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System Security Lab




                   Trusted Virtual Domains
                                                 on

             Usable Secure Desktop Environments

             Hans Löhr, Thomas Pöppelmann, Johannes Rave,
                   Martin Steegmanns, Marcel Winandy



5th Annual Workshop on Scalable Trusted Computing (STC 2010)
co-located to ACM CCS, Chicago, 4th October 2010
System Security Lab




           Trusted Virtual Domains (TVDs)




    ●    Coalition of virtual machines (VMs)
    ●    Distributed over various physical platforms
    ●    Same trust level, same security policy
    ●    Transparent policy enforcement

   Marcel Winandy           Trusted Virtual Domains on OpenSolaris   2
System Security Lab




        TVD Implementations – Why a new one?
    ●    TVDs on Xen:
          ●   Required several changes in Xen and dom0
              (e.g. sHype in Xen, vSwitch in dom0, etc....)
          ●   Large VM images to deploy (e.g. Vista: ~ 2 GB)
          ●   Focus on data centers
    ●    TVD on OpenSolaris:
          ●   Focus on end-user desktop systems
          ●   Lightweight virtualization
          ●   Requires no changes in kernel or core system
   Marcel Winandy            Trusted Virtual Domains on OpenSolaris   3
System Security Lab




        Security Features of OpenSolaris
    ●    Zones: Lightweight (OS) virtualization
    ●    ZFS: Efficient file system
    ●    MLS: built-in mandatory access control
    ●    Secure GUI: trusted path, MLS support


                      And all comes for free !!!


   Marcel Winandy           Trusted Virtual Domains on OpenSolaris   4
System Security Lab




       TVD on OpenSolaris: Architecture




                                                               Our Contribution



   Marcel Winandy     Trusted Virtual Domains on OpenSolaris                 5
System Security Lab
                      User Desktop




   Marcel Winandy     Trusted Virtual Domains on OpenSolaris   6
System Security Lab




                      Mapping TVD to MLS
    ●    MLS: classification (level) + compartment (category)
    ●    TVDs: non-hierarchical
    ●    Solution: all TVDs same level, but distinct compartments
         (240 possible TVDs)




                           Trusted Virtual Domains on OpenSolaris   7
System Security Lab




                       TVD Management
    ●    Simple TVD management (Admin)
          ●   Creation: name, description, network segment
          ●   Assignment of users and zone images
    ●    Automatic and transparent policy distribution
          ●   Global Policy: MLS labels, user assignments
          ●   Local Policy: allowed zones, network config, etc.
          ●   Platform Policy: defines secure channel between
              master and platforms


   Marcel Winandy           Trusted Virtual Domains on OpenSolaris   8
System Security Lab




        Efficient Zone Image Deployment (1)
    ●    User Login: can choose working environments




   Marcel Winandy      Trusted Virtual Domains on OpenSolaris   9
System Security Lab




        Efficient Zone Image Deployment (2)
    ●    Minimal standard zone: 1.4 GB (!)
    ●    But: ZFS features clones and snapshots
          ●   Every image is snapshot of a zone
          ●   Snapshots can have dependencies (delta images)
    ●    Tree-like organization:
          ●   Base zone images
          ●   Other zones are derived from base image
    ●    Deployment: base in cache, deploy deltas only!

   Marcel Winandy           Trusted Virtual Domains on OpenSolaris   10
System Security Lab




              Protected Storage Devices (1)
    ●    Encrypted Home Directories
          ●   Stored on central server (via NFS)
          ●   Loopback-mounted (lofi) with built-in encryption
          ●   TVD layer: management of encryption key
    ●    Mobile Storage Devices (e.g. USB sticks)
          ●   Similar approach
          ●   Transparent encryption after assignment to a TVD



   Marcel Winandy           Trusted Virtual Domains on OpenSolaris   11
System Security Lab




             Protected Storage Devices (2)
    ●    User attaches new USB device




   Marcel Winandy     Trusted Virtual Domains on OpenSolaris   12
System Security Lab




             Protected Storage Devices (3)
  ●    Transparent encryption after assignment to TVD




   Marcel Winandy     Trusted Virtual Domains on OpenSolaris   13
System Security Lab




                                  Conclusion
    ●   TVD on OpenSolaris:
        efficient and usable TVD realization for end-user desktop systems
    ●   Leverages existing OpenSolaris features
        ●   Zones, MLS, ZFS, Secure GUI
    ●   Adds new components
        ●   Server infrastructure (TVD Master), local TVD Layer
        ●   Transparent data encryption (home + USB sticks)
        ●   Efficient zone image deployment
    ●   No changes on kernel or core OS services

                                        More information:
                           http://www.trust.rub.de/projects/tvd-solaris



   Marcel Winandy                 Trusted Virtual Domains on OpenSolaris    14

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Trusted Virtual Domains on OpenSolaris: Usable Secure Desktop Environments

  • 1. System Security Lab Trusted Virtual Domains on Usable Secure Desktop Environments Hans Löhr, Thomas Pöppelmann, Johannes Rave, Martin Steegmanns, Marcel Winandy 5th Annual Workshop on Scalable Trusted Computing (STC 2010) co-located to ACM CCS, Chicago, 4th October 2010
  • 2. System Security Lab Trusted Virtual Domains (TVDs) ● Coalition of virtual machines (VMs) ● Distributed over various physical platforms ● Same trust level, same security policy ● Transparent policy enforcement Marcel Winandy Trusted Virtual Domains on OpenSolaris 2
  • 3. System Security Lab TVD Implementations – Why a new one? ● TVDs on Xen: ● Required several changes in Xen and dom0 (e.g. sHype in Xen, vSwitch in dom0, etc....) ● Large VM images to deploy (e.g. Vista: ~ 2 GB) ● Focus on data centers ● TVD on OpenSolaris: ● Focus on end-user desktop systems ● Lightweight virtualization ● Requires no changes in kernel or core system Marcel Winandy Trusted Virtual Domains on OpenSolaris 3
  • 4. System Security Lab Security Features of OpenSolaris ● Zones: Lightweight (OS) virtualization ● ZFS: Efficient file system ● MLS: built-in mandatory access control ● Secure GUI: trusted path, MLS support And all comes for free !!! Marcel Winandy Trusted Virtual Domains on OpenSolaris 4
  • 5. System Security Lab TVD on OpenSolaris: Architecture Our Contribution Marcel Winandy Trusted Virtual Domains on OpenSolaris 5
  • 6. System Security Lab User Desktop Marcel Winandy Trusted Virtual Domains on OpenSolaris 6
  • 7. System Security Lab Mapping TVD to MLS ● MLS: classification (level) + compartment (category) ● TVDs: non-hierarchical ● Solution: all TVDs same level, but distinct compartments (240 possible TVDs) Trusted Virtual Domains on OpenSolaris 7
  • 8. System Security Lab TVD Management ● Simple TVD management (Admin) ● Creation: name, description, network segment ● Assignment of users and zone images ● Automatic and transparent policy distribution ● Global Policy: MLS labels, user assignments ● Local Policy: allowed zones, network config, etc. ● Platform Policy: defines secure channel between master and platforms Marcel Winandy Trusted Virtual Domains on OpenSolaris 8
  • 9. System Security Lab Efficient Zone Image Deployment (1) ● User Login: can choose working environments Marcel Winandy Trusted Virtual Domains on OpenSolaris 9
  • 10. System Security Lab Efficient Zone Image Deployment (2) ● Minimal standard zone: 1.4 GB (!) ● But: ZFS features clones and snapshots ● Every image is snapshot of a zone ● Snapshots can have dependencies (delta images) ● Tree-like organization: ● Base zone images ● Other zones are derived from base image ● Deployment: base in cache, deploy deltas only! Marcel Winandy Trusted Virtual Domains on OpenSolaris 10
  • 11. System Security Lab Protected Storage Devices (1) ● Encrypted Home Directories ● Stored on central server (via NFS) ● Loopback-mounted (lofi) with built-in encryption ● TVD layer: management of encryption key ● Mobile Storage Devices (e.g. USB sticks) ● Similar approach ● Transparent encryption after assignment to a TVD Marcel Winandy Trusted Virtual Domains on OpenSolaris 11
  • 12. System Security Lab Protected Storage Devices (2) ● User attaches new USB device Marcel Winandy Trusted Virtual Domains on OpenSolaris 12
  • 13. System Security Lab Protected Storage Devices (3) ● Transparent encryption after assignment to TVD Marcel Winandy Trusted Virtual Domains on OpenSolaris 13
  • 14. System Security Lab Conclusion ● TVD on OpenSolaris: efficient and usable TVD realization for end-user desktop systems ● Leverages existing OpenSolaris features ● Zones, MLS, ZFS, Secure GUI ● Adds new components ● Server infrastructure (TVD Master), local TVD Layer ● Transparent data encryption (home + USB sticks) ● Efficient zone image deployment ● No changes on kernel or core OS services More information: http://www.trust.rub.de/projects/tvd-solaris Marcel Winandy Trusted Virtual Domains on OpenSolaris 14