This document provides an overview and summary of a webinar for registrars about DNSSEC and PIR's implementation of DNSSEC for the .ORG top-level domain. The webinar covers topics like how DNSSEC works to secure DNS data and prevent cache poisoning, the benefits of DNSSEC for end users, registrants and registrars, PIR's timeline and process for implementing DNSSEC for .ORG, an introduction to DNSSEC terminology, changes to the EPP protocol and registry database, and resources for registrars. The presentation aims to educate registrars on DNSSEC and PIR's rollout so they can support it for domains under .ORG.

1. DNSSEC Registrar Review DNSSEC Industry Coalition Webinar Series Brought to you by .ORG, The Public Interest Registry and Afilias

2. Lauren Price, DNSSEC Industry Coalition Chair Sr. Product Marketing Manager, .ORG The Public Interest Registry lprice@pir.org Jim Galvin, Afilias Director, Strategic Relationships & Technical Standards jgalvin@afilias.info Sadik Chandiwala, Afilias Technical Account Manager sadik@ca.afilias.info Panelists 2

3. Agenda The Vulnerability of DNS Quick Intro to DNSSEC PIR and DNSSEC Timeline Friends and Family Program Some DNSSEC Terminology OT&E Functionality and Changes EPP Etc. Resources Questions

4. Today… When you visit a web site, send an email, or download software, can you be sure you are communicating with the server that you think you are? The answer is ‘no’, at least not with certainty.

5. What is DNSSEC and what does it protect us from? DNSSEC (short for Domain Name System Security Extensions) adds security to the Domain Name System. DNSSEC is designed to protect Internet resolvers (clients) from forged DNS data, such as that created by DNS cache poisoning.

6. Currently, a DNS resolver sends a query out to the Internet and then accepts the first response it receives, without question. If a malicious system were to send back an incorrect response, the resolver would use this address until its cache expired. This is bad enough if a single user's computer gets this bad data, but it is much worse if it's another name server that answers queries for an ISP – affecting thousands of users. What does cache poisoning look like?

7. DNSSEC Basics It provides proof that DNS data has not been modified in transit to the end-user It does this by providing additional information, something like a “seal of origin”, that can be verified as being correct or not. It is a set of extensions to DNS, which provide: origin authentication of DNS data, data integrity, and authenticated denial of existence.

8. How does DNSSEC work? Each piece of a domain’s DNS information has a digital signature attached to it. When a user enters the domain in a browser, the resolver verifies the signature. If it does not match, the resolver discards the response and waits for another. Only a response with a verified signature will be accepted by the resolver The description above is a common scenario. Please note that different resolvers may take different actions ** Note: DNSSEC only adds signatures to DNS data. It does not encrypt anything. It has no effect on increasing the privacy of the DNS, and information in the DNS is still public information.

9. Benefits of DNSSEC End User Benefits Ensures you are communicating to the correct website End Users that are not DNSSEC aware will not see any adverse effect. Registrant Benefits Mitigates the risk of possible fraud Greater protection of brand Significantly decreases the threat of domain hijacking

10. Benefits of DNSSEC Registrar Benefits Ability to meet Registrant demands for increase security of their domain Ability to continue to sell domains that are not secured by DNSSEC for those registrants who are not interested. Complying with new industry standards Registry Benefits Meeting new industry standards Ability to meet Registrar demands for increase security of their portfolio of domains

11. .ORG & DNSSEC Why?

12. Top five perceptions of the .ORG Brand* Informative Well-Intentioned Trustworthy Valuable Information Reliable We expect to keep it that way! 12 Our Brand & Reputation * Source: e5 Marketing Survey of over 10,000 respondents in an electronic form, November 2008

14. Registrars can participate in the testing phase

15. Registrars are encouraged to test in OTE

16. A certification test will be required

17. 2 registrars have passed their certification test to date

18. We have selected small set of domains and have manually inserted the DS records at the Registry

22. What is a Resolver? domain.org? User’s PC Resolver A DNS resolver is the program on a user’s computer that sends the query to the DNS. Once a response is received, the resolver returns the response back to the end user’s application. 192.0.5.4

23. What is a key pair? A key pair contains two digital keys — a private key (held only by the .ORG registry) and a public key (distributed to the public). The .ORG registry uses the .ORG private key pair to sign the zone. End users' validators (or the validators at their ISPs) use the .ORG public key to validate the signature once they've asked for it.

24. The Chain of Trust If I trust a public key from someone, I can use that key to verify the signature … and authenticate the source Make sure the root zone key can be trusted Pointers in the root zone point to lower zones (org/com/info/de etc) Each pointer is validated with the previous validated zone key When DNSSEC is fully deployed, only the key for the root zone is needed to validate all the DNSSEC keys on the Internet

25. Root Servers User’s PC Resolver .org authoritative NS domain.org authoritative NS Recursive DNS Server Local Cache Local cache Confidential – Copyright 2008 Afilias Limited

26. Root Servers User’s PC Resolver .ORG authoritative NS domain.ORG authoritative NS DNSSEC DNSSEC Recursive DNS Server DNSSEC Local cache Confidential – Copyright 2008 Afilias Limited

27. What is a key rollover? A key rollover will occur when the .ORG registry needs to change its side of a key pair. This means that the entire pair needs to be changed The .ORG zone will need to be re-signed with a new private key AND The public will need to update their validating resolvers with the new public portion of the .ORG zone key.

28. PIR and Key Rollovers PIR will be required to do Key Rollovers on a regular basis: If one of the .ORG private keys were compromised (i.e., stolen) and had to be immediately revoked. For prevention of compromise (see next question for further information), where a key rollover would be scheduled at regular intervals.

29. Scheduled Key Rollovers Digital signatures are not secure all of the time. They are subject to cryptanalysis. It is possible for an attacker to learn the private key in a key pair even though that key has never been disclosed, either through "brute force" or other types of attacks. Since every attack requires time to complete, periodically changing the key decreases the length of time an attacker has to attempt the compromise.

30. So...... What would happen if end users do not update their validating resolvers with the new .ORG zone key? Once the old key is purged, domains in the .ORG zone that were signed would no longer resolve for those people who did not use the new .ORG key. It would not affect people that are not using DNSSEC – they would continue to see the domain name.

31. Announcing Key Rollovers A key rollover will be announced on the PIR Web site prior to the scheduled event Anyone using DNSSEC will have to watch for these announcements, specially ISPs, registrars, and people using DNSSEC in applications.

32. What Changes has Afilias Made to the ORG Registry? Changes have been made to support the DNS protocol. Built New Registrar Tool Kit for DNSSEC Adds DNSSEC EPP transactions (RFC 4310) EPP server has been modified for DNSSEC Adds DNSSEC EPP transactions (as per RFC 4310) Changes to the Registry Database to now Store DS Information DNSSEC

33. Registrar OT&E Covered in the ORG manual: Extensible Provisioning Protocol (EPP) v1.0 ORG DNSSEC Registrar Acceptance Criteria Registrars must test the basic operations that their client application can perform in the ORG DNSSEC registry environment including: Create Domain Create Domain with Optional Key Data Query Domain Query Domain with Optional Key Data Update Domain – Adding DS Data Update Domain – Changing DS Data Update Domain – Change to Include Optional Data Update Domain – Removing DS Data

36. Changes to EPP Commands The following EPP commands will now contain the optional DNSSEC data: 1.Session Mgmt. <login> <logout> 3.Object Transform <create> <delete> <renew> <transfer> <update> 2.Object Query <check> <info> <poll > <transfer>

37. Changes to EPP: <create> domain Create Domain is changed because a DNSSEC secure domain must be created with a DS record attached to it Registrar needs to be accredited for creating domain names with DS records If they are not, the system will reject the domain create command and throw a validation error – You are not authorized to perform this action.

38. Changes to EPP : <create> domain If the maxSigLife is not entered for a <create> domain name with DS records, the system will set it to the default value (40 days) If the user provides empty tags for the following parameters, the domain will not be created and an error message will be returned: secDNS:keyTag secDNS:alg secDNS:digestType

39. Changes to EPP : <update> domain <update> domain command is now changed as DS information can be added or changed for each domain If the Registrar is not accredited for creating domain names with DS records and attempts to add DS data to an existing domain name, the system will reject the domain update command and return an error If the domain name already has 10 DS records and the sponsoring Registrar attempts to add another, the system will reject the domain update command and return an error per EPP RFC 3730. If the maxSigLife is not entered for a domain name with DS records, the system will set it to the default value (40 days)

40. Whois Changes The following fields will be appended to the WHOIS output for a domain name with DS records – DNSSEC (Can be Signed or Unsigned) – To denote if the domain name is digitally signed. DS Created – Time stamp that the record was created in UTC DS Maximum Signature Life - Maximum Signature Life associated with this DS record

41. Whois Changes If a domain name has more than one DS record associated with it, the DS record information for all the records will be displayed one after the other as displayed in the screenshot (above) If a domain name does not have any DS records associated with it, the DNSSEC value displayed will be Unsigned

42. Resources for Registrars .ORG OT&E Test Criteria General FAQ ORG manual: Extensible Provisioning Protocol (EPP) v1.0 ORG DNSSEC Registrar Acceptance Criteria Registrar Tool Kit (RTK – Addon) including the DNSSEC extensions is available for download from: https://registrars.pir.org/registrar_relations/dns_security www.sourceforge.net

43. Where do I learn more? The Domain Name System Security Extensions (DNSSEC are described in these IETF documents: RFC 4033: DNS Security Introduction and Requirements RFC 4034: Resource Records for the DNS Security Extensions RFC 4035: Protocol Modifications for the DNS Security Extensions .ORG website http://www.pir.org/dnssec DNSSEC related information website www.dnssec.net

44. Thank you! Questions?