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Pattern Recognition and Applications group
             Department of Electrical and Electronic Engineering (DIEE)
             University of Cagliari, Italy




Robustness of multi-modal biometric
 verification systems under realistic
           spoofing attacks

    Battista Biggio, Zahid Akthar, Giorgio Fumera,
          Gian Luca Marcialis, and Fabio Roli




                                          Int’l Joint Conf. On Biometrics, IJCB 2011
Biometrics
 • Examples of body traits that can be used for biometric recognition



                            Face        Fingerprint      Iris      Hand geometry




                          Palmprint      Signature       Voice          Gait




• Enrollment and verification phases in biometric system
                   User                               User Identity

                                                                 Feature       XTemplate
 Enrollment                           Sensor
                                                                Extractor
                                                                                           Database



                   User                                    Claimed Identity
                                                                     XQuery         XTemplate
                                      Sensor                Feature         Matcher          Database
 Verification                                              Extractor
                                                                                 score

                                                                                   Decision           Genuine/Impostor

12-11-2011                                       G.L. Marcialis, IJCB 2011                                               2
Biometric systems
• Multi-modal biometric verification systems


                              DB
                                                                                true
                                                                                        genuine
                                             s1
             Sensor      Face matcher
                                                                        s
                                                    Score fusion rule       s ≥ s∗
                                             s2         f (s1 , s2 )
             Sensor    Fingerprint matcher
                                                                                false
                                                                                        impostor

                              DB




     – more accurate than unimodal
     – more robust to spoof attacks?




12-11-2011                                        G.L. Marcialis, IJCB 2011                        3
Direct (spoofing) attacks
• Spoofing attacks
     – attacks at the user interface (sensor)
     – fake biometric traits




• Countermeasures
     – liveness detection
     – multi-modal biometric systems


12-11-2011                       G.L. Marcialis, IJCB 2011   4
Motivation and goal of this work
• Open problems
     – Estimation of the FAR under spoof attacks for multi-modal
       systems
     – Construction of fake biometric traits (cumbersome task)

• State-of-the-art
     – Fake scores are simulated under a worst-case scenario, re-
       sampling genuine user scores


             sifake : p(si | G)   (when the i-th matcher is spoofed)


• Our goal
     – To experimentally verify if this worst-case assumption holds
       under realistic spoofing attacks


12-11-2011                          G.L. Marcialis, IJCB 2011          5
Experiments
• Multi-modal system with face and fingerprint matchers
     – Bozorth3 (fingerprint)
     – Elastic Bunch Graph Matching, EBGM (face)

                                                                               true
                                                                                       genuine
                                            s1
             Sensor     Face matcher
                                                                       s
                                                   Score fusion rule       s ≥ s∗
                                            s2         f (s1 , s2 )
             Sensor   Fingerprint matcher
                                                                               false
                                                                                       impostor




12-11-2011                                       G.L. Marcialis, IJCB 2011                        6
Experiments
                                 score fusion rules


      1. product                             s = s1 ⋅ s2

      2. weighted sum (LDA)                  s = w0 + w1s1 + w2 s2

      3. likelihood ratio (LLR)              s = p(s1 , s2 | G) / p(s1 , s2 | I )

      4. extended LLR*                       explicitly models the distribution of
             [Rodrigues et al., JVLC 2009]   spoof attacks (worst-case)




12-11-2011                                   G.L. Marcialis, IJCB 2011               7
Experiments
                        Fake biometric traits

• Fake fingerprints by “consensual method”
     – mould: plasticine-like materials
     – cast: latex, silicon, and two-compound mixture of liquid silicon




                                                       live      fake (latex) fake (silicon)
•   Fake faces by “photo attack” and “personal photo attack”
     – Photo displayed on a laptop screen to camera
     – Personal photos (like those appearing on social networks)




                                  live      fake (photo) fake (personal)
12-11-2011                           G.L. Marcialis, IJCB 2011                          8
Experiments
               Data sets




12-11-2011       G.L. Marcialis, IJCB 2011   9
Experiments
                         Results
• Fakes: latex (fingerprints) and photo (faces)
• Worst case assumption (dashed lines) holds to some extent




12-11-2011                 G.L. Marcialis, IJCB 2011     10
Experiments
                         Results
• Fakes: latex (fingerprints) and photo (faces)
• Worst case assumption (dashed lines) does not hold




12-11-2011                 G.L. Marcialis, IJCB 2011   11
Experiments
Extended LLR can be less robust than LLR
                        Results
  to realistic fingerprint spoof attacks!
• Fakes: latex (fingerprints) and photo (faces)
• Worst case assumption (dashed lines) does not hold




12-11-2011                 G.L. Marcialis, IJCB 2011   12
Experiments
                           Results

• Fakes: silicone (fingerprint) and personal photos (face)




12-11-2011                   G.L. Marcialis, IJCB 2011       13
Conclusions and future work
•   Crucial issue
     – performance evaluation of multimodal biometric systems under
       spoofing attacks


•   State-of-the-art: “worst-case” scenario

•   Our results
     – it may not provide an accurate model for fake score simulation
     – Score fusion rules designed under this assumption may worsen the
       system’s robustness!


•   Future work
     – experimental analysis involving other spoofing attacks
     – more accurate modelling and simulation of fake score distributions




12-11-2011                         G.L. Marcialis, IJCB 2011                14

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Robustness of multimodal biometric verification systems under realistic spoofing attacks - G.L. Marcialis @ IJCB2011

  • 1. Pattern Recognition and Applications group Department of Electrical and Electronic Engineering (DIEE) University of Cagliari, Italy Robustness of multi-modal biometric verification systems under realistic spoofing attacks Battista Biggio, Zahid Akthar, Giorgio Fumera, Gian Luca Marcialis, and Fabio Roli Int’l Joint Conf. On Biometrics, IJCB 2011
  • 2. Biometrics • Examples of body traits that can be used for biometric recognition Face Fingerprint Iris Hand geometry Palmprint Signature Voice Gait • Enrollment and verification phases in biometric system User User Identity Feature XTemplate Enrollment Sensor Extractor Database User Claimed Identity XQuery XTemplate Sensor Feature Matcher Database Verification Extractor score Decision Genuine/Impostor 12-11-2011 G.L. Marcialis, IJCB 2011 2
  • 3. Biometric systems • Multi-modal biometric verification systems DB true genuine s1 Sensor Face matcher s Score fusion rule s ≥ s∗ s2 f (s1 , s2 ) Sensor Fingerprint matcher false impostor DB – more accurate than unimodal – more robust to spoof attacks? 12-11-2011 G.L. Marcialis, IJCB 2011 3
  • 4. Direct (spoofing) attacks • Spoofing attacks – attacks at the user interface (sensor) – fake biometric traits • Countermeasures – liveness detection – multi-modal biometric systems 12-11-2011 G.L. Marcialis, IJCB 2011 4
  • 5. Motivation and goal of this work • Open problems – Estimation of the FAR under spoof attacks for multi-modal systems – Construction of fake biometric traits (cumbersome task) • State-of-the-art – Fake scores are simulated under a worst-case scenario, re- sampling genuine user scores sifake : p(si | G) (when the i-th matcher is spoofed) • Our goal – To experimentally verify if this worst-case assumption holds under realistic spoofing attacks 12-11-2011 G.L. Marcialis, IJCB 2011 5
  • 6. Experiments • Multi-modal system with face and fingerprint matchers – Bozorth3 (fingerprint) – Elastic Bunch Graph Matching, EBGM (face) true genuine s1 Sensor Face matcher s Score fusion rule s ≥ s∗ s2 f (s1 , s2 ) Sensor Fingerprint matcher false impostor 12-11-2011 G.L. Marcialis, IJCB 2011 6
  • 7. Experiments score fusion rules 1. product s = s1 ⋅ s2 2. weighted sum (LDA) s = w0 + w1s1 + w2 s2 3. likelihood ratio (LLR) s = p(s1 , s2 | G) / p(s1 , s2 | I ) 4. extended LLR* explicitly models the distribution of [Rodrigues et al., JVLC 2009] spoof attacks (worst-case) 12-11-2011 G.L. Marcialis, IJCB 2011 7
  • 8. Experiments Fake biometric traits • Fake fingerprints by “consensual method” – mould: plasticine-like materials – cast: latex, silicon, and two-compound mixture of liquid silicon live fake (latex) fake (silicon) • Fake faces by “photo attack” and “personal photo attack” – Photo displayed on a laptop screen to camera – Personal photos (like those appearing on social networks) live fake (photo) fake (personal) 12-11-2011 G.L. Marcialis, IJCB 2011 8
  • 9. Experiments Data sets 12-11-2011 G.L. Marcialis, IJCB 2011 9
  • 10. Experiments Results • Fakes: latex (fingerprints) and photo (faces) • Worst case assumption (dashed lines) holds to some extent 12-11-2011 G.L. Marcialis, IJCB 2011 10
  • 11. Experiments Results • Fakes: latex (fingerprints) and photo (faces) • Worst case assumption (dashed lines) does not hold 12-11-2011 G.L. Marcialis, IJCB 2011 11
  • 12. Experiments Extended LLR can be less robust than LLR Results to realistic fingerprint spoof attacks! • Fakes: latex (fingerprints) and photo (faces) • Worst case assumption (dashed lines) does not hold 12-11-2011 G.L. Marcialis, IJCB 2011 12
  • 13. Experiments Results • Fakes: silicone (fingerprint) and personal photos (face) 12-11-2011 G.L. Marcialis, IJCB 2011 13
  • 14. Conclusions and future work • Crucial issue – performance evaluation of multimodal biometric systems under spoofing attacks • State-of-the-art: “worst-case” scenario • Our results – it may not provide an accurate model for fake score simulation – Score fusion rules designed under this assumption may worsen the system’s robustness! • Future work – experimental analysis involving other spoofing attacks – more accurate modelling and simulation of fake score distributions 12-11-2011 G.L. Marcialis, IJCB 2011 14