1. Israeli Perspectives on the New Middle East
Report on the 12th Herzliya Conference, 30 January – 2 February 2012
1. Executive Summary
• The annual Herzliya Conference is the Israeli national equivalent to Davos,
Munich or the GMF Brussels Forum.
• Israelis are understandably worried by the developments of the last 12
months in their neighbourhood. At least in the upcoming few years, the "Arab
Spring", through instability or civil war like in Syria, or through electoral
victories by Islamists, is bound to make Israel's security environment more
difficult. Moreover, the stockpiling of weapons by Hamas and Hezbollah does
not augur well for the next military conflagration which, according to many
Israelis, will be difficult to avoid in the upcoming years.
• Iran is probably less than a year away from developing deployable nuclear
weapons. An Israeli strike against the Iranian nuclear programme, fraught
with many risks and doubtlessly causing trouble in the entire region, would be
an action of last resort. Israeli debate about a strike certainly helped to
increase European and American resolve about tougher sanctions, but it
should not be understood as pure sabre-rattling. PM Binyamin Netanyahu and
Defence Minister Ehud Barak are the two politicians who will decide whether
or not to strike.
• Despite the restart of Israeli-Palestinian proximity talks, no one places great
hopes in the peace process. Progress, if at all, will come slowly and
incrementally. The influence of any outside actors, including the US, is very
limited. The EU is hampered by its internal challenges as well as by deep
splits among the Member States regarding Israeli-Palestinian politics. A two-
state solution is widely accepted in most of the Israeli political spectrum. But
Roland Freudenstein – Deputy Director, Head of Research
rfreudenstein@thinkingeurope.eu Phone: +32 2 300 80 17, Mobile: +32 473 482 527
20, rue du commerce, B-1000 Brussels www.thinkingeurope.eu

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Israel's security must not be jeopardised, and this is where the disagreements
both within Israel and between Israel and its neighbors begin. The rising
instability in Israel's neighbourhood and increasing military risks further
complicate the peace process.
• Taking all this into account, the Israeli political class is remarkably calm and
determined. Worries about Israel's future persist, but further international
isolation or other "pressure on Israel" is unlikely to weaken Israeli resolve to
strive for a secure existence as the State of the Jewish People. Instead, Israel's
partners should listen carefully (though not uncritically) to Israelis‘
concerns about developments in the Middle East. As perceptions of the Arab
rebellions still widely differ between Israel and most of its partners, and as Israel
is hardly represented in European debates about the Middle East and North
Africa, more communication is direly needed.
1. Background
The annual Herzliya Conference, created in 2000, is the biggest international event
on security in Israel. Its host, the Interdisciplinary Center (IDC) in Herzliya, private
but non-profit, is one of Israel’s leading colleges in law, business, government,
computer science etc. The 3-day Herzliya Conference brings together Israeli
academia, government, media, security services and business, as well as foreign
politicians and researchers. The Diaspora Jewish and the German presence is
usually very strong, whereas other countries (UK, France, China, Russia) usually
only have few representatives in Herzliya. The organisers also make a point of
always inviting one or two Arab politicians – this year, the only PA representative
cancelled at the last minute, and Prince Hassan bin Talal, Deputy Prime Minister of
Jordan, gave a (very inspiring) speech only via telebeam. The most prominent
speaker was UN Secretary General Ban Ki Moon who happened to visit the region
early February and who is arguably the UN Chief most open to Israeli views in a long
time.
2. Israel’s security
Israeli assessments of its strategic situation remain mixed, at best, and often rather
negative. Politicians and academics tend to be very outspoken in this respect while
soldiers take care to balance the negative outlook by positive trends, as well. The

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Arab rebellions and their recent developments (cf. in Egypt and Syria) seem to prove
those Israelis right who have, from the very beginning, had a sceptical attitude and
who saw the revolutions as primarily a breakthrough for the Islamist parties in the
region. Egypt is lost as a reliable partner, as the destruction of the Israeli Embassy,
the lawlessness in Sinai and the easing of the enclosure of Hamas have shown.
Even if the Islamists formally stick to the Peace Treaty with Israel (because cheap
US wheat is part of the deal and would be lost if the treaty is abrogated), there are
many ways in which they can make life more uncomfortable and less secure for
Israel, f.e. just by allowing more arms deliveries to Gaza.
Israel’s Defense Forces now have to prepare and train for a much greater variety of
contingencies than in the past. Not only crowd control and counter-Intifada in the
West Bank and asymmetrical warfare against Hezbollah in the North and Hamas in
the Southwest are the likely threats, but regarding the developments in Syria, Egypt
and possibly even Jordan, large-scale conventional warfare against regular armies
has to be considered a theoretical possibility again. On top of this, the likely kind of
asymmetrical warfare to be expected from Hezbollah and, to an extent, Hamas, will
look quite different and much more dangerous for the IDF in the next conflict than in
Lebanon in 2006 or in Gaza in 2008: Not only have these two terrorist organizations
stored over 10.000 missiles, many of them built in Iran and able to reach the central
urban areas like Tel Aviv/Jaffa and Haifa. They have also received (from Russia via
Syria) massive deliveries of sophisticated anti-aircraft and anti-tank missiles that
may well end the ease with which IDF air and land forces have operated so far.
Some (from Israel’s perspective) positive aspects of the current situation are that
Iran is losing its most loyal ally in the unfolding Syrian civil war, that Hamas feels
compelled to distance itself from the Assad regime while Hezbollah’s loyalty to
Assad is increasingly isolating it, and that Iraq’s increasing closeness to Iran actually
may drive Jordan into a kind of tripartite anti-Iranian coalition, together with Israel
and the Palestinian Authority. Some successes in international diplomacy, in order to
improve Israel’s standing in individual countries, are noteworthy: f.e. in Canada,
South Korea and India. But all this does not alleviate Israel’s sense of being
“increasingly isolated in the world”, in the words of host MajGen (ret.) Danny
Rothschild.

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3. Iran
The Iranian nuclear programme, and the Israeli reaction to it, dominated many
Herzliya debates. There is consensus that Iran may finish the development of an
operational nuclear device by the end of this year, and then be able to fit it into a
warhead within months. While some international experts still believe Iran will hover
on the nuclear “threshold” (i.e. just some months away from actually developing a
weapon) for years to come, most Israelis believe Iran will test a device as soon as it
is technically possible, precisely because of the international sanctions which are
beginning to really hurt now. After a successful test, Iran’s rulers would expect the
sanctions to be lifted and the international community to enact the same “sunshine
policy” that they used vis-à-vis North Korea once it had tested its first weapon.
Virtually no Israeli wanted to rule out a military strike against Iran within 2012. The
decision will be taken by Prime Minister Netanyahu and Defence Minister Barak in
the upcoming months. A US-led strike can be excluded – the Obama administration
would not want to put itself in such a hot spot, and a new massive military
engagement overseas would severely disturb the re-election campaign. Most
experts agreed that Israel, in case it decided to strike, would give the US only 1-2
hours of advance warning which would make it impossible for the US to actually
prevent Israel from attacking. In case of a Republican victory, many observers said
that active US help for an Israeli strike would be much more likely – but by January
2013 it might be too late.
4. The Peace process
There was some debate about at which moment in the last 15 years Israel and the
Palestinians were closest to a deal: 2001 or 2005. But no one put any significant
hopes in the current round of proximity talks between the PA and Israel. The general
frustration was palpable. A (liberal) US guest asked the decisive question: Do
Israelis think that by prolonging the stalemate and holding out another 10, 15, 20
years they could get a better deal in terms of security for Israel than today? – In the
eyes of most conservative Israelis, this question is wrongly put. They cannot
sacrifice East Jerusalem, they cannot let in whatever symbolical number of
Palestinian refugees of 1948 without endangering Israel’s character as the State of
the Jewish People, and they will want to control the airspace and guard the Eastern
border of any Palestinian state-to-be, all regardless of the alternatives. In the first
narrative, shared by the Israeli radical Left and many foreigners, time is working

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against Israel, and Israelis should make compromises now in order to avoid even
bigger compromises (or existential threats) in future. There is also a notion that time
is running out fast for a peace agreement based on equitable land swaps because
with settlement construction going on, the land that Israel will want to retain cannot
be matched anymore by land that Israel will cede, from within today’s Israel proper
(this notion is disputed by Israeli conservatives who say settlement construction is
now largely confined to East Jerusalem which will not be ceded anyway). In the
second narrative, Israel finds that the current ‘defensive peace’ is the best option
available, and thanks to military strength, Israel will withstand any existential threats
in the near future. The proximity talks between Israel and the PA should continue,
but with as little publicity as possible and minimal expectations, leading to only
incremental improvements. Moreover, in this perspective, the current turmoil in the
Arab World is the worst time to compromise on existential questions, whereas in the
first perspective, now is the time to reach out to the neighbours – although the
question is which among the movements in the Arab World would actually want
Israelis as special dialogue or cooperation partners, except for Fatah and the
Jordanians.
5. The US
There was much speculation in Herzliya about the Obama administration’s “pivot”
away from the Transatlantic relationship (including the Middle East) and towards the
Pacific. Some Europeans, however, added that the Middle East has a tendency to
“drag the US back in”, even after such a pivot. In that sense, the New Middle East
might actually provide a field of increased Transatlantic cooperation – provided the
Iran issue or the Israeli-Palestinian question do not become a bone of Transatlantic
contention once more, and provided the EU can achieve more internal cohesion and
muster the willingness to cooperate with the US.
US Government officials (like the US ambassador to Israel) kept repeating the
American commitment to a “secure Jewish democratic state” like a mantra, although
more independent observers claimed that to many Americans especially on the
liberal side of the spectrum, Israel has become a liability. Israelis in Herzliya tried to
sell Israel as a strategic asset, an ally and producer rather than consumer of
security, provided it’s a strong and not a weak Israel. Overall, Herzliya showed a
great amount of unity between US and Israeli speakers – always keeping in mind
that most Americans (as well as Europeans) coming to Herzliya tend to be rather
pro-Israel. The highest ranking North American politician in Herzliya, however, was

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Canadian Foreign Minister Baird – clearly a result of the recently very pro-Israeli
positions of Prime Minister Harper’s government.
6. The EU
Although Europeans were present in large numbers (and among the Europeans, the
German contingent was probably more numerous than the others combined), EU
positions and policies regarding the Middle East played a bit of a side role in
Herzliya – just like in the real world. Of course, the most frequent complaint by the
Europeans themselves about EU Middle East policy was about the disunity among
the Member States. That disunity was, to an extent, exemplified in Herzliya in the
almost diametrically opposed positions of the current Head of the EU Delegation to
Israel, Ranham, and former Czech ambassador to Israel, Zantovsky. Ranham not
only defended his recently leaked report on alleged Israeli human rights violations
inter West Bank, but also an analysis of alleged discrimination of Israeli Arabs in
Israel proper (while completely ignoring the problem of the expanding Islamist
ideology in that group). Zantovsky, like most Israelis, criticised this report as
disingenuous and not helpful. The whole exchange was symptomatic for a deep split
among the Member States between those who see the EU's role as that of an arbiter
between Israel and the Palestinians (while being increasingly annoyed by Israel) and
those who would like to contribute to peace while leaving no doubt that Israel is an
ally, and actually a part of the West.
The most obvious EU success, for the moment, is its strong recent position on tough
sanctions against Iran, together with the United States. All Herzliya participants
could agree on that, while some Israelis added that Europe's toughness on
sanctions was largely a result of fears about Israeli military action and its
consequences.
The two most prominent speakers from Europe were Czech Foreign Minister Karel
Schwarzenberg (the Czech Republic has been consistently pro-Israel since the early
1990s) and former Greek PM George Papandreou (as Israel’s relations with Turkey
went sour in recent years, they have radically improved with Greece under
Papandreou’s reign). Both expressed support for Israel while calling upon the West
to respect, and remain interested in, the Arab democracy movements.

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7. Turkey
Turkey drew unanimous applause for its role in Syria, supporting and helping to
structure the opposition, and helping to isolate the regime. But most Israelis
remained, of course, critical of Turkey's increasing support for Hamas. Turkey's self-
appointed role as a model Muslim society with relatively secular state structures and
comparatively stable democracy drew more ambiguous reactions. Some Israelis
(like former ambassador to the US Oded Eran) still felt that a cooperative
relationship with Turkey is a central element of Israel's national interest and Israel
should therefore in some form apologise for the loss of Turkish lives in the flotilla
incident of 2010. They also found the EU's attitude towards Turkey "shameful" and
would like to see Turkey as a member. Other, more conservative Israelis were much
more critical of Turkish neo-Ottoman policy which is why they rejected any possible
Turkish role as a bridge between the West and the Muslim World.
8. Prince Hassan bin Talal’s speech
Arguably one of the more remarkable speeches was made by Jordanian Deputy PM
Prince Hassan bin Talal via telebeam. Being the only prominent Arab voice in
Herzliya, some of his remarks merit closer attention. He impressed listeners with a
quote of the progressive rabbi and thinker Leo Baeck in Hebrew (Prince Hassan has
studied in Jerusalem). He spoke of having had to overrule „much advice from friends
and family, and even from Israeli peace activists“ against speaking at Herzliya, and
predicted that he would be attacked from both ends of the spectrum for either being
„radically moderate or offensively realistic“.
Quoting Chaim Weizmann, he said that „conviviality existed longer than war
between Muslims and Jews“ and then went on to say that since 9-11, this
conviviality had been hijacked by the international security establishment, in order to
wage the „war on terror“. For us (Arabs), the security agenda of the Bush
administration was just another form of colonialism.
He deplored the arms spending in the Middle East and called for a Conference on
Security and Cooperation in the Middle East, modeled on the Helsinki process in
Europe. He also advocated a Weapons-of-mass-destruction free zone in the Middle
East, thereby clearly criticising the Iranian nuclear program, but also hinting at the

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widespread Arab demand that Israel get rid of its nuclear weapons in the famework
of a wider deal.
On the West Bank settlements, he was very clear: They are unlawful, and Israelis
should not complain about the delegitimisation of Israel while Palestine is being
delegitimised, and concluded with his wish that the Arab Spring turn into an Israeli
summer.
All in all, it was more the style in which he forwarded his ideas than the ideas
themselves.
9. The Isreali domestic situation
The social protests of last summer have subsided. They were motivated by young,
middle class Israelis' frustration about the costs of living and increasing income
disparities and not by dissatisfaction about the government's foreign or security
policy (as some Arab activists jubilantly claimed). The general mood among Israelis,
protests notwithstanding, is surprisingly upbeat, largely thanks to a booming
economy driven by information and communication technology. Another important
factor is the relative security of recent years, with a comparatively low level of missile
attacks from Gaza and very few suicide bombings thanks to the security fence. The
Herzliya conference publishes an annual intricate report on Israeli public opinion
which shows a positive tendency. Of course, there is a link between Israel's security
situation and its economy: higher military expenditures due to new threats in the
neighbourhood may lead to tax increases and therefore necessarily jeopardise
growth - which in turn would certainly exacerbate the frustrations of the young
middle class.
With parliamentary elections coming up in one year (and maybe earlier in case the
Knesseth is dissolved), most foreign observers (as well as many centrist and
conservative Israelis) hope for a more centrist coalition under Netanyahu (Likud),
leaving aside the religious and the secular extreme right and taking on board
moderates like Tzipi Livni (Kadima) and keeping Ehud Barak. But given the complex
character of Israeli coalition politics, the outcome of the next election is impossible to
predict.