Nco Role In Battlefield Management

crafting innovation together

Navneet Bhushan
(navneet.bhushan@crafitti.com)

Crafitti Consulting (www.crafitti.com)

CAIR, DRDO, August 10, 2010

A visualization of the network structure of the Internet at the level of “autonomous systems”—local groups
of computers each representing hundreds or thousands of machines. Picture by Hal Burch and Bill Cheswick, courtesy of Lumeta
Confidential
Corporation. INTERNET


Confidential © Crafitti Consulting Private Ltd. August 16, 2010 2

http://www.fastcodesign.com/1662020/eye-candy-solid-
vase-is-a-3-d-pic-of-splashing-milk

The Singaporean designer Fung Kwok Pan has managed to capture
the flow of water in solid form, and the results are stunning.

Globe has been Re-engineered!

While the defining measurement of (old world)
was weight – … – the defining measurement of
the globalization system is speed – speed of
commerce, travel, communication and
innovation
Thomas L. Friedman, “The Lexus and Olive Tree”

Flattening World

… And we don’t even realize it
…
Confidential

Technological Systems
Power System Information Technology
Violence Industrial Automation
Wealth crafting innovation together
Genomics
Knowledge Bio-Technology Organization Forms
Knowledge based Violence & Smart Materials Hierarchies shifting to
Wealth Nanotechnology Networked form of
Violence & Wealth based Propulsion Technology Organization
knowledge Hierarchical Networks
Networked Hierarchies

Geo Political System
Bipolarity/ Multi-polarity
Multinational Companies Economic System
Structure of Small more Networked
controlling the world
Reducing Value of Nation State
Future Organizations
World Rapid Changes in the way wealth

is generated
Low tariff barriers
Social System Common Currencies and
Rise of the Individual/Ethnic/Religious compatible economic systems
groupings Low entry barriers
Nuclear/Single parent family system
Rise of dissatisfaction

SOURCE: Bhushan N. and Rai K., Strategic Decision Making, Springer Verlag, Jan 2004

Confidential

The Globalized World

• Global Real-time Awareness

• Large monolithic structures to small, distributed well-
connected organizations –Collabtetion –
Collaboration+Competition

• Hierarchies – Hierarchical Networks – Networked
Hierarchies – Networks
• Power shifts to Knowledge Based Real-time Actors

• Time, Trade, Space, Geography, Cultural, Language, Social
Shackles Demolished

• Survival of the Agile – Decision Making and Action at
Electronic Speed
• Everyone has the wherewithal to continuously Re-
invent oneself

Confidential


As economic fortunes rise,

so does nationalism


Complexity in a Flattening
World crafting innovation together

Rapid Explosion Human Processing Limits
of Complexity (The Magic Number 7 ± 2)
Framing Limits
Confidence

 Connections create Value and Dependencies
Number of alternatives

create complexity
Time pressure  Future is approaching us Faster than History is
Need for analysis leaving us!
Information de-coherence  Increasing distance between user requirements
Connections of what they really need versus what they want.
Networks  With every choice we make today we Kill
many possible futures

Confidential

Decision Making in a
Flattening World crafting innovation together

Rapid Explosion Human Processing Limits
of Complexity (The Magic Number 7 ± 2)
Framing Limits
Confidence

 Each Decision (a Choice) affects future
Number of alternatives

Choices (decisions)
Time pressure  Each Decision is impacted by past Decisions
Need for analysis (Choices) made by someone somewhere
Information de-coherence  With every choice we make today we Kill
Connections many possible futures
Networks  With every choice we make today we Select
only a small subset of possible futures

Confidential

The Magical Number Seven, Plus or Minus Two:
Some Limits on our Capacity for cProcessingi oInformation
rafting innovat n together

George A. Miller (1956)
Harvard University
First published in Psychological Review, 63, 81-97.

[1] This paper was first read as an Invited Address before the Eastern Psychological Association in Philadelphia on April 15, 1955.

The point seems to be that, as we add
more variables to the display, we
increase the total capacity, but we
decrease the accuracy for any
particular variable. In other words,

we can make relatively crude
judgments of several things
simultaneously.

Confidential

The first decade of 20th Century…

• In 1890, Average company in US
had - FOUR employees (4)
• By 1901, US Steel became world’s
first 1 Billion $ company
• Ford Motor Company, founded in
1903, was producing half a million

cars a by 1913


The first decade of 21st Century…


More is Different – Scale is the New Frontier



SEI ULS Study – 2006!


Why we don’t know how to Design ULSS?

System Design - Present Approaches ULS Characteristics
All conflicts must be resolved centrally and uniformly Decentralized Control
Requirements can be known in advance and change slowly. Inherently conflicting, unknowable,
Tradeoff decisions will be stable. and diverse requirements
Discrete Time System improvements Continuous evolution and
Effect of a change can be predicted sufficiently well.
Configuration information
Components and users are fairly homogeneous.
People are just users of the system.
? deployment
Heterogeneous, inconsistent,
changing elements
and

Erosion of the people/system
Collective behavior of people is not of interest. boundary
Social interactions are not relevant.
Normal Failures
Failures will occur infrequently. Defects can be removed.
A prime contractor is responsible for system development, New paradigms for acquisition and
operation, and evolution. policy



Confidential © Crafitti Consulting Private
20

ULSS Research Areas

ULS Systems Specific Sub-Areas
Research Area
• Decentralized Production Management
• Context-Aware Assistive computing Adaptive • View-Based Evolution
• Understanding Users and Their Contexts
• Modeling Users and User Communities
System • Evolutionary Configuration and
Human Interaction • Fostering Non-Competitive Social Infrastructure Deployment
• In Situ Control and Adaptation
Collaboration
• Robustness, Adaptation, and Quality
• Longevity
Attributes
• Algorithmic Mechanism Design
Computational • Scale and Composition of Quality
• Metaheuristics in Software Engineering
Emergence Adaptable and Attributes
• Digital Evolution
• Understanding People-Centric Quality
• Design of All Levels Predictable

Attributes
• Design Spaces and Design rules
System Quality • Enforcing Quality Requirements
• Harnessing Economics to Promote Good
• Security, Trust, and Resiliency
Design
Design • Design Representation and Analysis
• Engineering Management at Ultra-
Large Scales
• Assimilation
• Determining and Managing Policy,
• Policy Definition for ULS Systems
Requirements Acquisition,
• Expressive Representation Languages • Fast Acquisition for ULS Systems
and • Management of ULS Systems
• Scaled-Up Specification, Verification, and
Computational Management
Certification
Engineering • Computational Engineering for Analysis
and Design

Competitive Advantage- Over Ages

How Fast
Co-Create
Extent of Connectedness

How Fast
Innovate
How much
Actionable
Knowledge

How much and
Quickly can be
Informed
How much can
be produced
In the Connected Age –
How much of
Agricultural land Co-Creators will thrive
and Natural
Resources

Confidential Time


Confidential

Nature

is
Fractal!

Confidential

Black Swan – The impact of
the highly improbable

• “I cannot accept a pretense of
science. I much prefer a
sophisticated craft, focused on
tricks, to a failed science looking
for certainties” Nassim Nicholas
Taleb

Confidential

A Weakening of Hierarchies

• Information abundance permits INDIVIDUALS to by-
pass hierarchies that have – deliberately or
inadvertently – controlled or limited information
• Alternative human organization forms – based mainly
on the Network have proved more effective and
efficient for transacting information than hierarchies.

• In Information intensive enterprises, hierarchical
organizations may not be competitive with networks.

IN ATHENA’s CAMP – Preparing for conflict in the Information Age, (Ed)
Arquilla J. and Ronfeldt D, RAND, 1997
Confidential © CRAFITTI CONSULTING


ONLY Networks
CAN FIGHT Networks

Confidential ©

Combat

Fight/Duel/Conflict/Battle/War/World
War/Armageddon

Modelling

Representing a system and its internal and/or external
dynamics in such a form (may be mathematical) that
information about its behaviour can be extracted or
studied

Confidential

Parameters and Processes of Combat

• Two Sides • Command and
Control
• Search
• Damage
• Detection
Assessment
• Identification
• Strategic and
• Acquisition Tactical

Movement
• Tracking
• Influence of
• Weapon Target Assignment Technology
• Weapon Aiming and Firing
• Attrition
Confidential

Nature of Combat and Combat Models

Past : Numerical Strength is Combat Power/ Attrition
Based
Modelling: Lanchester Equations Based and Fire Power
Scores in QJMA
Present: Technology Based Platform-Centric Revolution
in Military Affairs

Modelling: Weapon Power Scores in Extended Adaptive
Dynamic Model
Future: Network Centric Warfare
Modelling: Exploring New Models

Confidential

Approaches to Combat Modelling

Analytical Methods Simulation
• Lanchester Equations • Combat
• Adaptive Dynamic Simulations
Model • Wargames

Firepower Scores New Approaches

• QJMA • Cellular Automata
• WEI • Petri Nets
• Weapon Power Scores • Artificial Life
• Particle Swarm
Optimization
Confidential

Rand Report MG 268 (http://www.rand.org)


More than 12000 Sorties flown in mid
1990s to compare JTIDS datalink 16
system with conventional voice only
communications

250%
IMPROVEMENT
IN Kill Ratio


Performance Evaluation of an Air Defence System
(Networked) Modelled as a Petri Net (1998)

TL3
dar
rne ra raft
r Airbo y Airc
e rada Enem
Mobil
AD3
A CC1
Radar AD2
SFP2
ER R AD1
(SFP) B
B OR D E
OR D Delay
CAOC
CAOC
n Post
r Fusio A CC2
Senso l CAOC
Arriva ACC
tion
Opera
al Air ation
Centr e (CAOC) Penetr ACC
SFP3

Centr

ponse ACC
SA M SAM No res
ON T RO L OP Site
AIR C TRE r
CE N ) Centr
el Fighte
(ACC
SAM
TER
FIGH ON Gun
DR r
SQ U A N T R E Fighte TR1
OP C
E ron
Squad TR2
AD
SHOR ION
AT
OPER RE efence
CE N T Air D s TL3
Gun


Time Transition Petri Net Model of an AD
System

Stop Arrival
Delay Delay Start

Arrival

Arrivals 300 .
Threats Limit

Undetected Detected
Back Sensor TX1
Undetected SFP

No response Gone1 TX2
Penetrations
Penetration
Gone2
CAOC
ACC
NP
Plane

Sqdn TR
Pres ACC
Fighter Plane TL
NS ACCR
SAM
SAMOC
Sres
SAM ACCL
NG

Gres Gun
Gun

SHORADOC Transition with exponential firing
Transition with determinstic firing

Fig. 3 : TTPN Model of an AD System


Penetration Probability Vs Arrival Rate


Application- Simulation of Terrorist Networks and Evaluation
of Strategies

Confidential

Destabilization Strategies

Each strategy identifies actor criticality in a different way. All strategies rely on data in one
or more cells in the meta-matrix. The identified strategies are:
• Highest degree centrality: Isolate one agent from the covert network that has the
highest degree centrality [20].
• Highest betweenness centrality: Isolate one agent from the covert network that has
the highest betweenness centrality [20].
• Highest cognitive load: Isolate one agent from the covert network that has the highest
cognitive load [6], where cognitive load is computed as a linear combination of:
– Number of people person i interacts with / total number of people in the group;

– Number of subtasks person i is assigned to / total number of subtasks;
– Sum of number of people who do the same tasks person i does / (total number of tasks * total number of people);
– Sum of negotiation needs person i needs to do for each task / total possible negotiations, where a negotiation corresponds
to the amount of information or resources that an agent needs to complete a subtask that it is assigned to, but doesn't
have (and thus has to obtain from another agent by negotiation).

• Highest task accuracy: Isolate the best performing agent in the organization. This
corresponds to standard police practice of arresting agents implicated in commission
of a terrorist act.
• Amount of unique knowledge: Isolate the agent that has the highest expertise.

Confidential 39 ©

NetWatch: A Multi-Agent Network Model of Covert
Network Surveillance and Destabilization

• Random case consisted of random removal strategy combined with one of the three wiretapping strategies.
The baseline increases with accuracy of network discovery because of the fact that learning more of the
network gives the random strategy better access to targets (including these of high importance). In the absence
of false positives, the baseline strategies perform better then many complex heuristics.
• Degree Centrality-based removal of agents performs well only with targeted wiretapping. This is because
targeted wiretapping allows the Blue Team to completely discover a cell and all of its neighborhood, and thus
be very confident in removal of a most central person. However, the network does recover reasonably quickly
from the hit, thus decreasing the effectiveness of this strategy.
• Betweenness Centrality-based removal performs well with roving wiretaps - because of the fact that they allow
quick location of key gatekeepers in the network.
• Cognitive Load-based removal requires significant knowledge of the network, and thus only performs well

under targeted and roving wiretap strategies.
• Quite surprisingly, removal of Well-Performing individuals did not result in significant damage to the terrorist
network. Most likely this is caused by the structure of the tasks that the agents perform and equivalence of
individuals in equivalent network positions.
• Knowledge-based removal proved to be the most effective strategy of the lot, and the only one to outperform
the baseline strategies. The key to knowledge-based removal, though, is that its effectiveness hinges on speed
of response more than the accuracy of structural knowledge. The experiments show that the highest efficiency
of this strategy is achieved if Red Team experts are found and removed before they transmit much of their
knowledge to the rest of the group, thus favoring quick decisive action to lengthy deliberation and heuristic
learning that are characteristic of roving wiretaps.

Confidential 40 ©


The Past

Confidential

Combat

• Duels
• LOS Fire
• Attrition Based Warfare
• Numerical Strength
Important (the 3:1 Rule)

To make a Brigade of 4000 troops ineffective, one
needs to destroy atleast 33% to 50% of its troops
using a Division of about 12000 troops

Confidential

Combat Models: Past

• Coupled Differential Equations
incorporating the rate at which both sides
destroy each other’s numerical strengths
• Quantified Judgement Method of Analysis
based on Empirical Formulae developed
using Historical Combat Data of Past

Wars (T.N. Dupuy)

Confidential


The Present

Confidential

Influence of Technology on War/Combat

Information Technology Telecom & Networking
C4ISR IW/EW/SEW Communications
PGMs ILSS NetWar/CyberWar
Mobile Comm
Knowledge Processing
Lethality

Intelligence Analysis
Mass Destruction to
Tactical and Strategic
Selective/Precise &
Planning
Effective Destruction
Automated/Rapid Military
Decision Making

Confidential

COLLECT & CAPABILITY TO
PROCESS ABILITY TO DESTROY
PICK OUT c r a f t i n g i n n o v a t i o n t o g e t h e r
BATTLEFIELD TARGETS WITH
TARGETS IN A
INFORMATION WITH PRECISION FROM
DYNAMIC BATTLE
SPEED AND GREATER RANGES
SCENARIO
ACCURACY

INTERACTION

ABILITY TO SEE / CHOOSE TARGETS BETTER

INCREASES THE EFFECTIVENESS OF

PRECISION GUIDED MUNITIONS

HEART OF REVOLUTION IN MILITARY AFFAIRS
(RMA)
Confidential


The Future

Confidential

Network Centric Warfare

Network is the Computer

Fundamental Shift from Platform Centric
warfare to Network Centric Warfare

Characterized by:

Very High Level of Shared Battlespace
Awareness
Shared Knowledge of Commanders Intent
Self-Sync, Speed of Command, and rapid lock-
out

Confidential

Network Centric Warfare:
Sources of Increased Combat Power

Shared Battlespace Awareness
Increased Battlespace Awareness
Battlespace Expansion: Employment of
Weapons at Max Range

Increased Survivability
Self-Synchronization of Forces
Reduced Collateral Damage
Virtual Collaboration: Moving Information not
people
Confidential

The Present

Modelling and Analysis of
Advanced Technologies and
Combat Support Systems in
Combat between RMA Forces

Confidential

Combat
Evaluation of Weapon CSS Weights
Support System
Power Scores of Army, t o g e t h e r on AHP
based
(CSS)i n g i n n o v a t i o n
craft
Navy and Air Force Capability
Weapons Assessment

Force Strength Force Multiplier
Estimation of Evaluation related to CSS
Quantity of
Weapons

Adaptive Estimation of
Generation of Dynamic Model
Combat Scenarios Model Parameters

Combat
METHODOLOGY Outcomes

Confidential

Weapon Power Score

Self Integration
Operability
Lethality Protection Index
Index
Index

On-Board On- Board Self Night / All Ability to get
Weapons Defence Weather connected to
Capability Capability Capability C3I System

Confidential Each Node in the Network

Weapon Power Score (WPS)
= Operational Lethality Index (OLI) x (1+ Self-Protection Index (SPI)) x
(1 + Operability Index (OI)) x (1 + Integration Index (II))

Force Strength (FS)

= Summation of product of WPS and Quantity of weapons in a force

Force Potential (FP)

= Force Strength x (1 + Combat Support System Effectiveness Factor)

Confidential

Factors considered for OLI Computations

Weapons Factors
Infantry Small Arms Rate of Fire, Range, Accuracy, Reliability,
and Non Mobile and Potential Targets per Strike, Dispersion
Weapons Factor

Arty Towed/AD Guns All of the above and certain Artillery
related factors

Arty Self-Propelled All of the above and Mobility factors.

OLI of on-board Guns and Missiles,
Armour, Ships, Mobility factor Punishment factor,
Submarines Ammunition factor, Amphibious
capability factor etc.,

Attack Helicopter, OLI of on-board Guns, Missiles, Ceiling
Aircraft factor Mobility factor,

Confidential

Factors Affecting SPI, OI and II of Army Platforms

Weapon System Factors Affecting
SPI OI II

Infantry Survivability Night Vision, Communication Links
Transportability with Brigade. HQ. and
Built-in-Armor, RPV/UAV
Night Vision, All
Reactive Armor, Top
Armor Attack Protection NBC Weather Operations, Communication Links
Protection, Fire & fording, with RPV/UAV and other
Explosion Suppression, Amphibious Armor Vehicles.

Silhouette, Agility Capability, Air
droppable

Shoot & Scoot
Artillery Guns Capability, Stand Off All weather Integration with AOP
Range, Armored Operability, NBC
Protection Operability.
AD Arty/ SAM Radar Control, NBC Integration with C2
Shoot & Scoot
Capability, Stand Off Environment system
Range
Confidential

Factors Affecting SPI, OI and II coff t iAirnforce tWeapons
ra ng in ovation ogether

SPI OI II

Close Air Chaff, ECM,
Support / ESM, Multi Mode
Attack Helo Radar, Precision
Guided Munitions
Night Flight, Inter Aircraft
Night Time & Ground
Delivery, All Station
Deep Strike Weather

All of the above Communicati
and Inertial Operation on
Navigation
System

All of the above
Air Defense and Look
Down/Look Up
Radar

Confidential

Factors Affecting SPI, OI and IIr aofi nNavalt iPlatforms
c ft g innova on together


SPI OI II

Battle Ships Intensity of Communication
Threats faced, Links with Shore,
Ability to detect with Maritime
threatening Aircraft, with Sub

Shallow
Platform, Marine force, with
Water/ High
Protection to other Ships.
Seas
Evade hit,
Operability
Protection to
Evade Kill given Communication Links
Submarine hit, Ability to with Shore, Maritime
Jam/Confuse Aircraft, Own
Enemy Platform Submarine force.

Confidential

Combat Support Systems (CSS)

Intelligence Surveillance C4 Information Logistics
& Reconnaissance(ISR)
Warfare Support
System

Command and EW Infrastructure
Space based
Control Opsec Resources
Airborne
Communications Psyops Material
Sea Based
Computers Deception Management
• Ground Based
Lethal IW National

System Integration
Non lethal IW Resources
Encryption Inter-service
SW Engg Integration
Networking
Computer
Security
Info Security

Confidential


IW
ISR
C4
Space
Cmd & Control

Air
Communications

Sea
Computers

Gnd
System Integration

ILSS


I1 I2 I3 I4 C1 C2 C3 C4 W L
Space based ISR (I1) 1 1 1 1 1 0 0 0 1 1
Airborne ISR (I2) 0 1 1 1 1 0 0 0 1 1
ISR Sea based ISR (I3) 0 0 1 0 1 0 0 0 1 1
Gnd based ISR (I4) 0 1 1 1 1 0 0 0 1 1
Cmd and Control (C1) 0 0 0 0 1 0 0 0 1 0
C4 Communications (C2) 1 1 1 1 1 1 1 1 1 1
Computers (C3) 1 1 1 1 1 1 1 1 1 1
System Integration (C4) 1 1 1 1 1 1 1 1 1 1
IW (W) 1 1 1 1 1 1 1 1 1 1
ILSS (L) 0 0 0 0 1 0 0 1 0 1

I1 I2 I3 I4 C1 C2 C3 C4 W L
Space based ISR (I1) 1 0 0 0 0 1 1 1 1 0

Air ISR (I2) 1 1 0 1 0 1 1 1 1 0
ISR Sea based ISR (I3) 1 1 1 1 0 1 1 1 1 0
Gnd based ISR (I4) 1 1 0 1 0 1 1 1 1 0
Cmd and Control (C1) 1 1 1 1 1 1 1 1 1 1
C4 Communications (C2) 0 0 0 0 0 1 1 1 1 0
Computers (C3) 0 0 0 0 0 1 1 1 1 0
System Integration (C4) 0 0 0 0 0 1 1 1 1 1
IW (W) 1 1 1 1 1 1 1 1 1 0
ILSS (L) 1 1 1 1 0 1 1 1 1 1



Combat Combat Combat Sub System CSS Normalised Order of
Support Support Synergy Activity Index Weights Ranking
Systems System Indices Ai =(Di) X (Si) (Wi)
Dependency (Si)
Indices (Di)
Space based ISR 0.064 0.083 0.00531 0.0598 VIII
Air based ISR 0.096 0.070 0.672 0.0757 IV
Sea based ISR 0.115 0.047 0.00541 0.0609 VI
Gnd based ISR 0.096 0.070 0.00672 0.0757 IV
Cmd and Control 0.165 0.033 0.00545 0.0614 V
Communications 0.054 0.165 0.00891 0.1004 III

Computers 0.054 0.165 0.00891 0.1004 III
System 0.076 0.165 0.01254 0.1413 II
Integration
IW 0.142 0.165 0.2343 0.2639 I
ILSS 0.138 0.039 0.00538 0.0606 VII



ISR C4

Space Based Command and Control IW ILSS
Air Based Communications
Sea Based Computers
Ground Based System Integration

Country A Country B Country C


CSS Factors
Space based ISR Communications Satellites, Navigation Satellites,
Meterological Satellites, Imaging Reconnaissance Satellites,
Relay Satellites
Air baser ISR AWACS/AEW, Air based Ground Tactical Reconnaissance,
Maritime Reconnaissance, Airborne Ground Strategic
ISR Reconnaissance, Airborne Battlefield Surveillance Capability
(UAV/RPV capability)
Sea based ISR Surface Tactical Recce, Sub-surface Tactical Recce, Strategic
Recce, Coast based Strategic Recce
Ground based Tactical Recce, Air Space Recce, Strategic Recce
ISR
Command and Strategic C2, Tactical C2, Politics Military C2, Inter Services
Control Integration

Communications Utilization of EM Spectrum, Communication System,
Communication Security, Merger with National Telecom
System
C4 Computers Computing Power, Software capability, Knowledge
processing and Automated Decision Making Capability
System Data Fusion, National Level Interoperability, Inter Services
Integration Operability, Integration of ISR, C2, ILSS with Lethal
System, Fault Tolerant Communication / Computing,
Interoperability Standards
Information Warfare (IW) Operations Security, Psychological Operations, EW,
Deception Lethal IW, Non Lethal IW, Cryptology, Computer
Security, Info Security, Intelligence
ILSS Armed Forces Resources, Logistics Infrastructure, Material
Management, National Resources, Inter Service Integration

Adaptive Dynamic Model (ADM)

• Off shoot of Lanchester Models Extensions

• J.M. Epstein • Air to Air Combat

• Use of Exchange Ratio and • Naval Combat
Prosecution Rate including sub surface

• Parameters reflecting ability to • use of Weapon Power
Scores instead of

concentrate fire in engagements
WEI for Force
• Uses Force strength instead of Strength
Numerical Strength
• Estimation of
• Withdrawal and reinforcements parameters based on
• Close Air Support to Ground Forces realistic data

Confidential

INPUT
• Initial Force Strengths
of the Forces
• Force Strength
Reinforcement on each
day OUTPUT
• Force Strength Attrition
Force
Rate
Strength loss
• Exchange Ratio
Adaptive and Aircraft
• Threshold Attrition Attrition per
Rates
Dynamic
Model day
• Number of Close Air

Support (CAS) Aircraft
• CAS daily Sortie rate
per Aircraft
• CAS aircraft Attrition
rate per sortie
• Battle termination
Conditions

Confidential


Equations of the Model :

A t   A t  11   t  1  DCAS (t  1)  RA t ,
g g g

 t  1
D t   D t  1  A t  1  ACAS (t  1)  RD t ,

g g  t  1 g g

 W(t) 
 (t )   (t ) 1  ,
g  W 
 max 

Confidential


0 if  d (t  1)   dT
W (t )  
W (t  1)   Wmax  W (t  1)   (t  1)    if  (t  1)  

  d


  1   dT 
dT d dT

D (t )   D (t  1)  RD (t  1)
 g 
 (t ) 
g  g .
d D (t )
g

We set W(1) = 0, on the attacker’s side
   (t  1) 
 (t )   (t  1)   T
g g 
a

g
 a

  (t  1)  
aT

 aT 
,

A (t  1)   A (t  1)  RA (t  1)
 g 
 (t ) 
g  g .
a A (t )
Confidential g


We set g(1) equal to some initial value [g(1)
 aT].

The ground-induced exchange ratio is given
by

 D (t )  d
 g 
 (t ) =    ,

0 
A (t )  a
 g 
 
(8)

where 0 is a constant.

Confidential

Equations for Close Air Support (CAS)
aircraft:

a a
 da

D (t ) = D (t  1) 1   S d  RD (t ),
a

a a
 aa

A (t ) = A (t  1) 1   S a  RA (t ).
a

DCAS(t ) = a D (t ),

a

a=
LK
d 
 da d

1 - 1 -  S  1 
 1 ,
V   

 da 


Confidential


ACAS (t ) = b A (t ),
a

 S a 1 
 
 

1-1-  
L Ka   aa  
b=  1 .
V   aa 

 
 
 

Confidential


SIDE A SIDE B

Ground Forces Ground Forces

CAS Forces CAS Forces
AD Fighters
AD Fighters
AD Escorts

AD Escorts

Confidential

Test Scenario – Country A Strike
Corps attacking Country B holding forces

Force with Force with
Country A Country B
1 Armoured 2 Infantry Division
Division
1 Independent 3 Independent

Armoured Brigade Armoured Brigades
3 Infantry 1 Armoured
Divisions Regiment

Confidential

Nco Role In Battlefield Management

Nco Role In Battlefield Management

Recommandé

Recommandé

Contenu connexe

Tendances

Tendances (20)

En vedette

En vedette (20)

Similaire à Nco Role In Battlefield Management

Similaire à Nco Role In Battlefield Management (20)

Plus de Navneet Bhushan

Plus de Navneet Bhushan (20)

Nco Role In Battlefield Management