SlideShare une entreprise Scribd logo
1  sur  45
Télécharger pour lire hors ligne
Am I Being Spied On?
Low-tech Ways Of Detecting High-tech
Surveillance
Dr. Phil
@ppolstra
http://philpolstra.com
What this talk is about
● Determining if you are a victim of spying
– Video surveillance
– Tailing
– Audio eavesdropping
– Devices embedded in your computer,
tablet, or smart phone
Why you should care
● Government assault on Constitution is
well known
● Local governments
● Competitors
● Stalkers
● People who just don't like you
Video surveillance
Common flaw all night vision
cameras share
Detecting this flaw with any
digital camera
Finding a camera with a
phone
Other Ways to Detect IR
Detecting wireless cameras
Free way: Android tablet or
smartphone (ad hoc nets)
Inexpensive way: BeagleBone based system
Simple way using Airodump-ng
Slightly more sophisticated with Python#!/usr/bin/env python
from scapy.all import *
import os, sys, time, operator
interface = "mon0"
clientsIKnow = { }
def sniffClientStrength(p):
if p.haslayer(RadioTap) and p.haslayer(Dot11):
try:
sigStrength = int(-(256-ord(p.notdecoded[-4:-3])))
if str(p.addr2) not in clientsIKnow.keys():
clientsIKnow[str(p.addr2)] = sigStrength
else:
if sigStrength > clientsIKnow[str(p.addr2)]:
clientsIKnow[str(p.addr2)] = sigStrength
except KeyboardInterrupt:
sys.exit(1)
except:
pass
def main():
os.system('clear')
try:
while True:
sniff(iface=interface, prn=sniffClientStrength, timeout=2)
if clientsIKnow:
sorted_list = sorted(clientsIKnow.items(), key=lambda x: x[1], reverse=True)
for item in sorted_list:
print item[0], item[1]
time.sleep(1)
os.system('clear')
clientsIKnow.clear()
sorted_list = []
except KeyboardInterrupt:
pass
if __name__ == '__main__':
main()
More sophisticated Way
Moderately expensive way:
Detecting signals in licensed
bands
● Use an Linear Technologies LTC5582
RMS RF power detector
● Measure LTC5582 output on volt meter
or BeagleBone or ??
● Bandpass filters can be used to look at
individual frequency bands
Moderately Expensive Way
Moderately Expensive Way
Physical surveillance
● Tailing
– Common vehicles used
– Standard techniques
● Stakeout
– Common vehicles used
– Standard techniques
Tailing Vehicles
● Non-government spies choose vehicles to blend in
– Probably not the red Ferrari behind you
– Likely vehicles
● Bland colored Honda or Toyota sedan
● Bland colored SUV
● Whatever is commonly seen in the area
● Government spies drive vehicles issued to them
– Black SUV
– Crown Victoria
– Other vehicles too!
General Tailing Techniques
● Follow distance varies from about 2
cars behind to a block
● Bumper beeper may be used to extend
follow distance to 0.5 – 10.0 miles
● Tail is generally considered blown if
subject has 3 suspicious impressions
Single Car Tailing
● Generally will be closer than multi-car
tails
● More likely to follow traffic laws
● May use a bumper beeper to help
relocate the subject if lost
Multi-car Tailing
● In most cases everyone is behind the
subject
● Some cars may be on parallel streets
– More likely in urban areas
● Tailing vehicles may change relative
positions
● Vehicles might occasionally appear to
go a different direction only to rejoin
later
Combating Tailing
● Look!
– Check around your car for trackers
– Watch for vehicles who seem to be
behind you for long distances
– Watch for vehicles that go away and
then come back
Combating Tailing (contd)
● Detect electronic devices
– Use the previously describe RF
detection system without any
filters
– Scan the AM radio band on your
car radio before you go
● Many homemade or privately available
trackers operate in this frequency band
● If you hear nothing but a strong tone it is
probably a tracker on your car!
Combating Tailing (contd)
● Active techniques
– Drag a few traffic lights
– Take unusual routes
– Drive through residential neighborhoods
– Take a few alleys or deserted side
streets
– Occasionally park for no reason
Stakeout Vehicles
● Same vehicles used in tailing may be
used
● Additional vehicles might be used
– SUV
– Commercial vans
– Pickup trucks with toppers
Combating Stationary
Surveillance
● Look!
– People in parked vehicles
– Construction/utility workers who are
around too long or appear to be
doing nothing
– Commercial vans parked for
extended periods
– Anyone with view of all your exits
Combating Stationary
Surveillance (contd)
● Active techniques
– Get out your binoculars and spy back
– Run outside and jump in your car
● Run back inside and see if anyone
seems to notice
● Drive around the block and see if anyone
followed you
Audio bugging
Detecting active bugs
● Free way: analog AM/FM radio might detect
some bugs
● Inexpensive way: USB TV Tuner Software
Defined Radio (SDR)
– Can detect signals in 50 MHz - 2 GHz
– Commercial bugs are usually 10 MHz - 8
GHz
● Moderately expensive way: Broadband amplifier
connected to TV antenna
● Expensive way: Drop $500 on a commercial
detector
Detecting bugs with a radio
● Must be analog
● Scan through the AM/FM
bands to see if you can hear
the audio you are generating
● Works with only the simplest
bugs
Detecting passive bugs
● Must try to excite bug with RF in correct
band
● If you are close enough and the signal
is strong can still work with wrong
frequency
● Detection is same as active bugs
Exciting the bug
● Free way: Blast it with 2.4 GHz from
your Alfa
● Inexpensive way: Noisy broadband
transmitter attached to TV antenna
Bugs in your computing
devices
● Bugs can be installed by
– intercepting shipments
– "service" professionals
– spies in your local IT staff
– pissed off guy in your office
Detecting bugs
● Free way: Look!
– Bugging devices can be installed externally
– I described a small dropbox easily hidden
behind a computer at DC21
– Same dropbox is easily hidden in other
items on your desk
● Example: Dalek desktop defender
● Example: TARDIS
● Check every device connected to your
computer especially USB and network
Hiding Places
Bugs may be internal
● Open the case and look for obvious
signs
● Pictures of NSA devices have been
leaked
● Inexpensive way: Current leaks
– Bugs need current to run
– Turned off devices shouldn't draw any
power
A modified universal laptop
power supply can be used to
detect this current leakage● Modify the power supply to detect current
● For laptop or phone remove the battery and measure
current with device "off"
– Current flow indicates possible bug
● For tablet fully charge the battery
– Measure the current flow
– Small current might indicate issue with charging circuit
or battery
– If the current peaks when you speak or move in view of
the camera there may be a bug
Laptop Adapter
Laptop Adapter
For a desktop computer
● Physical inspection is best
– Can attempt to detect leakage current
with Kill o Watt or similar
● Many computer power supplies leak
current so this is not conclusive
● Desktop bug might only work when
computer is on
Passive bugs
● Excite as described for passive audio
bugs
● Use same techniques as described
above to detect excited bug
● Won't detect all passive bugs (such as
the expensive NSA bugs)
Summary
● Chose your level of paranoia
● Even if you aren't paranoid you can still
detect many spying activities at no cost
● Truly paranoid can still test without
financial ruin
References
● Hacking and Penetration Testing with
Low Power Devices by Philip Polstra
(Syngress, 2014)
● Jacob Appelbaum talk on NSA spy
device catalog
https://www.youtube.com/watch?
v=vILAlhwUgIU
Questions?
● Come see me after
● @ppolstra on Twitter
● Http://philpolstra.com or http://polstra.org
● More info on BeagleBone drones

Contenu connexe

Tendances

Cryptography.ppt
Cryptography.pptCryptography.ppt
Cryptography.ppt
Uday Meena
 
Pc to pc optical fibre communication mini project
Pc to pc optical fibre communication mini projectPc to pc optical fibre communication mini project
Pc to pc optical fibre communication mini project
Padmakar Mangrule
 
Steganography
SteganographySteganography
Steganography
Sonam M
 
UART(universal asynchronous receiver transmitter ) PPT
UART(universal asynchronous receiver transmitter ) PPTUART(universal asynchronous receiver transmitter ) PPT
UART(universal asynchronous receiver transmitter ) PPT
Sai_praneeth
 

Tendances (20)

Cryptography.ppt
Cryptography.pptCryptography.ppt
Cryptography.ppt
 
Pc to pc optical fibre communication mini project
Pc to pc optical fibre communication mini projectPc to pc optical fibre communication mini project
Pc to pc optical fibre communication mini project
 
Cryptography
CryptographyCryptography
Cryptography
 
MIPI DevCon 2021: MIPI D-PHY and MIPI CSI-2 for IoT: AI Edge Devices
MIPI DevCon 2021: MIPI D-PHY and MIPI CSI-2 for IoT: AI Edge DevicesMIPI DevCon 2021: MIPI D-PHY and MIPI CSI-2 for IoT: AI Edge Devices
MIPI DevCon 2021: MIPI D-PHY and MIPI CSI-2 for IoT: AI Edge Devices
 
Digital certificates
Digital certificatesDigital certificates
Digital certificates
 
Steganography
SteganographySteganography
Steganography
 
UART(universal asynchronous receiver transmitter ) PPT
UART(universal asynchronous receiver transmitter ) PPTUART(universal asynchronous receiver transmitter ) PPT
UART(universal asynchronous receiver transmitter ) PPT
 
Wireless LAN Security
Wireless LAN SecurityWireless LAN Security
Wireless LAN Security
 
Codasip application class RISC-V processor solutions
Codasip application class RISC-V processor solutionsCodasip application class RISC-V processor solutions
Codasip application class RISC-V processor solutions
 
4G MOBILE COMMUNICATION SYSTEM
4G MOBILE COMMUNICATION SYSTEM4G MOBILE COMMUNICATION SYSTEM
4G MOBILE COMMUNICATION SYSTEM
 
On deriving the private key from a public key
On deriving the private key from a public keyOn deriving the private key from a public key
On deriving the private key from a public key
 
Zigbee
ZigbeeZigbee
Zigbee
 
Side channel attacks
Side channel attacksSide channel attacks
Side channel attacks
 
Cryptography
CryptographyCryptography
Cryptography
 
PPT steganography
PPT steganographyPPT steganography
PPT steganography
 
IoT Device Hacking and New Direction of IoT Security Evaluation Using Common ...
IoT Device Hacking and New Direction of IoT Security Evaluation Using Common ...IoT Device Hacking and New Direction of IoT Security Evaluation Using Common ...
IoT Device Hacking and New Direction of IoT Security Evaluation Using Common ...
 
Seminar on sniffers
Seminar on sniffersSeminar on sniffers
Seminar on sniffers
 
Voice over Internet Protocol (VoIP)
Voice over Internet Protocol (VoIP)Voice over Internet Protocol (VoIP)
Voice over Internet Protocol (VoIP)
 
NVR
NVRNVR
NVR
 
Seminar on Encryption and Authenticity
Seminar on Encryption and AuthenticitySeminar on Encryption and Authenticity
Seminar on Encryption and Authenticity
 

En vedette

インテルMEの秘密 - チップセットに隠されたコードと、それが一体何をするかを見出す方法 - by イゴール・スコチンスキー - Igor Skochinsky
インテルMEの秘密 - チップセットに隠されたコードと、それが一体何をするかを見出す方法 - by イゴール・スコチンスキー - Igor SkochinskyインテルMEの秘密 - チップセットに隠されたコードと、それが一体何をするかを見出す方法 - by イゴール・スコチンスキー - Igor Skochinsky
インテルMEの秘密 - チップセットに隠されたコードと、それが一体何をするかを見出す方法 - by イゴール・スコチンスキー - Igor Skochinsky
CODE BLUE
 
Controlling USB Flash Drive Controllers: Expose of Hidden Features
Controlling USB Flash Drive Controllers: Expose of Hidden FeaturesControlling USB Flash Drive Controllers: Expose of Hidden Features
Controlling USB Flash Drive Controllers: Expose of Hidden Features
xabean
 
Practical network defense at scale Or: Protecting the “Eierlegende Wollmichsa...
Practical network defense at scale Or: Protecting the “Eierlegende Wollmichsa...Practical network defense at scale Or: Protecting the “Eierlegende Wollmichsa...
Practical network defense at scale Or: Protecting the “Eierlegende Wollmichsa...
CODE BLUE
 
Dna Technology
Dna TechnologyDna Technology
Dna Technology
annperry09
 
A Security Barrier Device That Can Protect Critical Data Regardless of OS or ...
A Security Barrier Device That Can Protect Critical Data Regardless of OS or ...A Security Barrier Device That Can Protect Critical Data Regardless of OS or ...
A Security Barrier Device That Can Protect Critical Data Regardless of OS or ...
CODE BLUE
 

En vedette (20)

Secret of Intel Management Engine by Igor Skochinsky
Secret of Intel Management Engine  by Igor SkochinskySecret of Intel Management Engine  by Igor Skochinsky
Secret of Intel Management Engine by Igor Skochinsky
 
Preventing hard disk firmware manipulation attack and disaster recovery by Da...
Preventing hard disk firmware manipulation attack and disaster recovery by Da...Preventing hard disk firmware manipulation attack and disaster recovery by Da...
Preventing hard disk firmware manipulation attack and disaster recovery by Da...
 
Polstra 44con2012
Polstra 44con2012Polstra 44con2012
Polstra 44con2012
 
Smart Wireless Surveillance Monitoring using RASPBERRY PI
Smart Wireless Surveillance Monitoring using RASPBERRY PISmart Wireless Surveillance Monitoring using RASPBERRY PI
Smart Wireless Surveillance Monitoring using RASPBERRY PI
 
Halvar Flake: Why Johnny can’t tell if he is compromised
Halvar Flake: Why Johnny can’t tell if he is compromisedHalvar Flake: Why Johnny can’t tell if he is compromised
Halvar Flake: Why Johnny can’t tell if he is compromised
 
Defcon 22-robert-rowley-detecting-defending-against-surveill
Defcon 22-robert-rowley-detecting-defending-against-surveillDefcon 22-robert-rowley-detecting-defending-against-surveill
Defcon 22-robert-rowley-detecting-defending-against-surveill
 
Cyberhijacking Airplanes Truth or Fiction
Cyberhijacking Airplanes Truth or FictionCyberhijacking Airplanes Truth or Fiction
Cyberhijacking Airplanes Truth or Fiction
 
Thotcon2013
Thotcon2013Thotcon2013
Thotcon2013
 
インテルMEの秘密 - チップセットに隠されたコードと、それが一体何をするかを見出す方法 - by イゴール・スコチンスキー - Igor Skochinsky
インテルMEの秘密 - チップセットに隠されたコードと、それが一体何をするかを見出す方法 - by イゴール・スコチンスキー - Igor SkochinskyインテルMEの秘密 - チップセットに隠されたコードと、それが一体何をするかを見出す方法 - by イゴール・スコチンスキー - Igor Skochinsky
インテルMEの秘密 - チップセットに隠されたコードと、それが一体何をするかを見出す方法 - by イゴール・スコチンスキー - Igor Skochinsky
 
Controlling USB Flash Drive Controllers: Expose of Hidden Features
Controlling USB Flash Drive Controllers: Expose of Hidden FeaturesControlling USB Flash Drive Controllers: Expose of Hidden Features
Controlling USB Flash Drive Controllers: Expose of Hidden Features
 
Practical network defense at scale Or: Protecting the “Eierlegende Wollmichsa...
Practical network defense at scale Or: Protecting the “Eierlegende Wollmichsa...Practical network defense at scale Or: Protecting the “Eierlegende Wollmichsa...
Practical network defense at scale Or: Protecting the “Eierlegende Wollmichsa...
 
The Deck by Phil Polstra GrrCON2012
The Deck by Phil Polstra GrrCON2012The Deck by Phil Polstra GrrCON2012
The Deck by Phil Polstra GrrCON2012
 
Philip polstra
Philip polstraPhilip polstra
Philip polstra
 
Surveillance
SurveillanceSurveillance
Surveillance
 
"Mass Surveillance" through Distant Reading
"Mass Surveillance" through Distant Reading"Mass Surveillance" through Distant Reading
"Mass Surveillance" through Distant Reading
 
IDA Vulnerabilities and Bug Bounty  by Masaaki Chida
IDA Vulnerabilities and Bug Bounty  by Masaaki ChidaIDA Vulnerabilities and Bug Bounty  by Masaaki Chida
IDA Vulnerabilities and Bug Bounty  by Masaaki Chida
 
Spy - Thriller Genre Analysis
Spy - Thriller Genre AnalysisSpy - Thriller Genre Analysis
Spy - Thriller Genre Analysis
 
Dna Technology
Dna TechnologyDna Technology
Dna Technology
 
HOW TO HACK HANGOUTS
HOW TO HACK HANGOUTS HOW TO HACK HANGOUTS
HOW TO HACK HANGOUTS
 
A Security Barrier Device That Can Protect Critical Data Regardless of OS or ...
A Security Barrier Device That Can Protect Critical Data Regardless of OS or ...A Security Barrier Device That Can Protect Critical Data Regardless of OS or ...
A Security Barrier Device That Can Protect Critical Data Regardless of OS or ...
 

Similaire à Am I being spied on: Low-tech ways of detecting high-tech surveillance (DEFCON 22)

SUAS & Arduino Presentation - Staples - 20140403 - CLEARED
SUAS & Arduino Presentation - Staples - 20140403 - CLEAREDSUAS & Arduino Presentation - Staples - 20140403 - CLEARED
SUAS & Arduino Presentation - Staples - 20140403 - CLEARED
Gabriel Staples
 
An Iot Noise Detector with Automatic Recording System.pptx
An Iot Noise Detector with Automatic Recording System.pptxAn Iot Noise Detector with Automatic Recording System.pptx
An Iot Noise Detector with Automatic Recording System.pptx
JAYPRAKASH383047
 
FIRSTFare 2013 overview of electronics-2014
FIRSTFare 2013   overview of electronics-2014FIRSTFare 2013   overview of electronics-2014
FIRSTFare 2013 overview of electronics-2014
Oregon FIRST Robotics
 
Car automation OHM2013
Car automation OHM2013Car automation OHM2013
Car automation OHM2013
Marian Marinov
 

Similaire à Am I being spied on: Low-tech ways of detecting high-tech surveillance (DEFCON 22) (20)

Defcon 22-phil-polstra-am-i-being-spied-on
Defcon 22-phil-polstra-am-i-being-spied-onDefcon 22-phil-polstra-am-i-being-spied-on
Defcon 22-phil-polstra-am-i-being-spied-on
 
DSEF CON 27 - WILL C - phreaking elevators
DSEF CON 27 - WILL C - phreaking elevatorsDSEF CON 27 - WILL C - phreaking elevators
DSEF CON 27 - WILL C - phreaking elevators
 
DerbyCon: Surveillance Using Spare Stuff
DerbyCon: Surveillance Using Spare StuffDerbyCon: Surveillance Using Spare Stuff
DerbyCon: Surveillance Using Spare Stuff
 
SUAS & Arduino Presentation - Staples - 20140403 - CLEARED
SUAS & Arduino Presentation - Staples - 20140403 - CLEAREDSUAS & Arduino Presentation - Staples - 20140403 - CLEARED
SUAS & Arduino Presentation - Staples - 20140403 - CLEARED
 
Voice controlled home automation.pptx
Voice controlled home automation.pptxVoice controlled home automation.pptx
Voice controlled home automation.pptx
 
project2presentation.pptx
project2presentation.pptxproject2presentation.pptx
project2presentation.pptx
 
Project PPT.pptx
Project PPT.pptxProject PPT.pptx
Project PPT.pptx
 
Distance measuring using ultra sonic sensor (2).pptx
Distance measuring using ultra sonic sensor (2).pptxDistance measuring using ultra sonic sensor (2).pptx
Distance measuring using ultra sonic sensor (2).pptx
 
Worksheet for Introduction to Software Defined Radio (SDR)
Worksheet for Introduction to Software Defined Radio (SDR)Worksheet for Introduction to Software Defined Radio (SDR)
Worksheet for Introduction to Software Defined Radio (SDR)
 
An Iot Noise Detector with Automatic Recording System.pptx
An Iot Noise Detector with Automatic Recording System.pptxAn Iot Noise Detector with Automatic Recording System.pptx
An Iot Noise Detector with Automatic Recording System.pptx
 
Accident prevention using bluetooth tech and eye blink sensor
Accident prevention using bluetooth tech and eye blink sensorAccident prevention using bluetooth tech and eye blink sensor
Accident prevention using bluetooth tech and eye blink sensor
 
FM & Bluetooth & WIFI, Oh My!
FM & Bluetooth & WIFI, Oh My!FM & Bluetooth & WIFI, Oh My!
FM & Bluetooth & WIFI, Oh My!
 
Birds of a Feather 2017: 邀請分享 IoT, SDR, and Car Security - Aaron
Birds of a Feather 2017: 邀請分享 IoT, SDR, and Car Security - AaronBirds of a Feather 2017: 邀請分享 IoT, SDR, and Car Security - Aaron
Birds of a Feather 2017: 邀請分享 IoT, SDR, and Car Security - Aaron
 
Troubleshooting Your Network.pptx
Troubleshooting Your Network.pptxTroubleshooting Your Network.pptx
Troubleshooting Your Network.pptx
 
A COMPLETE GUIDE FOR BUILDING AN INTERVIEW RECORDING.pptx
A COMPLETE GUIDE FOR BUILDING AN INTERVIEW RECORDING.pptxA COMPLETE GUIDE FOR BUILDING AN INTERVIEW RECORDING.pptx
A COMPLETE GUIDE FOR BUILDING AN INTERVIEW RECORDING.pptx
 
Troubleshooting methods of computer peripherals
Troubleshooting methods of computer peripheralsTroubleshooting methods of computer peripherals
Troubleshooting methods of computer peripherals
 
Smart solution for collision at doors using Arduino
Smart solution for collision at doors using ArduinoSmart solution for collision at doors using Arduino
Smart solution for collision at doors using Arduino
 
FIRSTFare 2013 overview of electronics-2014
FIRSTFare 2013   overview of electronics-2014FIRSTFare 2013   overview of electronics-2014
FIRSTFare 2013 overview of electronics-2014
 
Car automation OHM2013
Car automation OHM2013Car automation OHM2013
Car automation OHM2013
 
Autonomous robotics based on simple sensor inputs.
Autonomous robotics based on simplesensor inputs.Autonomous robotics based on simplesensor inputs.
Autonomous robotics based on simple sensor inputs.
 

Dernier

Histor y of HAM Radio presentation slide
Histor y of HAM Radio presentation slideHistor y of HAM Radio presentation slide
Histor y of HAM Radio presentation slide
vu2urc
 
+971581248768>> SAFE AND ORIGINAL ABORTION PILLS FOR SALE IN DUBAI AND ABUDHA...
+971581248768>> SAFE AND ORIGINAL ABORTION PILLS FOR SALE IN DUBAI AND ABUDHA...+971581248768>> SAFE AND ORIGINAL ABORTION PILLS FOR SALE IN DUBAI AND ABUDHA...
+971581248768>> SAFE AND ORIGINAL ABORTION PILLS FOR SALE IN DUBAI AND ABUDHA...
?#DUbAI#??##{{(☎️+971_581248768%)**%*]'#abortion pills for sale in dubai@
 

Dernier (20)

TrustArc Webinar - Stay Ahead of US State Data Privacy Law Developments
TrustArc Webinar - Stay Ahead of US State Data Privacy Law DevelopmentsTrustArc Webinar - Stay Ahead of US State Data Privacy Law Developments
TrustArc Webinar - Stay Ahead of US State Data Privacy Law Developments
 
Driving Behavioral Change for Information Management through Data-Driven Gree...
Driving Behavioral Change for Information Management through Data-Driven Gree...Driving Behavioral Change for Information Management through Data-Driven Gree...
Driving Behavioral Change for Information Management through Data-Driven Gree...
 
Automating Google Workspace (GWS) & more with Apps Script
Automating Google Workspace (GWS) & more with Apps ScriptAutomating Google Workspace (GWS) & more with Apps Script
Automating Google Workspace (GWS) & more with Apps Script
 
2024: Domino Containers - The Next Step. News from the Domino Container commu...
2024: Domino Containers - The Next Step. News from the Domino Container commu...2024: Domino Containers - The Next Step. News from the Domino Container commu...
2024: Domino Containers - The Next Step. News from the Domino Container commu...
 
Strategies for Unlocking Knowledge Management in Microsoft 365 in the Copilot...
Strategies for Unlocking Knowledge Management in Microsoft 365 in the Copilot...Strategies for Unlocking Knowledge Management in Microsoft 365 in the Copilot...
Strategies for Unlocking Knowledge Management in Microsoft 365 in the Copilot...
 
Handwritten Text Recognition for manuscripts and early printed texts
Handwritten Text Recognition for manuscripts and early printed textsHandwritten Text Recognition for manuscripts and early printed texts
Handwritten Text Recognition for manuscripts and early printed texts
 
Strategies for Landing an Oracle DBA Job as a Fresher
Strategies for Landing an Oracle DBA Job as a FresherStrategies for Landing an Oracle DBA Job as a Fresher
Strategies for Landing an Oracle DBA Job as a Fresher
 
Scaling API-first – The story of a global engineering organization
Scaling API-first – The story of a global engineering organizationScaling API-first – The story of a global engineering organization
Scaling API-first – The story of a global engineering organization
 
Exploring the Future Potential of AI-Enabled Smartphone Processors
Exploring the Future Potential of AI-Enabled Smartphone ProcessorsExploring the Future Potential of AI-Enabled Smartphone Processors
Exploring the Future Potential of AI-Enabled Smartphone Processors
 
Histor y of HAM Radio presentation slide
Histor y of HAM Radio presentation slideHistor y of HAM Radio presentation slide
Histor y of HAM Radio presentation slide
 
+971581248768>> SAFE AND ORIGINAL ABORTION PILLS FOR SALE IN DUBAI AND ABUDHA...
+971581248768>> SAFE AND ORIGINAL ABORTION PILLS FOR SALE IN DUBAI AND ABUDHA...+971581248768>> SAFE AND ORIGINAL ABORTION PILLS FOR SALE IN DUBAI AND ABUDHA...
+971581248768>> SAFE AND ORIGINAL ABORTION PILLS FOR SALE IN DUBAI AND ABUDHA...
 
Real Time Object Detection Using Open CV
Real Time Object Detection Using Open CVReal Time Object Detection Using Open CV
Real Time Object Detection Using Open CV
 
Tech Trends Report 2024 Future Today Institute.pdf
Tech Trends Report 2024 Future Today Institute.pdfTech Trends Report 2024 Future Today Institute.pdf
Tech Trends Report 2024 Future Today Institute.pdf
 
Mastering MySQL Database Architecture: Deep Dive into MySQL Shell and MySQL R...
Mastering MySQL Database Architecture: Deep Dive into MySQL Shell and MySQL R...Mastering MySQL Database Architecture: Deep Dive into MySQL Shell and MySQL R...
Mastering MySQL Database Architecture: Deep Dive into MySQL Shell and MySQL R...
 
Boost PC performance: How more available memory can improve productivity
Boost PC performance: How more available memory can improve productivityBoost PC performance: How more available memory can improve productivity
Boost PC performance: How more available memory can improve productivity
 
A Domino Admins Adventures (Engage 2024)
A Domino Admins Adventures (Engage 2024)A Domino Admins Adventures (Engage 2024)
A Domino Admins Adventures (Engage 2024)
 
Bajaj Allianz Life Insurance Company - Insurer Innovation Award 2024
Bajaj Allianz Life Insurance Company - Insurer Innovation Award 2024Bajaj Allianz Life Insurance Company - Insurer Innovation Award 2024
Bajaj Allianz Life Insurance Company - Insurer Innovation Award 2024
 
A Year of the Servo Reboot: Where Are We Now?
A Year of the Servo Reboot: Where Are We Now?A Year of the Servo Reboot: Where Are We Now?
A Year of the Servo Reboot: Where Are We Now?
 
Tata AIG General Insurance Company - Insurer Innovation Award 2024
Tata AIG General Insurance Company - Insurer Innovation Award 2024Tata AIG General Insurance Company - Insurer Innovation Award 2024
Tata AIG General Insurance Company - Insurer Innovation Award 2024
 
Developing An App To Navigate The Roads of Brazil
Developing An App To Navigate The Roads of BrazilDeveloping An App To Navigate The Roads of Brazil
Developing An App To Navigate The Roads of Brazil
 

Am I being spied on: Low-tech ways of detecting high-tech surveillance (DEFCON 22)

  • 1. Am I Being Spied On? Low-tech Ways Of Detecting High-tech Surveillance Dr. Phil @ppolstra http://philpolstra.com
  • 2. What this talk is about ● Determining if you are a victim of spying – Video surveillance – Tailing – Audio eavesdropping – Devices embedded in your computer, tablet, or smart phone
  • 3. Why you should care ● Government assault on Constitution is well known ● Local governments ● Competitors ● Stalkers ● People who just don't like you
  • 5. Common flaw all night vision cameras share
  • 6. Detecting this flaw with any digital camera
  • 7. Finding a camera with a phone
  • 8. Other Ways to Detect IR
  • 10. Free way: Android tablet or smartphone (ad hoc nets)
  • 12. Simple way using Airodump-ng
  • 13. Slightly more sophisticated with Python#!/usr/bin/env python from scapy.all import * import os, sys, time, operator interface = "mon0" clientsIKnow = { } def sniffClientStrength(p): if p.haslayer(RadioTap) and p.haslayer(Dot11): try: sigStrength = int(-(256-ord(p.notdecoded[-4:-3]))) if str(p.addr2) not in clientsIKnow.keys(): clientsIKnow[str(p.addr2)] = sigStrength else: if sigStrength > clientsIKnow[str(p.addr2)]: clientsIKnow[str(p.addr2)] = sigStrength except KeyboardInterrupt: sys.exit(1) except: pass def main(): os.system('clear') try: while True: sniff(iface=interface, prn=sniffClientStrength, timeout=2) if clientsIKnow: sorted_list = sorted(clientsIKnow.items(), key=lambda x: x[1], reverse=True) for item in sorted_list: print item[0], item[1] time.sleep(1) os.system('clear') clientsIKnow.clear() sorted_list = [] except KeyboardInterrupt: pass if __name__ == '__main__': main()
  • 15. Moderately expensive way: Detecting signals in licensed bands ● Use an Linear Technologies LTC5582 RMS RF power detector ● Measure LTC5582 output on volt meter or BeagleBone or ?? ● Bandpass filters can be used to look at individual frequency bands
  • 18. Physical surveillance ● Tailing – Common vehicles used – Standard techniques ● Stakeout – Common vehicles used – Standard techniques
  • 19. Tailing Vehicles ● Non-government spies choose vehicles to blend in – Probably not the red Ferrari behind you – Likely vehicles ● Bland colored Honda or Toyota sedan ● Bland colored SUV ● Whatever is commonly seen in the area ● Government spies drive vehicles issued to them – Black SUV – Crown Victoria – Other vehicles too!
  • 20. General Tailing Techniques ● Follow distance varies from about 2 cars behind to a block ● Bumper beeper may be used to extend follow distance to 0.5 – 10.0 miles ● Tail is generally considered blown if subject has 3 suspicious impressions
  • 21. Single Car Tailing ● Generally will be closer than multi-car tails ● More likely to follow traffic laws ● May use a bumper beeper to help relocate the subject if lost
  • 22. Multi-car Tailing ● In most cases everyone is behind the subject ● Some cars may be on parallel streets – More likely in urban areas ● Tailing vehicles may change relative positions ● Vehicles might occasionally appear to go a different direction only to rejoin later
  • 23. Combating Tailing ● Look! – Check around your car for trackers – Watch for vehicles who seem to be behind you for long distances – Watch for vehicles that go away and then come back
  • 24. Combating Tailing (contd) ● Detect electronic devices – Use the previously describe RF detection system without any filters – Scan the AM radio band on your car radio before you go ● Many homemade or privately available trackers operate in this frequency band ● If you hear nothing but a strong tone it is probably a tracker on your car!
  • 25. Combating Tailing (contd) ● Active techniques – Drag a few traffic lights – Take unusual routes – Drive through residential neighborhoods – Take a few alleys or deserted side streets – Occasionally park for no reason
  • 26. Stakeout Vehicles ● Same vehicles used in tailing may be used ● Additional vehicles might be used – SUV – Commercial vans – Pickup trucks with toppers
  • 27. Combating Stationary Surveillance ● Look! – People in parked vehicles – Construction/utility workers who are around too long or appear to be doing nothing – Commercial vans parked for extended periods – Anyone with view of all your exits
  • 28. Combating Stationary Surveillance (contd) ● Active techniques – Get out your binoculars and spy back – Run outside and jump in your car ● Run back inside and see if anyone seems to notice ● Drive around the block and see if anyone followed you
  • 30. Detecting active bugs ● Free way: analog AM/FM radio might detect some bugs ● Inexpensive way: USB TV Tuner Software Defined Radio (SDR) – Can detect signals in 50 MHz - 2 GHz – Commercial bugs are usually 10 MHz - 8 GHz ● Moderately expensive way: Broadband amplifier connected to TV antenna ● Expensive way: Drop $500 on a commercial detector
  • 31. Detecting bugs with a radio ● Must be analog ● Scan through the AM/FM bands to see if you can hear the audio you are generating ● Works with only the simplest bugs
  • 32. Detecting passive bugs ● Must try to excite bug with RF in correct band ● If you are close enough and the signal is strong can still work with wrong frequency ● Detection is same as active bugs
  • 33. Exciting the bug ● Free way: Blast it with 2.4 GHz from your Alfa ● Inexpensive way: Noisy broadband transmitter attached to TV antenna
  • 34. Bugs in your computing devices ● Bugs can be installed by – intercepting shipments – "service" professionals – spies in your local IT staff – pissed off guy in your office
  • 35. Detecting bugs ● Free way: Look! – Bugging devices can be installed externally – I described a small dropbox easily hidden behind a computer at DC21 – Same dropbox is easily hidden in other items on your desk ● Example: Dalek desktop defender ● Example: TARDIS ● Check every device connected to your computer especially USB and network
  • 37. Bugs may be internal ● Open the case and look for obvious signs ● Pictures of NSA devices have been leaked ● Inexpensive way: Current leaks – Bugs need current to run – Turned off devices shouldn't draw any power
  • 38. A modified universal laptop power supply can be used to detect this current leakage● Modify the power supply to detect current ● For laptop or phone remove the battery and measure current with device "off" – Current flow indicates possible bug ● For tablet fully charge the battery – Measure the current flow – Small current might indicate issue with charging circuit or battery – If the current peaks when you speak or move in view of the camera there may be a bug
  • 41. For a desktop computer ● Physical inspection is best – Can attempt to detect leakage current with Kill o Watt or similar ● Many computer power supplies leak current so this is not conclusive ● Desktop bug might only work when computer is on
  • 42. Passive bugs ● Excite as described for passive audio bugs ● Use same techniques as described above to detect excited bug ● Won't detect all passive bugs (such as the expensive NSA bugs)
  • 43. Summary ● Chose your level of paranoia ● Even if you aren't paranoid you can still detect many spying activities at no cost ● Truly paranoid can still test without financial ruin
  • 44. References ● Hacking and Penetration Testing with Low Power Devices by Philip Polstra (Syngress, 2014) ● Jacob Appelbaum talk on NSA spy device catalog https://www.youtube.com/watch? v=vILAlhwUgIU
  • 45. Questions? ● Come see me after ● @ppolstra on Twitter ● Http://philpolstra.com or http://polstra.org ● More info on BeagleBone drones