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VoIP – Vulnerabilities and Attacks


                          Presented by
                                - push
Agenda
      • Introduction to VoIP
             – VoIP Architecture
             – VoIP Components
             – VoIP Protocols
      • A PenTester Perspective
             –   Attack Vectors
             –   Scanning
             –   Attacks
             –   Tools of Trade
             –   Countermeasures and Security

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Remember Something?




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VoIP
      •    IP Telephony
      •    Voice over Internet Protocol
      •    Subset of IP Telephony
      •    Transmission of “Voice” over Packet-Switched
           Network.

      • Is it only Voice??? – Data, Audio, Video


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VoIP
      • Voice Analog Signals are converted to digital
        bits - “Sampled” and transmitted in packets
                                       Analog Voice
                                         Signals
                                                             101010101010
                                                              1101101101
           Analog Voice
                                              1010101010101101101      101010101010110110
             Signals                                  101                     1101



                     101010101010
                      1101101101                                                        Internet

                                    1010101010101101101      101010101010110110
                                            101                     1101




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VoIP Architecture

                 Ordinary Phone  ATA  Ethernet  Router  Internet




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VoIP Architecture
                     IP Phone  Ethernet  IP-PBX  Router  Internet




                                                                         Internet


  IP Phone                IP - PBX             Modem / Router




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VoIP Architecture

                     Softphone Phone  Ethernet  Router  Internet




                                                               Internet




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VoIP Architecture




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VoIP Components
      •    User Agents (devices)   •   Redirect Servers
      •    Media gateways          •   Registrar Servers
      •    Signaling gateways      •   Location Servers
                                   •   Network management system
      •    Gatekeepers             •   Billing systems
      •    Proxy Servers


       GW  Gateway MG  Media Gateway GK  Gatekeeper
       MGC  Media Gateway Controller NMS  Network Management System
       IVR  Interactive Voice Response



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VoIP Protocols
                     • Vendor Proprietary
                     • Signaling Protocols
                     • Media Protocols




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VoIP Protocols
SIP Session Initiation Protocol             SAP  Session Announcement Protocol

SGCP  Simple Gateway Control Protocol       MIME  Multipurpose Internet Mail

IPDC  Internet Protocol device Control      Extensions – Set of Standards

RTP  Real Time Transmission Protocol        IAX  Inter-Asterisk eXchange

SRTP  Secure Real Time Transmission Protocol Megaco H.248  Gateway Control Protocol

RTCP  RTP Control Protocol                  RVP over IP  Remote Voice Protocol over IP

SRTCP  Secure RTP Control Protocol          RTSP  Real Time Streaming Protocol

MGCP  Media Gateway Control Protocol        SCCP  Skinny Client Control Protocol (Cisco).

SDP  Session Description Protocol           UNISTIM  Unified Network Stimulus (Nortel).


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VoIP Protocols - SIP




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VoIP Protocols – H.323




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A PenTester Perspective




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VoIP – Attack Vectors
      • Vulnerabilities of Both Data and Telephone
        Network

      • CIA Triad




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VoIP - Scanning
      • Scanning a network for VoIP enabled systems / devices.
      • Tools for Scanning and Enumeration :
             –   Nmap  port scanner
             –   Smap  sip scanner. Finds SIP Enabled Servers
             –   Svmap  sip scanner
             –   Svwar  sip extension enumerator
             –   Iwar VoIP Enabled modem Dialer
             –   Metasploit Modules :
                     •   H.323 version scanner
                     •   SIP enumerator  SIP Username enumerator(UDP)
                     •   SIP enumerator_tcp  SIP Username Enumerator(TCP)
                     •   Options  SIP scanner(TCP)
                     •   Options_tcp  SIP scanner(UDP)


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VoIP – Scanning Demo
 • Nmap scan




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VoIP – Common Ports
        Protocol             TCP Port    UDP Port
        SIP                  5060        5060
        SIP-TLS              5061        5061
        IAX2                 -           4569
        http – web based     80 / 8080   -
        management console
        tftp                  -          69
        RTP                   -          5004
        RTCP                  -          5005
        IAX1                 -           5036
        SCCP                 2000
        SCCPS                2443
        H.323                1720




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VoIP – Scanning Demo
 • Smap
 • svmap




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VoIP – Scanning Demo
 • Metasploit Scanner




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VoIP - Attacks
      •    Identity Spoofing
      •    Conversation Eavesdropping / Sniffing
      •    Password Cracking
      •    Man-In-The-Middle
      •    SIP-Bye DoS
      •    SIP Bombing
      •    RTP Insertion Attacks
      •    Web Based Management Console Hacks
      •    Fuzzing
      •    Default Passwords


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VoIP – Attacks Demo
      • Identity – Caller ID Spoofing
             – Tools Used :
                     • Metasploit- SIP_INVITE_Spoof
                     • VoIP Fuzzer – Protos -Sip




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VoIP – Attacks Demo
      • Conversation Eavesdropping
             – Tools used :
                     •   Cain & Abel
                     •   Ettercap
                     •   Arpspoof
                     •   Wireshark




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VoIP – Attacks Demo
      • Man-In-The-Middle
             – Tools Used :
                     •   Wireshark
                     •   Arpspoof / ettercap
                     •   RTPInject
                     •   RTPmixsound




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VoIP – Attacks Demo
      • Password Cracking
             – Tools Used :
                     • SIPDump
                     • SIPCrack
                     • svcrack




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VoIP - Attacks
      Some Default Passwords for VoIP Devices and Consoles:
       Device / Console            Username                    Password

       Uniden UIP1868P VoIP        -                           admin
       phone Web Interface

       Hitachi IP5000 VOIP WIFI    -                           0000
       Phone 1.5.6

       Vonage VoIP Telephone       user                        user
       Adapter
       Grandstream Phones - Web    Administrator /admin        admin
       Adimistrator Interface
                                   user                        user




      •Asterisk Manager User Accounts are configured in /etc/asterisk/manager.conf


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VoIP – Audit & PenTest Tools
      •    UCSniff      •   MetaSploit Modules :
                            – Auxillary Modules
      •    VoIPHopper           • SIP enumerator  SIP Username enumerator
                                • SIP enumerator_tcp  SIP USERNAME
      •    Vomit                  Enumerator
      •    VoIPong              • Options  SIP scanner
                                • Options_tcp  SIP scanner
      •    IAX Flood            • Asterisk_login  Asterisk Manager Login Utility
                            – Exploits
      •    InviteFlood          • Aol_icq_downloadagent  AOL ICQ Arbitary File
                                  Downlowd
      •    RTPFlood             • Aim_triton_cseq AIM triton 1.0.4 CSeq Buffer
                                  Overflow
      •    IAXFlood             • Sipxezphone_cseq sipxezphone 0.35a Cseq Filed
                                  Overflow
      •    BYE-TearDown         • Sipxphone_cseq  sipxPhone 2.6.0.27 Cseq Buffer
                                  Overflow


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Countermeasures & Security
      •    Separate Infrasrtucture
      •    Do not integrate Data and VoIP Networks
      •    VoIP-aware Firewalls,
      •    Secure Protocols like SRTP,
      •    Session Encryption using SIP/TLS, SCCP/TLS
      •    Harden Network Security – IDS – IPS - NIPS



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Thank You
                     See you all @ nullcon - Delhi




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VoIP – vulnerabilities and attacks

  • 1. VoIP – Vulnerabilities and Attacks Presented by - push
  • 2. Agenda • Introduction to VoIP – VoIP Architecture – VoIP Components – VoIP Protocols • A PenTester Perspective – Attack Vectors – Scanning – Attacks – Tools of Trade – Countermeasures and Security http://null.co.in/ http://nullcon.net/
  • 4. VoIP • IP Telephony • Voice over Internet Protocol • Subset of IP Telephony • Transmission of “Voice” over Packet-Switched Network. • Is it only Voice??? – Data, Audio, Video http://null.co.in/ http://nullcon.net/
  • 5. VoIP • Voice Analog Signals are converted to digital bits - “Sampled” and transmitted in packets Analog Voice Signals 101010101010 1101101101 Analog Voice 1010101010101101101 101010101010110110 Signals 101 1101 101010101010 1101101101 Internet 1010101010101101101 101010101010110110 101 1101 http://null.co.in/ http://nullcon.net/
  • 6. VoIP Architecture Ordinary Phone  ATA  Ethernet  Router  Internet http://null.co.in/ http://nullcon.net/
  • 7. VoIP Architecture IP Phone  Ethernet  IP-PBX  Router  Internet Internet IP Phone IP - PBX Modem / Router http://null.co.in/ http://nullcon.net/
  • 8. VoIP Architecture Softphone Phone  Ethernet  Router  Internet Internet http://null.co.in/ http://nullcon.net/
  • 10. VoIP Components • User Agents (devices) • Redirect Servers • Media gateways • Registrar Servers • Signaling gateways • Location Servers • Network management system • Gatekeepers • Billing systems • Proxy Servers GW  Gateway MG  Media Gateway GK  Gatekeeper MGC  Media Gateway Controller NMS  Network Management System IVR  Interactive Voice Response http://null.co.in/ http://nullcon.net/
  • 11. VoIP Protocols • Vendor Proprietary • Signaling Protocols • Media Protocols http://null.co.in/ http://nullcon.net/
  • 12. VoIP Protocols SIP Session Initiation Protocol SAP  Session Announcement Protocol SGCP  Simple Gateway Control Protocol MIME  Multipurpose Internet Mail IPDC  Internet Protocol device Control Extensions – Set of Standards RTP  Real Time Transmission Protocol IAX  Inter-Asterisk eXchange SRTP  Secure Real Time Transmission Protocol Megaco H.248  Gateway Control Protocol RTCP  RTP Control Protocol RVP over IP  Remote Voice Protocol over IP SRTCP  Secure RTP Control Protocol RTSP  Real Time Streaming Protocol MGCP  Media Gateway Control Protocol SCCP  Skinny Client Control Protocol (Cisco). SDP  Session Description Protocol UNISTIM  Unified Network Stimulus (Nortel). http://null.co.in/ http://nullcon.net/
  • 13. VoIP Protocols - SIP http://null.co.in/ http://nullcon.net/
  • 14. VoIP Protocols – H.323 http://null.co.in/ http://nullcon.net/
  • 16. VoIP – Attack Vectors • Vulnerabilities of Both Data and Telephone Network • CIA Triad http://null.co.in/ http://nullcon.net/
  • 17. VoIP - Scanning • Scanning a network for VoIP enabled systems / devices. • Tools for Scanning and Enumeration : – Nmap  port scanner – Smap  sip scanner. Finds SIP Enabled Servers – Svmap  sip scanner – Svwar  sip extension enumerator – Iwar VoIP Enabled modem Dialer – Metasploit Modules : • H.323 version scanner • SIP enumerator  SIP Username enumerator(UDP) • SIP enumerator_tcp  SIP Username Enumerator(TCP) • Options  SIP scanner(TCP) • Options_tcp  SIP scanner(UDP) http://null.co.in/ http://nullcon.net/
  • 18. VoIP – Scanning Demo • Nmap scan http://null.co.in/ http://nullcon.net/
  • 19. VoIP – Common Ports Protocol TCP Port UDP Port SIP 5060 5060 SIP-TLS 5061 5061 IAX2 - 4569 http – web based 80 / 8080 - management console tftp - 69 RTP - 5004 RTCP - 5005 IAX1 - 5036 SCCP 2000 SCCPS 2443 H.323 1720 http://null.co.in/ http://nullcon.net/
  • 20. VoIP – Scanning Demo • Smap • svmap http://null.co.in/ http://nullcon.net/
  • 21. VoIP – Scanning Demo • Metasploit Scanner http://null.co.in/ http://nullcon.net/
  • 22. VoIP - Attacks • Identity Spoofing • Conversation Eavesdropping / Sniffing • Password Cracking • Man-In-The-Middle • SIP-Bye DoS • SIP Bombing • RTP Insertion Attacks • Web Based Management Console Hacks • Fuzzing • Default Passwords http://null.co.in/ http://nullcon.net/
  • 23. VoIP – Attacks Demo • Identity – Caller ID Spoofing – Tools Used : • Metasploit- SIP_INVITE_Spoof • VoIP Fuzzer – Protos -Sip http://null.co.in/ http://nullcon.net/
  • 24. VoIP – Attacks Demo • Conversation Eavesdropping – Tools used : • Cain & Abel • Ettercap • Arpspoof • Wireshark http://null.co.in/ http://nullcon.net/
  • 25. VoIP – Attacks Demo • Man-In-The-Middle – Tools Used : • Wireshark • Arpspoof / ettercap • RTPInject • RTPmixsound http://null.co.in/ http://nullcon.net/
  • 26. VoIP – Attacks Demo • Password Cracking – Tools Used : • SIPDump • SIPCrack • svcrack http://null.co.in/ http://nullcon.net/
  • 27. VoIP - Attacks Some Default Passwords for VoIP Devices and Consoles: Device / Console Username Password Uniden UIP1868P VoIP - admin phone Web Interface Hitachi IP5000 VOIP WIFI - 0000 Phone 1.5.6 Vonage VoIP Telephone user user Adapter Grandstream Phones - Web Administrator /admin admin Adimistrator Interface user user •Asterisk Manager User Accounts are configured in /etc/asterisk/manager.conf http://null.co.in/ http://nullcon.net/
  • 28. VoIP – Audit & PenTest Tools • UCSniff • MetaSploit Modules : – Auxillary Modules • VoIPHopper • SIP enumerator  SIP Username enumerator • SIP enumerator_tcp  SIP USERNAME • Vomit Enumerator • VoIPong • Options  SIP scanner • Options_tcp  SIP scanner • IAX Flood • Asterisk_login  Asterisk Manager Login Utility – Exploits • InviteFlood • Aol_icq_downloadagent  AOL ICQ Arbitary File Downlowd • RTPFlood • Aim_triton_cseq AIM triton 1.0.4 CSeq Buffer Overflow • IAXFlood • Sipxezphone_cseq sipxezphone 0.35a Cseq Filed Overflow • BYE-TearDown • Sipxphone_cseq  sipxPhone 2.6.0.27 Cseq Buffer Overflow http://null.co.in/ http://nullcon.net/
  • 29. Countermeasures & Security • Separate Infrasrtucture • Do not integrate Data and VoIP Networks • VoIP-aware Firewalls, • Secure Protocols like SRTP, • Session Encryption using SIP/TLS, SCCP/TLS • Harden Network Security – IDS – IPS - NIPS http://null.co.in/ http://nullcon.net/
  • 30. Thank You See you all @ nullcon - Delhi http://null.co.in/ http://nullcon.net/

Notes de l'éditeur

  1. IP Telephony - 1990
  2.  Run all VoIP traffic through a separate Internet connection, separating voice and data into their own network segments (VLAN). Set up separate servers dedicated just to VoIP traffic and firewall them apart from the rest of your network. VoIP connections between different buildings use a Virtual Private Network (VPN) to authenticate users to prevent spoofing. Avoid use of cheap VoIP systems. Encrypt any VoIP traffic to keep it confidential and prevent eavesdropping by network sniffers. Put VoIP servers in a secure physical location. Make sure all routers and servers hosting your VoIP system have been hardened and all unnecessary services turned off and ports closed. Restrict access to VoIP servers to only system administrators and log and monitor all access. Use intrusion detection systems to monitor malicious attempts to access your VoIP network. Employ a defense-in-depth of strategy with multiple layers of security, including dedicated VoIP-ready firewalls. Test all devices that send, receive or parse VoIP protocols, including handsets, softphones, SIP proxies, H.323 gateways, call managers and firewalls that VoIP messages pass through.