1. Have multicultural policies impeded
integration of ethnic minorities? A
generational perspective
Anthony Heath
University of Manchester
Neli Demireva
University of Oxford
2. What the politicians say
• “Under the doctrine of state multiculturalism, we have
encouraged different cultures to live separate lives, apart
from each other and apart from the mainstream”
(Cameron 2011)
• Britain is “sleepwalking to segregation” (Trevor Phillips,
head of the EHRC, 2005)
• “The tendency had been to say ‘Let’s adopt the multikulti
concept and live happily side by side, and be happy to be
living with each other’, but this concept has failed, and
failed utterly” (Merkel 2010)
• Multiculturalism has failed in Europe, and has proven to be
as harmful as the assimilationst approach it replaced
(Council of Europe, 2008)
3.
4. What some academics say
“Multicultural policies – which grant immigrants
easy access to equal rights and do not provide
strong incentives for host-country language
acquisition and interethnic contacts – when
combined with a generous welfare state …
display relatively poor integration outcomes.
Countries that either had more restrictive or
assimilationist integration policies or a relatively
lean welfare state have achieved better
integration results.” (Koopmans 2010)
5. A rival view
“Multiculturalism provides a locus for the high level of
mutual identification among native-born citizens and
immigrants in Canada …
The fact that Canada has officially defined itself as a
multicultural nation means that immigrants are a
constituent part of the nation that citizens feel pride
in, so multiculturalism helps native-born citizens to link
national identity to solidarity with immigrants and
minorities.
And, conversely, multiculturalism provides a link by
which immigrants and minorities come to identify
with, and feel pride in, Canada” (Kymlicka 2010)
6. So what is multiculturalism?
• A normative political theory maintaining the
inadequacy of standard liberal principles in the face of
cultural diversity. Not only individuals but also
communities need to have rights (Lord Parekh,
Rethinking Multiculturalism).
• Organizations should therefore be encouraged “to
devise policies that promote diversity as well as
equality … and to stress that the country is both a
community of citizens and a community of
communities, both a liberal and a plural society”
(Report of the Commission on the future of multi-
ethnic Britain)
7. MCP Index (Banting and Kymlicka)
1. Official affirmation of multiculturalism
2. Adoption of multiculturalism in school curricula
3. Inclusion of ethnic representation in licensing of
public media
4. Exemptions from dress codes
5. Allowing of dual citizenship
6. Funding of ethnic organizations to support cultural
activities
7. Funding of bilingual education or mother-tongue
teaching
8. Affirmative action for disadvantaged groups
8. Some queries about MCPs
• Affirmative action – some forms of affirmative
action (which do not involve quotas) could be
justified under straightforward liberal principles
to remedy discrimination (cf Brian Barry ‘the
muddles of multiculturalism’)
• Faith schools - some policies, eg Swedish
independent schools, unintentionally permit
minorities to establish their own faith schools. Is
this multiculturalism or simply extending same
rights to minorities as to other established
groups?
9. MC needs to be distinguished from
• Assimilationist regimes (eg France) with
limitations on freedom to practice own culture
• Classic liberalism with freedom to practice own
culture and anti-discrimination measures
• Plural/pillarized regimes where there are parallel
structures covering economic and political as well
as cultural institutions. These are not
multicultural but segmented societies (eg BiH)
• i.e. a spectrum ranging from assimilationist to
segmented regimes with multiculturalism lying in
between
10. MCP index 1980-2010
1980 2000 2010
Canada 5 7.5 7.5
Denmark 0 0.5 0
France 1 2 2
Netherlands 2.5 5.5 2
Sweden 3 5 7
Switzerland 0 1 1
UK 2.5 5.5 5.5
11. Britain – a ‘thin’ version of
multiculturalism
1. Lukewarm official affirmation of multiculturalism – Swann
report
2. Limited adoption of multiculturalism in school curricula
3. No inclusion of ethnic representation in licensing of public
media
4. Exemptions from dress codes, especially for Sikhs
5. Allows dual citizenship
6. Limited funding of ethnic organizations to support cultural
activities
7. Limited funding of bilingual education or mother-tongue
teaching
8. Weak affirmative action for disadvantaged groups
12. What outcomes do critics object to?
• Inability to communicate in host-country
language (Merkel)
• Segregated communities (Phillips, Cameron)
• Lack of economic and political participation
(Koopmans)
• Failure to adopt liberal western values and
maintenance of illiberal practices, eg forced
marriages (Cameron)
• Crime, extremism and home-grown terrorism
(Cameron)
13. And what do supporters claim?
• Multiculturalism encourages take-up of
citizenship and hence political participation
• Promotes educational and occupational
success
• promotes dual identities, eg as both Canadian
and minority, and national pride
• Encourages pro-minority attitudes among
majority group too. (Kymlicka 2010)
14. Our empirical approach
• Key test is attitudes and behaviour of the
second generation – not surprising if first
generation have difficulty learning English,
retain identification with origin country or
remain encapsulated in the ethnic community
• Key worry of critics is ‘home-grown’ terrorism
among the second generation
• Hence need to look at direction of
generational change
15. An important caveat
• Very difficult to determine whether outcomes
(good or bad) are actually caused by the MCPs.
• Rigorous policy evaluation is very difficult –
requires pre/post designs not cross-sectional
ones
• But can ask whether groups that have been
granted more protection for cultural practices (eg
Sikhs) have integrated less than groups not
seeking or granted cultural protection
(Caribbeans) cf Statham and Koopmans
16. Outcomes we can look at
• Citizenship
• Language
• Social segregation
• Political participation
• Democratic values
• Identities
• Support for violent protests
17. The data
• The 2010 Ethnic Minority British Election Survey
(EMBES)
• Thanks to the ESRC for their generous funding of the
study
• To the Electoral Commission for their support and
partnership
• To TNS-BMRB (Nick Howat, Oliver Norden, Emily
Pickering) for their work on design and fieldwork
• To our Advisory Board - Irene Bloemraad, John
Curtice, Harry Goulbourne, Chris Myant, Maajid
Nawaz, Lucinda Platt, Peter Riddell, Shamit Saggar,
Will Somerville, David Voas
18. Design 1
• Stand-alone survey rather than a booster to the main
BES (ie separate sample design etc)
• Nationally-representative probability sample
• Clustered, stratified design with over-sampling in
high EM density areas and exclusion of lowest
density areas (< 2% EM)
• PAF used as sample frame
• LSOAs were the PSUs (unlike main BES)
• Initial screening of addresses
19. Design 2
• 30,000 addresses issued for screening
• In 620 PSUs
• £20 conditional incentive offered to participants
• 50 minute questionnaire, administered by CAPI with
a self-completion module for confidential items
• Around half items exact replications of those in main
BES
• Short mailback questionnaire
20. Response
• 2787 respondents in total (including some
from mixed and other backgrounds who had
been indicated as belonging to one of the 5
target groups at screening)
• Response rate of 58 – 62% (depending on
method of treating those with unknown
ethnicity from the screening exercise)
• Poor response to mailback – 975 returned
21. Sample characteristics
EMBES BES
White British 0 3126
Other white 0 57
Mixed 113 32
Indian 587 52
Pakistani 668 17
Bangladeshi 270 8
Black Caribbean 598 31
Black African 525 38
Other 26 59
29. Don’t oversimplify the story
Clear evidence of generational change in the direction of
integration with respect to
Citizenship
Language
Social relationships
British identity
But some change in the opposite direction with respect to
Turnout
Support for violent protest
Duty to vote
30. Qualified optimism
• In the case of several outcomes, such as
language, citizenship, democratic
commitment and participation, all groups are
fully integrated by the second generation
• But some ethnic differences remain – lower
social integration among Pakistanis and
Bangladeshis but lower identificational
assimilation among Black groups
31. Some first reflections
• Positive changes are ones where starting values
in 1st generation were relatively low and have
since converged with the British pattern
• Negative changes are ones where 1st generation
showrf relatively high support for democracy,
and again have tended to converge with the
British level
• So overall picture is of gradual convergence with
established British patterns
32. Might the changes be due to MCPs?
• British MCP interventions weak so it would be
surprising if they had had much effect
• What might we have expected in the absence
of MCPs? Gradual convergence?
• Changes appear to have been at least as large
among South Asian groups (albeit from lower
starting points) as among Black groups so
doubtful if MCPs have had any impact
33. Can we discount alternative theories?
• Exclusion and discrimination by the White
majority group might also be expected to
reduce rates of convergence
• Black groups are particularly likely to feel
excluded and to experience relative
deprivation, and this is a more plausible
explanation of their disaffection
• Cultural preferences, especially with regard to
social segregation, cannot be ruled out
34. Logistic regression 1 (Average marginal effects)
Feels more Bothered about Might support
Black/Asian than marriage to white violent protest
British person against war
Ethno-religious group
Pakistani 0 0 0
Bangladeshi 0.07* -0.04 0.01
Indian Sikh 0.08* -0.07** 0.04
Indian Hindu 0.11** -0.09** -0.01
Indian Muslim -0.02 -0.09* -0.02
Other Indian 0.05 -0.12** 0.00
BA Muslim 0.13*** -0.10* -0.02
Other BA 0.25*** -0.03 0.04**
Black Caribbean 0.24*** -0.07** -0.03*
Generation
1st 0 0 0
1.5 -0.13*** -0.06** 0.06***
2nd + -0.25*** -0.11*** 0.06***
Age (ln) -0.31*** -0.04 -0.08**
Gender 0.01 0.01 -0.03**
Married 0.00 0.03* 0.00
Education 0.00 -0.01* 0.00
N 2552 2537 2520
35. Logistic regression 2 (Average marginal effects)
Feels more Bothered about Might support
Black/Asian than marriage to white violent protest
British person against war
Co-ethnic friends 0.03** -0.02 0.00
Co-ethnic neighbours 0.01 0.01 -0.01
Co-ethnic worship -0.02 0.01 0.02
Co-ethnic association 0.08*** 0.06*** 0.05**
Sociotropic discrimination 0.25*** 0.06 0.10***
Egocentric discrimination 0.09*** 0.07*** 0.00
Percentage co-ethnic (ln) 0.04 0.09* 0.00
Index of multiple deprivation (ln) 0.08 -0.03 -0.04
N 2552 2537 2520
36. In conclusion
• Multiculturalism has not failed utterly in Britain – MCPs
have not prevented convergence with British patterns
• Convergence has proceeded at similar rates for all ethno-
religious groups
• Some features of second generations – continuing social
segregation – are consistent with the critics’ claims, though
critics tend to oversimplify findings into exaggerated
‘stylized facts’.
• Best guess is that MCPs have been very weak and have
made little difference either way
• A better focus of policy interventions would be the
continued discrimination and exclusion by the majority
group
