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Practical web-attacks2

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Web application attacks – practical demonstration Ing. Pavol Lupták, CISSP, CEH          www.nethemba.com             www.nethemba.com      
Agenda  Unvalidates Parameters  Access Control Flaws  Session Management Flaws  Cross Site Scripting (XSS)  Injection flaws (bonus)  Improper Error Handling (bonus)  AJAX Security (bonus)          www.nethemba.com       
Access Controls Flaws  Bypass a Path Based Access Control Scheme  Bypass Data Layer Access Control  Bypass Business Layer Access Control  Remote Admin Access          www.nethemba.com       
AJAX Security  DOM­based XSS  Client Side Filtering  Same Origin Policy (SOP) Protection  XML Injection  JSON Injection  Silent Transaction Attacks   Dangerous Use of Eval        www.nethemba.com       
Authentication flaws  Forgot Password  Multilevel Login 1  Multilevel Login 2          www.nethemba.com       
Code Quality  Discover Clues in the HTML code          www.nethemba.com       
Concurrency  Shopping Card Concurrency Flaw           www.nethemba.com       
Cross Site Scripting (XSS)  Stored XSS  Reflected XSS  Cross Site Request Forgery (CSRF)  HTTPonly test          www.nethemba.com       
Improper Error Handling  Fail Open Authentication Scheme          www.nethemba.com       
Injection flaws  Blind SQL injection  Numeric SQL injection  String SQL injection  XPATH injection          www.nethemba.com       
Parameter tampering  Exploit Hidden Fields  Exploit Unchecked Email  Bypass Client Side JavaScript Validation          www.nethemba.com       
Session Management Flaws  Spoof an Authentication Cookie  Hijack a Session  Session Fixation Attack          www.nethemba.com       
Used tools  WebGoat project  http://www.owasp.org/index.php/Category:OWASP_WebGoat_P  WebScarab  http://www.owasp.org/index.php/Category:OWASP_WebScarab  Tamperdata http://tamperdata.mozdev.org/  LiveHTTPHeaders http://livehttpheaders.mozdev.org/  Foxy Proxy http://foxyproxy.mozdev.org/          www.nethemba.com       
References  New Web Applications Attacks  http://www.nethemba.com/new_web_attacks­nethe  LAMP and PHP security hardening (in Slovak  language)   http://www.nethemba.com/php­sec.pdf          www.nethemba.com       
Thank you for listening! Ing. Pavol Lupták, CISSP, CEH pavol.luptak@nethemba.com          www.nethemba.com       

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Practical web-attacks2

  • 1. Web application attacks – practical demonstration Ing. Pavol Lupták, CISSP, CEH          www.nethemba.com             www.nethemba.com      
  • 2. Agenda  Unvalidates Parameters  Access Control Flaws  Session Management Flaws  Cross Site Scripting (XSS)  Injection flaws (bonus)  Improper Error Handling (bonus)  AJAX Security (bonus)          www.nethemba.com       
  • 3. Access Controls Flaws  Bypass a Path Based Access Control Scheme  Bypass Data Layer Access Control  Bypass Business Layer Access Control  Remote Admin Access          www.nethemba.com       
  • 4. AJAX Security  DOM­based XSS  Client Side Filtering  Same Origin Policy (SOP) Protection  XML Injection  JSON Injection  Silent Transaction Attacks   Dangerous Use of Eval        www.nethemba.com       
  • 5. Authentication flaws  Forgot Password  Multilevel Login 1  Multilevel Login 2          www.nethemba.com       
  • 6. Code Quality  Discover Clues in the HTML code          www.nethemba.com       
  • 7. Concurrency  Shopping Card Concurrency Flaw           www.nethemba.com       
  • 8. Cross Site Scripting (XSS)  Stored XSS  Reflected XSS  Cross Site Request Forgery (CSRF)  HTTPonly test          www.nethemba.com       
  • 9. Improper Error Handling  Fail Open Authentication Scheme          www.nethemba.com       
  • 10. Injection flaws  Blind SQL injection  Numeric SQL injection  String SQL injection  XPATH injection          www.nethemba.com       
  • 11. Parameter tampering  Exploit Hidden Fields  Exploit Unchecked Email  Bypass Client Side JavaScript Validation          www.nethemba.com       
  • 12. Session Management Flaws  Spoof an Authentication Cookie  Hijack a Session  Session Fixation Attack          www.nethemba.com       
  • 13. Used tools  WebGoat project  http://www.owasp.org/index.php/Category:OWASP_WebGoat_P  WebScarab  http://www.owasp.org/index.php/Category:OWASP_WebScarab  Tamperdata http://tamperdata.mozdev.org/  LiveHTTPHeaders http://livehttpheaders.mozdev.org/  Foxy Proxy http://foxyproxy.mozdev.org/          www.nethemba.com       
  • 14. References  New Web Applications Attacks  http://www.nethemba.com/new_web_attacks­nethe  LAMP and PHP security hardening (in Slovak  language)   http://www.nethemba.com/php­sec.pdf          www.nethemba.com       
  • 15. Thank you for listening! Ing. Pavol Lupták, CISSP, CEH pavol.luptak@nethemba.com          www.nethemba.com