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RuhR-Universität Bochum




Compartmented Security for Browsers
                                             -
Or How to Thwart a Phisher with Trusted Computing


Sebastian Gajek, Ahmad-Reza Sadeghi, Christian Stüble, Marcel Winandy

                       Horst Görtz Institute for IT Security
                       Ruhr-University Bochum, Germany




ARES 2007
2nd International Conference on Availability, Reliability and Security
Vienna, 10-13 April 2007
RuhR-Universität Bochum




Marcel Winandy   Compartmented Security for Browsers (ARES 2007)        2007-04-10           2
RuhR-Universität Bochum




                    "Classical" Phishing

 Costumers
 (e.g., bank)
                                                  …….
                                                                              credentials




                        credentials (e.g., username,password)

      Adversary A                           Collection Server




Marcel Winandy       Compartmented Security for Browsers (ARES 2007)        2007-04-10           3
RuhR-Universität Bochum




                    Malware Phishing

 Costumers
 (e.g., bank)
                                                 …….
                                                                             credentials




      Adversary A                                Collection Server
                      Tailored to specific
                       services, such as
                        domestic banks




Marcel Winandy      Compartmented Security for Browsers (ARES 2007)        2007-04-10           4
RuhR-Universität Bochum




                 Reasons for Success
     ●   Strong assumptions on ordinary users
     ●   Legacy flaws of Internet technology (e.g. DNS)
     ●   Vulnerabilities of underlying computing platform




Marcel Winandy      Compartmented Security for Browsers (ARES 2007)        2007-04-10           5
RuhR-Universität Bochum




                 Existing approaches
     ●   Browser-based
     ●   Server-based
     ●   Operating System based




Marcel Winandy     Compartmented Security for Browsers (ARES 2007)        2007-04-10           6
RuhR-Universität Bochum




                 Browser-based approaches
     ●   White lists / black lists
     ●   Heuristic checks
     ●   Blinking browser boundaries
     ●   Logo-type certificates
     ●   Wallets

                                        F                  extra functionality
                   Browser



Marcel Winandy        Compartmented Security for Browsers (ARES 2007)        2007-04-10           7
RuhR-Universität Bochum




                 Browser-based approaches
     ●   White lists / black lists
     ●   Heuristic checks
     ●   Blinking browser boundaries
     ●   Logo-type certificates
     ●   Wallets
                                                                   Malware
                   Browser              F                          Phishing !?




Marcel Winandy        Compartmented Security for Browsers (ARES 2007)        2007-04-10           8
RuhR-Universität Bochum




                      Server-Based Approaches
     ●   User-friendly authentication protocols
     ●   Password-augmented SSL protocol
     ●   Trusted device augmented SSL protocol

                                                                            F      extra functionality
                 Client                                      Server
                 Client




Marcel Winandy            Compartmented Security for Browsers (ARES 2007)        2007-04-10              9
RuhR-Universität Bochum




                      Server-Based Approaches
     ●   User-friendly authentication protocols
     ●   Password-augmented SSL protocol
     ●   Trusted device augmented SSL protocol

                                                                               F
                 Client                                         Server
                 Client


                          Malware
                          Phishing !?


Marcel Winandy               Compartmented Security for Browsers (ARES 2007)        2007-04-10           10
RuhR-Universität Bochum




                 OS-Based Approaches
     ●   Isolation
     ●   Integrity Verification
     ●   Secure GUI
     ●   Virtualization

     Example: Tahoma BOS
                                                     Browser           Browser      Browser

                                                         VM              VM              VM

                                                                        VMM


Marcel Winandy       Compartmented Security for Browsers (ARES 2007)        2007-04-10           11
RuhR-Universität Bochum




                 OS-Based Approaches
     ●   Isolation
     ●   Integrity Verification
     ●   Secure GUI
     ●   Virtualization

     Example: Tahoma BOS
                                                     Browser           Browser      Browser
                       Classical
                                                         VM              VM              VM
                       Phishing !?
                                                                        VMM


Marcel Winandy       Compartmented Security for Browsers (ARES 2007)        2007-04-10           12
Idea:
                 Combination




Marcel Winandy   Compartmented Security for Browsers (ARES 2007)   2007-04-10   13
RuhR-Universität Bochum




                                Our Approach
     ●   Trusted wallet: Let the system...
           –     authenticate legitimate service sites
           –     control and perform the user authentication
     ●   Compartmentalization: Isolate browser / wallet
     ●   Trusted execution environment:
           –     Security kernel
           –     Trusted Computing
           –     Virtualization


Marcel Winandy              Compartmented Security for Browsers (ARES 2007)        2007-04-10           14
RuhR-Universität Bochum




                                     Basic Architecture

                 authentication data

                                          compartment
                           service                             virtual                         real
                           usage           Browser            network        Wallet­         network       Service
             U
                                                                             Proxy                           P
                                         Legacy OS
                                                       Security Kernel
                                                           Hardware
                                                    (Trusted Computing Support)

                                                            System S




Marcel Winandy                         Compartmented Security for Browsers (ARES 2007)        2007-04-10             15
RuhR-Universität Bochum




                                        Wallet-Proxy


           authenticate UW
                                           update_proxy WB

            use_service U↔B                 use_service B↔W                              authenticate WP
                              Browser                          Wallet­Proxy
    U                                                                                    use_service P↔W     P
                                 B                                  W
                                                                                       SSL secured channel




Marcel Winandy                   Compartmented Security for Browsers (ARES 2007)        2007-04-10               16
RuhR-Universität Bochum




                                        Wallet-Proxy

                                                     Setup
                                                     login
                                                     data
           authenticate UW
                                           update_proxy WB

            use_service U↔B                 use_service B↔W                              authenticate WP
                              Browser                          Wallet­Proxy
    U                                                                                    use_service P↔W     P
                                 B                                  W
                                                                                       SSL secured channel




Marcel Winandy                   Compartmented Security for Browsers (ARES 2007)        2007-04-10               17
RuhR-Universität Bochum




                                        Wallet-Proxy

                                                     Setup
                                                     login
                                                     data
           authenticate UW
                                           update_proxy WB

            use_service U↔B                 use_service B↔W                              authenticate WP
                              Browser                          Wallet­Proxy
    U                                                                                    use_service P↔W     P
                                 B                                  W
                                                                                       SSL secured channel
                     Call
                    service
                      site




Marcel Winandy                   Compartmented Security for Browsers (ARES 2007)        2007-04-10               18
RuhR-Universität Bochum




                                        Wallet-Proxy

                                                     Setup
                                                     login
                                                     data
           authenticate UW
                                           update_proxy WB

            use_service U↔B                 use_service B↔W                              authenticate WP
                              Browser                          Wallet­Proxy
    U                                                                                    use_service P↔W     P
                                 B                                  W
                                                                                       SSL secured channel
                     Call                            Insert
                    service                           login
                      site                            data




Marcel Winandy                   Compartmented Security for Browsers (ARES 2007)        2007-04-10               19
RuhR-Universität Bochum




                                        Wallet-Proxy

                                                     Setup
                                                     login
                                                     data
           authenticate UW
                                           update_proxy WB

            use_service U↔B                 use_service B↔W                              authenticate WP
                              Browser                          Wallet­Proxy
    U                                                                                    use_service P↔W     P
                                 B                                  W
                                                                                       SSL secured channel
                     Call                            Insert
                    service                           login                                 Authenticate
                      site                            data                                  site and user




Marcel Winandy                   Compartmented Security for Browsers (ARES 2007)        2007-04-10               20
RuhR-Universität Bochum




                                  Setup Procedure
     ●   "Two-factor authentication"
           –     User receives credentials out-of-band
                  ●   username, password (uid, pwdid), URLid of website, and ack.code
           –     Wallet blocks login forms in Browser
           –     User has to enter credentials in Wallet
           –     Wallet performs login procedure
           –     User enters acknowledgement code in Browser
     ●   "One-factor authentication"
           –     User has to register online at website
           –     Wallet blocks login forms in Browser
           –     User has to enter credentials in Wallet
           –     Wallet links password to website
                  ●   pwdid := hash(pwdiduser || r), r is random value

Marcel Winandy                    Compartmented Security for Browsers (ARES 2007)        2007-04-10           21
RuhR-Universität Bochum




                          Trusted Components

                                              Wallet­Proxy                              network connection

                     user interface
                                                   W
                     input / output                                      load / store data

                                                start


                                      start   Compartment        start          Storage
  U              Secure GUI
                                                Manager                         Manager
                                                                  sealing / unsealing

                                                           measurement
                                                                                   TPM                       Net   P




Marcel Winandy                    Compartmented Security for Browsers (ARES 2007)                2007-04-10            22
RuhR-Universität Bochum




                          Trusted Components

                                              Wallet­Proxy                              network connection

                     user interface
                                                   W
                     input / output                                      load / store data

                                                start


                                      start   Compartment        start          Storage
  U              Secure GUI
                                                Manager                         Manager
                                                                  sealing / unsealing

                                                           measurement
                                                                                   TPM                       Net   P
                   Trusted
                    path




Marcel Winandy                    Compartmented Security for Browsers (ARES 2007)                2007-04-10            23
RuhR-Universität Bochum




                          Trusted Components

                                              Wallet­Proxy                              network connection

                     user interface
                                                   W
                     input / output                                        load / store data

                                                start


                                      start   Compartment        start            Storage
  U              Secure GUI
                                                Manager                           Manager
                                                                  sealing / unsealing

                                                           measurement
                                                                                     TPM                     Net   P
                   Trusted
                    path
                                                                         System
                                                                         integrity



Marcel Winandy                    Compartmented Security for Browsers (ARES 2007)                2007-04-10            24
RuhR-Universität Bochum




                        Secure Booting




                    OS
                 OS Loader                                                TPM
                   BIOS
                  CRTM                                                        PCRs




Marcel Winandy        Compartmented Security for Browsers (ARES 2007)        2007-04-10           25
RuhR-Universität Bochum




                                            Secure Booting


                                 Proxy Wallet
                                      W


                                  start


                         start   Compartment    start   Storage
            Secure GUI
                                   Manager              Manager


                               OS
                            OS Loader                                                         TPM
                              BIOS
                             CRTM                                                                 PCRs




Marcel Winandy                            Compartmented Security for Browsers (ARES 2007)        2007-04-10           26
RuhR-Universität Bochum




                                           Secure Booting


                                Proxy Wallet                                               Seal Wallet data to
                                     W
                                                                                           platform configuration
                                 start


                        start   Compartment    start   Storage
           Secure GUI
                                  Manager              Manager


                              OS
                           OS Loader                                                         TPM
                             BIOS
                            CRTM                                                                 PCRs




Marcel Winandy                           Compartmented Security for Browsers (ARES 2007)        2007-04-10           27
RuhR-Universität Bochum




                                 Implementation

                                      Isolation
                  {untrusted }                    {trusted }

                                                    Wallet
                 Email   Browser
                                                    Proxy

                                                                                           Application Layer
                 Compartment               Compartment
                                                         
                                     Trusted Software Layer
                                                                                           Security Kernel
                                          Hypervisor Layer
                                                          
                                             Hardware                   TPM                Hardware Layer




Marcel Winandy              Compartmented Security for Browsers (ARES 2007)        2007-04-10                  28
RuhR-Universität Bochum




                                 Implementation

                                         Isolation
                  {untrusted }                       {trusted }

                                                       Wallet
                 Email     Browser
                                                       Proxy

                                                                                               Application Layer
                 Compartment                  Compartment
                                                              
                         Secure GUI     Trusted Software Layer
                                             Compartment Mgr                 Storage Mgr
                                                                                               Security Kernel
                     Input      Video           Net                         TDD       Disk
                                             Hypervisor Layer
                                               L4 Microkernel
                                                                   
                                                     Hardware              TPM                 Hardware Layer




Marcel Winandy                 Compartmented Security for Browsers (ARES 2007)         2007-04-10                  29
RuhR-Universität Bochum




                    Ongoing and Future Work
     ●   Web form scanner
           –     Currently improving and enhancing implementation
     ●   System updates (property-based attestation)
           –     Currently working on PbA implementation
     ●   What about additional user attributes?
           –     e.g. address, age, credit card number, etc.
     ●   Usability
           –     Secure GUI ("mGUI")
           –     Proxy-Wallet
Marcel Winandy             Compartmented Security for Browsers (ARES 2007)        2007-04-10           30
RuhR-Universität Bochum




Marcel Winandy   Compartmented Security for Browsers (ARES 2007)        2007-04-10           31
RuhR-Universität Bochum




Marcel Winandy   Compartmented Security for Browsers (ARES 2007)        2007-04-10           32
RuhR-Universität Bochum




                                                                   Questions ?




Marcel Winandy   Compartmented Security for Browsers (ARES 2007)        2007-04-10           33
backup




Marcel Winandy   Compartmented Security for Browsers (ARES 2007)   2007-04-10   34
Marcel Winandy   Compartmented Security for Browsers (ARES 2007)   2007-04-10   35
Marcel Winandy   Compartmented Security for Browsers (ARES 2007)   2007-04-10   36

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Compartmented Security for Browsers

  • 1. RuhR-Universität Bochum Compartmented Security for Browsers - Or How to Thwart a Phisher with Trusted Computing Sebastian Gajek, Ahmad-Reza Sadeghi, Christian Stüble, Marcel Winandy Horst Görtz Institute for IT Security Ruhr-University Bochum, Germany ARES 2007 2nd International Conference on Availability, Reliability and Security Vienna, 10-13 April 2007
  • 2. RuhR-Universität Bochum Marcel Winandy Compartmented Security for Browsers (ARES 2007) 2007-04-10 2
  • 3. RuhR-Universität Bochum "Classical" Phishing Costumers (e.g., bank) ……. credentials credentials (e.g., username,password) Adversary A Collection Server Marcel Winandy Compartmented Security for Browsers (ARES 2007) 2007-04-10 3
  • 4. RuhR-Universität Bochum Malware Phishing Costumers (e.g., bank) ……. credentials Adversary A Collection Server Tailored to specific services, such as domestic banks Marcel Winandy Compartmented Security for Browsers (ARES 2007) 2007-04-10 4
  • 5. RuhR-Universität Bochum Reasons for Success ● Strong assumptions on ordinary users ● Legacy flaws of Internet technology (e.g. DNS) ● Vulnerabilities of underlying computing platform Marcel Winandy Compartmented Security for Browsers (ARES 2007) 2007-04-10 5
  • 6. RuhR-Universität Bochum Existing approaches ● Browser-based ● Server-based ● Operating System based Marcel Winandy Compartmented Security for Browsers (ARES 2007) 2007-04-10 6
  • 7. RuhR-Universität Bochum Browser-based approaches ● White lists / black lists ● Heuristic checks ● Blinking browser boundaries ● Logo-type certificates ● Wallets F extra functionality Browser Marcel Winandy Compartmented Security for Browsers (ARES 2007) 2007-04-10 7
  • 8. RuhR-Universität Bochum Browser-based approaches ● White lists / black lists ● Heuristic checks ● Blinking browser boundaries ● Logo-type certificates ● Wallets Malware Browser F Phishing !? Marcel Winandy Compartmented Security for Browsers (ARES 2007) 2007-04-10 8
  • 9. RuhR-Universität Bochum Server-Based Approaches ● User-friendly authentication protocols ● Password-augmented SSL protocol ● Trusted device augmented SSL protocol F extra functionality Client Server Client Marcel Winandy Compartmented Security for Browsers (ARES 2007) 2007-04-10 9
  • 10. RuhR-Universität Bochum Server-Based Approaches ● User-friendly authentication protocols ● Password-augmented SSL protocol ● Trusted device augmented SSL protocol F Client Server Client Malware Phishing !? Marcel Winandy Compartmented Security for Browsers (ARES 2007) 2007-04-10 10
  • 11. RuhR-Universität Bochum OS-Based Approaches ● Isolation ● Integrity Verification ● Secure GUI ● Virtualization Example: Tahoma BOS Browser Browser Browser VM VM VM VMM Marcel Winandy Compartmented Security for Browsers (ARES 2007) 2007-04-10 11
  • 12. RuhR-Universität Bochum OS-Based Approaches ● Isolation ● Integrity Verification ● Secure GUI ● Virtualization Example: Tahoma BOS Browser Browser Browser Classical VM VM VM Phishing !? VMM Marcel Winandy Compartmented Security for Browsers (ARES 2007) 2007-04-10 12
  • 13. Idea: Combination Marcel Winandy Compartmented Security for Browsers (ARES 2007) 2007-04-10 13
  • 14. RuhR-Universität Bochum Our Approach ● Trusted wallet: Let the system... – authenticate legitimate service sites – control and perform the user authentication ● Compartmentalization: Isolate browser / wallet ● Trusted execution environment: – Security kernel – Trusted Computing – Virtualization Marcel Winandy Compartmented Security for Browsers (ARES 2007) 2007-04-10 14
  • 15. RuhR-Universität Bochum Basic Architecture authentication data compartment service virtual real usage Browser network Wallet­ network Service U Proxy P Legacy OS Security Kernel Hardware (Trusted Computing Support) System S Marcel Winandy Compartmented Security for Browsers (ARES 2007) 2007-04-10 15
  • 16. RuhR-Universität Bochum Wallet-Proxy authenticate UW update_proxy WB use_service U↔B use_service B↔W authenticate WP Browser Wallet­Proxy U use_service P↔W P B W SSL secured channel Marcel Winandy Compartmented Security for Browsers (ARES 2007) 2007-04-10 16
  • 17. RuhR-Universität Bochum Wallet-Proxy Setup login data authenticate UW update_proxy WB use_service U↔B use_service B↔W authenticate WP Browser Wallet­Proxy U use_service P↔W P B W SSL secured channel Marcel Winandy Compartmented Security for Browsers (ARES 2007) 2007-04-10 17
  • 18. RuhR-Universität Bochum Wallet-Proxy Setup login data authenticate UW update_proxy WB use_service U↔B use_service B↔W authenticate WP Browser Wallet­Proxy U use_service P↔W P B W SSL secured channel Call service site Marcel Winandy Compartmented Security for Browsers (ARES 2007) 2007-04-10 18
  • 19. RuhR-Universität Bochum Wallet-Proxy Setup login data authenticate UW update_proxy WB use_service U↔B use_service B↔W authenticate WP Browser Wallet­Proxy U use_service P↔W P B W SSL secured channel Call Insert service login site data Marcel Winandy Compartmented Security for Browsers (ARES 2007) 2007-04-10 19
  • 20. RuhR-Universität Bochum Wallet-Proxy Setup login data authenticate UW update_proxy WB use_service U↔B use_service B↔W authenticate WP Browser Wallet­Proxy U use_service P↔W P B W SSL secured channel Call Insert service login Authenticate site data site and user Marcel Winandy Compartmented Security for Browsers (ARES 2007) 2007-04-10 20
  • 21. RuhR-Universität Bochum Setup Procedure ● "Two-factor authentication" – User receives credentials out-of-band ● username, password (uid, pwdid), URLid of website, and ack.code – Wallet blocks login forms in Browser – User has to enter credentials in Wallet – Wallet performs login procedure – User enters acknowledgement code in Browser ● "One-factor authentication" – User has to register online at website – Wallet blocks login forms in Browser – User has to enter credentials in Wallet – Wallet links password to website ● pwdid := hash(pwdiduser || r), r is random value Marcel Winandy Compartmented Security for Browsers (ARES 2007) 2007-04-10 21
  • 22. RuhR-Universität Bochum Trusted Components Wallet­Proxy network connection user interface W input / output load / store data start start Compartment start Storage U Secure GUI Manager Manager sealing / unsealing measurement TPM Net P Marcel Winandy Compartmented Security for Browsers (ARES 2007) 2007-04-10 22
  • 23. RuhR-Universität Bochum Trusted Components Wallet­Proxy network connection user interface W input / output load / store data start start Compartment start Storage U Secure GUI Manager Manager sealing / unsealing measurement TPM Net P Trusted path Marcel Winandy Compartmented Security for Browsers (ARES 2007) 2007-04-10 23
  • 24. RuhR-Universität Bochum Trusted Components Wallet­Proxy network connection user interface W input / output load / store data start start Compartment start Storage U Secure GUI Manager Manager sealing / unsealing measurement TPM Net P Trusted path System integrity Marcel Winandy Compartmented Security for Browsers (ARES 2007) 2007-04-10 24
  • 25. RuhR-Universität Bochum Secure Booting OS OS Loader TPM BIOS CRTM PCRs Marcel Winandy Compartmented Security for Browsers (ARES 2007) 2007-04-10 25
  • 26. RuhR-Universität Bochum Secure Booting Proxy Wallet W start start Compartment start Storage Secure GUI Manager Manager OS OS Loader TPM BIOS CRTM PCRs Marcel Winandy Compartmented Security for Browsers (ARES 2007) 2007-04-10 26
  • 27. RuhR-Universität Bochum Secure Booting Proxy Wallet Seal Wallet data to W platform configuration start start Compartment start Storage Secure GUI Manager Manager OS OS Loader TPM BIOS CRTM PCRs Marcel Winandy Compartmented Security for Browsers (ARES 2007) 2007-04-10 27
  • 28. RuhR-Universität Bochum Implementation Isolation {untrusted } {trusted } Wallet Email Browser Proxy Application Layer Compartment Compartment   Trusted Software Layer Security Kernel Hypervisor Layer   Hardware TPM Hardware Layer Marcel Winandy Compartmented Security for Browsers (ARES 2007) 2007-04-10 28
  • 29. RuhR-Universität Bochum Implementation Isolation {untrusted } {trusted } Wallet Email Browser Proxy Application Layer Compartment Compartment   Secure GUI Trusted Software Layer Compartment Mgr Storage Mgr Security Kernel Input Video Net TDD Disk Hypervisor Layer L4 Microkernel   Hardware TPM Hardware Layer Marcel Winandy Compartmented Security for Browsers (ARES 2007) 2007-04-10 29
  • 30. RuhR-Universität Bochum Ongoing and Future Work ● Web form scanner – Currently improving and enhancing implementation ● System updates (property-based attestation) – Currently working on PbA implementation ● What about additional user attributes? – e.g. address, age, credit card number, etc. ● Usability – Secure GUI ("mGUI") – Proxy-Wallet Marcel Winandy Compartmented Security for Browsers (ARES 2007) 2007-04-10 30
  • 31. RuhR-Universität Bochum Marcel Winandy Compartmented Security for Browsers (ARES 2007) 2007-04-10 31
  • 32. RuhR-Universität Bochum Marcel Winandy Compartmented Security for Browsers (ARES 2007) 2007-04-10 32
  • 33. RuhR-Universität Bochum Questions ? Marcel Winandy Compartmented Security for Browsers (ARES 2007) 2007-04-10 33
  • 34. backup Marcel Winandy Compartmented Security for Browsers (ARES 2007) 2007-04-10 34
  • 35. Marcel Winandy Compartmented Security for Browsers (ARES 2007) 2007-04-10 35
  • 36. Marcel Winandy Compartmented Security for Browsers (ARES 2007) 2007-04-10 36