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Information Security in the
Starbucks Generation
Anthony Lauro
Anthony.Lauro@dfwwireless.org
Overview
• What is security?
• Who are the threats?
• Know thy enemy
• Know thyself
• Emerging threats
• Plan of defense
• Security Management
• Defense in depth
What Is “Security”?
• “Freedom from risk or danger”*
• The application of safeguards to
prevent loss
• A subjective measurement of
preparedness for risk
• A feeling of safety 
* The American Heritage Dictionary of the English Language.
What is Risk?
• A potential for loss or harm
• An exposure to a threat
• Risk is subjective
• Dependent on situation and
circumstances
What’s the big deal?
• Loss of company assets
• Loss of revenue/market
share
• Loss of intellectual property
• Loss of privacy
• Damage to reputation
Who is a threat?
• Hackers
• Vandals
• Espionage
• Insiders
• Everyone*
* This depends on how paranoid you are.
Know Thy Enemy
Knowing your Enemy
Not knowing who the enemy is can be a bad thing
• Vietnam
• “War on Drugs”
• Vezzini - from The Princess Bride
Know Thyself
• "Well, cyberterrorists may be difficult to capture in the act,
but from what I know about people who are highly skilled
with computers, they should be easy to beat up."
– Ernest Cey, Speechwriter
• "You mean some hacker could disrupt the computerized
billing and record-keeping of my local phone company,
costing them millions of dollars? That's awesome."
– Frank Moreland, Piano Teacher
• "This is not a tool we should take seriously, or our customers
should take seriously..."
– Edmund Muth, Microsoft, as reported by the New York Times,
referring to Back Orifice.
History of the Hack
1960: The Dawn of Hacking
1970: Phone Phreaks and Cap'n
Crunch
1980: Hacker Message Boards and
Groups
1983: Kids' Games
1984: Hacker 'Zines- Birth of the 2600
group
1986: Use a Computer, Go to Jail
1988: The Morris Worm
1989: The Germans and the KGB
1990: Operation Sundevil
1993: Why Buy a Car When You Can
Hack One?
1994: Hacking Tools R Us
1995: The Mitnick Takedown
1997: Hacking AOL
1998: The Cult of Hacking and the
Israeli Connection
1999: Software Security Goes
Mainstream
2000: Service Denied (DDOS)
2001: DNS Attacks
Hacking is not that hard to do!
• Openly displayed information
• Easily available tools
• Dumpster Diving
• Shoulder Surfing
Search online, see what you find
• Go to http://neworder.box.sk/ and search for your favorite
operating system or program. Chances are it’s already been
hacked.
• Find tools to secure your network and test your system for
vulnerabilities. http://packetstorm.dnsi.info
• Tools and info on security research. http://blacksun.box.sk/
• News and Info on wireless hacking and security. Tools to
audit wireless networks. Home of the DFW Wireless Users
Group.
http://www.dfwwireless.org
• Daily news, vulnerability listings, and advisories.
http://www.net-security.org/
Resources
Social Engineering
• Using social interaction to get information
• Plays upon people’s good intentions
• Extremely effective in many situations
• Common ploys
– The Dumb User
– The VIP
– The Lost Puppy
– The Prize
Social Engineering
• Attempt to manipulate or trick a person into
providing information or access
• Bypass network security by exploiting human
vulnerabilities
• Human-based
– Impersonation
– Third-person authorization
• Computer-based
– Popup windows
– Mail attachments
Wireless Networks
• Different technology, same threat
• Out of sight out of mind
• “Gee Wiz” technology
• Increases attack accessibility
• Unauthorized clients
• Misconfigurations
Consumer Wireless Products
Local Area NetworkLocal Area Network
TechnologyTechnology
802.11 (FHSS) 2.4 GHz802.11 (FHSS) 2.4 GHz
1 Mbps1 Mbps
Freq. Hopped Spread SpectrumFreq. Hopped Spread Spectrum
802.11 (DSSS) 2.4 GHz802.11 (DSSS) 2.4 GHz
1 or 2 Mbps1 or 2 Mbps
Direct Sequence Spread SpectrumDirect Sequence Spread Spectrum
HiperlanHiperlan
23.5 Mbps23.5 Mbps
High Performance Radio LANHigh Performance Radio LAN
P802.11b (DSSS) 2.4 GHzP802.11b (DSSS) 2.4 GHz
11 Mbps11 Mbps
Direct Sequence Spread SpectrumDirect Sequence Spread Spectrum
P802.11a 5 GHzP802.11a 5 GHz
InitialInitial
ShipmentsShipments
InitialInitial
ShipmentsShipments
FinalFinal
SpecificationSpecification
SpecificationsSpecifications
ApprovedApproved
Initial MobileInitial Mobile
ShipmentsShipments
19991999 20002000 20012001 20022002 20032003
Q1Q1 Q2Q2 Q3Q3 Q4Q4 Q1Q1 Q2Q2 Q3Q3 Q4Q4 Q1Q1 Q2Q2 Q3Q3 Q4Q4 Q1Q1 Q2Q2 Q3Q3 Q4Q4 Q1Q1 Q2Q2 Q3Q3 Q4Q4
54 Mbps54 Mbps
Direct Sequence Spread SpectrumDirect Sequence Spread Spectrum
!! WIRELESS GONE WILD !!
Wireless Access Points
Wireless Usage Statistics
• 35.8% of Access points are
running with default
configurations
• 65% of networks are NOT
using WEP
Basic Security Management
Defense in Depth
• Administrative Controls
• Physical Controls
• System Access
• File Access
• Authorization Tables
• Transmission Protocols
• Encryption
My crime is that of curiosity. My crime is
that of judging people by what they say and
think, not what they look like. My crime is
that of outsmarting you, something that you
will never forgive me for.
Mentor – Hackers Manefisto

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Information security in the starbucks generation

  • 1. Information Security in the Starbucks Generation Anthony Lauro Anthony.Lauro@dfwwireless.org
  • 2. Overview • What is security? • Who are the threats? • Know thy enemy • Know thyself • Emerging threats • Plan of defense • Security Management • Defense in depth
  • 3. What Is “Security”? • “Freedom from risk or danger”* • The application of safeguards to prevent loss • A subjective measurement of preparedness for risk • A feeling of safety  * The American Heritage Dictionary of the English Language.
  • 4. What is Risk? • A potential for loss or harm • An exposure to a threat • Risk is subjective • Dependent on situation and circumstances
  • 5. What’s the big deal? • Loss of company assets • Loss of revenue/market share • Loss of intellectual property • Loss of privacy • Damage to reputation
  • 6. Who is a threat? • Hackers • Vandals • Espionage • Insiders • Everyone* * This depends on how paranoid you are.
  • 8. Knowing your Enemy Not knowing who the enemy is can be a bad thing • Vietnam • “War on Drugs” • Vezzini - from The Princess Bride
  • 9. Know Thyself • "Well, cyberterrorists may be difficult to capture in the act, but from what I know about people who are highly skilled with computers, they should be easy to beat up." – Ernest Cey, Speechwriter • "You mean some hacker could disrupt the computerized billing and record-keeping of my local phone company, costing them millions of dollars? That's awesome." – Frank Moreland, Piano Teacher • "This is not a tool we should take seriously, or our customers should take seriously..." – Edmund Muth, Microsoft, as reported by the New York Times, referring to Back Orifice.
  • 10. History of the Hack 1960: The Dawn of Hacking 1970: Phone Phreaks and Cap'n Crunch 1980: Hacker Message Boards and Groups 1983: Kids' Games 1984: Hacker 'Zines- Birth of the 2600 group 1986: Use a Computer, Go to Jail 1988: The Morris Worm 1989: The Germans and the KGB 1990: Operation Sundevil 1993: Why Buy a Car When You Can Hack One? 1994: Hacking Tools R Us 1995: The Mitnick Takedown 1997: Hacking AOL 1998: The Cult of Hacking and the Israeli Connection 1999: Software Security Goes Mainstream 2000: Service Denied (DDOS) 2001: DNS Attacks
  • 11. Hacking is not that hard to do! • Openly displayed information • Easily available tools • Dumpster Diving • Shoulder Surfing
  • 12. Search online, see what you find
  • 13. • Go to http://neworder.box.sk/ and search for your favorite operating system or program. Chances are it’s already been hacked. • Find tools to secure your network and test your system for vulnerabilities. http://packetstorm.dnsi.info • Tools and info on security research. http://blacksun.box.sk/ • News and Info on wireless hacking and security. Tools to audit wireless networks. Home of the DFW Wireless Users Group. http://www.dfwwireless.org • Daily news, vulnerability listings, and advisories. http://www.net-security.org/ Resources
  • 14. Social Engineering • Using social interaction to get information • Plays upon people’s good intentions • Extremely effective in many situations • Common ploys – The Dumb User – The VIP – The Lost Puppy – The Prize
  • 15. Social Engineering • Attempt to manipulate or trick a person into providing information or access • Bypass network security by exploiting human vulnerabilities • Human-based – Impersonation – Third-person authorization • Computer-based – Popup windows – Mail attachments
  • 16. Wireless Networks • Different technology, same threat • Out of sight out of mind • “Gee Wiz” technology • Increases attack accessibility • Unauthorized clients • Misconfigurations
  • 17. Consumer Wireless Products Local Area NetworkLocal Area Network TechnologyTechnology 802.11 (FHSS) 2.4 GHz802.11 (FHSS) 2.4 GHz 1 Mbps1 Mbps Freq. Hopped Spread SpectrumFreq. Hopped Spread Spectrum 802.11 (DSSS) 2.4 GHz802.11 (DSSS) 2.4 GHz 1 or 2 Mbps1 or 2 Mbps Direct Sequence Spread SpectrumDirect Sequence Spread Spectrum HiperlanHiperlan 23.5 Mbps23.5 Mbps High Performance Radio LANHigh Performance Radio LAN P802.11b (DSSS) 2.4 GHzP802.11b (DSSS) 2.4 GHz 11 Mbps11 Mbps Direct Sequence Spread SpectrumDirect Sequence Spread Spectrum P802.11a 5 GHzP802.11a 5 GHz InitialInitial ShipmentsShipments InitialInitial ShipmentsShipments FinalFinal SpecificationSpecification SpecificationsSpecifications ApprovedApproved Initial MobileInitial Mobile ShipmentsShipments 19991999 20002000 20012001 20022002 20032003 Q1Q1 Q2Q2 Q3Q3 Q4Q4 Q1Q1 Q2Q2 Q3Q3 Q4Q4 Q1Q1 Q2Q2 Q3Q3 Q4Q4 Q1Q1 Q2Q2 Q3Q3 Q4Q4 Q1Q1 Q2Q2 Q3Q3 Q4Q4 54 Mbps54 Mbps Direct Sequence Spread SpectrumDirect Sequence Spread Spectrum
  • 18. !! WIRELESS GONE WILD !!
  • 20. Wireless Usage Statistics • 35.8% of Access points are running with default configurations • 65% of networks are NOT using WEP
  • 22. Defense in Depth • Administrative Controls • Physical Controls • System Access • File Access • Authorization Tables • Transmission Protocols • Encryption
  • 23. My crime is that of curiosity. My crime is that of judging people by what they say and think, not what they look like. My crime is that of outsmarting you, something that you will never forgive me for. Mentor – Hackers Manefisto