order of acquittal. In para
42 it was observed: 42. From the above decisions, in our considered view,
the following general principles regarding powers of appellate Court while
dealing with an appeal against an order of acquittal emerge; (1) An appellate
Court has full power to review, reappreciate and reconsider the evidence
upon which the order of acquittal is founded; (2) The Code of Criminal
Procedure, 1973 puts no limitation, restriction or condition on exercise of
such power and an appellate Court on the evidence before it may reach its
own conclusion, both on questions of fact and of law; (3) Various
expressions, such as, substantial and compelling reasons, good and sufficient
grounds, very strong circumstances, distorted conclusions, 'glaring mistakes',
etc. are not intended to curtail extensive powers of an appellate Court in an

5. appeal against acquittal. Such phraseologies are more in the nature of
'flourishes of language' to emphasize the reluctance of an appellate Court to
interfere with acquittal than to curtail the power of the Court to review the
evidence and to come to its own conclusion. (4) An appellate Court,
however, must bear in mind that in case of acquittal, there is double
presumption in favour of the accused. Firstly, the presumption of innocence
available to him under the fundamental principle of criminal jurisprudence
that every person shall be presumed to be innocent unless he is proved guilty
by a competent court of law. Secondly, the accused having secured his
acquittal, the presumption of his innocence is further reinforced, reaffirmed
and strengthened by the trial court. (5) If two reasonable conclusions are
possible on the basis of the evidence on record, the appellate court should
not disturb the finding of acquittal recorded by the trial court.
8. It is also to take note of a judgement delivered by this court in State Vs.
Dwarka Dass (Crl. App. No.135/1989) decided on 2.4.2007 where it was
observed: 5. In Sachchey Lal Tiwari V. State of Uttar Pradesh (AIR 2004 SC
5039) also laid down certain principal in this regard in the following words;-
(i) Generally, the order of acquittal shall not be interfered with because the
presumption of innocence of the accused is further strengthened by acquittal.
(ii) If two views are possible on the evidence adduced in the case, one
pointing to the guilt of the accused and the other to his innocence, the view
which is favourable to the accused should be adopted. (iii) A miscarriage of
justice which may arise from acquittal of the guilty is no less than from the
conviction of an innocent. (iv) Where admissible evidence is ignored, a duty
is cast upon the appellate court to re-appreciate the evidence where the
accused has been acquitted, for the purpose of ascertaining as to whether any
of the accused really committed any offence or not. (v) Court considering
the appeal against the judgment of acquittal is to interfere only when there
are compelling and substantial reasons for doing so.
9. Now coming to the facts of this case, I find that Learned ASJ in her
impugned Judgment has observed that as it was not a case of adulteration
and finding of insects in the 200 gms. of Atta taken for sample analysis does
not mean that it has been deliberately done by the respondents to increase
the value or to downgrade the quality of the food article manufactured by
them. She has also discussed the judgment which has been cited by the
learned counsel for the appellant and which have been rightly distinguished.
It is important to mention over here that as per the report of PA the standard
of the Atta was not below the quality which is required and the presence of

6. insects was only an incident can occur due to open storage. In the above
case, view taken by the Session Court does not suffer from any infirmity and
is not contrary to law. There was no miscarriage of justice and it is not a case
where this Court is required to reverse the order of acquittal by exercising its
power under Section 378(4) Cr.P.C. and, therefore, the appeal filed by the
appellant is hereby dismissed.
Sd/-
MOOL CHAND GARG, J.