Buying Success in the English Premier League

MA Sports Management Philip Barnes

Sports Economics

An Analysis of the Ability to Buy Success in the English Football Association
Premier League and the Subsequent Implications on Consumer Welfare

‘The professional game has consistently rebutted the notion that success can be built,
crafted or coerced out of anything other than a significant heft in the transfer market.
Under Abramovich Chelsea spent £150m on players and abruptly won the league for
the first time in 50 years. Manchester United (valued at just over £900m), Arsenal
(£600m) and Chelsea (£384m) are among the top eight richest clubs in the world.
Between them they've won the last 13 Premier League titles.’
Ronay (2008, p.1)

Out of the top 25 richest clubs in the world, 10 are from the English Football
Association Premier League (FAPL). That is two fifths of the world’s richest football
clubs that ply their trade in the Premiership. In addition to the observation by Ronay,
Liverpool are also among the top eight, thus it is clear to see why these four clubs,
Manchester United, Arsenal, Chelsea and Liverpool, have gained the reputation as the
‘Big Four.’ Is it possible for other clubs in the league to dislodge one of these teams
or become successful enough to create the hypothetical ‘Big Five?’ On the contrary,
does a glass ceiling exist where teams’ advancements are limited by financial power?
Competitive balance must surely be a foregone conclusion between the Big Four and
the rest of the FAPL. Between the 2000/01 and 2007/08 seasons; the Big Four came
in the top four league positions 28 times out of a possible 32, won 69% of domestic
cups (FA and League Cup) and claimed the prestigious UEFA Champions League
(CL) twice. This dominance, domestically, is in part ‘shaped by assumed annual
returns from lucrative European club soccer competition (Williams 2007, p.139).’

It appears that the Big Four have been entered into a vicious circle, where
sporting success yields financial rewards, allowing the club to invest to ensure further
successes in the future (Michie & Oughton 2004; Buraimo et al. 2006). This article
will examine the extent to which teams in the FAPL are buying success. Can a
winning team be purchased? One of the most interesting questions in soccer, where
players’ salaries are relatively high, is whether salary structures and player
performance are correlated (Torgler & Schmidt 2007, p.2355). A host of authors
suggest so, identifying a strong positive correlation between pay and performance
(Szymanski & Smith 1997; Hall et al. 2002; Rosner & Shropshire 2004; Buraimo et
al. 2007; Barros & Garcia-del-Barrio 2008). To add to this intriguing range of

Page No. 1


literature, this study will also look at wage disparity, its consequent competitive
imbalance and the implication of subsequent ‘bought successes’ on consumer welfare.

Sporting success is an individual entity with different meanings for different
teams; for example, to recently promoted teams, the interpretation of success is
maintaining FAPL status for the following year. To the Big Four, success is the
FAPL title and competing for the CL, whilst mid table teams’ aim for entry to the less
important but still financially resourceful UEFA Cup. As Downward & Dawson
(2000) identify, the Big Four may contest the championship whereas many stand no
hope in even competing. In the FAPL, it appears that the more affluent clubs gain the
most success. Differences in teams’ prosperity originate from an array of
characteristics including their history, demand for tickets with willingness to pay,
stadium size, allure of sponsorship, effective management and marketing to mention a
few (Szymanski & Smith 1997, Frick 2005). Can a financial injection upon a club
enhance that team’s performance? This is an extremely captivating question,
considering the fact that Chelsea couldn’t compete with Arsenal, Liverpool and
Manchester United before they were taken over by Russian billionaire Roman
Abramovich prior to the 2003/2004 season. Interestingly, Arsenal, Liverpool and
Manchester United all share one common characteristic, their red home kit. Attrill et
al. (2008) undertook a study that suggested football teams with a red kit share a strong
positive correlation with long term success. They warn that ‘the injection of large
sums of money into individual teams, irrespective of shirt colour, may begin to
override any selective advantage that has built up over the last 50 years (p.581).’
Chelsea’s kit is blue, and so is the mood of Williams (2007, p.137) who proposes
billionaire takeovers provide ‘a bleak future for the premiership as a whole.’

Abramovich doubled Chelsea’s wage bill in his first season, bringing them
closer to FAPL success than ever before, finishing second to Arsenal. Frick (2005,
p.250) argues that in addition to players salaries, ‘head coach remuneration has a
positive and statistically significant influence on a team’s performance.’ A new
manager, whose contract made him the highest paid manger in the world (Burt 2005),
Jose Mourinho, took over in the summer of 2004 and promptly guided his highest
paid FAPL team to two successive FAPL titles, the FA Cup and two League Cups.
Coinciding with this drive towards English football dominance was an ever-advancing

Page No. 2


assault on European CL success (Appendix 1). Wagg (2007, p.447) places this recent
success by virtue of Mourinho’s skill rather than Abramovich’s millions, adding that
in the Premiership ‘there is equality of opportunity and that money cannot buy
success,’ which is nonsense as Chelsea’s recent success has been no coincidence;
looking at the Big Four price for success analysis (Appendix 2), we can see that
Chelsea have paid a much higher price than their competitors for domestic and
European points1. The comparative Big Four success graph (Appendix 3) paints a
clear picture, with Chelsea spending an estimated £406 million more than their rivals
for an equivalent level of success.

Football clubs spend in an attempt to achieve sporting success, as the financial
rewards continue to prove principal incentives (Michie & Oughton 2004; Buraimo et
al. 2006). If successful, the rewards can be plentiful, but if not, clubs can fall into
serious financial difficulty; this may involve selling top players for a reduced price,
going into administration or selling the club. This scenario has escalated recently
according to Buraimo et al. (2006), who recall the downfall of Leeds and West Ham
United who had to sell their best talent at a reduced rate. The authors also discover a
paradox where FAPL is ever increasing in affluence due to the vast broadcast of
games and the fact that clubs are becoming global brands. These characteristics
combined were the catalyst for the high wage bills of the current climate (Forrest et al.
2006; Noll 2007). Rosner & Shropshire (2004) identify a spiral effect where
escalating salary costs increase as a result of the precedent set by the previous season.
As we see by comparing recent FAPL total wage bills (Appendix 4), a coefficient (R²)
of 0.85 shows a strong positive correlation that the total wage expenditure in the
FAPL increases each season. According to Deloitte (2008), the wage total for the
2007/08 Premier League season was £1.1 billion2. Unlike the majority of American
sports, football is a free market where teams can offer whatever they can afford;
according to Hall et al. (2002), ‘teams compete in the market for playing talent,
bidding up salaries to the point where wages equal marginal revenue products,
therefore total payroll is a perfect predictor of performance.’ We will look at points
as a measure of team’s performance, despite Simmons & Forrest (2004, p.128)
suggesting that ‘teams in a league competition are probably less concerned with

1
Using the familiar point system, 3 for a win, 1 for a draw, 0 for a defeat, in the knockout stages of the
CL, this analysis became more accurate.
2
Estimated with the average exchange rate for the year on €1.4 billion

Page No. 3


points ratio than their relative standing.’ It is an obvious theory that the more points a
team has the higher their relative standing; with an R² of 0.89 (Appendix 5), this
relationship is nearly perfect and is therefore an ideal measurement of performance.

Barros & Garcia-del-Barrio (2008, p.26) summarise an extensive range of
literature (Hall et al. 2002; Rosner & Shropshire 2004; Simmons & Forrest 2004;
Michie & Oughton 2004; Buraimo et al. 2006; Togler & Schmidt 2007) suggesting
‘investment made in players is positively correlated to points scored on the pitch.’
Looking at the FAPL between the 2000/01 and 2006/07 seasons, a coefficient of 0.58
was identified (Appendix 6), showing the significant positive relationship between
individual annual team wage bills and the level of seasonal points they accrued. It is
possible however to eliminate time from the equation to strengthen the analysis
further. A seven year time span can see a huge difference in the value of money, thus
using a relative wage system, where the season’s average wage is taken from each
team’s wage bill, the relationship is further reinforced with a coefficient 0.63
(Appendix 7). This reinforces the wide array of literature suggesting higher wage
spend will yield better performance. Incidentally the PKF Football Finance Annual
Report 2008 shows that 59% of FAPL club financial directors would be budgeting to
spend more on the first team salaries, with 66% saying they would be reducing the
first team squad to do so; perhaps their optimal FAPL team would sacrifice squad
depth for richer quality which could possibly have an adverse effect. The theory
suggests that performance and wage bill are very highly correlated (Szymanski &
Smith 1997), yet not perfect ‘due to factors such as managerial talent, injuries, luck or
poor judgement (Hall et al. 2002, p.157).’ Team cohesion and homesickness may
also affect individual performances, which according to Torgler & Schmidt (2007),
are significantly related to salary.

Tunaru et al. (2004, p.284) suggest that a football team striving for success in
domestic and European competition ‘must employ the best, and inevitably, the most
expensive players’; thus the most affluent clubs will command a greater level of
playing talent (Szymanski & Smith 1997). Looking at the recent Professional
Footballer’s Association Player of the Year award, we can see the best players play
for the top four placed teams each year, coincidentally the highest paid as well
(Appendix 8). With regard to the employment of the best playing talent, net transfer

Page No. 4


activity must be taken into account. Comparing the transfer spend with the
performance of the thirteen teams that remained in the premiership throughout a five
year observation period (2002/03 – 2006/07), a significant relationship of 0.5 can be
seen (Appendix 9). This relationship would be a lot stronger if Chelsea hadn’t spent
erratically in the transfer market, three times more in fact than the next highest
spending team. Investment in player talent alone will not guarantee success according
to Frick & Simmons (2005, p.16), who suggest that an increase in wages and transfer
spending needs to be ‘accompanied by some investment in coaching talent if teams
are to progress up the league.’ In a detrimental effect on the league, larger market
teams will preside over smaller teams as they can afford to hire more talent, be it
playing or managerial (Simmons & Forrest 2004).

Wage disparity is damaging the competitiveness of the FAPL, with a widening
gap between the big four and the rest (Michie & Oughton 2005; Buraimo et al. 2006);
Rosner & Shropshire (2004, p.9) picture it as ‘the division between the haves and the
have nots.’ A successful league campaign and subsequent European expedition will
bring increased revenue to a club enabling the potential capture of more and better
playing talent, to help ensure future successes. Conversely, usually the financially
weaker teams that aren’t performing well get relegated, which can be economically
devastating to the club who will have to make substantial losses to survive (Michie &
Oughton 2005; Buraimo et al. 2006); Simmons & Forrest (2004) recommend that
teams with high relegation risk should spend to survive. Buraimo et al. (2007, p.204)
add to the already identified relationship between pay and performance, confirming
that ‘teams with higher revenues will have higher league positions or winning
percentages than teams with smaller revenues.’ Every year the inequality of
expenditure is increasing, shown in a wage dispersion box plot (Appendix 10). This
system shows the level of imbalance there is through dispersion and skew. A
common characteristic through the seasons was the majority of teams sitting below
£45 million per year, which coincided with an unfair rapid increase of wages between
the top tier and the bottom. The highest paid team was paying an estimated 3.5 times
as much as the lowest paid team in the 2000/2001 season opposed to an incredible 7.5
times in 2006/2007. The FAPL is the worlds most popular soccer league, however
Wagg (2008) points out that the competition is beginning to lack credibility as the
potential champions are too easily predicted.

Page No. 5


Using the C5 index of competitive balance derived by Michie & Oughton
(2004), we can analyse if the FAPL is in fact competitively imbalanced. The C5
index is gained by dividing the top five teams’ net total of points by the total number
of points won by all clubs. In a perfectly balanced league of 20 teams, the C5 ratio
should equal 0.25, therefore anything greater than this shows the level of competitive
disproportion. The FAPL has an average C5 index of 0.35 between the 2000/01 and
2006/07 seasons highlighting the constant inequality. Given the link between pay and
performance alongside the widening gap between the top and bottom teams, it is
obvious to see why the contest is imbalanced. Research suggests that this competitive
discrepancy could deteriorate the level of FAPL broadcasting as consumers want to
see more competition and uncertainty of outcome (Forrest et al. 2006; Noll 2007).
Kesenne (2007, p.11) argues that ‘fans don’t like to see the same clubs on top year
after year;’ this author regards competitive imbalance to reduce fan interest.
However, to explain the global popularity of the league, the ‘competitiveness of the
weaker teams is crucial to maintain the uncertainty of game outcomes (Rosner &
Shropshire 2004, p.57).’

Thus the FAPL remains balanced when the big four are removed from the
equation, and even when they aren’t, Andreff & Szymanski (2006, p.597) suggest the
‘realisation of the completely unexpected can generate enormous satisfaction.’ On the
contrary, competition between the big four is also fierce with unbelievable
competitive balance where bookmakers usually give very small odds as they are so
uncertain of the outcome. It is this uncertainty of outcome which maintains consumer
interest according to Rosner & Shropshire (2004). One of the best feasible measures
to determine fan interest level is through attendance figures. Whilst the FAPL’s
average attendance also gradually increased throughout the seven year period, a
considerable relationship of 0.33 was seen between attendance figures and
performance (Appendix 12). Therefore the consumer interest remains high despite
this imbalance with fans increasing in attendance watching teams achieving more
success (Forrest & Simmons 2002). However, Noll (2007, p.419) warns that ‘the
centralization of the sale of television rights in leagues will cause increasing harm to
consumers by restricting choice and raising prices.’ The twenty teams that form the
FAPL must remain independent sporting clubs with respect to their sporting

Page No. 6


performances, yet also form economic allies to sustain and enhance consumer welfare
(Flynn & Gilbert 2001; Rosner & Shropshire 2004); in addition, Buraimo et al. (2006)
argue that a financial disaster for one team could weaken the league as a whole.

To summarise, this study has strengthened the recent array of recent literature
highlighting the link between pay and performance. A significant relationship of 0.63
helped prove the assumption that ‘greater spending on talent will indeed translate to
higher win percent (Simmons & Forrest 2004, p.123).’ Thus teams in the FAPL can
buy success to a relatively large extent; considering that the theory isn’t perfect due to
external factors such as injuries and poor form, the PKF Football Finance Annual
Report 2008 suggests performance related pay is the way forward for teams looking
to focus their financial resources on the best players. 54% of FAPL clubs in the
current 2008/2009 season are making 10-25% of players pay dependant on
performance. However, such a system will evidently create a competitive imbalance
between the richer and poorer teams (Hall et al. 2002; Michie & Oughton 2004;
Szymanski 2007). However, given the attendance figures we can see that buying
success in the FAPL fails to affect consumers’ welfare negatively with fans inclined
to increase in attendance as their team gets more successful. Michie & Oughton
(2004) suggest that applying best practice across each teams’ business strategy,
marketing, financial management and corporate governance ‘would help to boost the
income of lagging clubs and close the revenue gap.’

Page No. 7


Appendix

Appendix 1 – Chelsea’s Champions League Progression (Various Seasons)

Owner Season Chelsea’s Champions League Progression
Ken Bates 1998/99 Didn’t Qualify
Ken Bates 1999/00 Quarter Final
Abramovich 2003/04 Semi Final
Abramovich 2005/06 Quarter Final
Abramovich 2007/08 Final

Appendix 2 – The Big Four: Price for Success Analysis

Season 2002/03 2003/04 2004/05 2005/06 2006/07
Wages 60,569,000 69,889,000 66,012,000 82,965,000 89,700,000
Transfers 16,762,000 12,188,000 8,736,000 11,793,000 8,009,000
Arsenal Total Money 77,331,000 82,077,000 74,748,000 94,758,000 97,709,000
League Points 78 90 83 67 68
Cup Points 10 13 10 25 11
Total Points 88 103 93 92 79
Money Per Point £878,761 £796,864 £803,742 £1,029,978 £1,236,823

Season 2002/03 2003/04 2004/05 2005/06 2006/07
Wages 54,365,000 114,784,000 108,887,000 114,002,000 132,800,000
Transfers -354,000 131,049,000 126,724,000 85,425,000 11,740,000
Chelsea Total Money 54,011,000 245,833,000 235,611,000 199,427,000 144,540,000
Cup Points 0 19 19 11 19
Total Points 67 98 114 102 102
Money Per Point £806,134 £2,508,500 £2,066,763 £1,955,167 £1,417,059

Season 2002/03 2003/04 2004/05 2005/06 2006/07
Wages 54,431,000 65,635,000 64,233,000 68,868,000 92,300,000
Transfers 15,981,000 3,324,000 20,157,000 28,212,000 46,173,000
Liverpool Total Money 70,412,000 68,959,000 84,390,000 97,080,000 138,473,000
Cup Points 8 0 22 12 22

Page No. 8


Total Points 72 60 80 94 90
Money Per Point £977,944 £1,149,317 £1,054,875 £1,032,766 £1,538,589

Season 2002/03 2003/04 2004/05 2005/06 2006/07
Wages 79,517,000 76,874,000 77,010,000 85,389,000 77,600,000
Transfers 7,861,000 28,804,000 -2,651,000 32,551,000 10,587,000
Manchester Total Money 87,378,000 105,678,000 74,359,000 117,940,000 88,187,000
Cup Points 15 15 11 6 18
Total Points 98 90 88 89 107
Money Per Point £891,612 £1,174,200 £844,989 £1,325,169 £824,178

Appendix 3 – Buying Success: The Big Four

Buying Success - The Big Four

1,000,000,000 600

900,000,000 Expenditure
Points Achieved 500
Expenditure (Wage & Transfers)

800,000,000

Points (Premiership and
700,000,000

Champions League)
400
600,000,000

500,000,000 300

400,000,000
200
300,000,000

200,000,000
100
100,000,000

0 0
Arsenal Chelsea Liverpool Manchester United
Team

Data Source: Past Seasons Tables (Premier League 2000 – 2007, Champions League
2000 - 2007), Annual Review of Football Finance (Deloitte 2000 - 2007)

Appendix 4 -Recent Increase of FAPL Wages Graph

Recent Increase of FAPL Wages

£1,000
Annual FAPL Wages (Millions)

£900

£800
2
R = 0.8524
£700
y = 53.12x - 105656
£600

£500
2000 2001 2002 2003 2004 2005
Page No. 9
2006 2007
Annual FAPL Seasons


Data Source: Past Seasons Tables (Premier League 2000 - 2007), Annual
Review of Football Finance (Deloitte 2000 - 2007)

Appendix 5 - Points and Performance Relationship Graph

FAPL Points and Performance Relationship

20
18
16
14
Position in League

2
R = 0.8917
12
10
8
6
4
2
0
0 10 20 30 40 50 60 70 80 90 100
League Points Accrued

Data Source: Past Seasons Tables (Premier League)

Appendix 6 - FAPL Wage Performance Relationship Graph

FAPL Wage Performance Relationship (2000-2007)

120

100
League Points Accrued

80

60
y = 6E-07x + 30.833
R2 = 0.5826
40

20

0 Page No. 10
£0 £20,000,000 £40,000,000 £60,000,000 £80,000,000 £100,000,000 £120,000,000 £140,000,000
Annual Wage (Millions)


Data Source: Past Seasons Tables (Premier League 2000 - 2007), Annual Review of Football Finance (Deloitte
2000 - 2007)

Appendix 7 – FAPL Relative Wage Performance Graph

FAPL Relative Wage Performance Relationship

120

100
Performance (Points)

80

60

40 2
R = 0.6284
y = 6E-07x + 52.121
20

0
-£60,000, -£40,000, -£20,000, £0 £20,000, £40,000, £60,000, £80,000, £100,000
000 000 000 000 000 000 000 ,000
Relative Wage

2000 - 2007)

Appendix 8 – The Performance of Teams with Award Winning High Wage Players

2000/01 2001/02 2002/03 2003/04 2004/05 2005/06 2006/07
PFA Player of the Year T.Sheringham R.V.Nistelrooy T.Henry T.Henry J.Terry S.Gerrard C.Ronaldo
Team Man Utd Man Utd Arsenal Arsenal Chelsea Liverpool Man Utd
Team's Wage Bill 50,002,000 69,999,000 60,569,000 69,889,000 108,887,000 68,868,000 92,300,000
Team's Position in League 1 3 2 1 1 3 1

PFA Young Player of the Year S.Gerrard C.Bellamy J.Jenas S.Parker W.Rooney W.Rooney C.Ronaldo
Team Liverpool Newcastle Newcastle Chelsea Man Utd Man Utd Man Utd
Team's Wage Bill 48,880,000 32,055,000 45,195,000 114,784,000 77,010,000 85,389,000 92,300,000
Team's Position in League 3 4 3 2 3 2 1

Data Source: Professional Footballer’s Association 2008

Page No. 11


Appendix 9 – Net Transfer Activity Affecting Performance

Player Spending and Performance (Five Year Period)

450

400
2
R = 0.5019

350
Net Points

300

250

200
0 50,000,0 100,000, 150,000, 200,000, 250,000, 300,000, 350,000, 400,000,
00 000 000 000 000 000 000 000
Net Transfer Activity (£)

2002 - 2007)

Appendix 10 – Wage Dispersion Box Plot
FAPL Wage Dispersion Box Plot [2000 to 2007]

140

120

100
Club Wages (Millions)

80

60

40

20

0
Page No. 12
2000/01 2001/02 2002/03 2003/04 2004/05 2005/06 2006/07
Annual FAPL Seasons


Data Source: Annual Review of Football Finance (Deloitte 2002 - 2007)

Appendix 11 – Seasonal Wage Comparison Graph

Coefficient of Pay
Season Mean Wage Standard Deviation and Performance
2000/01 28.3998 11.646873 0.486519
2001/02 34.2090 14.943004 0.779042
2002/03 38.0396 15.732267 0.533733
2003/04 40.5737 23.088258 0.617164
2004/05 38.3837 22.551997 0.741742
2005/06 41.0479 25.421491 0.708655
2006/07 48.5150 27.912529 0.668845

Data Source: Annual Review of Football Finance (Deloitte 2000 - 2007)

Appendix 12 – Club Performance and Consumer Welfare

Performance and Consumer Welfare
80000
R2 = 0.3291
70000

60000

50000
Attendance

40000

30000

20000

10000

0
0 10 20 30 40 50 60 70 80 90 100
Points (Performance)

2000 - 2007)

Page No. 13


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