This document summarizes César Schirmer dos Santos' analysis of Annalisa Coliva's constitutive theory of self-knowledge. Coliva argues that there are two types of beliefs - commitments and dispositions - which lead to two different forms of self-knowledge. Commitments involve deliberation, control and responsibility, allowing first-personal knowledge of one's own beliefs. Dispositions lack these features, only permitting third-personal knowledge. The document also discusses debates around whether necessarily believing one believes P if one is committed to P, and examines Coliva's responses to objections from self-deception and Geach's point about negation.

1. Coliva’s constitutive theory
of self-knowledge
César Schirmer dos Santos
cesar.santos@ufsm.br
Federal University of Santa Maria, Brazil
2017

2. Coliva (2016, p. 28).

3. Coliva (2016, p. 189).

4. Anscombe (1963, §5)

5. Anscombe (1963, §6).

6. S believes that p ↔ S believes that S believes that p
The constitutive thesis

7. Left-to-right reading
S believes that p → S believes that S believes that p
It’s alright for commitment-type mental states – deliberation,
content-assessment, control, responsibility (cf. Coliva 2016, p.
189).
It’s not ok for disposition-type mental states – no deliberation,
no content-assessment, no control, no responsibility taken (cf.
Coliva 2016, p. 28).

8. The No-Unconscious-Commitments Rule
A stronger left-to-right constitutive thesis:
S believes that p → S knows that S believes that p
If your belief that p is a commitment, then (1) you do believe
that you believe that p, (2) it’s (self-verifyingly) true that you
believe that p, and (3) you are justified (by your own
commitment) in believing that you believe that p

9. A reductio
1. Suppose that if S is personally committed to believe that p,
then S has no deliberation, content-assessment, control or
responsibility on the issue of the truth of p.
2.Commitmentdef: to deliberate, assess, control or take
responsibility on the issue of the truth of p.
3.If you’re committed to believe that p, then (by 1) you don’t
have control and (by 2) you do have control on the issue of
the truth of p.

10. Necessity
Necessarily, if you believe by commitment that p, then you know
that you believe that p.
That’s a conceptual necessity for the concept of belief-by-
commitment.

11. Caveat
To deliberate, to assess, to control or take responsibility about
the truth of a belief are third-personal tools or ways to obtain
self-knowledge.
Dilemma. Knowledge-by-commitment of one’s own belief has to
be first-personal, not third-personal.

12. Coliva (2016, p. 52).

13. Coliva (2016, p. 53).

14. Wittgensteinian boot camp for blind learning of how to master
the concept of belief-by-commitment (cf. Coliva 2016, p. 191–
192).
Blind learning instead of two problematic options: observation
and inference (cf. Coliva 2016, p. 52–53).
The introduction rule for the concept of belief-by-
commitment

15. Self-deception as a problem for left-to-right
reading
S (is in self-deception, and because of that she) believes that p →
S knows that S believes that p

16. Self-knowledge as conflict commitment vs.
disposition
S believes-by-commitment that p, but S doubts-by-disposition
that p (cf. Coliva 2016, p. 198).
Example: S is committed to believe that the email with the
reservation confirmation attachment means what it means, but S
is afraid of sleeping in the streets of a strange city in a foreign
country.
S has two beliefs about the same thing (cf. Coliva 2016, p. 199).

17. Two kinds of beliefs, two kinds of self-knowledge
One’s own beliefs-as-commitments: known first-personally –
deliberation, content-assessment, control, responsibility (cf.
Coliva 2016, p. 189)..
One’s own beliefs-as-dispositions: known third-personally – no
deliberation, no content-assessment, no control, no
responsibility taken (cf. Coliva 2016, p. 28).

18. Right-to-left reading: authority as convention
No epistemic achievement. Mere social convention. No irrealism
or instrumentalism – practices and performances are real (cf.
Coliva 2016, p. 212–213).

19. Two routes to left-to-right authority
S believes that p → S knows that S believes that p
By self-ascription: the same commitments for S believe that p
and for S believe that she believes that p. To bring a belief into
existence, performatively, by commitment (cf. Coliva 2016, p.
201–202).
By self-expression: S can express her point of view uttering either
“p” ou “I believe that p” (cf. Coliva 2016, p. 203).

20. The Geach point
Geach’s point: Since “I believe that p” can be prefaced by
negation or embedded in supposition, “I believe that p” can’t be
mere expression.
Answer: Geach’s point can’t affect commitments, because they
are similar to performatives, and dissimilar to mere descriptions
(cf. Coliva 2016, p. 205–206).

21. Anscombe, G. E. M. 1963. Intention. 2nd ed. Cambridge, MA:
Harvard University Press.
Coliva, Annalisa. 2016. The Varieties of Self-Knowledge. London:
Palgrave Macmillan. doi:10.1057/978-1-137-32613-3.
References