1. Biographies
Steven
Lauwers
is
a
Belgian
(Flemish)
national
currently
pursuing
a
Master
of
Public
Policy
at
the
Hertie
School
of
Governance.
After
having
received
his
degrees
in
Corporate
Communications
and
International
Communication
from
Plantijn
Universtiy
College
in
Antwerp,
he
worked
with
the
World
Health
Organization
(WHO)
in
Geneva
for
nearly
3
years,
representing
WHO
as
a
spokesperson
during
the
H1N1
Influenza
outbreak.
Godefroy
Grosjean
is
a
Belgian
(Walloon)
national
studying
public
policy
at
the
Hertie
School
of
Governance.
He
is
currently
doing
a
professional
year
with
the
German
International
Cooperation
(GIZ)
in
China.
Godefroy
holds
a
M.Sc.
in
Economics
from
Maastricht
University.
He
focuses
on
environmental
policy
with
a
particular
interest
for
sustainable
urban
development.
BELGIUM’S
IDENTITY
CRISIS
On
the
15th
of
February
2011,
after
250
days
without
a
government,
Belgium
snatched
the
world
record
for
the
longest
period
without
a
government
from
Iraq.
A
debatable
trophy,
but
nonetheless
the
country
seemed
finally
to
have
found
something
they
can
all
celebrate
together:
in
Antwerp
DJs
were
on
hand,
Liege
staged
a
flash-­‐mob,
Louvain
handed
out
free
chips
and
Ghent
featured
250
protesters
who
'dressed
down
to
the
bare
essentials’.
How
did
we
get
there
and,
more
importantly,
where
do
we
go
from
here?
Looking
back
in
history,
Belgium
could
be
seen
as
an
“accidental”
nation.
In
1815,
at
the
end
of
the
Napoleonic
Wars,
the
Congress
of
Vienna
gave
the
“Southern
Netherlands”
(previously
and
successively
under
Spanish,
Austrian
and
French
rule)
to
the
Kingdom
of
Netherlands.
That
region
was,
contrary
to
the
Northern
provinces,
homogeneously
Roman
Catholic.
During
the
Dutch
rule,
the
Southern
provinces
were
underrepresented
politically
and
exploited
financially,
compared
to
the
Northern
Provinces
(today’s
Netherlands).
This
situation
created
tensions
and
eventually
led
to
the
Belgian
revolution.
The
big
powers
in
Europe,
afraid
of
potential
instability
in
the
region,
recognized
the
new
country
rather
quickly.
At
a
period
of
nation
building
in
Europe,
Belgium
declared
French
as
its
only
official
language.
The
Belgian
elites
were
willing
to
dissociate
themselves
from
the
previous
Dutch
rule:
the
ruling
class
turned
to
French
(all
over
Belgium,
including
Flanders),
while
the
masses
spoke
Flemish
in
the
North
and
Walloon
in
the
South.
The
arrogance
of
the
French-­‐speaking
1

2. Belgian
elite
during
the
industrialization
and
the
poor
living
conditions
of
the
working
class
caused
a
lot
of
resentment.
During
the
20th
century,
French
was
slowly
replaced
by
Dutch
in
Flanders,
while
in
Wallonia
French
became
the
main
language
–
a
natural
development
as
Walloon
was
a
Latin
dialect
much
closer
to
French.
During
that
process,
a
lot
of
the
frustration
existing
in
Flanders
against
the
previously
French-­‐speaking
bourgeoisie
shifted
towards
the
French-­‐speaking
part
of
Belgium.
In
the
late
1960s
the
economic
lead
was
transferred
from
the
South
to
the
North..
Wallonia,
long
among
the
most
prosperous
and
technologically
advanced
regions
of
Europe
due
to
its
heavy
industries
(coal
and
steel-­‐based),
entered
a
period
of
decline,
similar
to
other
regions
with
comparable
economic
structures.
Flanders
benefited
at
the
same
time
from
a
rapid
development
of
its
trade-­‐oriented
SMEs
and
light
industries,
supported
by
the
fast
growth
of
the
Antwerp
harbour.
Due
to
the
lack
of
economic
vision
of
Wallonia’s
politicians,
the
southern
part
of
Belgium
was
not
able
to
recover
completely
–
despite
significant
social
security
transfers
from
the
North
to
the
South
–
and
Flemish
people
became
increasingly
reluctant
to
subsidise
and
support
the
economically
depressed
Walloons.
A
major
turning
point
in
the
political
history
of
Belgium
was
the
constitutional
reform
of
1970.
The
country
was
divided
into
language
communities,
not
only
increasing
the
division
of
the
country
on
the
basis
of
language,
but
also
restructuring
its
politics:
Belgium’s
conservative
Catholic
party
split
into
Francophone
and
Flemish
halves,
followed
by
the
liberals
and
the
socialists.
Belgian
politics
became
tribal,
with
each
party
championing
its
own
linguistic
agenda.
Belgium
now
consists
of
federated
entities
–
language
based
“communities”
–
and
the
three
regions,
Flanders,
Wallonia,
and
Brussels.
Competences
are
shared
between
these
three
levels
of
government
while
matters
like
social
security,
justice
and
foreign
affairs
remain
a
federal
responsibility.
The
complicated
structure
of
the
Belgian
state,
and
a
history
of
unsuccessful
requests
from
Flanders
for
state
reform,
has
led
to
growing
political
tensions
over
the
last
years
in
the
country.
At
the
most
recent
election,
about
8
months
ago,
many
Flemish
voters
sought
refuge
in
the
one
party
that
had
been
criticising
the
political
mess
all
along:
the
New
Flemish
Alliance
(NVA).
This
nationalist
party,
which
only
held
a
few
seats
in
the
Senate
and
the
Chamber
of
2

3. Representatives
before
2010,
won
the
elections
in
Flanders
with
nearly
30%
of
the
votes.
In
Wallonia,
almost
40%
of
the
voters
put
their
hopes
in
the
Socialist
Party
(PS).
Both
party
presidents
embody
what
the
different
linguistic
communities
feel
the
other
one
stands
for:
Bart
De
Wever
(NVA)
sees
separatism
as
the
solution
to
the
current
chaos
and
represents
a
Flemish
part
that
is
clearly
in
search
of
its
identity,
whereas
Elio
Di
Rupo
(PS)
represents
the
kind
of
socialism
the
Flemish
voters
dislike,
the
long-­‐term
social
security
and
support,
which
they
perceive
as
the
opposite
of
change
and
progress.
Belgium’s
unwieldy
political
system
makes
coalition
governments
inevitable
and
with
Flemish
politicians
squabbling
with
Walloons,
and
just
as
fiercely
among
themselves,
political
paralysis
ensued.
In
the
ensuing
coalition
negotiations,
the
parties
have
chosen
to
get
a
federal
reform
agreed
first
before
building
a
government.
This
complex
bargaining
process
between
Belgium’s
seven
largest
parties
is
still
ongoing
–
increasingly
paralysing
the
country.
Putting
history
aside
for
a
bit,
what
hinders
Belgium
to
find
a
sustainable
solution
and
what
are
our
recommendations?
Parties
like
the
NVA
have
often
highlighted
the
long-­‐lasting
social
transfer
from
Flanders
to
Wallonia
as
a
reason
for
the
independence
of
the
Northern
region.
We
should,
indeed,
fine-­‐tune
our
welfare
system.
But,
while
infinite
transfers
are
not
a
solution,
solidarity
is
part
of
the
European
model
we
have
to
defend.
Confidence
in
cultural
exchange
and
mutual
enrichment,
as
well
as
economic
innovation,
is
key
for
long-­‐term
growth.
The
nationalism
put
forward
by
the
NVA
is
at
the
antipode
of
such
approach.
Language
issues
have
played
another
major
role
in
the
Belgian
disunion.
The
Flemish
were
relatively
more
successful
than
the
French-­‐speaking
at
mastering
both
main
languages
of
the
country.
However,
the
young
Belgian
generations
are
evolving
with
different
horizons
than
four
decades
ago.
They
want
to
discover
Europe
and
the
rest
of
the
world,
which
may
be
observed
in
the
popularity
of
the
Erasmus
exchange
program,
and
are
eager
to
learn
English,
Chinese,
Spanish
or
even
German
to
communicate
with
the
rest
of
the
world.
But
becoming
increasingly
cosmopolitan,
our
generation
should
realise
this
language
“fundamentalism”
is
outdated
in
today’s
society.
After
all,
what
is
more
essential,
the
communication
itself
or
the
means
used
to
exchange?
3

4. The
EU
is
pressuring
Belgians
to
calm
down
and
act
sensibly,
but
tribal
linguistic
and
cultural
passions
often
pre-­‐empt
rational
behaviour.
Belgium
is
facing
its
worst
troubles
just
as
the
EU
confronts
the
gravest
challenge
to
the
Euro.
Belgium
should
realise
that,
as
one
of
the
founding
members
of
the
EU
and
host
to
its
political
centre,
it
must
remain
a
small-­‐scale
example
for
European
integration.
European
unification
is
based
on
looking
beyond
the
nation-­‐state;
Belgium
cannot
dissect
itself
without
setting
a
worrisome
precedent:
not
only
Spain
and
Italy
would
fret
about
the
precedent
of
rich
regions
pulling
away
from
poorer
ones;
Scottish
nationalists
speak
of
independence
within
Europe
and
many
ex-­‐communist
countries
have
significant
national
minorities:
think
of
Hungarians
in
Slovakia.
Splitting
Belgium
would
break
the
mystique
of
European
integration.
So
far
the
Belgian
citizens
have
demonstrated
a
certain
lassitude
towards
the
current
events.
But
now,
250
days
after
the
elections,
Belgium
is
probably
one
of
the
only
countries
in
the
world
that
is
organising
protests
in
favour
of
a
government,
rather
than
against
it.
While
the
global
political
framework
is
evolving
dramatically,
Belgium
wastes
time
debating
only
minor
issues.
Public
debt
is
now
at
around
100%
of
GDP
and
the
spread
of
Belgian
10-­‐year
bonds
over
the
German
benchmark
is
three
times
as
high
as
at
the
beginning
of
2010.
Not
finding
a
solution
will
result
in
a
rising
debt
ratio
and
complete
chaos.
It
is
obvious
we
cannot
stay
where
we
are,
with
so
much
political
capital
invested,
but
where
exactly
do
we
go
from
here?
One
of
the
solutions
being
discussed
by
Belgium’s
political
parties
–
and
the
solution
favoured
by
the
authors
–
consists
of
a
partial
transfer
of
competences
and
tax
revenues
from
the
federal
state
to
the
regions.
The
seven
parties
have
not
been
able
agree
on
the
amount
of
transfers
so
far,
but
a
minimal
amount
of
transfers
seems
to
be
the
best
solution.
Under
the
current
financing
law,
the
“special
financing
act”
of
1989,
the
communities
depend
entirely
on
funding
from
the
federal
government.
By
transferring
some
competences
and
a
part
of
the
personal
and
indirect
tax
revenues
to
the
regions,
Belgium
would
grant
the
regions
more
autonomy
and
give
them
some
of
the
competences
they
have
been
asking
for.
Brussels
should
then
be
compensated
for
the
taxes
lost
to
commuters
that
work
but
don’t
live
in
Brussels.
Transfers
are
essential
to
give
the
regions
better
tools
to
fight
unemployment,
4

5. embrace
innovation
and
create
incentives
for
good
governance,
while
also
relieving
the
federal
state
from
some
of
its
burden.
While
transfers
are
necessary,
the
principle
of
federal
solidarity
should
remain,
and
therefore
competences
such
as
justice,
social
security
and
public
debt
need
to
be
kept
at
the
federal
level.
This
compromise
would
divide
powers,
without
dividing
the
country.
While
this
solution
might
have
downsides
and
needs
to
be
discussed
in
more
details,
it
may
–
rather
than
break
up
the
country
–
strengthen
it,
providing
much-­‐needed
economic
and
political
stability.
5