2. PREFACE
Putin won at the election 4th March presidential election
Unprecedented meetings and demonstrations for „Russia
without Putin‟
Why Tandem failed ?
Character and orientation of the protest movement from
December to March
How Kremlin reacted to these challenges?
Future of Political reforms
New Agendas of the Putin Ⅱ
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3. Ⅰ・FROM PUTIN TO TANDEM
Putin revisited, From the First Person
Grandfather was Lenin’s cook, It means that his ancestors
were the Old believers, or Russian protestants who were
against the state orthodox church
Putin Ⅰas weak President, he won only 53 percent votes.
Putin‟s agenda: strengthening the state, horizontal control
State control over strategic resources like oil and gas, after Khodorkovskii incident
Putin from 2004, authoritarian control after Beslan tragedy
Pragmatism, especially after 2007, when some proposed the third term, Instead invented
Tandem system by instituting „technical‟ President D. Medvedev
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4. TEN YEARS ACHIEVEMENTS
2002 2012
GDP 1282 GDP 2260 bn
bn 13000$
Per average 2376$
498bn $
Foreign currency reserve
36.6 bn 143 mn
population 64.3
145 mn 1.6
Life expectancy of men 58.7 860,00
Average pregnancy 0
1.2
Federal level state
bureaucrats 600,0
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5. PUTIN’S POLITICS AND ECONOMY
Elites; Oligarkh, Siloviki and Civiliki
Burden of bureaucracy, irony of strengthening the state
Corruption, Ozero group attacked, though systemic
State corporation expanding (Gasprom and Rostekhnologia)
Modernization, Military industrial complex
Skolkovo and “Sovereign economy”
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7. Ⅱ・CRISES OF TANDEM
Autonomy of D. Medvedev(2010-2011fall)
Agenda of Political modernization
Was power struggle between Medvedev and Putin existed?
Siloviki? Vs. Civiliki?
By 2011 the gap was salient. Yurgens and G.Pavlovskii
advocates Medvedev’s agendas
By May 2011, Putin organizationally set up the National Front
along with, or alternative to Edinoross
Yaroslavel and Valdai as international supporters, but few
support for Medvedev
24th September, Putin decides (By the end of August really)
Lybia as demarcation line between P and M,Yurgens
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8. Ⅲ・POLITICAL TECHNOLOGY OF PUTIN
Kremlin, the first DeputyCchief of
the Executive Office as chief
ideologue V. Surkov
Chechen, Alifa bank ‘Soveriegn
Democracy’
Dissmised by December 27th
V.Bolodin, Saratov political
scientist, against Ayatskov as the
gubernor
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9. NEW PERSONS
V・
BOLODIN
Specialist on elections
Edinoross secretary from 2001
The Putin‟s government Chief
secretary , October 2010
„V den vyborakh‟
Former position Naryshkin,
Peskov, Vaino as close associates
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10. V DEN’ VYBORAKH(2007)
Gubernator Ayatskov
as common enemy
for Putin and Volodin
Satirical film on how
oligarkh controls
election by mobilizing
campaigner
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11. FIRST CIRCLE VICTORY OR FINAL VICTORY?
SILOVIKI AND NATIONALISTS LIBERALS WITHIN GOVERNMENT
Sergei Ivanov D・Medvedev
Govorukhin, N Shwarov deputy minisiter
Mikhalkov, Bodarchuk Dvorkovich
Chemezov and Sechin Kudrin
Patrushev Surkov?
Dugin, Kruginyan and Chubais and others
Prokhorov as campaigner
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16. A . N AV L N Y I 、 L AW Y E R
35 AKUNIN, WRITER
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17. NEW COMERS
S . U D A LT S O V P R O K H R O V, O L I G A R C K
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18. Ⅳ・THE CONSTITUTIONAL
REFORM, END OF ONE DOMINANT
PARTY SYSTEM
THE FALL OF THE NEW OPPOSITIONISTS
EDINOROSS POSSIBLE?
EdinoRoss as Russian LDP Ideological
system? gap , liberal, national and leftists
Popov and Migranyan New law on the Party
Putin against the Edinoross Club like 4th Nov.
The constitution change by Kremlin invites part of
Medvedev oppositionists(systemic and part
-more authoritarian, American of systemic)
model?
Kudrin, former finance Minister
-Or Parliamentary Cabinet also plans to set up the party
system?
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19. POLITICAL REFORMS
New law on the party minimum 500 =
new mushroom 68 parties for application
Control over by Kremlin, Bolodin
How to cope with the disintegration of systemic dominant
party, Edinoross, into normal horizontal structure. Example of
Japanese experience from LDP to the real two party system
Oppositionists can unite? Personal party again? Yabloko as
personified party still. Ideology left and Right
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20. PUTINⅡ AND PERESTROIKAⅡ
PREMIER MINISTER
SEVEN ARTICLES BY PUTIN
Putin’s Seven articles on D・Medvedev decided
national, constitutional, corrup
tion, foreign, democracy and By 7th March began to
investment discuss on the new alignment
of the government
Core of appointment
fixed, Naryshkin, Sechin, Rog Confused image
odin, Surkov as deputy A・Kudrin
ministers,
Prokhorov refused to join
Reformists likely to be
appointed like Nabiurina
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21. PUTINⅡAS TRANSITIONAL PHENOMENA?
First, unpopular Putin manage the unpopular policy measure?
Hand control over unprecedented crisis?
Second, waning Medvedev manage to survive? Otherwise who is
likely to replace
Third, political reform and constitutional change possible
before, or along with political reforms? Crises may take place
spontaneously and destabilise the system
Fourth, sub-elites, verticals clans manifest themselves. How
to control
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22. Ⅴ・FOREIGN POLICY IMPLICATIONS
Fall of Medvedev as Atlantic orientation
Eurasianism in Ascendance in Izvestya article October 2011
However China not mentioned
Putin as anti-Chinese? Next premier Li was declined in February
MN article on foreign policy was drafted by foreign Ministry. Who is
going to be a foreign minister? Pro US vs,Pro China lobby
Why Japan was not mentioned
Multipolar and anti-Americanism in disguise
Japan as a new partner?
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23. CONCLUDING REMARKS
The future of protest movements as civic Society
rebirth?
Medvedev as transitional Premier Minister?
Can the real oppositionist party instituted?
But Putin Ⅱ as temporary phenomenon?
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