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IRR	
  Lockdown	
  
-­‐	
  or	
  -­‐	
  
How	
  to	
  make	
  the	
  most	
  of	
  exis1ng	
  
IRR	
  systems	
  
Job	
  Snijders	
  
job@n=.net	
  
Who	
  am	
  I?	
  
Job	
  Snijders	
  
	
  
IP	
  Development	
  @	
  AS2914	
  /	
  NTT	
  
	
  
Twi=er:	
  @JobSnijders	
  
Email:	
  job@n=.net	
  
	
  
Shoe	
  size:	
  45/EU	
  
	
  
IRR	
  Lockdown	
  -­‐	
  PLNOG	
  -­‐	
  job@n=.net	
  
Agenda	
  
•  What	
  is	
  IRR?	
  
•  Issues	
  with	
  IRR	
  
•  Protec1ng	
  RIPE	
  managed	
  space	
  “IRR	
  lockdown”	
  
•  New	
  IRR	
  debug	
  tool:	
  “IRR	
  Explorer”	
  
•  Q	
  &	
  A	
  
IRR	
  Lockdown	
  -­‐	
  PLNOG	
  -­‐	
  job@n=.net	
  
IRR	
  background	
  
•  IRR/RPSL	
  is	
  decades	
  old	
  technology	
  
•  Register	
  routes	
  which	
  you	
  intend	
  to	
  announce	
  
•  Some	
  people	
  classify	
  IRR	
  as	
  garbage:	
  
–  Stale	
  data	
  
–  No	
  incen1ve	
  to	
  clean	
  up	
  
–  Almost**	
  	
  no	
  verifica1on	
  
–  RPSL	
  is	
  close	
  to	
  non-­‐determinis1c	
  shit	
  to	
  parse	
  
•  Google	
  keywords:	
  RIPE,	
  RADB,	
  ARIN,	
  “route:”,	
  
“route6:”,	
  “aut-­‐num:”,	
  “inetnum:”,	
  “inet6num:	
  
	
  
**	
  But	
  there	
  is	
  hope…..	
  
IRR	
  Lockdown	
  -­‐	
  PLNOG	
  -­‐	
  job@n=.net	
  
Issues	
  
•  h=p://www.bgpmon.net/using-­‐bgp-­‐data-­‐to-­‐
find-­‐spammers/	
  
•  “Spamming	
  with	
  BGP	
  Spectrum	
  Agility”	
  h=p://
nanog.org/mee1ngs/nanog36/presenta1ons/
feamster.pdf	
  
•  Mistakes	
  clings	
  to	
  you	
  forever…	
  
IRR	
  Lockdown	
  -­‐	
  PLNOG	
  -­‐	
  job@n=.net	
  
What	
  is	
  an	
  IRR	
  lockdown?	
  
•  Only	
  honor	
  route	
  objects	
  when	
  they	
  come	
  
from	
  the	
  right	
  data	
  source	
  AND	
  have	
  been	
  
properly	
  authen1cated	
  
•  Ignore	
  route	
  objects	
  covering	
  the	
  “locked	
  
down”	
  IRR	
  if	
  they	
  come	
  from	
  elsewhere	
  
IRR	
  Lockdown	
  -­‐	
  PLNOG	
  -­‐	
  job@n=.net	
  
PIECHART	
  TIME!11	
  (DFZ)	
  
DFZ	
  
RIPE	
  
ARIN	
  
LACNIC	
  
APNIC	
  
Others	
  
IRR	
  Lockdown	
  -­‐	
  PLNOG	
  -­‐	
  job@n=.net	
  
Quality	
  differences	
  
•  Coupling	
  between	
  RIR	
  &	
  IRR	
  func1onality?	
  
– Does	
  the	
  IP	
  owner	
  have	
  to	
  authorize	
  route	
  object	
  
crea1on?	
  
•  Verifica1on	
  queuing?	
  
•  Yearly	
  payment	
  as	
  keep-­‐alive?	
  
•  24/7	
  support	
  staff?	
  
•  Easily	
  accessible	
  training?	
  
•  ….	
  
IRR	
  Lockdown	
  -­‐	
  PLNOG	
  -­‐	
  job@n=.net	
  
What	
  makes	
  RIPE’s	
  database	
  special?	
  
•  NTT	
  can	
  trust	
  the	
  authen1ca1on	
  chain	
  from	
  IP	
  
block	
  owner	
  (“inetnum	
  owner”)	
  down	
  to	
  route	
  
object	
  crea1on:	
  both	
  aut-­‐num	
  owner	
  and	
  
inetnum	
  owner	
  have	
  to	
  approve	
  
•  RIPE	
  arguably	
  has	
  infrastructure	
  in	
  place	
  for	
  
good	
  registry	
  service	
  up1me	
  
•  RIPE	
  leads	
  ‘whois	
  server’	
  sopware	
  
development	
  
IRR	
  Lockdown	
  -­‐	
  PLNOG	
  -­‐	
  job@n=.net	
  
The	
  plan	
  
Knowing	
  that:	
  RIPE	
  administrates	
  roughly	
  35	
  /8	
  
blocks	
  
	
  
NTT	
  considers	
  only	
  to	
  allow	
  route	
  objects,	
  covering	
  
RIPE	
  managed	
  space,	
  to	
  influence	
  NTT	
  prefix	
  filters,	
  
if	
  the	
  objects	
  come	
  from	
  RIPE’s	
  registry	
  itself.	
  
	
  
–  Ignore	
  certain	
  updates	
  on	
  NRTM	
  streams	
  
–  Reject	
  certain	
  route	
  object	
  crea1on	
  in	
  NTTCOM	
  
registry	
  
IRR	
  Lockdown	
  -­‐	
  PLNOG	
  -­‐	
  job@n=.net	
  
What	
  are	
  Untrusted	
  NRTM/IRR	
  
updates?	
  
•  Anything	
  that	
  any	
  IRR	
  sends	
  to	
  rr.n1.net	
  via	
  
NRTM,	
  which	
  covers	
  part	
  of	
  the	
  35	
  /8s	
  RIPE	
  
NCC	
  manages	
  
•  Anything	
  with	
  “source:	
  RIPE”	
  from	
  non-­‐RIPE	
  
NRTM	
  server	
  
•  Any	
  route	
  objects	
  customers	
  create	
  which	
  
covers	
  RIPE	
  managed	
  space	
  inside	
  the	
  
NTTCOM	
  registry	
  
IRR	
  Lockdown	
  -­‐	
  PLNOG	
  -­‐	
  job@n=.net	
  
Benefits	
  
•  It	
  will	
  become	
  harder	
  to	
  hijack	
  RIPE	
  space	
  
through	
  rogue	
  route	
  objects	
  in	
  lenient	
  registries	
  
•  NTT	
  (and	
  other	
  par1es	
  using	
  rr.n1.net	
  to	
  
generate	
  filters)	
  can	
  trust	
  the	
  filters	
  be=er	
  
•  Clear	
  benefit	
  to	
  register	
  route-­‐objects	
  in	
  same	
  
database	
  as	
  the	
  inetnum:	
  (APNIC	
  -­‐>	
  APNIC,	
  RIPE	
  -­‐
>	
  RIPE,	
  AFRINIC	
  -­‐>	
  AFRINIC)	
  
•  Proper	
  registra1on	
  will	
  actually	
  mean	
  something,	
  
and	
  have	
  impact	
  on	
  global	
  scale	
  
IRR	
  Lockdown	
  -­‐	
  PLNOG	
  -­‐	
  job@n=.net	
  
Sta1s1cs	
  (28	
  nov	
  2014)	
  
1.  	
  Total	
  number	
  of	
  RIPE	
  prefixes	
  for	
  which	
  a	
  route	
  
object	
  ONLY	
  exists	
  in	
  a	
  foreign	
  IRR	
  AND	
  which	
  were	
  
observed	
  in	
  the	
  DFZ:	
  1004	
  prefixes	
  (aggregated	
  522),	
  
spread	
  over	
  280	
  ASNs.	
  
2.  	
  Total	
  number	
  of	
  prefixes	
  for	
  which	
  a	
  route	
  object	
  
exists	
  in	
  both	
  RIPE	
  IRR	
  and	
  a	
  foreign	
  IRR	
  (with	
  
mismatching	
  origins),	
  AND	
  where	
  the	
  foreign	
  version	
  
is	
  observered	
  in	
  the	
  DFZ:	
  269	
  prefixes	
  spread	
  over	
  
119	
  ASNs.	
  
3.  Combined	
  intersec1on	
  of	
  #1	
  and	
  #2	
  with	
  our	
  
customer	
  cone:	
  ~	
  500	
  prefixes	
  
Details:	
  
h=ps://www.ripe.net/ripe/mail/archives/rou1ng-­‐wg/
2014-­‐November/002887.html	
  	
  
	
  
IRR	
  Lockdown	
  -­‐	
  PLNOG	
  -­‐	
  job@n=.net	
  
Good:
route: 193.0.0.0/21
descr: RIPE-NCC
origin: AS3333
mnt-by: RIPE-NCC-MNT
source: RIPE
BAD!
route: 193.0.0.0/21
descr: RIPE-NCC
origin: AS666
mnt-by: MAINT-AS237
source: RADB
IANA gave to RIPE 193.0.0.0/8:
inetnum: 193.0.0.0 - 195.255.255.255
netname: EU-ZZ-193-194-195
descr: European Regional Registry
Why	
  would	
  we	
  ever	
  honor	
  the	
  bad	
  route	
  object?!	
  
IRR	
  Lockdown	
  -­‐	
  PLNOG	
  -­‐	
  job@n=.net	
  
Implementa1on	
  steps:	
  
•  Patch	
  IRRd	
  to	
  have	
  shim	
  layer	
  between	
  NRTM	
  
receiver	
  and	
  internal	
  radix	
  tree/db,	
  which	
  
checks	
  whether	
  the	
  route	
  object	
  comes	
  from	
  
RIPE	
  IRR	
  and	
  covers	
  RIPE	
  space	
  
– In	
  case	
  of	
  failure:	
  insert	
  into	
  DB	
  with	
  AS0	
  as	
  origin	
  
– Source:	
  h=ps://github.com/irrdnet/irrd/	
  
– rr.n1.net	
  runs	
  IRRd	
  
•  On	
  a	
  daily	
  basis	
  fetch	
  list	
  of	
  RIPE	
  managed	
  
prefixes	
  
IRR	
  Lockdown	
  -­‐	
  PLNOG	
  -­‐	
  job@n=.net	
  
IRR	
  Lockdown	
  -­‐	
  PLNOG	
  -­‐	
  job@n=.net	
  
Why	
  IRR	
  Explorer?	
  
•  Make	
  it	
  easier	
  to	
  test	
  whether	
  an	
  “IRR	
  
Lockdown”	
  would	
  affect	
  you	
  
•  Get	
  a	
  sense	
  of	
  where	
  people	
  registered	
  route-­‐
objects	
  covering	
  your	
  own	
  space	
  
•  Mo1vate	
  people	
  to	
  clean	
  up!	
  J	
  
•  I	
  grew	
  1red	
  of	
  	
  
$ peval | awk | sed | derp | help | echo “get
me out of here” | wall –g
	
  
IRR	
  Lockdown	
  -­‐	
  PLNOG	
  -­‐	
  job@n=.net	
  
Debugging	
  your	
  IRR	
  data	
  
IRR	
  Explorer	
  	
  
	
  
h=p://irrexplorer.nlnog.net/	
  is	
  a	
  tool	
  to	
  search	
  
where	
  your	
  IRR	
  objects	
  are	
  located	
  and	
  see	
  if	
  
they	
  are	
  in	
  the	
  proper	
  database	
  or	
  not	
  
	
  
Code:	
  h=ps://github.com/job/irrexplorer	
  
	
  
IRR	
  Lockdown	
  -­‐	
  PLNOG	
  -­‐	
  job@n=.net	
  
IRR	
  explorer	
  overview	
  
IRR	
  Lockdown	
  -­‐	
  PLNOG	
  -­‐	
  job@n=.net	
  
ë	
  
IRR	
  Explorer	
  BETA	
  WARNING	
  
IRR	
  Explorer	
  was	
  hacked	
  together	
  in	
  ~	
  300	
  hours	
  
with	
  the	
  help	
  of	
  Nat	
  Morris	
  (@natmorris),	
  Peter	
  van	
  
Dijk	
  (@habbie)	
  &	
  Henrik	
  Thostrup	
  Jensen	
  
(NORDUnet).	
  J	
  
	
  
IRR	
  Explorer	
  currently	
  is	
  slow	
  FAST	
  and	
  prone	
  to	
  
crashes,	
  but	
  that	
  will	
  improve	
  soon!	
  	
  
	
  
Ingredients:	
  Python,	
  py-­‐radix,	
  Flask,	
  bootstrap,	
  
jquery,	
  PostgreSQL	
  
	
  
	
   IRR	
  Lockdown	
  -­‐	
  PLNOG	
  -­‐	
  job@n=.net	
  
IRR	
  Lockdown	
  -­‐	
  PLNOG	
  -­‐	
  job@n=.net	
  
IRR	
  Lockdown	
  -­‐	
  PLNOG	
  -­‐	
  job@n=.net	
  
IRR	
  Lockdown	
  -­‐	
  PLNOG	
  -­‐	
  job@n=.net	
  
IRR	
  Lockdown	
  -­‐	
  PLNOG	
  -­‐	
  job@n=.net	
  
IRR	
  Lockdown	
  -­‐	
  PLNOG	
  -­‐	
  job@n=.net	
  
IRR	
  Lockdown	
  -­‐	
  PLNOG	
  -­‐	
  job@n=.net	
  
IRR	
  Lockdown	
  -­‐	
  PLNOG	
  -­‐	
  job@n=.net	
  
Timeline	
  
•  Test	
  your	
  prefixes	
  @	
  irrexplorer:	
  now	
  
•  Deploy	
  IRR	
  Lockdown:	
  Q2	
  2016?	
  
IRR	
  Lockdown	
  -­‐	
  PLNOG	
  -­‐	
  job@n=.net	
  
Known	
  par1es	
  to	
  consider	
  an	
  
IRR	
  Lockdown	
  
•  Opteamax	
  (Germany)	
  
•  ECIX	
  route	
  servers	
  (Germany)	
  
•  NTT	
  /	
  AS	
  2914	
  (Global)	
  
•  Anybody	
  that	
  uses	
  rr.n1.net	
  in	
  2016	
  
•  You?	
  J	
  let	
  me	
  know!	
  
IRR	
  Lockdown	
  -­‐	
  PLNOG	
  -­‐	
  job@n=.net	
  
Q&A	
  for	
  the	
  rou1ng	
  police	
  
IRR	
  Lockdown	
  -­‐	
  PLNOG	
  -­‐	
  job@n=.net	
  

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PLNOG15 - IRR Lockdown - Job Snijders

  • 1. IRR  Lockdown   -­‐  or  -­‐   How  to  make  the  most  of  exis1ng   IRR  systems   Job  Snijders   job@n=.net  
  • 2. Who  am  I?   Job  Snijders     IP  Development  @  AS2914  /  NTT     Twi=er:  @JobSnijders   Email:  job@n=.net     Shoe  size:  45/EU     IRR  Lockdown  -­‐  PLNOG  -­‐  job@n=.net  
  • 3. Agenda   •  What  is  IRR?   •  Issues  with  IRR   •  Protec1ng  RIPE  managed  space  “IRR  lockdown”   •  New  IRR  debug  tool:  “IRR  Explorer”   •  Q  &  A   IRR  Lockdown  -­‐  PLNOG  -­‐  job@n=.net  
  • 4. IRR  background   •  IRR/RPSL  is  decades  old  technology   •  Register  routes  which  you  intend  to  announce   •  Some  people  classify  IRR  as  garbage:   –  Stale  data   –  No  incen1ve  to  clean  up   –  Almost**    no  verifica1on   –  RPSL  is  close  to  non-­‐determinis1c  shit  to  parse   •  Google  keywords:  RIPE,  RADB,  ARIN,  “route:”,   “route6:”,  “aut-­‐num:”,  “inetnum:”,  “inet6num:     **  But  there  is  hope…..   IRR  Lockdown  -­‐  PLNOG  -­‐  job@n=.net  
  • 5. Issues   •  h=p://www.bgpmon.net/using-­‐bgp-­‐data-­‐to-­‐ find-­‐spammers/   •  “Spamming  with  BGP  Spectrum  Agility”  h=p:// nanog.org/mee1ngs/nanog36/presenta1ons/ feamster.pdf   •  Mistakes  clings  to  you  forever…   IRR  Lockdown  -­‐  PLNOG  -­‐  job@n=.net  
  • 6. What  is  an  IRR  lockdown?   •  Only  honor  route  objects  when  they  come   from  the  right  data  source  AND  have  been   properly  authen1cated   •  Ignore  route  objects  covering  the  “locked   down”  IRR  if  they  come  from  elsewhere   IRR  Lockdown  -­‐  PLNOG  -­‐  job@n=.net  
  • 7. PIECHART  TIME!11  (DFZ)   DFZ   RIPE   ARIN   LACNIC   APNIC   Others   IRR  Lockdown  -­‐  PLNOG  -­‐  job@n=.net  
  • 8. Quality  differences   •  Coupling  between  RIR  &  IRR  func1onality?   – Does  the  IP  owner  have  to  authorize  route  object   crea1on?   •  Verifica1on  queuing?   •  Yearly  payment  as  keep-­‐alive?   •  24/7  support  staff?   •  Easily  accessible  training?   •  ….   IRR  Lockdown  -­‐  PLNOG  -­‐  job@n=.net  
  • 9. What  makes  RIPE’s  database  special?   •  NTT  can  trust  the  authen1ca1on  chain  from  IP   block  owner  (“inetnum  owner”)  down  to  route   object  crea1on:  both  aut-­‐num  owner  and   inetnum  owner  have  to  approve   •  RIPE  arguably  has  infrastructure  in  place  for   good  registry  service  up1me   •  RIPE  leads  ‘whois  server’  sopware   development   IRR  Lockdown  -­‐  PLNOG  -­‐  job@n=.net  
  • 10. The  plan   Knowing  that:  RIPE  administrates  roughly  35  /8   blocks     NTT  considers  only  to  allow  route  objects,  covering   RIPE  managed  space,  to  influence  NTT  prefix  filters,   if  the  objects  come  from  RIPE’s  registry  itself.     –  Ignore  certain  updates  on  NRTM  streams   –  Reject  certain  route  object  crea1on  in  NTTCOM   registry   IRR  Lockdown  -­‐  PLNOG  -­‐  job@n=.net  
  • 11. What  are  Untrusted  NRTM/IRR   updates?   •  Anything  that  any  IRR  sends  to  rr.n1.net  via   NRTM,  which  covers  part  of  the  35  /8s  RIPE   NCC  manages   •  Anything  with  “source:  RIPE”  from  non-­‐RIPE   NRTM  server   •  Any  route  objects  customers  create  which   covers  RIPE  managed  space  inside  the   NTTCOM  registry   IRR  Lockdown  -­‐  PLNOG  -­‐  job@n=.net  
  • 12. Benefits   •  It  will  become  harder  to  hijack  RIPE  space   through  rogue  route  objects  in  lenient  registries   •  NTT  (and  other  par1es  using  rr.n1.net  to   generate  filters)  can  trust  the  filters  be=er   •  Clear  benefit  to  register  route-­‐objects  in  same   database  as  the  inetnum:  (APNIC  -­‐>  APNIC,  RIPE  -­‐ >  RIPE,  AFRINIC  -­‐>  AFRINIC)   •  Proper  registra1on  will  actually  mean  something,   and  have  impact  on  global  scale   IRR  Lockdown  -­‐  PLNOG  -­‐  job@n=.net  
  • 13. Sta1s1cs  (28  nov  2014)   1.   Total  number  of  RIPE  prefixes  for  which  a  route   object  ONLY  exists  in  a  foreign  IRR  AND  which  were   observed  in  the  DFZ:  1004  prefixes  (aggregated  522),   spread  over  280  ASNs.   2.   Total  number  of  prefixes  for  which  a  route  object   exists  in  both  RIPE  IRR  and  a  foreign  IRR  (with   mismatching  origins),  AND  where  the  foreign  version   is  observered  in  the  DFZ:  269  prefixes  spread  over   119  ASNs.   3.  Combined  intersec1on  of  #1  and  #2  with  our   customer  cone:  ~  500  prefixes   Details:   h=ps://www.ripe.net/ripe/mail/archives/rou1ng-­‐wg/ 2014-­‐November/002887.html       IRR  Lockdown  -­‐  PLNOG  -­‐  job@n=.net  
  • 14. Good: route: 193.0.0.0/21 descr: RIPE-NCC origin: AS3333 mnt-by: RIPE-NCC-MNT source: RIPE BAD! route: 193.0.0.0/21 descr: RIPE-NCC origin: AS666 mnt-by: MAINT-AS237 source: RADB IANA gave to RIPE 193.0.0.0/8: inetnum: 193.0.0.0 - 195.255.255.255 netname: EU-ZZ-193-194-195 descr: European Regional Registry Why  would  we  ever  honor  the  bad  route  object?!   IRR  Lockdown  -­‐  PLNOG  -­‐  job@n=.net  
  • 15. Implementa1on  steps:   •  Patch  IRRd  to  have  shim  layer  between  NRTM   receiver  and  internal  radix  tree/db,  which   checks  whether  the  route  object  comes  from   RIPE  IRR  and  covers  RIPE  space   – In  case  of  failure:  insert  into  DB  with  AS0  as  origin   – Source:  h=ps://github.com/irrdnet/irrd/   – rr.n1.net  runs  IRRd   •  On  a  daily  basis  fetch  list  of  RIPE  managed   prefixes   IRR  Lockdown  -­‐  PLNOG  -­‐  job@n=.net  
  • 16. IRR  Lockdown  -­‐  PLNOG  -­‐  job@n=.net  
  • 17. Why  IRR  Explorer?   •  Make  it  easier  to  test  whether  an  “IRR   Lockdown”  would  affect  you   •  Get  a  sense  of  where  people  registered  route-­‐ objects  covering  your  own  space   •  Mo1vate  people  to  clean  up!  J   •  I  grew  1red  of     $ peval | awk | sed | derp | help | echo “get me out of here” | wall –g   IRR  Lockdown  -­‐  PLNOG  -­‐  job@n=.net  
  • 18. Debugging  your  IRR  data   IRR  Explorer       h=p://irrexplorer.nlnog.net/  is  a  tool  to  search   where  your  IRR  objects  are  located  and  see  if   they  are  in  the  proper  database  or  not     Code:  h=ps://github.com/job/irrexplorer     IRR  Lockdown  -­‐  PLNOG  -­‐  job@n=.net  
  • 19. IRR  explorer  overview   IRR  Lockdown  -­‐  PLNOG  -­‐  job@n=.net   ë  
  • 20. IRR  Explorer  BETA  WARNING   IRR  Explorer  was  hacked  together  in  ~  300  hours   with  the  help  of  Nat  Morris  (@natmorris),  Peter  van   Dijk  (@habbie)  &  Henrik  Thostrup  Jensen   (NORDUnet).  J     IRR  Explorer  currently  is  slow  FAST  and  prone  to   crashes,  but  that  will  improve  soon!       Ingredients:  Python,  py-­‐radix,  Flask,  bootstrap,   jquery,  PostgreSQL       IRR  Lockdown  -­‐  PLNOG  -­‐  job@n=.net  
  • 21. IRR  Lockdown  -­‐  PLNOG  -­‐  job@n=.net  
  • 22. IRR  Lockdown  -­‐  PLNOG  -­‐  job@n=.net  
  • 23. IRR  Lockdown  -­‐  PLNOG  -­‐  job@n=.net  
  • 24. IRR  Lockdown  -­‐  PLNOG  -­‐  job@n=.net  
  • 25. IRR  Lockdown  -­‐  PLNOG  -­‐  job@n=.net  
  • 26. IRR  Lockdown  -­‐  PLNOG  -­‐  job@n=.net  
  • 27. IRR  Lockdown  -­‐  PLNOG  -­‐  job@n=.net  
  • 28. Timeline   •  Test  your  prefixes  @  irrexplorer:  now   •  Deploy  IRR  Lockdown:  Q2  2016?   IRR  Lockdown  -­‐  PLNOG  -­‐  job@n=.net  
  • 29. Known  par1es  to  consider  an   IRR  Lockdown   •  Opteamax  (Germany)   •  ECIX  route  servers  (Germany)   •  NTT  /  AS  2914  (Global)   •  Anybody  that  uses  rr.n1.net  in  2016   •  You?  J  let  me  know!   IRR  Lockdown  -­‐  PLNOG  -­‐  job@n=.net  
  • 30. Q&A  for  the  rou1ng  police   IRR  Lockdown  -­‐  PLNOG  -­‐  job@n=.net