The Adaptability of Populist Discourse: Greece and Finland in Comparison

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Tuukka Ylä-Anttila

ISA World Congress of Sociology, Yokohama 2014

INTRODUCTION

Populism as reaction to (sense of) crisis
(Post)-2008 crisis affected European countries differently
Similarities & differences in populist
mobilizations across Europe

FINNISH POLITICS

0
10
20
30
40
50
60
70
1987 1991 1995 1999 2003 2007 2011
Conservatives
Soc. Dem.
Rural/Finns
Centre
Left
Greens
Swedish
Christian D.
Others
Seats in parliament, 1987–

GREEK POLITICS

0

20

40

60

80

100

120

140

160

180

1989 I

1989 II

1990

1993

1996

2000

2004

2007

2009

2012 I

2012 II

ND

SYRIZA

PASOK

ANEL

XA

DIMAR

KKE

LAOS

Others

Seats in parliament, 1989–

POPULISM

“[A]n ideology that considers society to be ultimately separated
into two homogeneous and antagonistic groups, ‘the pure
people’ versus ‘the corrupt elite’, and which argues that politics
should be an expression of the volonté generale (general will) of
the people.” (Mudde 2004)

FRAMEWORK

ECONOMY:
Debtors vs. creditors
POLITICS:
Stable consensus vs. “populist democracy”
IDEOLOGY:
The people vs. its enemies
How does enemy construction work in these different contexts?

METHODS / DATA

Content analysis
Qualitative & quantitative
In-vivo “grounded” codebook
Discursive material: blogs, speeches

ENEMIES OF
“THETRUE FINNS”

Domestic political elite
Domestic intellectual elite
European bureaucratic elite
Global banking and business elite
“Lazy Greek spenders” (and other Southerners)

ENEMIES OF
“THE INDEPENDENT GREEKS”

Domestic political elite – lackeys
European bureaucratic elite – federalists
Global banking and business elite
“German austerity fascists”
NEW WORLD ORDER

SIMILARITIES / DIFFERENCES

Domestic elites accused of acting
in interest of foreign enemies...
...but with stronger moral condemnation
and conspiracy narrative in Greece

ADAPTABILITY OF
POPULIST DISCOURSE

The power of a simplistic Manichean good vs. evil worldview...
...but with crucial cultural qualifications

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The Adaptability of Populist Discourse: Greece and Finland in Comparison

1. The Adaptability Of Populist Discourse GREECE AND FINLAND IN COMPARISON Paris Aslanidis (University of Macedonia) TuukkaYlä-Anttila (University of Helsinki)

2. INTRODUCTION Populism as reaction to (sense of) crisis (Post)-2008 crisis affected European countries differently Similarities & differences in populist mobilizations across Europe

3. GDP / capita

4. debt / GDP

5. UNEMPLOYMENT

6. FINNISH POLITICS 0 10 20 30 40 50 60 70 1987 1991 1995 1999 2003 2007 2011 Conservatives Soc. Dem. Rural/Finns Centre Left Greens Swedish Christian D. Others Seats in parliament, 1987–

7. GREEK POLITICS 0 20 40 60 80 100 120 140 160 180 1989 I 1989 II 1990 1993 1996 2000 2004 2007 2009 2012 I 2012 II ND SYRIZA PASOK ANEL XA DIMAR KKE LAOS Others Seats in parliament, 1989–

8. POPULISM “[A]n ideology that considers society to be ultimately separated into two homogeneous and antagonistic groups, ‘the pure people’ versus ‘the corrupt elite’, and which argues that politics should be an expression of the volonté generale (general will) of the people.” (Mudde 2004)

9. FRAMEWORK ECONOMY: Debtors vs. creditors POLITICS: Stable consensus vs. “populist democracy” IDEOLOGY: The people vs. its enemies How does enemy construction work in these different contexts?

10. METHODS / DATA Content analysis Qualitative & quantitative In-vivo “grounded” codebook Discursive material: blogs, speeches

11. ENEMIES OF “THETRUE FINNS” Domestic political elite Domestic intellectual elite European bureaucratic elite Global banking and business elite “Lazy Greek spenders” (and other Southerners)

12. ENEMIES OF “THE INDEPENDENT GREEKS” Domestic political elite – lackeys European bureaucratic elite – federalists Global banking and business elite “German austerity fascists” NEW WORLD ORDER

13. SIMILARITIES / DIFFERENCES Domestic elites accused of acting in interest of foreign enemies... ...but with stronger moral condemnation and conspiracy narrative in Greece

14. ADAPTABILITY OF POPULIST DISCOURSE The power of a simplistic Manichean good vs. evil worldview... ...but with crucial cultural qualifications

The Adaptability of Populist Discourse: Greece and Finland in Comparison

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