Pe baza articolului: D.P. Aligica & V. Tarko, 2011, “Policentricity: From Polanyi to Ostrom and Beyond”, Governance, in curs de aparitie

1. Policentricitatea Structuraordiniispontane in sistemelesocialecomplexe Pebazaarticolului: D.P. Aligica & V. Tarko, 2011, “Policentricity: From Polanyi to Ostrom and Beyond”, Governance, in curs de aparitie

2. Ordineaspontana Caracteristici: Mai multi centri de decizie Mecanism de agregare al alegerilorindividuale Opusulplanificariicentralizate Un singurcentru de decizie Structuraierarhica de subordonare

3. Ordineasocialareala O combinatie de ordinespontanasi management central Ordineacentralizata e o idealizareteoretica – nu exista de fapt – nicimacar in comunism Multevariante de sistemesociale cu organizare de tip bottom-up: la modul general le numimsisteme “sistemepolicentrice”

4. Istoriaconceptului de policentricitate Michael Polanyi (1951): filosofiastiintei; analogiestiinta-piata Lon Fuller (1957-9): drept, limiteleadjudecarii V. & E. Ostrom et al. (1960s-70s): reformaadministratieimetropolitane E. Ostrom (1980s-2000s): managementul common-pool resources V. Ostrom (1970s-90s): federalism

5. Michael Polanyi Cum functioneazacomunitateastiintifica Multecentre de cercetare Au un scop abstract (“adevarul”) darimposibil de operationalizat (nu exista o “metodastiintifica” unica) Evolutiastiintifica: prinincercaresieroare; multiplicitateacentrelorsilibertatea de cercetaresuntesentialepentru a aveaprogresstiintific Analogie cu altesistemesociale: Sistemuldreptuluicutumiar Cultura in general Piata -> argument original despreimposibilitateacalcului socialist

6. Lon Fuller, limiteleadjudecarii Candtrebuie un judecatorsa se abtinasaemita o deciziesisa lase problema in seamapieteisauprocesului democratic? Cazuri in care deciziaaraveaefectesecundaremarisinumeroase, iarterteleparti nu suntreprezentate in sala de judecata. Existaesecuri ale pietei, democratieisisistemuluijuridic – cheiaeste de a compensaesecuriledintr-o arie cu functionareauneialtearii. Cu cat crestegradul de policentricitate al uneiprobleme (ordinea emerge din activitatilemultorcentre de decizie) cu atatcresteprobalitateaeseculuijustitiei (care adjudeca un conflict intredoardouaparti).

7. V. & E. Ostrom et al. reformaadministratieimetropolitane Zonelemetropolitane au aparut din crestereasisuprapunereaoraselor => nu au o administrarecentrala => aparenteineficiente SuspiciuneaOstromiana: argumentele pro-centralizare ale administratieimetropolitanesunaufoarte similar cu argumenteledesprepretinsafezabilitatea a calculului socialist Studiiempirice care au demonstratcaaparentulhaosadministrativ era de fapteficient => ideeacapoateexista un fel de piata a furnizorilor de serviciipublice, “antreprenoriat public” Conceptul de “policentricitate” preluat de la Polanyi pentru a explicafunctionareaadministratieimetropolitane

8. Managementul CPR Ideeaesteapoiutilizatasipentru a explicasuccesul/insuccesulmanagementuluiCommon-Pool Resources Paradoxulorganizariiierarhice: Comportamentul la un nivelesteguvernat de regulistabilite de autoritatea de la nivelul superior Pentruca o regulasa se respectetrebuiesa fie monitorizatarespectareaeisipedepsitaincalcariiei Ceasiguracamonitorizatoriiisifactreaba? Cine-i monitorizeazapecei care monitorizeaza? => regresieinfinita Sistemulierarhic are o problema: nivelul superior ramanediscretionar Solutia paradoxului: Introducereasi a unui control de jos in sus. Participarelocala in monitorizaresistabilirearegulilor => cointeresareamonitorizatorilor de a-si face treaba cum trebuie Rezulta un sistempolicentricpemaimultenivele de organizare: autoritati locale cu un anumit grad de independenta

9. Federalism Nivelurile de organizarecapata o anumitaindependenta: federalism (V. Ostrom). Market-preserving federalism (Weingast): Hierarchy of governments (central and local) with delineated scope of authority; Each government’s autonomy is institutionalized in a self-enforcing manner; Economic regulations are conducted at local level; Common market (local governments are prevented by central government to engage in protectionism); Local governments face hard budget constraints (can’t print money and don’t have indefinite access to credit).

10. Ostrom: accent pus pelaturaempirica Identificareaconditiilor in care diferitesisteme de management policentricfunctioneazaeficient. Rezulta o conturareincipienta a atributelordefinitorii ale policentricitatii: Multiplicitateacentrilor de decizie Cum functioneazasi cum interactioneazaei Sistem de reguli general Caracteristici ale juristictieisistemului de reguli Cum suntimplicatiagentii in determinarearegulilor Competitieintremodurile de organizare Libertatea de intrare/iesire Managementulinformatieirelevantepentrudecizii

11. Lista de sistemepolicentrice Exemple: Comunitateastiintifica Piata Dreptulcutumiar Administratiametropolitana Democratiareprezentativa Federalismul Market-based management Exempleinrudite: Dreptul international Anarhia

12. MetodologiaGerring-Goertz Varianteclasice de conturare a unui concept: Definitia de tip “gen proximdiferentaspecifica” Asemanari de familie Formalizarealogica a celordoua: Un set de proprietati, {X, Y, Z, ...} , cu diverse valoriposibile {{x1, x2,...}, {y1, y2,...}, {z1, z2,...}, ...} Folosestedoarconjunctii: Conceptulspecificacevaloritrebuiesaaibaproprietatile: e.g. x1 & y2 & z5& … Folosesteoriceoperatiilogice: E.g. (x1sau x3) & y2 & (z1sauz5)

13. Aplicatia la policentricitate Luatediferiteexemple de policentricitatesimapatevalorileatributeloridentificate de Ostromcaimportante: Multiplicitateacentrilor de decizie Cum functioneazasi cum interactioneazaei Sistem de reguli general Caracteristici ale juristictieisistemului de reguli Cum suntimplicatiagentii in determinarearegulilor Competitieintremodurile de organizare Libertatea de intrare/iesire Managementulinformatieirelevantepentrudecizii

15. Intr-o singura formula 𝑃𝑜𝑙𝑦𝑐𝑒𝑛𝑡𝑟𝑖𝑐𝑖𝑡𝑦 = = 𝑃1 & 𝑃2 & 𝑃3 & (𝐴1#𝐴2) & (𝐵1#𝐵2) & (𝐶1#𝐶2)& & (𝐷1#𝐷2#𝐷3) & (𝐸1#𝐸2#𝐸3) & (𝐹1#𝐹2) & (𝐺1#𝐺2) where “&” denotes the logical “and”, while “#” denotes the logical “exclusive or”. 288 de cazuridiferiteposibile

16. Posibilitati de disparitie a policentricitatii (1/3) Multiplicity of decision centers break-down: non-P1: active exercise of diverse opinions eliminated (monopoly) non-P2: the system becomes hierarchical non-(A1 or A2): the activity becomes considered meaningless (the goals disappear, the polycentric system disappears because it no longer serves a function)

17. Posibilitati de disparitie a policentricitatii (2/3) Overarching system of rules break-down: non-P3: rules no longer considered useful by agents non-(B1 or B2): agreement about territoriality disappears (decision centers fight over territorial authority) non-(C1 or C2): no agreement about rule design (rules are no longer considered legitimate and their enforcement becomes difficult to impossible) non-(D1 or D2 or D3): the rule of law breaks down - power-based decisions (authority rule)

18. Posibilitati de disparitie a policentricitatii (3/3) Spontaneous order break-down: non-(E1 or E2 or E3): no entry (monopoly) non-(F1 or F2): the constituency of the system is unclear (some decision centers accept X as part of the system while others do not) non-(G1 or G2): no available information relevant to decision making (random decisions, relation between consequences and rules unclear, spontaneous order turns into drift)

19. Care sistemepolicentricesuntcelemaivulnerabile? A1: common/shared goals B1: territorial C2: rules designed by outsider D3: majority rule E2: merit-based entry F2: constrained exit G2: private information

20. Design institutional Conceptul de policentricitateasa cum l-am definit face posibilaexistenta a 288 de sistemepolicentricediferite – in teorie. Analizasidezvoltareainstitutionala a unuisistempolicentricpresupuneintrebarea: Ce s-arintampladaca am schimbavaloareaatributului X din ceaactualaintr-unadintrecelelaltevarianteposibile? Posibilecriterii normative: Rezilienta, eficienta, echitateaetc.

21. Exemple Social-democratii: Educatie & sanatate: 𝐷2->𝐷3 (individual decision replaced by majority rule) Libertarienii: sistemulbancar: 𝐷3->𝐷2 (interest rates determined by the Central Bank should be freed and left entirely at the decision of individual banks) Licenteocupationale: 𝐸1->𝐸2(free entry should be replaced by merit-based entry) Drepturileomului: 𝐵1->𝐵2 (certain rights should be territory independent)

22. Nu exista o regulagenerala a cum e un sistempolicentricoptim Exemple legate de “rules designed by outsider”: Sistemuljuridic optimal: 𝐶1->𝐶2 (the separation between the juridical power and the legislative and executive powers, i.e. ideally, the rules that constrain the executive power are no longer designed by the executive power itself) Sistemul de piata optimal: 𝐶1->𝐶2 (it is usually considered undesirable when firms and corporations get involved, mainly via lobbying, in the design of market regulations; transition from mercantilism to modern capitalism) Sistemul democratic ideal: 𝐶2->𝐶1 (citizens are no longer completely separated from the process of rule design)