1. Why Did We Lose in Iraq? To an insurgency that didn’t even exist until after the end of major military operations? Despite outspending the rest of the world, put together? Chet Richards Straus Military Reform Project Center for Defense Information May 2006
2. 'We just took too much for granted. We didn't challenge our basic assumptions,'' Gen Michael Hayden, Senate Intelligence Committee confirmation hearing, May 18, 2006.
3. Not everybody accepts that we’re losing Source: Gordon & Trainor, Cobra II Accomplished Establish democracy (elections) in the Middle East Accomplished Prevent Saddam from providing nuclear weapons to terrorists Accomplished Rid Saddam of weapons of mass destruction Status Goal
4.
5.
6.
7.
8.
9.
10.
11.
12.
13.
14.
15.
16. A model for analysis (with apologies to the late Col John Boyd, USAF)
17. A model for analysis Implicit Guidance & Control Know what to do Act And be able to do it Unfolding Interaction With Environment Action (Test) Decide Decision (Hypothesis ) Feed Forward Feed Forward Feedback Feedback While learning from the experience Observe Orient Feed Forward Implicit Guidance & Control Observations Unfolding Circumstances Outside Information Unfolding Interaction With Environment Quickly understand what’s going on
18. What happens when orientation locks? Observe Decide Act Orient Feed Forward Implicit Guidance & Control Observations Unfolding Circumstances Outside Information Unfolding Interaction With Environment Quickly understand what’s going on Basically, you just go on autopilot. Field Marshal Douglas Haig, British commander at the Battle of the Somme, July – Nov 1916. Act And be able to do it Unfolding Interaction With Environment Action (Test) Implicit Guidance & Control Know what to do Decision (Hypothesis ) Feed Forward Feed Forward Feedback Feedback While learning from the experience
24. For example, … the U.S. intelligence community missed the significance of the Fedayeen organization. It was a striking omission given the visibility of the Fedayeen in Iraqi towns and cities and the vital importance of the Fedayeen to the regime, but understandable given the CIA’s dearth of human sources … (Gordon & Trainor, Cobra II , p. 62) The US intelligence budget is reported to be around $40 Billion / year.
25.
26. What we did (Gordon & Trainor) WAR Stability Operations Our Emphasis Other coalition members? Allies? Arabs? The Iraqis themselves? p. 503
27. What we should have done (Gordon & Trainor) Enabling occupation Establishing security & rehabilitating Iraq Know your enemy and know yourself and you will not fear in 100 battles. p. 503
