Serverless Security Defense Against Dark Arts
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The document discusses security best practices for serverless applications. It emphasizes that application dependencies represent a large attack surface and inputs/outputs should be sanitized. The least privilege principle and compartmentalization are important, as is encrypting data at rest and in transit. Unused functions should be deleted, and threats like DoS attacks and credential theft should be guarded against. People can be the weakest link, so secure credentials and implement authentication. The document provides resources for further reading on these topics.
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Serverless Security Defense Against Dark Arts
- 1. Serverless Security defense against the dark arts
- 4. protection from OS attacks Amazon automatically apply latest patches to host VMs
- 8. still have to patch your code vulnerable code, 3rd party dependencies, etc.
- 11. https://snyk.io/blog/owasp-top-10-breaches Known Vulnerable Components cause 24% of the top 50 data breaches
- 19. sanitise inputs & outputs (standardise and encapsulate into shared lib)
- 20. security is as much about what your function should do as well as what it shouldn’t do (protect against data exfiltration)
- 22. http://bit.ly/2gSHtay Broken Access Control Insecure Direct Object Reference Information Leakage GraphQL Injection
- 25. Yan Cui http://theburningmonk.com @theburningmonk AWS user for 10 years
- 29. Yan Cui http://theburningmonk.com @theburningmonk Independent Consultant advisetraining delivery
- 33. app dependencies is a attack surface BIGGER than you think
- 38. https://snyk.io
- 39. security updates are often bundled with unrelated feature and API changes
- 40. your security is as strong as its weakest link
- 41. OS Application Dependencies physical infrastructure NPM Authors Container runs in runs in runs in has hosted by published by pushes to Developers develops uses Users guardsprotects Networking runs on needs Source Code has maintains
- 42. OS Application Dependencies physical infrastructure NPM Authors Container runs in runs in runs in has hosted by published by pushes to Developers develops uses Users guardsprotects Networking needs runs on this is where an attacker will target in a movie Source Code has maintains
- 44. OS Dependencies physical infrastructure NPM Authors Container runs in runs in runs in has hosted by published by pushes to Developers develops uses Users guardsprotects Application A9 Networking runs on needs Source Code has maintains A1, A3, …
- 45. people are often the WEAKEST link in the security chain
- 47. OS Dependencies physical infrastructure NPM Authors Container runs in runs in runs in has hosted by published by pushes to Developers develops uses Users guardsprotects Application phishing… Networking runs on needs Source Code has maintains
- 48. OS Dependencies physical infrastructure NPM Authors Container runs in runs in runs in has hosted by published by pushes to Developers develops uses Users guardsprotects Application brute force, known account leaks, … Networking runs on needs Source Code has maintains
- 49. OS Dependencies physical infrastructure NPM Authors Container runs in runs in runs in has hosted by published by pushes to Developers develops uses Users guardsprotects Application brute force, known account leaks, … Networking runs on needs Source Code has maintains
- 50. http://bit.ly/2sFDwYX …obtained publish access to 14% of npm packages…
- 51. http://bit.ly/2sFDwYX debug, request, react, co, express, moment, gulp, mongoose, mysql, bower, browserify, electron, jasmine, cheerio, modernizr, redux, …
- 52. http://bit.ly/2sFDwYX total downloads/month of the unique packages which I got myself publish access to was 1 972 421 945, that’s 20% of the total number of d/m directly.
- 53. 20% of all monthly NPM downloads…
- 54. brute force known account leaks from other sources leaked NPM credentials (github, etc.)
- 56. http://bit.ly/2sFDwYX 662 users had password “123456” 172 — “123” 124 — “password”
- 61. WTF!?!?
- 66. oh god, that was too easy…
- 69. compromised package is a transient dependency sigh…
- 70. still “works”…
- 75. rm -rf /!!!
- 77. NPM default - get latest “compatible” version, ie. 1.X.X
- 78. clean install (eg. on CI server) will download the latest, compromised package without any code change… NPM default - get latest “compatible” version, ie. 1.X.X
- 80. use `npm ci` in CI environment
- 81. not specific to Node.js or NPM
- 82. the attackers are in…
- 83. the attackers are in… what now?
- 85. who can invoke the function?
- 86. what can the function access?
- 91. sensitive data
- 93. always public access is controlled via IAM
- 98. compromised servers allow attacker to access all of your sensitive data!
- 99. implement authentication and authorization for every API aka. zero-trust networking
- 101. Which auth method should I use?
- 107. DON’T authenticate in the API function itself!
- 115. AWS Lambda docs Write your Lambda function code in a stateless style, and ensure there is no affinity between your code and the underlying compute infrastructure. http://amzn.to/2jzLmkb
- 117. secure sensitive data both at rest and in-transit
- 124. Disposability is a virtue
- 125. AWS Lambda docs Delete old Lambda functions that you are no longer using. http://amzn.to/2jzLmkb
- 126. easier said than done…
- 127. identifying component ownership in a big IT organization is challenging
- 128. identifying ownership of individual functions is much harder
- 129. tag every function with Team name
- 131. more likely to scale through DoS attacks
- 132. DoS + per exec billing = Denial of Wallet problem
- 133. configure WAF rules on API Gateway or CloudFront
- 134. review the default API Gateway throttling settings
- 136. AWS Shield Advanced also gives you access to the AWS DDoS Response Team (DRT) and protection against DDoS related spikes in your ELB, CloudFront or Route 53 charges.
- 137. avoid (unnecessary) long timeouts
- 138. alert on error rate
- 140. cryptojacking
- 144. monitor activities in unused regions using CloudWatch Events
- 146. disable inactive regions & services using AWS Organization and SCPs
- 150. watertight compartments that can contain water in the case of hull breach or other leaks
- 151. Michael Nygard
- 156. Recap
- 157. app dependencies is a attack surface BIGGER than you think
- 159. sanitise inputs and outputs
- 161. here’s your per function policy NEXT!
- 162. S3 AWS IoT DynamoDB RDS EventStore Elasticsearch Couchbase Redshift Neo4j Google BigQuery encrypt data at rest
- 163. S3 AWS IoT DynamoDB RDS EventStore Elasticsearch Couchbase Redshift Neo4j Google BigQuery and in-transit
- 165. DoS DoW* * Denial of Wallet
- 167. don’t be an unwilling bit miner
- 168. don’t be an unwilling bit miner safeguard your credentials…
- 170. people are often the WEAKEST link in the security chain
- 172. https://theburningmonk.com/hire-me AdviseTraining Delivery “Fundamentally, Yan has improved our team by increasing our ability to derive value from AWS and Lambda in particular.” Nick Blair Tech Lead