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Presentation on the KiuFunza Initiative by Youdi Schipper of Twaweza
- 1. KiuFunza Improving Early Grade Learning Outcomes Youdi Schipper 19 June 2014 COSTECH, Dar es Salaam
- 2. •The learning problem •What is KiuFunza? •How to assess performance? •Test and Results Integrity •Payment of Incentives •Take Aways Outline
- 3. The 2012 CSEE results crisis
- 4. Introduction: Realities of Primary School Education 2010 2011 Kiswahili 32.7% 28.3% English 7.7% 11.5% Mathematics 30.3% 30.4% Uwezo Results: Percentage of Standard III pupils who were able to complete the Standard II exercises by year and subject
- 5. Flat learning profiles in East Africa
- 6. • Teacher Data •The average teacher salary is TZS575,000 (€254)/month, pre-tax, inclusive of allowances. •47% of teachers report that, if they could start over, they would not choose teaching as a career. •1/3 of teachers report having missed class at least once in the past week. Evidence from our baseline 2013
- 7. • Large expansion in primary school enrollment • High student to teacher ratios • Teachers often not in class • Capitation Grant payments fall short of policy • Poor learning outcomes • What should be done? Descriptive data show
- 9. •A portmanteau of two Kiswahili words •Kiu which means thirst •Kujifunza which means to learn •Together KiuFunza means thirst to learn KiuFunza
- 10. • Capitation Grant, current policy (input): transfer payments for inputs directly to school accounts • TZS 10,000 (€4.4) per student • Normal policy rules on spending, accountability apply • Cash on Delivery, policy innovation (teacher incentive) • Grades 1, 2 and 3 • Test subjects: Kiswahili, English, Mathematics • TZS 5,000 (€2.2) per test passed is paid to responsible teacher; TZS 1,000 (€0.44) per test passed is paid to Head Teacher • Combination arm Intervention Design
- 11. • 11 Districts, randomly sampled • 35 schools in each district • 4 intervention groups in each district • COD: 7 schools • CG: 7 schools • COD & CG: 7 Schools • Control: 14 schools RCT Design COD Yes No CG Yes 7 7 No 7 14 (control) Number of Schools per treatment group per district
- 15. How to assess performance?
- 16. • Appropriate and legitimate • Goldilocks: Not too hard and not too easy, but Just Right. • Based on the Uwezo test, but with more grade- specific variation. • According to Tanzanian syllabus • Test made by university specialists on curricular and test development KiuFunza Tests
- 21. Test and Results Integrity
- 22. • Test set randomly assigned to student • We created a Random Numbers Table • Test set to be administered to student was determined using the Random Numbers Table • First letter of student’s last name and • Second digit of the day, selected test set • The tests were also conducted one-on-one and with independent implementers not the teachers Test Integrity
- 25. • Choice between: • Bank account (teacher liabilities) • Mobile money account (innovative, but not without its problems) • Irregularities in payment information delayed payment • Two teachers deceased before payment was arranged • Next of kin issues • Third party payments not allowed Payment of Incentives
- 26. • Blamed any dismal results on student anxiety and fear • Students are not used to the one-on-one testing style • Blamed any dismal results on many exogenous factors • Rain, testing after end-of-year tests were conducted • Want teachers themselves to test the students • Overall positive feedback and feel the tests were transparent and fair Teacher Sentiments
- 27. • KiuFunza is an intervention aimed at improving learning outcomes in early-grade education in Tanzania designed as an RCT • Aim is to demonstrate how current government policy can be implemented effectively and • Identify whether paying teachers for the performance of their students has impact on learning outcomes • Measuring and rewarding performance has practical constraints that can be non-trivial Take Aways
- 28. Ahsante Sana Questions and Discussion cmanda@twaweza.org yschipper@twaweza.org
Notes de l'éditeur
- Expansion in primary school enrollment 2001: abolished primary school fees 2002: Primary Education Development Program (PEDP) established with main goal of achieve universal primary enrollment (UPE) from 59% (2000) to 97% (2010); 94% (2011) High student to teacher ratios from 46:1 to 59:1, with some as high as 74:1 Schools are adopting double-shift schedules to deal with high # of students Causing decrease in daily classroom hours from 6 to 3.5 Poor Learning Outcomes Uwezo results Shortcomings of current CG funding policy funds reaching schools are well below policy commitment (10,000Tsh) per primary pupil per year and are declining, from TZS. 6,654 (USD 6) in 2004 and TZS. 6,665 in 2009 to less than TZS. 3,000 in 2011 (Education Sector Performance Report 2004, 2009, 2011; see also Reinnika and Svensson, 2004 for Uganda) http://hakielimu.org/files/publications/document102edu_poverty_reduction_tz_en.pdf
- Expansion in primary school enrollment 2001: abolished primary school fees 2002: Primary Education Development Program (PEDP) established with main goal of achieve universal primary enrollment (UPE) from 59% (2000) to 97% (2010); 94% (2011) High student to teacher ratios from 46:1 to 59:1, with some as high as 74:1 Schools are adopting double-shift schedules to deal with high # of students Causing decrease in daily classroom hours from 6 to 3.5 Poor Learning Outcomes Uwezo results Shortcomings of current CG funding policy funds reaching schools are well below policy commitment (10,000Tsh) per primary pupil per year and are declining, from TZS. 6,654 (USD 6) in 2004 and TZS. 6,665 in 2009 to less than TZS. 3,000 in 2011 (Education Sector Performance Report 2004, 2009, 2011; see also Reinnika and Svensson, 2004 for Uganda) http://hakielimu.org/files/publications/document102edu_poverty_reduction_tz_en.pdf
- We made a big effort during our baseline to inform all stakeholders, at the school, community and government levels, of each intervention. We used many different information sharing techniques, from cartoon booklets sent home with students to formal letters to all levels of government. This was done for a number of reasons: To ensure government buy in and understanding of the intervention in order to ease scale up efforts if intervention is found to be effective. Increase accuracy of evaluation by ensuring all stakeholders completely understand the details of the intervention.
- CG Make payments (Tsh 10,000/enrolled pupil) directly into school bank account 2 equal installments of Tsh 5,000/enrolled pupil each For quality improvement only (in line with current government policy re: use) Accountability: comply with existing government protocol Sharing information with communities COD Focused on early grade learning (Standard 1, 2 & 3) Offer of incentive publicised at the beginning of school year/first school visit. TZS 5,000/child if s/he performs Uwezo like (English, Swahili & Numeracy) tests up to standard Maximum incentive per child: TZS 15,000 Plus TZS 1,000/child/subject to head teacher Incentive paid after students assessed at end of yr. Combo A result of extensive consultation: incentive alone may not work where inputs are significantly inadequate/unavailable. COD is implemented on top of the Capitation Grant program School receive capitation grant for all pupils enrolled at the beginning of the year COD focused on early grade (STD 1, 2 & 3) also implemented at school. Monitor results for STD IV and VII: what changed? Analysis: Allows for a comparison between the impact of paying for inputs (current policy) and paying an incentive for outputs (innovation), while using combination intervention allows us to measure the interaction effect of both the current policy and the innovation.
- This is a mostly representative sample across the country Random assignment gives high internal validity Random assignment in a representative sample gives external validity across Tanzania While the sample is 10 districts, there is implementation in an 11th district outside of the evaluation.