SlideShare une entreprise Scribd logo
1  sur  27
http://www.security.re.kr
Protection Profile for
E-Certificate Issuance System
Hyunjung Lee, Dongho Won, Seungjoo Kim
Sungkyunkwan University, Information Security Group, Korea
http://www.security.re.kr
http://www.security.re.kr2
Why we use the e-Document
Issuance Service?
§ Definition
§ Should one go to the school just to get a report card?
§ e-Government services: Government-guaranteed documents issued
via Internet
§ What will change?
AS-
IS
TO-
BE
…
Document Issuing
System
Forgery Prevention
System
Claimed & issued on Web page
Issued by email
User Printing
Forge-Proof
Document
http://www.security.re.kr3
Upsides and Requirements
§ Upsides
§ Requirements
Aspects Description
Quick Available 24/7
Economical Low cost compared to issuing off-line
Accessible Everywhere with the Internet services
Security feature Technical feature
Confidentiality of the
Issuing System
• Cryptography for e-documents issued
• Screen control
• UI control
• Printer control
Forgery Prevention for
Print-out
• Watermark
• 2D Barcode
• Copy Detector
Reliability of the
Issuing Organization
• PKI authentication
http://www.security.re.kr4
Terms and Definition
§ Original Document
§ Original Document refers to electronic document and its proper and
secure print-outs that is an object of issue.
§ Electronic Document
§ Electronic Document means an electronic file of a structured
document standardized with a pair of form and data of the
document.
§ Issue System
§ Issue System refers commonly to a system of issuing organizations
that issues electronic documents.
§ Detect Software
§ Detect Software refers to a program that extracts digital information.
Using scanners, it detects 2D high-density barcodes and invisible
watermarks attached to print-outs. It extracts digital information by
analyzing the 2D high-density barcodes and invisible watermarks.
http://www.security.re.kr5
Terms and Definition
§ Forgery Prevention Elements
§ Forgery Prevention Elements refer to all kinds of devices
(identification elements) that give reliability to print-outs of
electronic documents and make it possible for regular users to
distinguish whether the print-outs are authentic or not by
viewing the documents or using tools. EPS's Forgery
Prevention Elements are 2D high-density barcodes, invisible
watermarks, copy detector marks and so on.
§ Secure Print-out
§ Secure Print-out means a print-out of an electronic document
that contains functions (high-density 2D barcodes, invisible
watermarks) for print-out security.
http://www.security.re.kr6
System Structure
Web Server
Requests
document
Apply for document
Document Issuing System
Document
DB
Requests info for document
Data required
for document2D barcode created
Original
document
Original
document
Certificate of
issuing
organization
Issues
document
Printed
document
WAS
Compressed/
Encrypted
User Control
Module
Document Verification
Module
Server
Module
http://www.security.re.kr7
Threat Factors
User PC
Printer
Printed
document Copier
Scanner
Document
Issuing
Server
Original
document
Web Browser
Sniffering on networkLeaking source by
saving or capturing on
Web browser
Leaking source via
temporary files of
Web browser
Leaking source by
using print spool file
Leaking source by
virtual printer
Forging by
high-end scanner
Copying by
digital copier
Forged
document
Submit to
authorities
http://www.security.re.kr8
Core Security Functions
Function 1. Web Protection
CoreCore
SecuritySecurity
FunctionsFunctions
• Controls printing, saving, copying from web browser
• Prevents document capturing from capture/remote program
• Limits pop-up menus by clicking mouse right-button
• Prevents information leakage by cache or temporary files
Function 2. Printer control
• High-density 2D barcode with Error Correction Code
• Digital Signature Verification with publisher confirmation
• Detection Program
• Digital Watermark to protect image seal/log
• All data for the issuance is encrypted in metafile
Function 3. Prevention & Verification
• Limits print spool file
• Counts/limits the numbers of prints
• Prevents printing from virtual printers(ex. PDF Writer)
• Controls printer drivers & Checks printer’s status
http://www.security.re.kr9
Function 1. Web Protection
User PC
Printer
Printed
document Copier
Scanner
Document
Issuing
Server
Original
document
Web Browser
Sniffering on networkLeaking source by
saving or capturing on
Web browser
Leaking source by
virtual printer
Forging by
high-end scanner
Copying by
digital copier
Forged
document
Submit to
authorities
Leaking source by
using print spool file
Leaking source via
temporary files of
Web browser
http://www.security.re.kr10
Function 1. Web Protection
§ Web Protection
Secure Web Page
• Control Web Browser Menus
• Limit to produce cache/
temp file
• Preventing copying by
keyboard or mouse
• Limit the use of pop-up menu
• Encryption
• Preventing link by URL
• Limit use of Clipboard
• Blocking image capture
• Preventing capture by
keyboard
• Protect document screen
from remote program
Browser Control
Encrypted Meta File
Capture Prevention
http://www.security.re.kr11
Function 2. Printer control
User PC
Printer
Printed
document Copier
Scanner
Document
Issuing
Server
Original
document
Web Browser
Sniffering on network
Submit to
authorities
Forged
document
Forging by
high-end scanner
Copying by
digital copier
Leaking source by
virtual printer
Leaking source by
using print spool file
Leaking source by
saving or capturing on
Web browser
Leaking source via
temporary files of
Web browser
http://www.security.re.kr12
Function 2. Printer control
• Control virtual printers by checking
print port(WMF, PDF Writer, FAX, etc.)
• Limit generation or Intercepting print
spool file and internet temporary files.
• Control virtual printers by checking
print port(WMF, PDF Writer, FAX, etc.)
• Limit generation or Intercepting print
spool file and internet temporary files.
• Checking the number of the prints:
the document only can be printed as
Many times as the service provider
desired.
• Checking the number of the prints:
the document only can be printed as
Many times as the service provider
desired.
LimitationLimitation Print Count ControlPrint Count Control
Print
control
Print
control
http://www.security.re.kr13
Function 3. Prevention & Verification
User PC
Printer
Printed
document Copier
Scanner
Web Browser
Submit to
authorities
Forged
document
Copying by
digital copier
Forging by
high-end scanner
Leaking source by
saving or capturing on
Web browser
Leaking source by
using print spool file
Leaking source by
virtual printer
Leaking source via
temporary files of
Web browser
Sniffering on network
Original
document
Document
Issuing
Server
http://www.security.re.kr14
Function 3. Prevention & Verification
§ 2D Barcode
§ Comparison between original document with the
document brought from the 2D barcode, enables
a verification of document forgery.
§ Embedding the entire original document data and
digital signed data (hash code) into high-density
2D barcode for the legal proof of originality and
to prevent any forgery.
§ Digital Watermark
§ Embedding important hidden information into
organization’s logo / official seals / images
invisibly by using watermarks for its genuineness
of a document.
§ This reinforces 2D barcode in terms of forgery.
§ Dopy Detector
§ Scanning for any change to the code inserted in the original document
http://www.security.re.kr15
Detector ModuleDetector ModuleServer ModuleServer Module
TOE(Target of Evaluation)
Identification &
Authentication
Security
Management
Audit Record
Mail Server
TSF Data Protection
Administrator
User Data Protection
Security Audit
Cryptographic
Support
TSF Data
User Data Protection
(Data Authentication)Verifier
User ModuleUser Module
User Data Protection
Cryptographic
Support
User
Network
http://www.security.re.kr16
The Contents of Protection Profile
PP Introduction
Conformance Claims
Security Problem
Definition
Security Objectives
Extended Components
Definition
Security Requirements
PP Reference
TOE Overview
CC conformance Claim
PP Claim, Package Claim
Conformance Rationale
Conformance Statement
Assumptions
Threats
Organizational Security Objectives
Security Objectives for the TOE
Security Objectives for the Operational Environment
Security Objectives Rationale
Extended Components Definition
Security Functional Requirements
Security Assurance Requirements
Security Requirements Rationale
Protection Profile
http://www.security.re.kr17
Threats(1/2)
Threats Description
T.Network Sniffering
A threat agent may disclose, modify, or delete the data of an e-document
while the document is being issued via network by the issuing system.
T.Screen Capturing
The data of an e-document may be leaked by saving or capturing on the
Web browser.
T.Temporary File Storage
The data of an e-document may be leaked from temporary files if the Web
browser holds a directory for them to be saved.
T.Print Spool
A threat agent may leak an e-document as it is in the printer spool files while
the document is being printed.
T.Virtual Printer
A threat agent may leak the data of e-document using a virtual printer while
the document is being printed.
T.Forgery by Scanner
A threat agent may forge the printed document using a high-resolution
scanner.
T.Copy
A threat agent may make more copies of the e-document than issued by the
document issuing organization.
§ Asset : Electronic Document
http://www.security.re.kr18
Threats(2/2)
Threats Description
T.Unauthorized System
Modification
Unauthorized modification of the system, affecting operational
capabilities, can occur.
T.Audit Record Alteration
A threat agent may forge the records of e-document issuance in the
issuing system.
T.System Data Alteration Alteration of system data can occur.
T.Recording failure
A threat agent may exhaust the storage to make the TOE fail to record
security-relevant events and document issuance log.
T.Consecutive Authentication
Attempt
A threat agent may have access to the TOE with the authority of an
authorized user by consecutively attempting authentication.
T.TSF data tampering
Attacker can modify TSF data in unauthorized way to avoid record or
cause misusage.
§ Asset : TOE
http://www.security.re.kr19
Assumptions
Assumptions Description
A.Trusted Administrator
It is assumed that the administrators are non-hostile, well trained and follow
all administrator guidance.
A.Timestamp
It is assumed that the TOE environment provides a secure timestamp that
fulfills RFC 1305.
A.Physical Security
The e-document issuing system is located in a physically secure
environment that can only be accessed by an authorized administrator.
A.Secure Installation and
Operation
The TOE will be distributed and installed on a user PC in a secure manner.
A.Network Any traffic flow required by the TOE services will always be allowed.
A.OS Enhancement
Services or means not required by the e-document issuing system will be
removed from the operating system and vulnerabilities of the operating
system will be fixed properly to ensure its reliability and stability.
http://www.security.re.kr20
Organizational Security Policy
Policies Description
P.Audit
The TOE must audit every auditable event and keep the audit record secure.
This audit record is protected from unauthorized access.
P.Secure Management
An authorized administrator shall manage the TOE, audit log, and so on in a
secure way.
P.Authorized User
A user shall be identified and authenticated before using e-document issuance
services.
P.Verifying Module
A software to help verify the authenticity of an e-document shall be distributed
for anyone to use.
P.Recover
The TOE must be capable of being restored to a secure state without losing
any fatal data.
http://www.security.re.kr21
Security Objectives for the TOE
Security
Objectives
Description
O.Transferred Data
Protection
The TOE shall ensure confidentiality and integrity of an e-document transferred
on network.
O.Stored Data
Protection
The TOE shall protect the TSF data stored in it from unauthorized disclosure,
modification, or deletion.
O.Secure Print
The TOE shall provide a secure print function to prevent data leakage by
temporary files or a virtual printer while an e-document is being printed.
O.Data Authentication
The TOE shall provide a function to display digital data such as e-document on
a secured print-out and a function to analyze 2D barcode, which verifies the
authenticity of the print-out.
O.Screen Protection
The TOE shall provide a screen protection function to prevent data leakage by
using a screen capturing key that the OS provides(e.g. PrintScreen), capture
program, and remote program while an e-document is being viewed.
O.Web Browser
Control
The TOE shall provide a security function to prevent data leakage by controlling
use of applications for viewing an e-document, e.g. Web browser, Report tool.
http://www.security.re.kr22
Security Objectives for the TOE
Security
Objectives
Description
O.Verification
The TOE shall provide a function to display digital data such as e-document on
a secured print-out and a function to analyze 2D barcode, which verifies the
authenticity of the print-out.
O.Forgery Prevention
The TOE shall provide a means to prevent forgery of an e-document, which
include 2D barcodes, watermark, or electronic signature.
O.Identification and
Authentication
The TOE shall uniquely identify its administrator and authenticate a user prior to
allowing access.
O.Audit
The TOE shall generate and maintain the record of all security-relevant events
to ensure they can be traced and shall provide a means to review the records.
O.Management
The TOE shall provide a means for the authorized administrator of the TOE to
efficiently manage the TOE in a secure manner.
http://www.security.re.kr23
Security Objectives for the
Operational Environment
Security Objectives Description
OE.Trusted
Administrator
Authorized administrator must be trained as to establishment and
maintenance of security policies in practice.
OE.Timestamp The TOE environment shall provide a secure timestamp that fulfills RFC 1305.
OE.Physical Security
The e-document issuing system shall be located in a physically secure
environment that can only be accessed by an authorized administrator.
OE.Secure Installation
and Operation
The TOE shall be distributed and installed on a user PC in a secure manner.
OE.OS Enhancement
Services or means not required by the e-document issuing system shall be
removed from the operating system and vulnerabilities of the operating system
shall be fixed properly to ensure its reliability and stability.
OE.Network Any traffic flow required by the TOE services shall always be allowed.
http://www.security.re.kr24
Security Functional Requirements
Class Components
Security Audit
FAU_ARP.1(Security alarms)
FAU_GEN.1(Audit data generation), GEN.2(User identity association)
FAU_SAA.1(Potential violation analysis)
FAU_SAR.1(Audit review), SAR.2(Restricted audit review)
FAU_STG.2(Guarantees of audit data availability)
Cryptographic
support
FCS_CKM.1(Cryptographic key management), CKM.2(Cryptographic key
distribution), CKM.4(Cryptographic key destruction)
FCS_COP.1(Cryptographic operation)
User data
Protection
FDP_ACC.1(Subset access control), ACF.1(Security attribute based access
control)
FDP_DAU.2(Data authentication with identity of guarantor)
FDP_IFC.1(Subset information flow control), IFF.1(Simple security attributes)
FDP_ITT.1(Basic internal transfer protection)
FDP_RIP.1(Subset residual information protection)
FDP_UCT.1(Basic data exchange confidentiality), UIT.1(Data exchange Integrity)
http://www.security.re.kr25
Security Functional Requirements
Class Components
Identification &
Authentication
FIA_ATD.1(User attribute definition)
FIA_SOS.1(Verification of secrets)
FIA_UAU.1(Timing of authentication)
FIA_UID.1(User identification before any action)
Security
Management
FMT_MOF.1(Management of security functions behavior)
FMT_MSA.1(Management of security attributes), MSA.2(Secure
security attributes), MSA.3(Static attribute initialization)
FMT_SMR.1(Security roles), SMR.2(Restrictions on security roles)
Protection of the
TSF
FPT_FLS.1(Failure with preservation of secure sate)
FPT_STM.1(Reliable time stamp)
FPT_TST.1(TST testing)
http://www.security.re.kr26
Security Assurance Requirements
§ Our Protection Profile adopts EAL4+ Level
§ TOE is a critical information system
§ The result of attack can cause terrible confusion in society
§ Depending on User environment, this system is important
to maintain.
§ We extend security assurance requirement to reinforce
verification of implementation
§ Extended requirements are ADV_IMP.2, ATE_DPT.3,
ALC_FLR.3, AVA_VAN.4
http://www.security.re.kr
Thank You!
E-mail : chelee3@gmail.com

Contenu connexe

Tendances

Malware Hunter: Building an Intrusion Detection System (IDS) to Neutralize Bo...
Malware Hunter: Building an Intrusion Detection System (IDS) to Neutralize Bo...Malware Hunter: Building an Intrusion Detection System (IDS) to Neutralize Bo...
Malware Hunter: Building an Intrusion Detection System (IDS) to Neutralize Bo...
Editor IJCATR
 

Tendances (17)

A novel way of integrating voice recognition and one time passwords to preven...
A novel way of integrating voice recognition and one time passwords to preven...A novel way of integrating voice recognition and one time passwords to preven...
A novel way of integrating voice recognition and one time passwords to preven...
 
OPERATING SYSTEM
OPERATING SYSTEMOPERATING SYSTEM
OPERATING SYSTEM
 
Bitrix Software Security
Bitrix Software SecurityBitrix Software Security
Bitrix Software Security
 
Preventing Web-Proxy Based DDoS using Request Sequence Frequency
Preventing Web-Proxy Based DDoS using Request Sequence Frequency Preventing Web-Proxy Based DDoS using Request Sequence Frequency
Preventing Web-Proxy Based DDoS using Request Sequence Frequency
 
Cyberscout Corporate Security
Cyberscout   Corporate SecurityCyberscout   Corporate Security
Cyberscout Corporate Security
 
IRJET- Zombie - Venomous File: Analysis using Legitimate Signature for Securi...
IRJET- Zombie - Venomous File: Analysis using Legitimate Signature for Securi...IRJET- Zombie - Venomous File: Analysis using Legitimate Signature for Securi...
IRJET- Zombie - Venomous File: Analysis using Legitimate Signature for Securi...
 
Website vulnerability to session fixation attacks
Website vulnerability to session fixation attacksWebsite vulnerability to session fixation attacks
Website vulnerability to session fixation attacks
 
Ijcnc050205
Ijcnc050205Ijcnc050205
Ijcnc050205
 
International Journal of Computational Science and Information Technology (I...
 International Journal of Computational Science and Information Technology (I... International Journal of Computational Science and Information Technology (I...
International Journal of Computational Science and Information Technology (I...
 
Malware Hunter: Building an Intrusion Detection System (IDS) to Neutralize Bo...
Malware Hunter: Building an Intrusion Detection System (IDS) to Neutralize Bo...Malware Hunter: Building an Intrusion Detection System (IDS) to Neutralize Bo...
Malware Hunter: Building an Intrusion Detection System (IDS) to Neutralize Bo...
 
IRJET- Cyber Attacks and its different Types
IRJET- Cyber Attacks and its different TypesIRJET- Cyber Attacks and its different Types
IRJET- Cyber Attacks and its different Types
 
RAZORPOINT SECURITY GLOSSARY
RAZORPOINT SECURITY GLOSSARYRAZORPOINT SECURITY GLOSSARY
RAZORPOINT SECURITY GLOSSARY
 
Advanced security - Seccom Global
Advanced security - Seccom Global Advanced security - Seccom Global
Advanced security - Seccom Global
 
Which Came First: The Phish or the Opportunity to Defend Against It
Which Came First: The Phish or the Opportunity to Defend Against ItWhich Came First: The Phish or the Opportunity to Defend Against It
Which Came First: The Phish or the Opportunity to Defend Against It
 
Web server security challenges
Web server security challengesWeb server security challenges
Web server security challenges
 
Double guard synopsis
Double guard synopsisDouble guard synopsis
Double guard synopsis
 
Implementation of user authentication as a service for cloud network
Implementation of user authentication as a service for cloud networkImplementation of user authentication as a service for cloud network
Implementation of user authentication as a service for cloud network
 

En vedette

En vedette (16)

How the CC Harmonizes with Secure Software Development Lifecycle
How the CC Harmonizes with Secure Software Development LifecycleHow the CC Harmonizes with Secure Software Development Lifecycle
How the CC Harmonizes with Secure Software Development Lifecycle
 
Developing a Protection Profile for Smart TV
Developing a Protection Profile for Smart TVDeveloping a Protection Profile for Smart TV
Developing a Protection Profile for Smart TV
 
보안실무, 어디까지가실무일까? @ 보안대첩 (2014.10.31)
보안실무, 어디까지가실무일까? @ 보안대첩 (2014.10.31)보안실무, 어디까지가실무일까? @ 보안대첩 (2014.10.31)
보안실무, 어디까지가실무일까? @ 보안대첩 (2014.10.31)
 
성균인으로 사는 법 - 방황하고 있는 후배님들께 -
성균인으로 사는 법 - 방황하고 있는 후배님들께 -성균인으로 사는 법 - 방황하고 있는 후배님들께 -
성균인으로 사는 법 - 방황하고 있는 후배님들께 -
 
Smart TV Security - #1984 in 21st century -
Smart TV Security - #1984 in 21st century -Smart TV Security - #1984 in 21st century -
Smart TV Security - #1984 in 21st century -
 
Using the CGC's Fully Automated Vulnerability Detection Tools in Security Eva...
Using the CGC's Fully Automated Vulnerability Detection Tools in Security Eva...Using the CGC's Fully Automated Vulnerability Detection Tools in Security Eva...
Using the CGC's Fully Automated Vulnerability Detection Tools in Security Eva...
 
Problem and Improvement of the Composition Documents for Smart Card Composed ...
Problem and Improvement of the Composition Documents for Smart Card Composed ...Problem and Improvement of the Composition Documents for Smart Card Composed ...
Problem and Improvement of the Composition Documents for Smart Card Composed ...
 
Hacking, Surveilling, and Deceiving Victims on Smart TV
Hacking, Surveilling, and Deceiving Victims on Smart TVHacking, Surveilling, and Deceiving Victims on Smart TV
Hacking, Surveilling, and Deceiving Victims on Smart TV
 
Исполнение бюджета Гапкинского сельского поселения за 1 полугодие 2016 года
Исполнение бюджета Гапкинского сельского поселения за 1 полугодие  2016 годаИсполнение бюджета Гапкинского сельского поселения за 1 полугодие  2016 года
Исполнение бюджета Гапкинского сельского поселения за 1 полугодие 2016 года
 
Исполнение бюджета Гапкинского сельского поселения за 1 квартал 2016 года
Исполнение бюджета Гапкинского сельского поселения за 1 квартал  2016 годаИсполнение бюджета Гапкинского сельского поселения за 1 квартал  2016 года
Исполнение бюджета Гапкинского сельского поселения за 1 квартал 2016 года
 
DDoS Attack on DNS using infected IoT Devices
DDoS Attack on DNS using infected IoT DevicesDDoS Attack on DNS using infected IoT Devices
DDoS Attack on DNS using infected IoT Devices
 
Sketch root locus
Sketch root locusSketch root locus
Sketch root locus
 
Writing the report for doctoral confirmation at Massey University, New Zealand
Writing the report for doctoral confirmation at Massey University, New ZealandWriting the report for doctoral confirmation at Massey University, New Zealand
Writing the report for doctoral confirmation at Massey University, New Zealand
 
іс тәжірибе
іс тәжірибеіс тәжірибе
іс тәжірибе
 
алгебра 8 (рабочая тетрадь)
алгебра 8 (рабочая тетрадь)алгебра 8 (рабочая тетрадь)
алгебра 8 (рабочая тетрадь)
 
Crime Record Management System (CRMS)
Crime Record Management System (CRMS)Crime Record Management System (CRMS)
Crime Record Management System (CRMS)
 

Similaire à PP for E-Certificate Issuance System

Spe cs getting_started_guide
Spe cs getting_started_guideSpe cs getting_started_guide
Spe cs getting_started_guide
saurabh_classic
 
Spe cs getting_started_guide
Spe cs getting_started_guideSpe cs getting_started_guide
Spe cs getting_started_guide
Saurabh Singh
 
Www architecture,cgi, client server security, protection
Www architecture,cgi, client server security, protectionWww architecture,cgi, client server security, protection
Www architecture,cgi, client server security, protection
Austina Francis
 
SGSB Webcast 2 : Smart grid and data security
SGSB Webcast 2 : Smart grid and data securitySGSB Webcast 2 : Smart grid and data security
SGSB Webcast 2 : Smart grid and data security
Andy Bochman
 

Similaire à PP for E-Certificate Issuance System (20)

Internet Banking
Internet BankingInternet Banking
Internet Banking
 
Network concepts and wi fi
Network concepts and wi fiNetwork concepts and wi fi
Network concepts and wi fi
 
00. introduction to app sec v3
00. introduction to app sec v300. introduction to app sec v3
00. introduction to app sec v3
 
The Notorious 9: Is Your Data Secure in the Cloud?
The Notorious 9: Is Your Data Secure in the Cloud?The Notorious 9: Is Your Data Secure in the Cloud?
The Notorious 9: Is Your Data Secure in the Cloud?
 
Firewalls and proxies are both use for security
Firewalls and proxies are both use for securityFirewalls and proxies are both use for security
Firewalls and proxies are both use for security
 
Security and-visibility
Security and-visibilitySecurity and-visibility
Security and-visibility
 
Implementing an improved security for collin’s database and telecommuters
Implementing an improved security for collin’s database and telecommutersImplementing an improved security for collin’s database and telecommuters
Implementing an improved security for collin’s database and telecommuters
 
Firewall vpn proxy
Firewall vpn proxyFirewall vpn proxy
Firewall vpn proxy
 
Spe cs getting_started_guide
Spe cs getting_started_guideSpe cs getting_started_guide
Spe cs getting_started_guide
 
Spe cs getting_started_guide
Spe cs getting_started_guideSpe cs getting_started_guide
Spe cs getting_started_guide
 
PROJECT REPORT.docx
PROJECT REPORT.docxPROJECT REPORT.docx
PROJECT REPORT.docx
 
Www architecture,cgi, client server security, protection
Www architecture,cgi, client server security, protectionWww architecture,cgi, client server security, protection
Www architecture,cgi, client server security, protection
 
Ppt
PptPpt
Ppt
 
"EL ATAQUE INTERNO"
"EL ATAQUE INTERNO""EL ATAQUE INTERNO"
"EL ATAQUE INTERNO"
 
VISULOX-Summary-SN
VISULOX-Summary-SNVISULOX-Summary-SN
VISULOX-Summary-SN
 
Event - Internet Thailand - Total Security Perimeters
Event - Internet Thailand - Total Security PerimetersEvent - Internet Thailand - Total Security Perimeters
Event - Internet Thailand - Total Security Perimeters
 
Internet security
Internet securityInternet security
Internet security
 
Final ppt ecommerce
Final ppt ecommerceFinal ppt ecommerce
Final ppt ecommerce
 
Overview of Microsoft Exchange Online
Overview of Microsoft Exchange OnlineOverview of Microsoft Exchange Online
Overview of Microsoft Exchange Online
 
SGSB Webcast 2 : Smart grid and data security
SGSB Webcast 2 : Smart grid and data securitySGSB Webcast 2 : Smart grid and data security
SGSB Webcast 2 : Smart grid and data security
 

Plus de Seungjoo Kim

Plus de Seungjoo Kim (20)

블록체인의 본질과 동작 원리
블록체인의 본질과 동작 원리블록체인의 본질과 동작 원리
블록체인의 본질과 동작 원리
 
[Blockchain and Cryptocurrency] 01. Syllabus
[Blockchain and Cryptocurrency] 01. Syllabus[Blockchain and Cryptocurrency] 01. Syllabus
[Blockchain and Cryptocurrency] 01. Syllabus
 
[Blockchain and Cryptocurrency] 02. Blockchain Overview and Introduction - Te...
[Blockchain and Cryptocurrency] 02. Blockchain Overview and Introduction - Te...[Blockchain and Cryptocurrency] 02. Blockchain Overview and Introduction - Te...
[Blockchain and Cryptocurrency] 02. Blockchain Overview and Introduction - Te...
 
[Blockchain and Cryptocurrency] 03. Blockchain's Theoretical Foundation, Cryp...
[Blockchain and Cryptocurrency] 03. Blockchain's Theoretical Foundation, Cryp...[Blockchain and Cryptocurrency] 03. Blockchain's Theoretical Foundation, Cryp...
[Blockchain and Cryptocurrency] 03. Blockchain's Theoretical Foundation, Cryp...
 
[Blockchain and Cryptocurrency] 04. Bitcoin and Nakamoto Blockchain
[Blockchain and Cryptocurrency] 04. Bitcoin and Nakamoto Blockchain[Blockchain and Cryptocurrency] 04. Bitcoin and Nakamoto Blockchain
[Blockchain and Cryptocurrency] 04. Bitcoin and Nakamoto Blockchain
 
[Blockchain and Cryptocurrency] 05. Ethereum and Smart Contract
[Blockchain and Cryptocurrency] 05. Ethereum and Smart Contract[Blockchain and Cryptocurrency] 05. Ethereum and Smart Contract
[Blockchain and Cryptocurrency] 05. Ethereum and Smart Contract
 
[Blockchain and Cryptocurrency] 06. NFT and Metaverse
[Blockchain and Cryptocurrency] 06. NFT and Metaverse[Blockchain and Cryptocurrency] 06. NFT and Metaverse
[Blockchain and Cryptocurrency] 06. NFT and Metaverse
 
[Blockchain and Cryptocurrency] 07. Cardano(ADA) and Other Altcoins
[Blockchain and Cryptocurrency] 07. Cardano(ADA) and Other Altcoins[Blockchain and Cryptocurrency] 07. Cardano(ADA) and Other Altcoins
[Blockchain and Cryptocurrency] 07. Cardano(ADA) and Other Altcoins
 
[Blockchain and Cryptocurrency] 08. Dark Coins
[Blockchain and Cryptocurrency] 08. Dark Coins[Blockchain and Cryptocurrency] 08. Dark Coins
[Blockchain and Cryptocurrency] 08. Dark Coins
 
[Blockchain and Cryptocurrency] 09. Blockchain Usage Beyond Currency - Way to...
[Blockchain and Cryptocurrency] 09. Blockchain Usage Beyond Currency - Way to...[Blockchain and Cryptocurrency] 09. Blockchain Usage Beyond Currency - Way to...
[Blockchain and Cryptocurrency] 09. Blockchain Usage Beyond Currency - Way to...
 
Why is it getting harder to train the cybersecurity workforce? (ExtendedVersion)
Why is it getting harder to train the cybersecurity workforce? (ExtendedVersion)Why is it getting harder to train the cybersecurity workforce? (ExtendedVersion)
Why is it getting harder to train the cybersecurity workforce? (ExtendedVersion)
 
Kid Blockchain - Everything You Need to Know - (Part 2)
Kid Blockchain - Everything You Need to Know - (Part 2)Kid Blockchain - Everything You Need to Know - (Part 2)
Kid Blockchain - Everything You Need to Know - (Part 2)
 
Kid Blockchain - Everything You Need to Know - (Part 1)
Kid Blockchain - Everything You Need to Know - (Part 1)Kid Blockchain - Everything You Need to Know - (Part 1)
Kid Blockchain - Everything You Need to Know - (Part 1)
 
Application of the Common Criteria to Building Trustworthy Automotive SDLC
Application of the Common Criteria to Building Trustworthy Automotive SDLCApplication of the Common Criteria to Building Trustworthy Automotive SDLC
Application of the Common Criteria to Building Trustworthy Automotive SDLC
 
Assurance-Level Driven Method for Integrating Security into SDLC Process
Assurance-Level Driven Method for Integrating Security into SDLC ProcessAssurance-Level Driven Method for Integrating Security into SDLC Process
Assurance-Level Driven Method for Integrating Security into SDLC Process
 
How South Korea Is Fighting North Korea's Cyber Threats
How South Korea Is Fighting North Korea's Cyber ThreatsHow South Korea Is Fighting North Korea's Cyber Threats
How South Korea Is Fighting North Korea's Cyber Threats
 
Blockchain for Cyber Defense: Will It Be As Good As You Think?
Blockchain for Cyber Defense: Will It Be As Good As You Think?Blockchain for Cyber Defense: Will It Be As Good As You Think?
Blockchain for Cyber Defense: Will It Be As Good As You Think?
 
Post-Coronavirus 시대 보안 패러다임의 변화
Post-Coronavirus 시대 보안 패러다임의 변화Post-Coronavirus 시대 보안 패러다임의 변화
Post-Coronavirus 시대 보안 패러다임의 변화
 
IoT Device Hacking and New Direction of IoT Security Evaluation Using Common ...
IoT Device Hacking and New Direction of IoT Security Evaluation Using Common ...IoT Device Hacking and New Direction of IoT Security Evaluation Using Common ...
IoT Device Hacking and New Direction of IoT Security Evaluation Using Common ...
 
Verification of IVI Over-The-Air using UML/OCL
Verification of IVI Over-The-Air using UML/OCLVerification of IVI Over-The-Air using UML/OCL
Verification of IVI Over-The-Air using UML/OCL
 

Dernier

+97470301568>> buy weed in qatar,buy thc oil qatar,buy weed and vape oil in d...
+97470301568>> buy weed in qatar,buy thc oil qatar,buy weed and vape oil in d...+97470301568>> buy weed in qatar,buy thc oil qatar,buy weed and vape oil in d...
+97470301568>> buy weed in qatar,buy thc oil qatar,buy weed and vape oil in d...
Health
 
DeepFakes presentation : brief idea of DeepFakes
DeepFakes presentation : brief idea of DeepFakesDeepFakes presentation : brief idea of DeepFakes
DeepFakes presentation : brief idea of DeepFakes
MayuraD1
 
Cara Menggugurkan Sperma Yang Masuk Rahim Biyar Tidak Hamil
Cara Menggugurkan Sperma Yang Masuk Rahim Biyar Tidak HamilCara Menggugurkan Sperma Yang Masuk Rahim Biyar Tidak Hamil
Cara Menggugurkan Sperma Yang Masuk Rahim Biyar Tidak Hamil
Cara Menggugurkan Kandungan 087776558899
 
notes on Evolution Of Analytic Scalability.ppt
notes on Evolution Of Analytic Scalability.pptnotes on Evolution Of Analytic Scalability.ppt
notes on Evolution Of Analytic Scalability.ppt
MsecMca
 

Dernier (20)

Computer Lecture 01.pptxIntroduction to Computers
Computer Lecture 01.pptxIntroduction to ComputersComputer Lecture 01.pptxIntroduction to Computers
Computer Lecture 01.pptxIntroduction to Computers
 
Bridge Jacking Design Sample Calculation.pptx
Bridge Jacking Design Sample Calculation.pptxBridge Jacking Design Sample Calculation.pptx
Bridge Jacking Design Sample Calculation.pptx
 
+97470301568>> buy weed in qatar,buy thc oil qatar,buy weed and vape oil in d...
+97470301568>> buy weed in qatar,buy thc oil qatar,buy weed and vape oil in d...+97470301568>> buy weed in qatar,buy thc oil qatar,buy weed and vape oil in d...
+97470301568>> buy weed in qatar,buy thc oil qatar,buy weed and vape oil in d...
 
Air Compressor reciprocating single stage
Air Compressor reciprocating single stageAir Compressor reciprocating single stage
Air Compressor reciprocating single stage
 
A CASE STUDY ON CERAMIC INDUSTRY OF BANGLADESH.pptx
A CASE STUDY ON CERAMIC INDUSTRY OF BANGLADESH.pptxA CASE STUDY ON CERAMIC INDUSTRY OF BANGLADESH.pptx
A CASE STUDY ON CERAMIC INDUSTRY OF BANGLADESH.pptx
 
Rums floating Omkareshwar FSPV IM_16112021.pdf
Rums floating Omkareshwar FSPV IM_16112021.pdfRums floating Omkareshwar FSPV IM_16112021.pdf
Rums floating Omkareshwar FSPV IM_16112021.pdf
 
Bhubaneswar🌹Call Girls Bhubaneswar ❤Komal 9777949614 💟 Full Trusted CALL GIRL...
Bhubaneswar🌹Call Girls Bhubaneswar ❤Komal 9777949614 💟 Full Trusted CALL GIRL...Bhubaneswar🌹Call Girls Bhubaneswar ❤Komal 9777949614 💟 Full Trusted CALL GIRL...
Bhubaneswar🌹Call Girls Bhubaneswar ❤Komal 9777949614 💟 Full Trusted CALL GIRL...
 
Unleashing the Power of the SORA AI lastest leap
Unleashing the Power of the SORA AI lastest leapUnleashing the Power of the SORA AI lastest leap
Unleashing the Power of the SORA AI lastest leap
 
AIRCANVAS[1].pdf mini project for btech students
AIRCANVAS[1].pdf mini project for btech studentsAIRCANVAS[1].pdf mini project for btech students
AIRCANVAS[1].pdf mini project for btech students
 
2016EF22_0 solar project report rooftop projects
2016EF22_0 solar project report rooftop projects2016EF22_0 solar project report rooftop projects
2016EF22_0 solar project report rooftop projects
 
HAND TOOLS USED AT ELECTRONICS WORK PRESENTED BY KOUSTAV SARKAR
HAND TOOLS USED AT ELECTRONICS WORK PRESENTED BY KOUSTAV SARKARHAND TOOLS USED AT ELECTRONICS WORK PRESENTED BY KOUSTAV SARKAR
HAND TOOLS USED AT ELECTRONICS WORK PRESENTED BY KOUSTAV SARKAR
 
DeepFakes presentation : brief idea of DeepFakes
DeepFakes presentation : brief idea of DeepFakesDeepFakes presentation : brief idea of DeepFakes
DeepFakes presentation : brief idea of DeepFakes
 
Navigating Complexity: The Role of Trusted Partners and VIAS3D in Dassault Sy...
Navigating Complexity: The Role of Trusted Partners and VIAS3D in Dassault Sy...Navigating Complexity: The Role of Trusted Partners and VIAS3D in Dassault Sy...
Navigating Complexity: The Role of Trusted Partners and VIAS3D in Dassault Sy...
 
Block diagram reduction techniques in control systems.ppt
Block diagram reduction techniques in control systems.pptBlock diagram reduction techniques in control systems.ppt
Block diagram reduction techniques in control systems.ppt
 
FEA Based Level 3 Assessment of Deformed Tanks with Fluid Induced Loads
FEA Based Level 3 Assessment of Deformed Tanks with Fluid Induced LoadsFEA Based Level 3 Assessment of Deformed Tanks with Fluid Induced Loads
FEA Based Level 3 Assessment of Deformed Tanks with Fluid Induced Loads
 
kiln thermal load.pptx kiln tgermal load
kiln thermal load.pptx kiln tgermal loadkiln thermal load.pptx kiln tgermal load
kiln thermal load.pptx kiln tgermal load
 
A Study of Urban Area Plan for Pabna Municipality
A Study of Urban Area Plan for Pabna MunicipalityA Study of Urban Area Plan for Pabna Municipality
A Study of Urban Area Plan for Pabna Municipality
 
Cara Menggugurkan Sperma Yang Masuk Rahim Biyar Tidak Hamil
Cara Menggugurkan Sperma Yang Masuk Rahim Biyar Tidak HamilCara Menggugurkan Sperma Yang Masuk Rahim Biyar Tidak Hamil
Cara Menggugurkan Sperma Yang Masuk Rahim Biyar Tidak Hamil
 
notes on Evolution Of Analytic Scalability.ppt
notes on Evolution Of Analytic Scalability.pptnotes on Evolution Of Analytic Scalability.ppt
notes on Evolution Of Analytic Scalability.ppt
 
Computer Networks Basics of Network Devices
Computer Networks  Basics of Network DevicesComputer Networks  Basics of Network Devices
Computer Networks Basics of Network Devices
 

PP for E-Certificate Issuance System

  • 1. http://www.security.re.kr Protection Profile for E-Certificate Issuance System Hyunjung Lee, Dongho Won, Seungjoo Kim Sungkyunkwan University, Information Security Group, Korea http://www.security.re.kr
  • 2. http://www.security.re.kr2 Why we use the e-Document Issuance Service? § Definition § Should one go to the school just to get a report card? § e-Government services: Government-guaranteed documents issued via Internet § What will change? AS- IS TO- BE … Document Issuing System Forgery Prevention System Claimed & issued on Web page Issued by email User Printing Forge-Proof Document
  • 3. http://www.security.re.kr3 Upsides and Requirements § Upsides § Requirements Aspects Description Quick Available 24/7 Economical Low cost compared to issuing off-line Accessible Everywhere with the Internet services Security feature Technical feature Confidentiality of the Issuing System • Cryptography for e-documents issued • Screen control • UI control • Printer control Forgery Prevention for Print-out • Watermark • 2D Barcode • Copy Detector Reliability of the Issuing Organization • PKI authentication
  • 4. http://www.security.re.kr4 Terms and Definition § Original Document § Original Document refers to electronic document and its proper and secure print-outs that is an object of issue. § Electronic Document § Electronic Document means an electronic file of a structured document standardized with a pair of form and data of the document. § Issue System § Issue System refers commonly to a system of issuing organizations that issues electronic documents. § Detect Software § Detect Software refers to a program that extracts digital information. Using scanners, it detects 2D high-density barcodes and invisible watermarks attached to print-outs. It extracts digital information by analyzing the 2D high-density barcodes and invisible watermarks.
  • 5. http://www.security.re.kr5 Terms and Definition § Forgery Prevention Elements § Forgery Prevention Elements refer to all kinds of devices (identification elements) that give reliability to print-outs of electronic documents and make it possible for regular users to distinguish whether the print-outs are authentic or not by viewing the documents or using tools. EPS's Forgery Prevention Elements are 2D high-density barcodes, invisible watermarks, copy detector marks and so on. § Secure Print-out § Secure Print-out means a print-out of an electronic document that contains functions (high-density 2D barcodes, invisible watermarks) for print-out security.
  • 6. http://www.security.re.kr6 System Structure Web Server Requests document Apply for document Document Issuing System Document DB Requests info for document Data required for document2D barcode created Original document Original document Certificate of issuing organization Issues document Printed document WAS Compressed/ Encrypted User Control Module Document Verification Module Server Module
  • 7. http://www.security.re.kr7 Threat Factors User PC Printer Printed document Copier Scanner Document Issuing Server Original document Web Browser Sniffering on networkLeaking source by saving or capturing on Web browser Leaking source via temporary files of Web browser Leaking source by using print spool file Leaking source by virtual printer Forging by high-end scanner Copying by digital copier Forged document Submit to authorities
  • 8. http://www.security.re.kr8 Core Security Functions Function 1. Web Protection CoreCore SecuritySecurity FunctionsFunctions • Controls printing, saving, copying from web browser • Prevents document capturing from capture/remote program • Limits pop-up menus by clicking mouse right-button • Prevents information leakage by cache or temporary files Function 2. Printer control • High-density 2D barcode with Error Correction Code • Digital Signature Verification with publisher confirmation • Detection Program • Digital Watermark to protect image seal/log • All data for the issuance is encrypted in metafile Function 3. Prevention & Verification • Limits print spool file • Counts/limits the numbers of prints • Prevents printing from virtual printers(ex. PDF Writer) • Controls printer drivers & Checks printer’s status
  • 9. http://www.security.re.kr9 Function 1. Web Protection User PC Printer Printed document Copier Scanner Document Issuing Server Original document Web Browser Sniffering on networkLeaking source by saving or capturing on Web browser Leaking source by virtual printer Forging by high-end scanner Copying by digital copier Forged document Submit to authorities Leaking source by using print spool file Leaking source via temporary files of Web browser
  • 10. http://www.security.re.kr10 Function 1. Web Protection § Web Protection Secure Web Page • Control Web Browser Menus • Limit to produce cache/ temp file • Preventing copying by keyboard or mouse • Limit the use of pop-up menu • Encryption • Preventing link by URL • Limit use of Clipboard • Blocking image capture • Preventing capture by keyboard • Protect document screen from remote program Browser Control Encrypted Meta File Capture Prevention
  • 11. http://www.security.re.kr11 Function 2. Printer control User PC Printer Printed document Copier Scanner Document Issuing Server Original document Web Browser Sniffering on network Submit to authorities Forged document Forging by high-end scanner Copying by digital copier Leaking source by virtual printer Leaking source by using print spool file Leaking source by saving or capturing on Web browser Leaking source via temporary files of Web browser
  • 12. http://www.security.re.kr12 Function 2. Printer control • Control virtual printers by checking print port(WMF, PDF Writer, FAX, etc.) • Limit generation or Intercepting print spool file and internet temporary files. • Control virtual printers by checking print port(WMF, PDF Writer, FAX, etc.) • Limit generation or Intercepting print spool file and internet temporary files. • Checking the number of the prints: the document only can be printed as Many times as the service provider desired. • Checking the number of the prints: the document only can be printed as Many times as the service provider desired. LimitationLimitation Print Count ControlPrint Count Control Print control Print control
  • 13. http://www.security.re.kr13 Function 3. Prevention & Verification User PC Printer Printed document Copier Scanner Web Browser Submit to authorities Forged document Copying by digital copier Forging by high-end scanner Leaking source by saving or capturing on Web browser Leaking source by using print spool file Leaking source by virtual printer Leaking source via temporary files of Web browser Sniffering on network Original document Document Issuing Server
  • 14. http://www.security.re.kr14 Function 3. Prevention & Verification § 2D Barcode § Comparison between original document with the document brought from the 2D barcode, enables a verification of document forgery. § Embedding the entire original document data and digital signed data (hash code) into high-density 2D barcode for the legal proof of originality and to prevent any forgery. § Digital Watermark § Embedding important hidden information into organization’s logo / official seals / images invisibly by using watermarks for its genuineness of a document. § This reinforces 2D barcode in terms of forgery. § Dopy Detector § Scanning for any change to the code inserted in the original document
  • 15. http://www.security.re.kr15 Detector ModuleDetector ModuleServer ModuleServer Module TOE(Target of Evaluation) Identification & Authentication Security Management Audit Record Mail Server TSF Data Protection Administrator User Data Protection Security Audit Cryptographic Support TSF Data User Data Protection (Data Authentication)Verifier User ModuleUser Module User Data Protection Cryptographic Support User Network
  • 16. http://www.security.re.kr16 The Contents of Protection Profile PP Introduction Conformance Claims Security Problem Definition Security Objectives Extended Components Definition Security Requirements PP Reference TOE Overview CC conformance Claim PP Claim, Package Claim Conformance Rationale Conformance Statement Assumptions Threats Organizational Security Objectives Security Objectives for the TOE Security Objectives for the Operational Environment Security Objectives Rationale Extended Components Definition Security Functional Requirements Security Assurance Requirements Security Requirements Rationale Protection Profile
  • 17. http://www.security.re.kr17 Threats(1/2) Threats Description T.Network Sniffering A threat agent may disclose, modify, or delete the data of an e-document while the document is being issued via network by the issuing system. T.Screen Capturing The data of an e-document may be leaked by saving or capturing on the Web browser. T.Temporary File Storage The data of an e-document may be leaked from temporary files if the Web browser holds a directory for them to be saved. T.Print Spool A threat agent may leak an e-document as it is in the printer spool files while the document is being printed. T.Virtual Printer A threat agent may leak the data of e-document using a virtual printer while the document is being printed. T.Forgery by Scanner A threat agent may forge the printed document using a high-resolution scanner. T.Copy A threat agent may make more copies of the e-document than issued by the document issuing organization. § Asset : Electronic Document
  • 18. http://www.security.re.kr18 Threats(2/2) Threats Description T.Unauthorized System Modification Unauthorized modification of the system, affecting operational capabilities, can occur. T.Audit Record Alteration A threat agent may forge the records of e-document issuance in the issuing system. T.System Data Alteration Alteration of system data can occur. T.Recording failure A threat agent may exhaust the storage to make the TOE fail to record security-relevant events and document issuance log. T.Consecutive Authentication Attempt A threat agent may have access to the TOE with the authority of an authorized user by consecutively attempting authentication. T.TSF data tampering Attacker can modify TSF data in unauthorized way to avoid record or cause misusage. § Asset : TOE
  • 19. http://www.security.re.kr19 Assumptions Assumptions Description A.Trusted Administrator It is assumed that the administrators are non-hostile, well trained and follow all administrator guidance. A.Timestamp It is assumed that the TOE environment provides a secure timestamp that fulfills RFC 1305. A.Physical Security The e-document issuing system is located in a physically secure environment that can only be accessed by an authorized administrator. A.Secure Installation and Operation The TOE will be distributed and installed on a user PC in a secure manner. A.Network Any traffic flow required by the TOE services will always be allowed. A.OS Enhancement Services or means not required by the e-document issuing system will be removed from the operating system and vulnerabilities of the operating system will be fixed properly to ensure its reliability and stability.
  • 20. http://www.security.re.kr20 Organizational Security Policy Policies Description P.Audit The TOE must audit every auditable event and keep the audit record secure. This audit record is protected from unauthorized access. P.Secure Management An authorized administrator shall manage the TOE, audit log, and so on in a secure way. P.Authorized User A user shall be identified and authenticated before using e-document issuance services. P.Verifying Module A software to help verify the authenticity of an e-document shall be distributed for anyone to use. P.Recover The TOE must be capable of being restored to a secure state without losing any fatal data.
  • 21. http://www.security.re.kr21 Security Objectives for the TOE Security Objectives Description O.Transferred Data Protection The TOE shall ensure confidentiality and integrity of an e-document transferred on network. O.Stored Data Protection The TOE shall protect the TSF data stored in it from unauthorized disclosure, modification, or deletion. O.Secure Print The TOE shall provide a secure print function to prevent data leakage by temporary files or a virtual printer while an e-document is being printed. O.Data Authentication The TOE shall provide a function to display digital data such as e-document on a secured print-out and a function to analyze 2D barcode, which verifies the authenticity of the print-out. O.Screen Protection The TOE shall provide a screen protection function to prevent data leakage by using a screen capturing key that the OS provides(e.g. PrintScreen), capture program, and remote program while an e-document is being viewed. O.Web Browser Control The TOE shall provide a security function to prevent data leakage by controlling use of applications for viewing an e-document, e.g. Web browser, Report tool.
  • 22. http://www.security.re.kr22 Security Objectives for the TOE Security Objectives Description O.Verification The TOE shall provide a function to display digital data such as e-document on a secured print-out and a function to analyze 2D barcode, which verifies the authenticity of the print-out. O.Forgery Prevention The TOE shall provide a means to prevent forgery of an e-document, which include 2D barcodes, watermark, or electronic signature. O.Identification and Authentication The TOE shall uniquely identify its administrator and authenticate a user prior to allowing access. O.Audit The TOE shall generate and maintain the record of all security-relevant events to ensure they can be traced and shall provide a means to review the records. O.Management The TOE shall provide a means for the authorized administrator of the TOE to efficiently manage the TOE in a secure manner.
  • 23. http://www.security.re.kr23 Security Objectives for the Operational Environment Security Objectives Description OE.Trusted Administrator Authorized administrator must be trained as to establishment and maintenance of security policies in practice. OE.Timestamp The TOE environment shall provide a secure timestamp that fulfills RFC 1305. OE.Physical Security The e-document issuing system shall be located in a physically secure environment that can only be accessed by an authorized administrator. OE.Secure Installation and Operation The TOE shall be distributed and installed on a user PC in a secure manner. OE.OS Enhancement Services or means not required by the e-document issuing system shall be removed from the operating system and vulnerabilities of the operating system shall be fixed properly to ensure its reliability and stability. OE.Network Any traffic flow required by the TOE services shall always be allowed.
  • 24. http://www.security.re.kr24 Security Functional Requirements Class Components Security Audit FAU_ARP.1(Security alarms) FAU_GEN.1(Audit data generation), GEN.2(User identity association) FAU_SAA.1(Potential violation analysis) FAU_SAR.1(Audit review), SAR.2(Restricted audit review) FAU_STG.2(Guarantees of audit data availability) Cryptographic support FCS_CKM.1(Cryptographic key management), CKM.2(Cryptographic key distribution), CKM.4(Cryptographic key destruction) FCS_COP.1(Cryptographic operation) User data Protection FDP_ACC.1(Subset access control), ACF.1(Security attribute based access control) FDP_DAU.2(Data authentication with identity of guarantor) FDP_IFC.1(Subset information flow control), IFF.1(Simple security attributes) FDP_ITT.1(Basic internal transfer protection) FDP_RIP.1(Subset residual information protection) FDP_UCT.1(Basic data exchange confidentiality), UIT.1(Data exchange Integrity)
  • 25. http://www.security.re.kr25 Security Functional Requirements Class Components Identification & Authentication FIA_ATD.1(User attribute definition) FIA_SOS.1(Verification of secrets) FIA_UAU.1(Timing of authentication) FIA_UID.1(User identification before any action) Security Management FMT_MOF.1(Management of security functions behavior) FMT_MSA.1(Management of security attributes), MSA.2(Secure security attributes), MSA.3(Static attribute initialization) FMT_SMR.1(Security roles), SMR.2(Restrictions on security roles) Protection of the TSF FPT_FLS.1(Failure with preservation of secure sate) FPT_STM.1(Reliable time stamp) FPT_TST.1(TST testing)
  • 26. http://www.security.re.kr26 Security Assurance Requirements § Our Protection Profile adopts EAL4+ Level § TOE is a critical information system § The result of attack can cause terrible confusion in society § Depending on User environment, this system is important to maintain. § We extend security assurance requirement to reinforce verification of implementation § Extended requirements are ADV_IMP.2, ATE_DPT.3, ALC_FLR.3, AVA_VAN.4