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VoIP security legends and myths Konstantin Gurzov Head of Sales Support Department
VoIP   is attractive ! VoIP Access company’s network Manage calls  ( fraud ) Data defect and replacement Call interception Personal data theft and so on …
VoIP infrastructure components VoIP segment is an integration of a number of specialized platforms and network devices, different networks and technologies
All local network threats are actual for VoIP ,[object Object],[object Object],[object Object],[object Object],[object Object]
[object Object],Known threats  –  former protection measures Примеры рассчитанных метрик на основе "живых" данных при проведении внутренних аудитов ИБ специалистами компании Positive Technologies ,  2009 г. About  50%   of all network devices have  default   or easily  bruteforced  passwords
[object Object],[object Object],[object Object],[object Object],[object Object],[object Object],[object Object],[object Object],Examples Reconfiguration Minoring Interception
[object Object],[object Object],[object Object],[object Object],[object Object],Known threats  –  former protection measures If an attacker manages to access your device web interface, attacks are  guaranteed  to be successful
[object Object],[object Object],[object Object],[object Object],[object Object],[object Object],[object Object],Examples The possibility to detect vulnerabilities of different risk level, based on analysis of  5560  sites conducted by Positive Technologies experts, 2009
Known threats  –  former protection measures ,[object Object],Arbitrary code execution from the network in  в  CISCO Call Manager  6 Vulnerability allows attackers to execute  arbitrary code
Known threats  –  former protection measures ,[object Object],Denial of service in  CISCO Call Manager  6 Vulnerability allows attackers to cause  a denial of service
[object Object],[object Object],[object Object],Known threats  –  former protection measures Any VoIP device is a member of Ethernet network, so it is vulnerable to a most part of network attacks
[object Object],[object Object],[object Object],[object Object],Known threats  –  former protection measures Traffic listening leads to  violation of confidentiality   and  personal data thefts
Examples of real attacks ,[object Object],[object Object],[object Object]
Traffic fraud IP PBX 1 – Client’s IP PBX of  «А»  company IP PBX 2 – Attacker’s IP PBX ,[object Object],[object Object],[object Object],[object Object]
Traffic fraud  –  attacker’s actions ,[object Object],[object Object],[object Object],1 2 3 «А»  operator   is unable to explicitly separate responsibilities between itself and its client, so it  pays always
Traffic fraud  –  can be avoided if ,[object Object],[object Object],[object Object],[object Object],[object Object],[object Object]
Interception of negotiations ,[object Object],[object Object],[object Object],[object Object]
Capture corporate network ,[object Object]
Capture corporate network  –  attacker’s actions ,[object Object],[object Object],[object Object],[object Object],[object Object],[object Object],2 3 ,[object Object],https://www.example.org/ccmuser/personaladdressbookEdit.do?key='+UNION+ALL+SELECT+'','','',user,'',password+from+applicationuser;-- 1 An attacker can  capture all local network  via VoIP services
Conclusions ,[object Object],[object Object],[object Object]
Advices to create secure infrastructure ,[object Object],[object Object],[object Object],[object Object],[object Object]
Thank you for your attention ! Questions ? Konstantin Gurzov [email_address]

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Positive Hack Days. Gurzov. VOIP - Reduce Your Expenses, Increase Your Income! Or Vice Versa?

  • 1. VoIP security legends and myths Konstantin Gurzov Head of Sales Support Department
  • 2. VoIP is attractive ! VoIP Access company’s network Manage calls ( fraud ) Data defect and replacement Call interception Personal data theft and so on …
  • 3. VoIP infrastructure components VoIP segment is an integration of a number of specialized platforms and network devices, different networks and technologies
  • 4.
  • 5.
  • 6.
  • 7.
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  • 9.
  • 10.
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  • 14.
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  • 22. Thank you for your attention ! Questions ? Konstantin Gurzov [email_address]

Notes de l'éditeur

  1. DBMS, FTP, OS, Web, Mail, DNS, LDAP, Remote administration, Network hardware Number of vulnerable services associated with password policy Metrics are based on “alive” data collected in security internal audits conducted by Positive Technologies experts, 2009
  2. High, Medium, Low Dynamic site Typical site Detailed analysis of a vulnerable application
  3. Картинку просить у автора
  4. Картинку просить у автора