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INSIDER TRADING

          Presented By :
       Rohit Kumar Jaitly
         Praveen Kumar
              Mohit Arora
          Monika Bansal
           Sulagna Dutta
INSIDER TRADING
CASE OVERVIEW
• The case primarily involves 4 parties namely Unit Trust of
  India(UTI), Hindustan Lever Limited(HLL), Brooke Bond Lipton India
  Limited(BBLIL), and Securities & Exchange Board of India(SEBI).
• HLL planned a merger with sister concern BBLIL so that Uniliver has
  a major stake in merged company.
• Merger was to be carried out by HLL acquiring shares of BBLIL. The
  corresponding stock exchanges were informed on 19 April, 1996.
• HLL bought 8,00,000 shares of BBLIL from UTI just before the
  merger was initiated.
• SEBI accused HLL of INSIDER TRADING while entering in the
  above mentioned transaction.
• SEBI penalized HLL with Rs. 34 million & also initiated criminal
  proceedings against five common directors of HLL & BBLIL.
• On 15 July, 1998 the Union Finance Ministry absolved HLL of all
  charges of insider trading & quashed all the proceedings against the
  Directors.
WHAT IS INSIDER
          TRADING...???

• Insider trading refers to a situation, where
  in a person, by virtue of his position to
  access unpublished price sensitive
  information of the company, gains such
  access and subsequently uses the
  information obtained for his or her
  personal benefits.
.
ISSUES INVOLVED IN THE
           CASE

1) Whether HLL was an insider or not?
2) Whether or not the pre-merger
   information HLL had access to was
   „Unpublished‟?
3) Whether HLL had any price sensitive
   information with regard to the merger?
4) Whether or not HLL had gained any
   unfair advantage out of the deal?
ISSUE 1

Whether HLL was an insider
       or not...???
As per clause 2(e) of SEBI regulations “Insider
    means any person
•   who is or was connected with the company or
•   is deemed to have been connected with the
    company, and
•   who is reasonably expected to have access, by
    virtue of such connection, to unpublished price
    sensitive information, in respect of securities of
    the company or
•   who has received or
•   has had access to such unpublished price
    sensitive information.”
Applicability of Clause 2(e)
SEBI‟s arguments                      HLL‟s arguments
Argument 1                           Counter Argument 1
• As per SEBI, HLL is deemed to      • As per HLL, the company had
   be connected with BBLIL and         access to the information
   thus had access to the price        because it was the primary
   sensitive information of merger     party to the merger and no
                                       where in the world primary
Argument 2                             party is considered to be an
• HLL falls in the category of         insider from view-point of
   insider who might not be            insider
   connected to the company ,but
   “who had access to such            Counter Argument 2
   undisclosed price sensitive
   information”                      • No counter argument
CONCLUSION FOR ISSUE 1
• As per the above given arguments it can
  be concluded that HLL was an INSIDER
  as they did have access to the price
  sensitive information, even though they did
  not obtain it via any connections, but
  through there position as primary party in
  the merger and they took advantage in the
  form of buying shares from UTI so as to
  consolidate there position.
ISSUE 2

   Whether or not the pre-
 merger information HLL had
access to was „Unpublished‟?
As per Clause 2(k) “Unpublished price
 sensitive information means,

• information which is of concern, directly or
  indirectly, to a company, and
• is not generally known or published by
  such company for general information,
• but which if published or known,
• is likely to materially affect the price of
  securities of that company in the market.”
SEBI‟s argument                           HLL‟s argument


•   SEBI, on the basis of statement of    •   As per HLL even before the
    a UTI official, tried to prove that       transaction with UTI the merger
    information about the merger was          was subject matter of wide
    “Unpublished”.                            market & media speculation.

•   They also stated that the             •   HLL pointed out that before
    information about merger was              transaction took place share price
    speculative and that only HLL             of BBLIL moved from Rs. 242 to
    could sufficiently understand the         Rs. 320 showing that merger was
    technicality involved and use this        a „generally known information‟.
    information.

•   Thus HLL has gone against the         •   HLL still further contended that
    regulation.                               UTI was a large institution & it was
                                              not possible for UTI to remain
                                              ignorant about the widespread
                                              speculation in the market.
Conclusion for issue 2
• From the above arguments it can be
  deduced that the merger was something
  which was being speculated even before
  the transaction between HLL & UTI took
  place.
• So it was not an “Unpublished price
  sensitive Information”. HLL used the
  information just like any other investor in
  the market.
ISSUE 3

Whether HLL had any price
 sensitive information with
  regard to the merger?
Section 2k of SEBI‟s regulation laid down
eight examples of price-sensitive
information, which includes inter alia
“amalgamations, mergers, and takeovers”.
SEBI‟s arguments              HLL‟s arguments



• As per SEBI, term          • HLL argued that the
  “merger” is a price-         “merger” itself was not
  sensitive information        a price-sensitive
  i.e. Widespread news         information as investors
  of merger in the market      with reasonable
  would impact the             knowledge would not
  number of shares             be induced to buy the
  bought or sold by            shares unless the share
  investors in the market.     Swap Ratio is known
• HLL had information        • HLL did not know the
  about the merger with        swap ratio at the time of
  BBLIL                        buying shares from UTI
SWAP RATIO
• Ratio at which shares are allotted by new
  company to the old company.
• For e.g. Swap ratio of 1:10 means that the
  new company will issue 1 share for every
  10 shares held by shareholders of the old
  company.
Conclusion for issue 3
 HLL and BBLIL are
• sister concerns,
• having common board of directors,
• under the same holding company i.e. Unilever and
• are large profit making companies with frequently traded
  shares.
  Thus the news of merger would not create any ripples across
  the market as the companies already have many things in
  common. It would not cause any excessive trading on the part
  of investors.
   However, market would certainly react if the SWAP ratio
  arrived is such that it is favourable to one company while
  unfavourable to other. In that case it becomes a price
  sensitive information.
ISSUE 4

  Whether or not HLL had
gained any unfair advantage
      out of the deal?
SEBI‟s arguments                    HLL‟s arguments


• As per SEBI,” Making profit or   As per HLL after the merger all
  losses is not a legal               the shares purchased got
  requirement under the               cancelled and so there were
  regulation to establish charge      no financial gains to the
  of insider trading.”                company.
• As per SEBI, HLL benefitted in   • They bought 8,00,000 of BBLIL
  the form of uncertainty             shares from UTI at
  attached with the market            Rs. 350 while the market price
  reaction to the news of Merger      was Rs.318 thus at 10%
  and its subsequent impact on        premium.
  share prices.                    • Finally aim was to consolidate
                                      the shareholdings of
                                      UNILEVER.
Conclusion to issue 4
• Even though HLL says that it was not
  benefited from the transaction with
  UTI, however it was able to churn out huge
  gains. When they formally announced
  merger, the market price shot up from Rs.
  318 to Rs. 405 per share while they bought
  those shares for Rs.350.
• If UTI had not sold these shares they would
  have got shares worth Rs.483.3 million in the
  merged HLL, Rs. 208.3 million more than
  what they received by selling them to HLL
  before merger.
Overall it can be concluded that stand
taken by SEBI is incorrect because:-


1) The information about the Merger
   was not an “unpublished
   information”.
2) The merger itself was not a “price
   sensitive information”.
3) Unintentional gains out of the
   transactions.
RESPONE OF
UNION FINANCE
  MINISTRY...
• Union ministry upheld HLL‟S view that the
  merger was “generally known” as it was
  widely speculated in national media.
• As per the ministry, SEBI should gather
  conclusive evidence and should present
  strong case to support its arguments.
• Still further the SEBI suffered from
  procedural deficiencies and prosecuting
  and penalizing HLL was beyond there
  jurisdiction.
WAS THE
  RESPONSE
JUSTIFIED...???
• Response of the Union Finance Ministry was
  correct.
• Stance taken by the ministry to treat the merger as
  „generally known information‟ is appropriate, as it
  was being widely speculated in the media and any
  investor could use the same.
• Also there were question marks about the powers
  of SEBI and without the authority to do so SEBI
  could not penalize HLL and prosecute the
  directors.
• This case helped us in realising that it is
  necessary to define the powers of SEBI.
THANK YOU

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Insider Trading

  • 1. INSIDER TRADING Presented By : Rohit Kumar Jaitly Praveen Kumar Mohit Arora Monika Bansal Sulagna Dutta
  • 3. CASE OVERVIEW • The case primarily involves 4 parties namely Unit Trust of India(UTI), Hindustan Lever Limited(HLL), Brooke Bond Lipton India Limited(BBLIL), and Securities & Exchange Board of India(SEBI). • HLL planned a merger with sister concern BBLIL so that Uniliver has a major stake in merged company. • Merger was to be carried out by HLL acquiring shares of BBLIL. The corresponding stock exchanges were informed on 19 April, 1996. • HLL bought 8,00,000 shares of BBLIL from UTI just before the merger was initiated. • SEBI accused HLL of INSIDER TRADING while entering in the above mentioned transaction. • SEBI penalized HLL with Rs. 34 million & also initiated criminal proceedings against five common directors of HLL & BBLIL. • On 15 July, 1998 the Union Finance Ministry absolved HLL of all charges of insider trading & quashed all the proceedings against the Directors.
  • 4. WHAT IS INSIDER TRADING...??? • Insider trading refers to a situation, where in a person, by virtue of his position to access unpublished price sensitive information of the company, gains such access and subsequently uses the information obtained for his or her personal benefits. .
  • 5. ISSUES INVOLVED IN THE CASE 1) Whether HLL was an insider or not? 2) Whether or not the pre-merger information HLL had access to was „Unpublished‟? 3) Whether HLL had any price sensitive information with regard to the merger? 4) Whether or not HLL had gained any unfair advantage out of the deal?
  • 6. ISSUE 1 Whether HLL was an insider or not...???
  • 7. As per clause 2(e) of SEBI regulations “Insider means any person • who is or was connected with the company or • is deemed to have been connected with the company, and • who is reasonably expected to have access, by virtue of such connection, to unpublished price sensitive information, in respect of securities of the company or • who has received or • has had access to such unpublished price sensitive information.”
  • 8. Applicability of Clause 2(e) SEBI‟s arguments HLL‟s arguments Argument 1 Counter Argument 1 • As per SEBI, HLL is deemed to • As per HLL, the company had be connected with BBLIL and access to the information thus had access to the price because it was the primary sensitive information of merger party to the merger and no where in the world primary Argument 2 party is considered to be an • HLL falls in the category of insider from view-point of insider who might not be insider connected to the company ,but “who had access to such Counter Argument 2 undisclosed price sensitive information” • No counter argument
  • 9. CONCLUSION FOR ISSUE 1 • As per the above given arguments it can be concluded that HLL was an INSIDER as they did have access to the price sensitive information, even though they did not obtain it via any connections, but through there position as primary party in the merger and they took advantage in the form of buying shares from UTI so as to consolidate there position.
  • 10. ISSUE 2 Whether or not the pre- merger information HLL had access to was „Unpublished‟?
  • 11. As per Clause 2(k) “Unpublished price sensitive information means, • information which is of concern, directly or indirectly, to a company, and • is not generally known or published by such company for general information, • but which if published or known, • is likely to materially affect the price of securities of that company in the market.”
  • 12. SEBI‟s argument HLL‟s argument • SEBI, on the basis of statement of • As per HLL even before the a UTI official, tried to prove that transaction with UTI the merger information about the merger was was subject matter of wide “Unpublished”. market & media speculation. • They also stated that the • HLL pointed out that before information about merger was transaction took place share price speculative and that only HLL of BBLIL moved from Rs. 242 to could sufficiently understand the Rs. 320 showing that merger was technicality involved and use this a „generally known information‟. information. • Thus HLL has gone against the • HLL still further contended that regulation. UTI was a large institution & it was not possible for UTI to remain ignorant about the widespread speculation in the market.
  • 13. Conclusion for issue 2 • From the above arguments it can be deduced that the merger was something which was being speculated even before the transaction between HLL & UTI took place. • So it was not an “Unpublished price sensitive Information”. HLL used the information just like any other investor in the market.
  • 14. ISSUE 3 Whether HLL had any price sensitive information with regard to the merger?
  • 15. Section 2k of SEBI‟s regulation laid down eight examples of price-sensitive information, which includes inter alia “amalgamations, mergers, and takeovers”.
  • 16. SEBI‟s arguments HLL‟s arguments • As per SEBI, term • HLL argued that the “merger” is a price- “merger” itself was not sensitive information a price-sensitive i.e. Widespread news information as investors of merger in the market with reasonable would impact the knowledge would not number of shares be induced to buy the bought or sold by shares unless the share investors in the market. Swap Ratio is known • HLL had information • HLL did not know the about the merger with swap ratio at the time of BBLIL buying shares from UTI
  • 17. SWAP RATIO • Ratio at which shares are allotted by new company to the old company. • For e.g. Swap ratio of 1:10 means that the new company will issue 1 share for every 10 shares held by shareholders of the old company.
  • 18. Conclusion for issue 3 HLL and BBLIL are • sister concerns, • having common board of directors, • under the same holding company i.e. Unilever and • are large profit making companies with frequently traded shares. Thus the news of merger would not create any ripples across the market as the companies already have many things in common. It would not cause any excessive trading on the part of investors. However, market would certainly react if the SWAP ratio arrived is such that it is favourable to one company while unfavourable to other. In that case it becomes a price sensitive information.
  • 19. ISSUE 4 Whether or not HLL had gained any unfair advantage out of the deal?
  • 20. SEBI‟s arguments HLL‟s arguments • As per SEBI,” Making profit or As per HLL after the merger all losses is not a legal the shares purchased got requirement under the cancelled and so there were regulation to establish charge no financial gains to the of insider trading.” company. • As per SEBI, HLL benefitted in • They bought 8,00,000 of BBLIL the form of uncertainty shares from UTI at attached with the market Rs. 350 while the market price reaction to the news of Merger was Rs.318 thus at 10% and its subsequent impact on premium. share prices. • Finally aim was to consolidate the shareholdings of UNILEVER.
  • 21. Conclusion to issue 4 • Even though HLL says that it was not benefited from the transaction with UTI, however it was able to churn out huge gains. When they formally announced merger, the market price shot up from Rs. 318 to Rs. 405 per share while they bought those shares for Rs.350. • If UTI had not sold these shares they would have got shares worth Rs.483.3 million in the merged HLL, Rs. 208.3 million more than what they received by selling them to HLL before merger.
  • 22. Overall it can be concluded that stand taken by SEBI is incorrect because:- 1) The information about the Merger was not an “unpublished information”. 2) The merger itself was not a “price sensitive information”. 3) Unintentional gains out of the transactions.
  • 24. • Union ministry upheld HLL‟S view that the merger was “generally known” as it was widely speculated in national media. • As per the ministry, SEBI should gather conclusive evidence and should present strong case to support its arguments. • Still further the SEBI suffered from procedural deficiencies and prosecuting and penalizing HLL was beyond there jurisdiction.
  • 25. WAS THE RESPONSE JUSTIFIED...???
  • 26. • Response of the Union Finance Ministry was correct. • Stance taken by the ministry to treat the merger as „generally known information‟ is appropriate, as it was being widely speculated in the media and any investor could use the same. • Also there were question marks about the powers of SEBI and without the authority to do so SEBI could not penalize HLL and prosecute the directors. • This case helped us in realising that it is necessary to define the powers of SEBI.