Aboriginal and Non-Aboriginal Partnerships: Building Blocks for Sustainable Community Development

Aboriginal and Non-Aboriginal
Partnerships:

Building Blocks for Sustainable
Community Development

Submitted to: Brent Mueller & Dale Leitch
Community Transition
Ministry of Community, Aboriginal and
Women’s Services
#221 Market Square–560 Johnson Street
Victoria, British Columbia

Date: October, 2001

Prepared by: Wayne Dunn & Bob Isbister
2457 Bakerview Road
Mill Bay, BC V0R 2P0
250.743.7619
wayne@waynedunn.com

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Acknowledgements
The consulting team of Wayne Dunn & Associates Ltd. wish to acknowledge the sincere
co-operation and support they received from the Ministry of Community, Aboriginal and
Women’s Services, the Ministry of Water, Air and Land Protection, the Office of the
Provincial Health Officer, and the numerous individuals and organizations involved in
Aboriginal partnerships. While it is impossible to directly thank and acknowledge
everyone who was so generous with their time, information and ideas, a number of
individuals deserve special mention for their valuable contribution to this process.

We are grateful to the Project Team of Mr. Dale Leitch, Executive Director, Community
Transition Branch of the Ministry of Community, Aboriginal and Women’s Services and
to Mr. Brent Mueller, Ms. Catherine Rodgers, also of this Ministry, for their input
throughout this process. Their quick responses, insightful suggestions and ideas, and
their enthusiastic collaboration throughout this project have been extremely valuable.
Mr. Tim Cottrell, formerly Assistant Director of the Community Transition Branch was
also an indispensable contributor to the project prior to his transfer to the Ministry of
Sustainable Resource Management.

The Consultants and the Project Team would like to acknowledge the advice and
assistance from Ms. Lisa Nye and Mr. Graham Dragushan of the Ministry of Community
Aboriginal and Women's Services; Ms. Judy Birch of the Ministry of Water, Air and
Land Protection; and Cathy Hull of the Office of the Provincial Health Officer.
Throughout our research numerous individuals from various organizations throughout the
province made themselves available for interviews (many more than once). While we
cannot thank everyone directly, we would like to acknowledge Allan Pineo, Claire
Marshall, Steve Mazur, Tarel S. Quandt, Cameron Beck, Bill Cordoban, Gerry
Stelsmaschuk, Wayne d’Easum, Mathew Ney, Janice Rose, Robin True, Russ Helberg,
Doug Krogel, Ron Creber, Frankie Craig, Wanda Stachura, Richard Krentz, Darlene
Luke, Chief Sophie Pierre, Alex Wolf, Randall Martin, Bill Lee, Rob Enfield, Tina
Donald, Kevin Brown, Clarence Louie, Jeannine Cook, Lee-Anne Crane, Gerry Sanders,
Dave Monture, Mike Anderson, Georg Schurian, Jennifer Turner, Harvey Filger, Roger
Williams, Bob Sankey, Bernadette Spence, Alison McNeil, Frieda Enns, Clinton Mutch,
Diane St. Jacques and Steven James. To those we may have missed, please accept our
sincere apologies and our heartfelt thanks.

WDA Project Team:

Wayne Dunn
Bob Isbister
Gifty Serbeh-Dunn
Bernadette Spence
Randall Levine

Aboriginal Partnerships – Building Blocks for
Sustainable Community Development

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Table of Contents
1 Introduction and Background .................................................................................. 1
2 Methodology and Approach ..................................................................................... 4
2.1 Approach................................................................................................................... 4
2.1.1 Data Sources and Collection Methodologies ............................................................. 5
2.1.2 Data Collection Framework ....................................................................................... 5
2.2 Limitations of Research ........................................................................................... 7
3 Case Studies and Individual Partnership Analysis .............................................. 10
3.1 Summary of Partnership Case Studies................................................................. 10
3.2 Individual Case Studies ......................................................................................... 11
3.2.1 Carrier Sekani Family Services................................................................................ 11
3.2.2 Gallagher Canyon Agreement .................................................................................. 14
3.2.3 Greater Massett Development Corporation.............................................................. 17
3.2.4 Iisaak Forest Resources ............................................................................................ 22
3.2.5 Lakeview Meadows.................................................................................................. 26
3.2.6 Monthly Licensee Meetings – North Thompson...................................................... 29
3.2.7 Skwlax/Sanders Construction Ltd. ........................................................................... 32
3.2.8 Sun Rivers Resort Community................................................................................. 36
3.2.9 Tsilqot’in People of Xeni and BC Parks (Ts’yl-os Provincial Park)........................ 39
3.2.10 West Chilcotin Forest Products................................................................................ 43
4 Lessons Learned....................................................................................................... 46
4.1 Motivation of Partners and Stakeholders ............................................................ 46
4.2 Critical Success Factors ......................................................................................... 49
4.3 Conflict Management............................................................................................. 50
4.4 Lessons Learned from Failed Partnerships ......................................................... 51
4.5 Lessons Learned from other Initiatives................................................................ 53
4.5.1 First Nations Summit of Chiefs and UBCM ............................................................ 54
4.5.2 Knowledge Network Series...................................................................................... 55
5 From Individual to Community – The Case for Community Level Facilitated
Partnership Development ....................................................................................... 56
6 Building on the Results: Recommendations for Developing a Community
Partnership Initiative....................................................................................... 59
6.1 Model Partnership and Bridge Building Process ................................................ 59
6.2 Selecting Pilot Project Communities .................................................................... 62
6.3 Next Steps - Launching a Pilot Project................................................................. 63
7 Conclusion ................................................................................................................ 69

Attachments
Table of Abbreviations and Acronyms
Information Sources and Bibliography

List of Exhibits
Exhibit 2-1 WDA Partnership Analysis Framework© ...................................................... 6
Exhibit 6-1 Community Transformation Process ............................................................. 61
Exhibit 6-2 Suggested Year 1 Activities and Financial Sources ..................................... 66
Exhibit 6-3 Analysis of Two Potential Pilot Communities ............................................. 67


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Executive Summary
In British Columbia, there is an ever-increasing need for First Nations to partner with
private industry as well as local and regional public sector entities, to enhance the
potential to achieve shared goals of diversification, sustainable employment and
community economic and social development. While there are an increasing number of
such partnerships being developed the authors argue that a facilitated process for
developing and supporting partnerships would substantially increase their number and
impact on the economy of British Columbia (especially rural and remote areas who have
been hardest hit by the downturn in traditional resource based economies).

The report which follows is the result of efforts by the British Columbia Ministry of
Community, Aboriginal and Women’s Services to gain a greater understanding of the
nature of existing partnerships of this type, as well as to develop an initiative for
identifying and supporting community-based collaboration efforts.

In the development of this report, several case analyses were undertaken within the
province, the results of which have provided a body of data and information which was
used to identify a number of lessons learned and critical success factors for
Aboriginal/non-Aboriginal partnerships. From the information collected, ten specific
studies were analyzed which reflect a level of regional coverage and industry variation
which cumulatively offer a valid and relevant cross-section of current partnership
activities.

The analysis of these various collaborations has highlighted the following critical success
factors in the development of an Aboriginal/non-Aboriginal partnership framework for
the future (see Section 4.2 for full information and text).

All partners should have clear and appropriate motivation to collaborate
Regular, effective and appropriate communications should be maintained
Partners should have the capacity to finance their participation in projects


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Roles and responsibilities within the partnership should be clearly outlined, with a
strong commitment to mutual decision-making
Partners should have committed leadership who will endeavour to keep politics
out of the operations of the partnership
An appropriate level of managerial and operational competence must be present,
as well as technical capacity which meets the requirements of the project
A sufficient amount of front-end negotiating time to ensure appropriate partner
selection and mutual understanding of issues
Partners should have qualified personnel to manage their activities
Partnerships should have a clear, succinct vision and mandate as well as
measurable objectives.

The findings also detail several challenges faced by collaborative endeavours, including
the need to develop sustainable revenue streams and ensure the effective management of
finances and resources. Further challenges included balancing the desire to maximize
employment with the economic realities faced by the communities, reconciling individual
autonomy to support effective partnerships, and ensuring the administrative and political
stability of partner First Nation(s) while keeping politics out of the negotiations and
operations.

The lessons learned through the examination of the case studies provide the basis for the
development of a community partnership initiative for the Province. Such a process
would involve two fundamental, concurrent activities to support collaborative efforts:
• Economic bridge building
• Social/community bridge building.

The economic bridge building component reflects the need to identify and foster
collaborative economic opportunities through joint ventures or partnerships. The process
should include the identification of potential partners and developing a mutual
understanding of the interests of stakeholders, as well as the delivery of highly practical
workshops on creating and negotiating the partnerships themselves. Finally, the


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provision of on-going support and consultation will be critical to ensure the development
of the partnerships.

The social/community bridge building aspect of the framework reflects the need for
sustained dialogue between stakeholders. The goal of this activity is to address long-
standing divisions in the community, and ultimately to change conflicting relationships,
and foster a level of trust and respect that would serve to increase collaboration and trust
(and thus increase the number and sustainability of Aboriginal/non-Aboriginal
partnerships).

In order to create this initiative, pilot communities should be identified and qualified
based upon the following recommended criteria:
• Community has been subjected to recent economic downturn
• Partners have access to sufficient financial resources to cover costs of project
• Community has proven history of collaboration between Aboriginal and non-
Aboriginal community
• Community is comprised of sufficiently large groups of both populations
• All partners display commitment to project
• Strong leadership evident amongst partners
• Meaningful and practical economic opportunities available

Through the course of the creation of this report, two potential pilot communities have
been identified which meet the above criteria, with the exception of the level of
commitment made, which cannot be determined until later in the process. Both Port
Hardy and Ucluelet represent excellent examples of communities where pilot initiatives
of the provincial partnership framework could be developed.

The review and analysis of the case study partnerships identified in this report serve to
reinforce the belief that Aboriginal/non-Aboriginal partnerships offer a major economic
opportunity to several communities in the province, both in the expansion of existing


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partnerships, and in the identification and fostering of potential collaborations in the
future. The suggested plan presents an opportunity for the Government of British
Columbia to work proactively with these community partners and take a leading role in
the fostering of such value-added initiatives.


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1 Introduction and Background

The Community Transition Branch of the Ministry of Community, Aboriginal and
Women’s Services of the Government of British Columbia (BC) initiated this Research
Project on Aboriginal and Non-Aboriginal Partnerships to develop an improved
understanding of such partnerships and identify opportunities for the Ministry to support
community level collaboration between Aboriginal and non-Aboriginal groups. A
Request for Proposals was issued and the BC firm Wayne Dunn & Associates Ltd.
(WDA) was engaged to undertake the project.

The project was launched in early February and a progress report was submitted on
February 23, 2001. The Progress Report included mini case studies and preliminary
analysis of sixty-four1 examples of collaboration between Aboriginal and non-Aboriginal
interests2. The Progress Report was circulated to various government stakeholders for
comment and observation. On March 9, 2001 the Consultants met with the Ministry to
discuss their comments on the Progress Report and identify those partnerships suitable
for more detailed study and analysis.

Aboriginal and non-Aboriginal communities alike face social and economic challenges
that require new approaches and innovative solutions. While in general terms, many
Aboriginal communities have improved their quality of life in recent years, in
comparison to the non-Aboriginal population they are more likely to be burdened by a
lack of employment opportunities, under-educated and living in poverty. Non-Aboriginal
communities also face difficult challenges in trying to secure a stronger social and
economic future, including recovery from economic downturns in the resource sector or
dealing with inner-city poverty. Improving relations between these two groups can help
BC communities overcome impediments to social and economic progress.

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Subsequent to the completion of the Progress Report, preliminary analysis was conducted on four additional
partnerships


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Cooperation and collaboration between Aboriginal and non-Aboriginal communities can
mobilize and focus local and regional resources to affect positive change for all residents.
Insight on how these communities can work together to address common concerns in
building a healthy sustainable future can be provided through the profiling of best
practices of Aboriginal and non-Aboriginal partnerships.

This Report builds on and makes extensive use of prior research sponsored by the
Ministry and the Federal, Provincial and Territorial Ministers and National Aboriginal
Leaders report on Strengthening Aboriginal Participation in the Economy. Section 2
describes the methodology and approach employed by the Consultants to collect the data
and undertake the various analyses.

The following Section (3) presents ten case studies of Aboriginal and non-Aboriginal
partnerships in five different sectors of the BC economy. Section 4 summarizes the
lessons learned from these partnerships; examining in particular what motivated the
formation of the partnerships, what were the critical success factors and then discusses
how the issue of conflict management is addressed. As well, this Section reviews lessons
learned from ‘failed partnerships’ and discusses lessons learned from two other Ministry-
supported partnership initiatives.

In Section 5 the Consultants argue that, while individual and ad-hoc partnerships between
Aboriginal and non-Aboriginal citizens of BC have made a positive impact on the social
and economic fabric of BC, the impact could be significantly greater if a facilitated and
systematic partnership development and bridge building process was implemented at a
community level.

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A listing of the sixty-eight partnerships and the results of the analysis conducted on them is presented in Appendix 1.


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Section 6 outlines what such a process might look like and then goes on to list criteria
that would help to select potential pilot community sites. This section also presents a
detailed plan for launching and financing a pilot project that could, after testing and
refinement, be rolled out to communities across the province. The final section contains
the Consultants conclusions.

The following section summarizes the approach and methodology utilized by the
Consultants and discusses limitations of the research.


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2 Methodology and Approach

2.1 Approach

In order to achieve the objectives of the assignment within the time and budget
constraints, a two-stage research and analysis process was developed. The initial
research stage involved the identification of partnerships, desktop research to gather
preliminary data on the identified partnerships, and preliminary analysis of each
partnership. A data collection framework was developed to ensure consistency of data
across the various partnerships reviewed.

The geographic focus of the research was on the province of British Columbia. However,
the Progress Report included several Aboriginal and Non-Aboriginal partnerships from
northern Saskatchewan, as this area has been particularly successful at the development
of economic and business collaboration between First Nations and other interests.
Anecdotal evidence suggests that Northern Saskatchewan is a world leader in Aboriginal
business and economic development. For this reason, the researchers felt that it was
worthwhile to review appropriate examples from this area. However, after consultation
with various stakeholders it was decided that due to: the unique history of Aboriginal
issues in BC; the ease with which BC examples can be followed-up by interested parties;
the fact that there may be historical and geographic challenges to applying lessons from
outside BC; and the project’s budgetary limitations, it was appropriate that detailed
research and analysis should focus exclusively on BC partnerships.

The Consultants and the Ministry team identified seventeen partnerships in five basic
sectors (Environment, Social, Economic, Municipal and Other) that were suitable for
further research and analysis. Recognizing that time and budget constraints, coupled with
the need to contact and interview major stakeholders in each partnership would make it
impossible to complete the research on all seventeen partnerships in the time available, it


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was agreed that the Consultants should attempt to develop 6-10 detailed case studies,
with at least one from each sector. This report contains ten such case studies and further
analysis.

2.1.1 Data Sources and Collection Methodologies

Data sources and collection methodologies utilized by the Consultant included:
• Telephone interviews and meetings with First Nations officials, federal,
provincial and municipal officials, representatives of non-Aboriginal partners,
and other significant stakeholders in various partnerships;
• Review of published documents and reports; and
• Internet research.
A complete listing of information sources is presented in Attachment 2.

Data Verification and Crosschecking
Due to the preliminary nature of the information required, the 68 partnership overviews
that were reviewed in the initial stage did not necessarily include data crosschecking and
verification. Many of the overviews presented in the initial stage were based on only one
data source. However, the detailed partnership case studies presented in this report all
involved multiple data sources to ensure accuracy of data and to enable the Consultants to
synthesize the viewpoints of significant stakeholders.

2.1.2 Data Collection Framework

In order to ensure consistency of data, the Consultants developed a uniform data
collection framework for each Phase of the project (see Attachment 3 for the Data
Collection Frameworks utilized for each Phase). The Frameworks were designed to
allow researchers to quickly gather and organize pertinent information. The Phase I
Framework was designed to provide sufficient information to enable a preliminary


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analysis of each partnership and allow the project team and the client to identify which
partnerships warranted further research and development as more detailed case studies.
The Phase II Data Collection Framework, which was used for interviews with each
partner and stakeholder, was designed to allow the Consultants to develop a more
detailed understanding of each partnership and the factors that supported or inhibited its
success. The project team recognized that even though it was unlikely that data on each
item in the framework would be available for each partnership, it was useful to have a
framework that could easily capture and organize whatever data was available. This
enabled a more systematic and consistent analytical process, which allowed the
identification of critical success factors across the range of partnerships reviewed. The
overall data gathering and analysis process is summarized in Exhibit 2-1 below.

Exhibit 2-1 WDA Partnership Analysis Framework©

Development
Legal/Structural
Identification
Operational Capacity
Accomplishments Replicable
Partnership Research of Critical
Stakeholders
Development
Aboriginal Partnership
and Analysis Success
Financial External issues
Employment Case Study
Factors
Aboriginal Barriers and
Procurement Constraints
Community
Characteristics

The results from the data gathering and analysis are presented in Section 3 (Case Studies
and Individual Partnership Analysis).

Following the analysis of individual partnerships the Consultants undertook an integrated
review of all ten partnerships to identify traits and characteristics that are generally
applicable to successful partnerships, regardless of which sector they are in. This is
presented in Section 4 (Lessons Learned).


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The draft plan for a Community Bridge Building Initiative is presented in Section 6.

2.2 Limitations of Research
The consultants recognize that there are significant limitations on the preliminary
research and analysis. These limitations include:

• Partnership identification was not exhaustive – No effort was made to
inventory every Aboriginal - Non-Aboriginal partnership in British Columbia.
However, consultation was undertaken with key government contacts with
extensive knowledge of Aboriginal partnerships. This consultation helped to
identify important partnerships and focus the Consultants on those partnerships
that the stakeholders felt most relevant. While conducting an inventory of
partnerships may well be a very useful exercise it was beyond the scope and
budget of the current project. The objective of the Phase I research was simply to
identify and collect information on enough partnerships to provide a pool from
which partnerships could be selected for further research and analysis.

This notwithstanding, the consultants would encourage the Government of BC to
consider undertaking an exhaustive partnership inventory. This exercise would
produce valuable information and data and would provide a baseline from which
to measure the success of efforts to support and promote Aboriginal/non-
Aboriginal partnerships.

• No crosschecking and data verification (Phase I) – For most partnerships only
one data source was utilized to gather data and information. However, the
consulting team itself has considerable personal knowledge of many of the
partnerships reviewed. This information was used to undertake a preliminary
verification of data and information. Still, there could well be some inaccuracies


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in the data and information. Phase II research methodology utilized a data
checking and verification process as outlined in Section 2.1.

• Uneven geographic dispersion of partnerships. The project team attempted to
identify examples that represented a wide range of foci and types of initiative
rather than to undertake an exhaustive inventory of partnerships for any particular
area or to ensure that there were partnerships identified and reviewed from
throughout the entire province. While efforts were made to identify and gather
information from all areas, challenges with having telephone calls returned
limited the geographic dispersion in Phase I. Phase II research targets were, for
the most part, selected from partnerships reviewed in Phase I. Information was
not gathered on any partnerships in the far north of the province. It should be
noted that the research was conducted near the end of the fiscal year, a time that is
particularly demanding for most informants.

• Some partnerships are of recent origin. Generally, partnerships between
Aboriginal and non-Aboriginal interests in BC are recent phenomena. Although
some partnerships had several years of operating experience, most were originally
formed within the past three years. As a result, some critical success factors and
key challenges may have not yet become evident. To compensate for this the
Consultants informally compared the results of the partnership analysis to their
knowledge of partnerships in other areas that have been in existence for extended
periods of time (e.g., Kitsaki Development Corporation/Trimac Transportation
(1986); Meadow Lake Tribal Council/NorSask Forest Products (1988), etc.).

• No Research into Failed Partnerships. The research focused only on existing
successful partnerships. In other words, it did not seek to review partnerships that
had failed in order to glean learnings from them. However the researchers have
had direct experience in partnerships that have failed and this has been factored
into the Lessons Learned discussion in Section 4.


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Despite the limitations noted above, the Consultants are confident that the research and
analysis has provided findings that are interesting and useful and which will serve to
guide the establishment of comprehensive partnership development and bridge building
initiatives in British Columbia. These findings and analyses are presented in subsequent
Sections.


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3 Case Studies and Individual Partnership Analysis

3.1 Summary of Partnership Case Studies
The following list summarizes the detailed case studies reviewed in this report and
specifies the sector that they are from.

1. Environment
• Tsilqot'in People of Xeni and BC Parks

2. Social
• Carrier Sekanni Family Services

3. Economic
• West Chilcotin Forest Products Ltd.
• Monthly Licensee Meetings – North Thompson
• Skwalx/Sanders Construction Ltd – Little Shuswap Indian Band and Sanders
Construction
• Greater Masset Development Corporation
• Iisaak Forest Resources

4. General
• Sun Rivers Resort Community – Kamloops Indian Band and Sun Rivers

5. Other (Municipal)
• Gallagher Canyon Agreement
• Lake View Meadows

Detailed case studies of the above ten partnerships are presented in the following sub-
section. The case studies are arranged in alphabetical order.


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3.2 Individual Case Studies
The following ten sub-sections discuss the ten case studies referred to earlier. Specific
contacts and methods of data gathering utilized for gathering information are summarized
in the Appendix Information Sources.

3.2.1 Carrier Sekani Family Services

Parties to the Agreement:

• Carrier Sekani Family Services
⇒ Wet’suwet’en First Nation
⇒ Cheslatta First Nation
⇒ Burns Lake First Nation
⇒ Stellat’en First Nation
⇒ Nadleh Whut’en First Nation
⇒ Saik’us First Nation
⇒ Nak’azdli First Nation
⇒ Tl’azt’en First Nation
⇒ Takla Lake First Nation
⇒ Yekooche First Nation
• Indian and Northern Affairs Canada
• Ministry for Children and Family Services

Narrative Description of the Collaboration

Carrier Sekani Family Services is essentially a service delivery agreement entered into in
1991 between the Provincial Ministry of Child and Family Services, Indian and Northern
Affairs Canada (INAC) and the ten First Nations. This is a multi-year financing
agreement that allows the First Nations to organize a service delivery agency (Carrier
Sekani Family Services) to deliver child and family service programs to First Nations
Peoples in the area. The agreement is similar to others that are negotiated throughout
Canada involving First Nations, INAC and the relevant provincial Ministry.


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INAC’s policy governing the
Mission Statement
financing of Child and Family
"With the guidance of our elders, Carrier Sekani
Service Agency funding stipulates
Family Services is committed to the healing and
that there must be a minimum of
empowerment of Aboriginal Families by taking
500 children in the area before
direct responsibilities for health, social and legal
they will enter into an agreement
services for First Nations people residing in Carrier
(the purpose is to ensure effective
Sekanni territory."
economies of scale).

Launched in 1990/91 the Mission Statement of Carrier Sekani Family Services is:

A 10 person Board of Directors, one from each member nation, oversees the operation of
Carrier Sekani.

Motivation of the Partners and Stakeholders

The First Nations’ interest was to ensure that their membership received child and family
services in a culturally appropriate manner. The Federal and Provincial government
recognized that traditional mechanisms for delivering child and family services to First
Nations Peoples was not working and that they could be enhanced through First Nations
controlled delivery structures.

Lessons Learned and Critical Success Factors

Interviews and research have identified several lessons learned and critical success
factors. They are:

• Secure financing is a critical issue, especially in an organization that has no
mechanism for internally generated financing;
• A strong focus on acquiring, training and maintaining quality staff is fundamental.
This is especially important when activities are located in relatively remote areas


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and there is a difficulty in attracting staff to move from the more populated areas
like the lower mainland;
• There is value in delivering more services, as long as they are related in a general
way. This provides the organization with improved economies of scale and
greater visibility with its stakeholders.
• It is important to involve the communities and local stakeholders at the onset of
the project. It allows the membership to define priorities and drive the process.
This will ensure much more credibility when the organization is up and running.
• There is a need to develop as much information as possible and manage it in a
way that it can be used to further the goals of the organization.

Bridge Building and Conflict Management Strategies

Due to the nature of the collaboration – an agreement with Federal and Provincial
governments to deliver specific services to specific clients, there did not appear to be any
overt bridge building strategies undertaken. Conflicts with other governments are
addressed through negotiations; other conflicts (staff, member nations, etc.) are addressed
through the personnel manual and organization by-laws.


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3.2.2 Gallagher Canyon Agreement

• Westbank First Nation, Kelowna, BC
• Central Okanagan Regional District (CORD), Kelowna, BC
• The Corporation of the City of Kelowna
• The Black Mountain Irrigation District
• The South East Kelowna Irrigation District


After nearly five years of negotiations the Westbank First Nation and the Central
Okanagan Regional District (CORD) signed a five-year services agreement (Gallagher
Canyon Agreement) in early 2000. The agreement includes other local stakeholders and
covers how services are provided to some fee simple land that the First Nation purchased
several years ago.

After purchasing the land the First Nation wanted to convert it to Reserve status. The
land had several easements to local Improvement Districts to allow for the provision of
water to their constituents. As well, the City of Kelowna had constructed a road through
the land in question. In order to fully understand the implications for all stakeholders
CORD asked the Federal Government to undertake a thorough examination of the
situation prior to converting the land to Reserve Status.

In about 1995 CORD and Westbank began negotiations to develop a framework for
development of this land. While the original intent of the land purchase was to provide
land for First Nation’s housing, everyone recognized that the agreement needed to be
flexible enough to enable the stakeholders to accommodate changing requirements in the
future.


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The agreement addresses the allocation of various developmental costs, the number of
homes, types of buildings allowed and provides for the continuation of the easements. It
also protects the rights of the several service providers on this land.

CORD also has another agreement with Westbank which addresses payment for services
provided to approximately 7,000 non-Aboriginals who live on Reserve land but utilize
CORD services (recreation centre, emergency vehicles, etc.). CORD felt that this
agreement did not provide the Regional District with adequate payment for services
provided so they took the First Nation to court to attempt to have the agreement
renegotiated. The court case failed but relations between the parties remained cordial.
According to CORD the First Nation acknowledges that there is a problem with the
current agreement and that, in the interest of longer-term collaboration and relationships,
a new agreement should be developed.

Even though the Gallagher Canyon Agreement has been in place for only one year, the
stakeholders have already begun negotiations for a follow-up agreement that would also
address the issue of non-Aboriginals utilizing CORD services.


• The primary motivation for each partner was the desire to develop a mutually
agreeable framework for development and development services on the land
acquired by the First Nation. Each party wanted the agreement to be structured so
that it would support their longer-term development aspirations and provide a
mechanism for fair allocation of costs and benefits.


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• All parties were motivated to develop a legal agreement that could provide a
framework to support their respective needs and development aspirations.
• The parties agreed to spend the time up-front (five-years) to ensure that all issues
were raised in negotiations and that the final agreement would meet their needs.
• It is possible to have a ‘civilized disagreement’ and still remain as active
collaborators on other fronts.
• When developing agreements it is critically important to openly communicate
one’s needs and to be patient and keep the discussion going, even when some
aspects of it are difficult and there is no evident path to an agreement.

The parties identified two specific bridge building and conflict management strategies
that worked for them. They were:
• Keep the dialogue going even when there is conflict and the two sides don’t fully
understand each other; and
• Make the agreement comprehensive so that all foreseeable conflicts and issues have
been addressed.


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3.2.3 Greater Massett Development Corporation


• Old Masset First Nation
• Village of Masset


The Greater Massett Development Corporation (GMDC) had its genesis in 1994 when
the Federal Department of National Defense (DND) decided to close the local military
base (GMDC was incorporated in 1996). The base contained: 190 residences; barracks
that could accommodate up to 65 people; a recreation centre; a curling rink, and
administration buildings. Costs to dismantle and decommission the facilities were
pegged at $3 million.

Coupled with significant downturns in the forestry and fisheries sectors, and the closure
of a local refueling station, the village of Massett and the Old Massett First Nation were
facing a major economic downturn. The military base had traditionally pumped about $5
million dollars per year into the local economy – its closure could be devastating. DND
was facing a major public relations challenge as the closure of the base could push the
local economy over the economic brink and DND could become the public scapegoat.

Necessity brought the three major stakeholders (Old Massett First Nation, Village of
Massett and DND) together to try and develop a scenario that would lessen the economic
and social impact of the base closure. The First Nation and the Village had prior
partnership experience with each other – two years earlier they had combined their sewer
and water systems. This benefited both parties by improving overall service and creating
operational efficiencies and economies of scale.


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The stakeholders decided that the economic impact of the base closure could be mitigated
somewhat with the formation of a development corporation that would be jointly owned
by the First Nation and the Village. DND agreed to transfer the base infrastructure and
fixed assets, along with the $3 million decommissioning budget to the newly formed
Greater Massett Development Corporation.

The GMDC was formed as the vehicle to liquidate the assets, and look after the funds
from the sales of Personnel Married Quarters (PMQs) and other former DND properties.
Approximately $8 million in revenue was generated through these sales. The GMDC was
to re-invest these funds into the two communities to enhance local economic
development activities. GMDC presently utilizes these funds to support the operations of
the Old and the New Massett Economic Development offices. DND also provided the
GMDC with a $3,000,000 barracks demolition fund which is presently invested in its
own account, the interest of which is only to be used to subsidise the operation of the
Massett recreation centre.

Each partner (the village and the First Nation) appointed five Directors to the GMDC
Board and they began the difficult process of launching a jointly owned corporation and
affecting the transfer of assets from DND. The partners spent considerable time at the
front end developing a strategic plan for GMDC. This afforded the opportunity to
surface potential conflict areas and fully discuss the strategic direction of the corporation
and the communities.

Transferring the assets from DND proved to be a Herculean challenge involving 11
different government departments and many layers of bureaucracy. The $3 million was
put into a GMDC managed ‘Greenfield Fund’ which is used to assist local entrepreneurs.
The former administration centre was converted into an incubator mall, which has
already spawned some successful local businesses. The GMDC operates the recreation
facilities for the benefit of the entire community. Western Diversification provides
project specific financing to assist GMDC.


19

GMDC holds monthly Board of Director meetings, and two large meetings per year that
are open to the general public; an Annual General Meeting and a Public Meeting.
Communication with the public and consistent attendance at Director’s meetings has
been a critical issue for GMDC.

Decisions are made by a ten-person Board of Directors (each partner appoints five Board
members). At one point GMDC undertook a major communication initiative, going
door-to-door in the community to inform community members of the corporation and its
strategic direction (they used the strategic plan as a guide).

Although there have been numerous challenges, including ensuring that there are revenue
streams to match expenses (e.g., operating community recreation facilities), and it is too
early to determine its long term success, GMDC has had a positive impact on the Greater
Massett community. It has inspired a can-do attitude and helped to mitigate the social
and economic impact of the base closure. It has established infrastructure that is
dedicated to supporting the economic rejuvenation of the entire community. As well, it
has significantly increased cross-cultural interaction and fostered improved relations
between the First Nations and non-First Nations communities.

The main financial challenge facing GMDC is that there are no significant revenue
sources. The operations of the GMDC and the costs of operating the recreation center are
funded from the rapidly depleting capital base that was generated by the liquidation of
DND assets.

However, despite the intentions of all parties, there have been few jobs or entrepreneurs
created other than in the operation of the recreation centre. There have been few direct
benefits for the community, other than the 8 to 11 total employees of the GMDC. The
partnership appears to face serious challenges as the $11 Million in seed money that they
started with has been seriously eroded and continues to be burned at a high rate by the
costs of the recreation centre. Some people that were interviewed indicated that the


20
partnership has actually worsened relationships between the Aboriginal and non-
Aboriginal elements of the community.


The partners and stakeholders were all motivated by enlightened self-interest. Old
Massett First Nation and the Village of Massett were searching for opportunities to
mitigate major economic shocks to the community. DND and the Federal Government
sought to close the base with a minimum negative impact on the local economy and on
their reputation.

The original motivation was to split the DND assets equally between the two
communities. This has not changed since its inception; both communities would like to
share in the assets equally.


The partners identified several lessons learned and critical success factors:

• It was vitally important to spend time at the onset in the development of a
strategic plan. In addition to providing direction to the corporation, the process of
developing the plan enabled the partners to address numerous issues that may
have created serious problems if left un-addressed;
• Communication with community members is essential – do what it takes to
ensure that the larger community is informed;
• Once you have a plan, stick to it. A well-developed strategic plan/vision can
provide directional stability and allow an organization to proactively pursue its
long-term vision. Conversely, failure to follow a plan/vision encourages reactive
responses to the opportunity of the week;


21
• Solid financial plans, especially on the revenue side, are extremely important.
Failure to adequately develop a sustainable financial plan can place extreme
stresses on the partnership and the relationships between the partners;
• A committed Board of Directors who will attend all meetings, and provide
strategic guidance and direction to the organization is of critical importance;
• Ensure that the operations of the development corporation are managed in a way
that is consistent with the goals and objectives of the organization. This requires
careful selection of a General Manager and ensuring that appropriate
management, reporting and monitoring processes are in place that allow any
deviations from the strategic plan to be quickly identified and corrected; and
• It is important to ensure that the Directors are qualified and well trained and that
personal agendas do not interfere with the strategic direction of the organization.


There were a number of processes and strategies that helped to mitigate the impact of
conflicts and build bridges between the two communities. These included:
• A two-day strategic planning workshop at the start of the partnership to address
outstanding issues and develop a strategic plan for the partnership;
• Decisions of the partnership are made by consensus;
• The partners have found that, as they come together for community activities in
their jointly owned recreation facilities, they have developed better friendships
with one and other on a personal level.


22

3.2.4 Iisaak Forest Resources


• Weyerhaeuser Canada Ltd. (formerly MacMillan Bloedel Ltd)
• Nuu-chah-nulth
• Ahousaht First Nation
• Hesquiaht First Nation
• Tla-o-qui-aht First Nation
• Ucluelet First Nation
• Toquaht First Nation

While not officially ‘partners’ in Iisaak, numerous international environmental
organizations such as Greenpeace were critical stakeholders who had shaped the
conditions that stimulated the creation of Iisaak.


Worldwide attention was brought to bear on the logging industry in Clayoquot Sound in
the 1990s. International organizations applied tremendous pressure on companies
logging (clear-cutting) the old growth forests in the area, disrupting logging activities and
alienating markets in Europe and North America.

Clayoquot Sound is the traditional home of the Central Nuu-chah-nulth Aboriginal
people. They have an interest in reclaiming their lands to promote economic, social and
cultural development for their people. These people include five First Nations, with the
northern most three, the Hesquiaht, Ahousaht and Tla-o-qui-aht residing within
Clayoquot Sound with the Ucluelet and Toquaht bordering to the south.


23
Before the escalation of conflict, Weyerhaeuser (MacMillan Bloedel (MB)) the operator
throughout the 1990s was purchased by Weyerhaeuser in 1999) had an annual harvest of
over 600,000 cubic metres in Clayoquot Sound, which generated over $100 million in
economic activity. This activity was a significant component of the local economy
supporting many local businesses and providing a revenue base to municipal, provincial
and federal governments.

Initially the local First Nations, who had been largely excluded from the economic
benefits associated Weyerhaeuser’s (MB) operation, supported and were supported by the
international organizations that were leading the anti-logging protest. In July 1996, First
Nations hosted an all-stakeholder meeting to discuss a resolution to Clayoquot
controversy. In January 1997, Weyerhaeuser (MB) laid off 110 workers with a decision
to stop logging in Clayoquot Sound for 18 months.

Iisaak Forest Resources was formed in March 1997, as a joint venture between Nuu-
chah-nulth people and Weyerhaeuser (MB). Iisaak (pronounced e-sock) would be 51%
First Nations owned and would take over Weyerhaeuser’s (MB’s) operations in
Clayoquot Sound. However harvests would be reduced to 40,000 cubic metres per year
and be put-off for three years while value-added forest product opportunities were
investigated. Harvesting resumed in Clayoquot in August 2000.

Iisaak Forest Resources will harvest up to 40,000 cubic metres per year. That is less than
10% of the volume that had been sustained before the dispute began. First Nations
control Iisaak, not Weyerhaeuser (MB), and they have options to increase their
ownership, to 100% at some point. Weyerhaeuser (MB) will continue to work with
Iisaak, providing start-up working capital and management experience.

The intent of the partners is that the area will be managed first for conservation values
and then for economic benefit. This enabled the support of many of the international
organizations that had previously led the protest against Clayoquot logging.


24
Iisaak is committed to an eco-forestry approach, logging in second growth areas,
supplying wood to local value-added wood converters and pursuing eco-certifications
through a process agreed to by the international organizations. Some watersheds and
other areas will be set aside for non-timber uses including eco-tourism and spiritual uses.
The international organizations have committed to assist with marketing products from
Iisaak and to continue looking for other ways to stay positively involved.

Economically, Iisaak expects to operate at barely above break-even in 2000 and 2001. So
despite the positive feeling of the parties supporting Iisaak, it is clearly too early to
conclude whether Iisaak will grow to be an economically viable success.


• The First Nations involved were interested in both economic growth and development
and in preserving Clayoquot Sound as one of the world’s special places.
• Weyerhaeuser was interested in limiting the damage to its international
reputation/brand equity and the alienation of markets for its other forest products.
Additionally, Iisaak provides them with an opportunity to work directly in partnership
with First Nations and will undoubtedly assist them in their relationships with First
Nations Peoples in other areas where they work.
• While many of the international organizations would have undoubtedly preferred an
absolute moratorium on logging in Clayoquot Sound, they realized that for them to
continue opposing a limited-impact logging program that was supported by local First
Nations would be difficult.


A number of lessons can be drawn from this experience:


25
• First Nations can have a strong influence on disputes between industry and
environmentalists;
• Local issues can quickly become global problems for resource companies; and
• First Nations’ leadership and commitment were able to draw former combatants
together and forge a common ground.


The Iisaak partnership grew out of one of the biggest conflicts in BC history. Partners
have learned to work together in support of their common interest. First Nations
leadership and moral commitment to balance environmental preservation with the
creation of economic opportunities for their members provided the catalyst to bridge the
chasm that had developed between the parties.


26

3.2.5 Lakeview Meadows

• Shuswap First Nation, Cranbrook, BC
• Regional District of East Kootenay, Cranbrook, BC
• Private Developer (Lakeview Meadows)


In the late 1990s the Regional District of East Kootenay (RDEK) and the Shuswap First
Nation faced some difficult challenges. The popularity of the area as a summer resort
resulted in extensive development along the shores of Lake Windermere. All of the
houses and cottages were on septic fields, which were causing pollution levels to rise to
unacceptable standards. RDEK recognized the need for a new sewer and water system,
but financing the $15 million cost of developing it would require an expensive and
lengthy referendum process, with no guarantee of receiving approval.

Due to geology, geographic proximity and a greater degree of regulatory autonomy, it
made sense to explore the option of having the Shuswap First Nation finance and
construct the sewer and water system and sell services to RDEK. The parties already had
a history of cooperating. The First Nation had a service agreement with the Regional
District for fire protection and the Regional District had a member on the First Nation’s
Development Review Board. As well, the First Nation saw this as a lucrative opportunity
to protect the environment and make a profit at the same time.

The situation came to a head when a private developer wanted to develop Lakeview
Meadows subdivision and needed sewer and water services in order to do so. The First
Nation negotiated a pre-payment of service fees and an agreement to pay design costs and
construction costs from the edge of the reserve to the Lakeview Meadows subdivision.


27
They leveraged the prepayment and commitment to secure the capital to develop the
system. Today the First Nation supplies sewer and water services to the Lakeview
Meadows subdivision and has a new system for their own members. RDEK has a
management contract with the First Nation to manage the system for at least five years –
during this time it is expected that someone from the First Nation will be trained to
operate the system. Financing for the system was entirely private – the First Nation was
able to bypass traditional government financing processes for on-reserve infrastructure,
allowing them to proceed with the development in a timely fashion (sources indicated
that the average time to process government financing for on-reserve infrastructure is 36-
42 months).


The partners had a history of working together and recognized that they could realize
advantages by collaborating on this initiative. They both wanted to reverse the
environmental damage that was caused by septic systems. RDEK wanted to avoid the
challenges of securing regulatory approval and raising $15 million capital to finance a
new system. The First Nation wanted to utilize their geographic and geological
advantages to develop a profitable business opportunity.


A number of lessons learned and critical success factors emerged when reviewing this
partnership with the stakeholders:

• Leadership is critical. The First Nation had strong leadership with clear vision
and goals (and an active process of consultation and communication with the FN
community);
• Communication is essential. Each party involved the other in relevant decisions
and there was a regular sharing of information;


28
• Both partners had clear goals and understood what they could do best to make the
partnership work;
• Both partners stressed the importance of entering into negotiations with an open
mind, a good understanding of the risks and a commitment to continue
negotiations until all issues had been addressed and the best possible deal for
everyone had been developed;
• Financing – developing and arranging the appropriate financial package allowed
the development to proceed in a timely manner; and
• Shared interests – the parties needed each other to solve a common problem
(pollution) and to achieve other party specific objectives (e.g., create a revenue
opportunity, avoid a referendum and the need to raise a huge amount of capital).


In addition to a history of trust and collaboration developed through earlier initiatives the
partners stressed the importance of regular communication as a mechanism for bridge
building and managing potential conflict. The agreement also included a clause
committing the parties to binding arbitration if they were unable to come to agreement on
a particular issue.


29

3.2.6 Monthly Licensee Meetings – North Thompson

Parties to the Agreement (Process):

The participants are:
• North Thompson First Nation
• Ministry of Forests (MOF)
• Ministry of Environment (MOE)
• FRBC
• Tolco Industries
• Slocan Forest Products
• Weyerhaeuser Canada Ltd.
• Adams Lake Lumber (Division of Interfor)
• Gilbert Smith Forest Products
• Several small forest operators from the area

Guests and Environmental consultants sometimes participate in the meetings.


In the early 1990s the stakeholders in North Thompson’s forest and other natural
resources began meeting regularly (monthly) to exchange information and inform each
other of their plans and priorities. Although the meetings were nominally about all
resource sectors, forestry related issues were generally the primary focus. These
meetings have continued over the past decade and have become an important and regular
feature of resource management and development in the North Thompson.


30
A major benefit of the process is that it provides an ongoing opportunity for dialogue and
interaction amongst the stakeholders. This dialogue assists the stakeholders to get to
know each other and to increase the coordination and efficiency of projects and activities.
For example, if the First Nations require wood for its mill, the meetings provide a forum
where they can discuss the most efficient means to get it with the major industry
participants. In some cases it may be that TOLCO is harvesting the needed species in the
geographic area – in other cases it may be Weyerhaeuser. Regardless of which supplier,
the meetings provide a quick and efficient means to gathering this information and input.

An added benefit of the meetings is that they provide an opportunity for the stakeholders
to get to know each other better. For instance, several non-Aboriginal participants noted
that they have a greater appreciation for the range of issues and concerns being addressed
by First Nations – not just those directly related to local resources. As well, the
participants in the meetings often get together for social events that help to further their
mutual understanding.


There was and still is a plethora of motivations for the individual stakeholders to
participate. They include:
• To maintain effective information flow and communication – keeping abreast of
each other’s activities and quickly identifying potential synergies and
opportunities to increase efficiency;
• To build relationships and understanding with other stakeholders;
• To understand the concerns and priorities of the North Thompson First Nation in
relation to forestry and other resource harvesting/management activities;
• To understand the capacity of local First Nation’s people and institutions and how
they can add value to existing and planned activities;


31
• To maximize the employment, business and other benefits accruing to First
Nation’s people from the harvesting and development of local forestry and other
resources;
• To provide an opportunity for informal input into broad Provincial Government
requirements on issues related to local resource management;


• It is important that everyone participate with a spirit of openness and cooperation,
ready to really listen to the viewpoints and concerns of the others;
• Perseverance is critical. It is important that the meetings be held regularly and
that participants attend consistently; and
• It is critical that participants keep in mind the objective of the meetings –
communication, dialogue and identification of opportunities for collaboration and
synergy. It needs to be clearly understood that the meetings are not a political
forum.


• The regularity of the meetings and the interaction between the participants has
enabled them to get to know each other on many levels. When they are not in
agreement on a particular issue there is a depth to the relationship that sustains
them as they work through potential conflict(s);
• The participants regularly get together for social events such as a cultural day at
the First Nation or renting the local ski hill and spending a family skiing day
together; and
• The group tries to be proactive about identifying and addressing potential conflict
issues and, if necessary, will hold weekly meetings on special occasions to ensure
adequate communication and information flow amongst stakeholders.


32
3.2.7 Skwlax/Sanders Construction Ltd.


• Little Shuswap Indian Bank, Chase BC
• Sanders & Company, Merrit BC


Sanders and Company, a Merritt based road construction and heavy equipment company
had been successfully undertaking projects on the Little Shuswap Indian Band’s (LSIB)
Quaaout Reserve for about seven years. In 1999 LSIB and Sanders decided that it would
be beneficial for both parties to form a company to undertake smaller (under $10 million)
road construction and heavy equipment projects. Skwlax/Sanders Construction Ltd. was
formed with the LSIB holding a 51% interest. Each party nominated two persons to the
Board of Directors and the management agreement made a provision for a fifth,
independent, director to be appointed jointly (to date this position has not been filled).

The company bid on and secured several projects during their first year of operation,
generating over $1 million in revenue. Gerry Sanders and Stuart Adamson, a senior
manager with LSIB, make the day-to-day decisions of the company, on a collaborative
basis. Any projects that require financing must be approved by the LSIB. Project
managers make Day to day project decisions.

Sanders brought technical expertise and equipment to the partnership while LSIB brought
manpower, information on upcoming projects and the ability to meet Aboriginal
procurement guidelines. LSIB also brought administrative capacity and are tasked with
maintaining the company’s accounting system.


33
The company had some initial challenges as it sought to balance First Nation member’s
desire to maximize employment with the economic reality of operating a project based
company in a cyclical sector. After much discussion it was agreed that, while
employment and training opportunities for First Nation’s people is a strong priority,
employment must be based on project revenue. The partners closely monitor the
financial profit and the employment and training that the projects generate.

In addition to the profits and employment, the partnership produced an unexpected
benefit in terms of addressing at least one person’s way of thinking about Aboriginal
peoples. On one project Skwlax Sanders deliberately engaged a subcontractor who had a
reputation as a vocal redneck and a staunch opponent of Aboriginal development. As a
result of working directly with the company and its Aboriginal workers, this person’s
attitude made a 180-degree shift.


The motivations of both partners were enlightened self-interest. The LSIB wanted more
employment opportunities for First Nations members, an opportunity to share in the
profits of local construction work, and the ability to have a more substantial local
business presence. Sanders wanted to develop more work and to ensure that its work in
the area was sustainable by developing a partnership with a leading influencer of local
construction opportunities.


Although the partnership is still in its early stages, a number of lessons learned and
critical success factors have been identified. They include:

• It is important to have strong technical skills in order to bid on and manage
complex construction projects. If the First Nation does not have this capacity
internally it is wise for them to select and twin with a partner who can provide it;


34
• In order to successfully execute construction projects it is important to have
access to the appropriate equipment and the skills to complete the project
effectively;
• Identifying and selecting the right partner requires a significant time commitment;
• It is important to allow enough time to thoroughly complete the due diligence;
• In order for a partnership to work effectively it must be financially self-sufficient
with clear revenue streams and partners with the necessary financial resources to
ensure adequate working capital;
• The parties must agree that there will be some limits on individual autonomy in
order to support the partnership;
• The First Nation must have the political and administrative stability that will
allow the partnership to operate without political interference and abrupt changes
in administrative direction;
• The partnership should have a clear mission/mandate and keep focused on
achieving it;
• The partners should strategically (and ethically) utilize all political relationships
and influence available in order to market themselves and develop/secure
projects; and
• It is critically important to invest the time at the front end of the partnership to
clearly define the roles, expectations, mission and mandate of the relationship and
be able to communicate it effectively to internal and external stakeholders.


In order to ensure a strong and sustainable relationship the partners have identified and
utilized a number of conflict management and bridge building strategies. These include:
• Strong/daily communication – the partners are in daily communication with each
other. That way, when an issue comes up it can surface immediately and be
addressed. They have committed to each other that, when a difficult issue arises


35
they will address it head-on and get it resolved before it develops into something
that could threaten their ongoing relationship;
• When a particular project requires debt to finance the initial working capital it
requires formal approval from both parties;
• The potential conflict between employment/profits is mitigated by the strong
leadership who ensure a separation between business and politics; and
• They have a provision to utilize a third-party mediator if a conflict arises that they
are unable to settle amongst themselves.


36

3.2.8 Sun Rivers Resort Community


• The Sun Rivers Corporation, Kamloops BC
• Kamloops Indian Band, Kamloops BC


In 1997, the membership of the Kamloops Indian Band voted by a margin of 74% in
favour of surrendering3 a 480 acre parcel of their land to Sun Rivers Corporation for a
real estate development. The property is located immediately east of the City of
Kamloops on the south-facing slope of the valley overlooking the city. The uses for this
land as approved in the Head Lease are for “developing 2,000 residential housing units, a
school, park, hotel, village centre and 18 hole golf course”.

The development utilizes thermal heat for the entire subdivision. It is one of the only
subdivisions in Canada to utilize this environmentally friendly energy source. When the
subdivision is fully developed it will provide the First Nation with annual tax revenues of
approximately $7-8 million per year. The remainder would accrue to the City of
Kamloops and to the developer for various services that they provide to the landowners.

With the prepaid lease and the market provided by the development, the First Nation was
able to finance and construct a state of the art water treatment facility that supplies
services to the Sun Rivers Resort Community and to many First Nations facilities.

3
The surrender is a formal process wherein the land is assigned back to her Majesty the Queen’s representative – the
Government of Canada – who in turn provide a Head Lease (generally 99 years in duration) to the applicant First


37

Sun Rivers was motivated by a desire to profitably develop a unique housing and
recreational facility. The First Nation realized that this transaction could provide them
with a number of immediate and ongoing benefits including:
• Upfront lease payment for the land and ongoing payments over the life of the
lease;
• An ‘inside track’ on employment and business opportunities stemming from the
development;
• An opportunity to increase the tax and revenue base of the First Nation;
• The development would increase the value of other First Nation’s land in the
immediate vicinity; and
• An opportunity to increase the market for a state of the art water treatment facility
to improve the water available to First Nations members.

As well, the City of Kamloops, which has signed on to provide sewer services to the
development, can amortize the cost of their existing system (which was not running to
capacity) across a broader tax base.


• Leadership and communication is critical. The leadership of the Kamloops Indian
Band were visionary and saw the benefits that the development could bring to
their First Nation. They communicated this effectively to their membership who
overwhelmingly endorsed it in a referendum;
• The developer had a clear vision and plan for the development and had the
financial and managerial capacity to execute the plan effectively;

Nation or designate for the purpose of developing projects on this land that are not otherwise permitted under the
Indian Act.


38
• Once the project had begun, the stakeholders recognized their common interest
and worked in a spirit of cooperation and collaboration; and
• The Kamloops Indian Band had the technical expertise (in the land leasing
department) and had good legal and professional advisers.


• The parties ensured that everything that was written into the agreement was
achievable. They did not make any commitments that could not be kept;
• There is strong communication between the stakeholders. All employment and
contracting opportunities are communicated to the First Nation. The developer
works with them to help them to take advantage of as many opportunities as they
have the capacity to undertake; and
• There are detailed records kept of agreements, commitments and of First Nations
employment/business opportunities at the project. That helps to ensure that the
facts are known and helps to eliminate rumour mongering.


39

3.2.9 Tsilqot’in People of Xeni and BC Parks (Ts’yl-os Provincial Park)

• The Xeni Gwet’in First Nations Government

• BC Parks (Ts’yl-os Provincial Park).


In the 1980s the Xeni Gwet’in Elders were becoming concerned that clear-cut areas were
getting very close to their traditional territory4. They were afraid that, if nothing were
done about non-Aboriginal land use practices in the area, it would severely limit the
traditional land use practices of the Xeni Gwet’in Peoples. A number of tribal meetings
were held to discuss the Elder’s concerns. In 1989 a Declaration stating that the Xeni
Gwet’in Peoples would not tolerate mining or clear-cut forestry practices on their
traditional lands was released at a press conference in Vancouver.

As a result of the Declaration the Xeni Gwet’in Peoples became involved with the
Government of British Columbia in a review of the Deferred Planning Area around
Chilco Lake (further development was frozen in this area pending additional studies). A
60 person Chilco Study Committee was formed in 1993/94. The Xeni Gwet’in were one
of three co-chairs (the Ministry of Parks and the Ministry of Municipal Affairs were the
other co-chairs). The Committee, which was made up of all stakeholders in the region,
recommended the establishment of a Provincial Park and a separate Tsilqot'in
Management Zone (TZM)

The recommendations of the Chilco Study became the basis for the development of a
Memorandum of Understanding (MOU) between Xeni Gwet’in and BC Parks. The
MOU set out in detail what can and cannot occur in the area, what the roles and


40
responsibilities of the respective stakeholders are, and established a monthly stakeholder
meeting process. The MOU, which was supported by the stakeholder group, was signed
in a ceremony in Victoria.

The scope of the agreement, which initially focused primarily on park management
issues, has been recently expanded to include issues on lands adjacent to the park. A
management group comprised of Xeni Gwet’in and BC Parks has been created to
consider applications and permits for a variety of land use applications and other matters
that routinely come up.


The Xeni Gwet’in Peoples wanted to ensure that they had an active role in the
management of their traditional lands and that clear cutting and mining operations did not
decimate the lands. They also wanted to ensure that they would have access to the lands
for traditional purposes (e.g., hunting, gathering medicinal plants, fishing, ceremonies,
etc.).

The Government of BC wanted to ensure that the management of the area is consistent
with the mandate of BC Parks and to ensure that traditional land use practices of the First
Nations Peoples were allowed to continue. As well, they wanted to establish a process
that allowed input from other stakeholders in the region.

4
The park that was established is located about 220 kilometers west of Williams Lake


41


• The leadership demonstrated by the Xeni Gwet’in Peoples to identify their issues
and priorities and communicate them effectively provided the catalyst for this
collaboration to develop;
• The openness and willingness of BC Parks personnel to consider the priorities of
the Xeni Gwet’in Peoples and work with them to develop a mechanism to allow
the Park to be developed.
• Regular, structured interaction amongst the stakeholders (e.g., the monthly
meetings) and ensuring that all parties attend on a regular basis;
• Developing a specific focus and sticking to it. This keeps potentially divisive
issues like the Treaty Land Entitlement process out of the regular meetings and
park management process;
• A commitment to shared decision-making. The parties stressed that this has to be
a real commitment and a recognition that it may mean that you have to give up
authority in some areas. They also stressed the importance of clearly identifying
the areas of shared decision making so there is a common understanding; and
• A mechanism for other stakeholders to have input into the process (e.g., the
Chilcotin Advisory Group, which acts as a third-party watchdog)


• Regular meetings of the stakeholders are held. Between meetings the
stakeholders regularly contact each other to discuss issues and other aspects of
Park management;

• The regular meetings of the Working Group are open to the public and individuals
are encouraged to attend;

• There is ongoing, informal contact between the stakeholders. (e.g., Parks
personnel and others often drop by the Band Office for coffee); and


42
• The First Nation has a regular and consistent communication process to ensure
that their membership is well informed of issues and opportunities emanating
from the management of the Park.


43

3.2.10 West Chilcotin Forest Products

Parties to the Agreement

• Ulkatcho First Nation, Anahim Lake, B.C.
• CAT Resources Ltd. Anahim Lake, B.C.
• Carrier Lumber Ltd., Prince George, B.C.


Carrier Lumber of Prince George, B.C. had operated a sawmill in the community of
Anahim Lake for a number of years. In 1993 they were forced to close their mill when
they lost their Timber Supply License (TSL) due to a controversial decision by the
Government of the day.

The loss of the Carrier mill was potentially devastating. While the region had a
smattering of tourism outfitters and ranchers, the mill and associated logging operations
was the economic mainstay of Anahim Lake. The loss of the TSL was a significant blow
to Carrier Lumber as it literally reduced the value of their sawmill facility in Anahim
Lake to zero. It was also a huge loss to the residents of Anahim Lake as the mill, its
associated logging operations and spin off businesses was the economic lifeblood of the
community.

The leadership of one individual in the community was responsible for the formation of a
tripartite partnership involving Carrier Lumber, the Ulkatcho First Nation and a group of
50 investors from the community to form West Chilcotin Lumber. This partnership was
uniquely positioned to resuscitate the economy. Carrier Lumber had the facility and
infrastructure. The involvement of the fifty local investors provided both Carrier and the


44
Government with a concrete demonstration of local commitment and support for the
Ulkatcho First Nation’s (the third partner) application for a TSL.

West Chilcotin commenced operations in 1996 and manufactures studs (2in X 4in X 8ft
lumber), which they sell all over the world.


All parties to the agreement were highly motivated. The Ulkatcho First Nation had been
pursuing a TSL for years, but the Government had always declined, telling them to ‘go
find a partner’. The First Nation has always viewed a TSL as a means for them to
achieve a significant share of the work in the forest sector and to establish a base for their
economy.


• All partners must enter into the deal with the view and commitment that it is
better to own a portion of a success story than 100% of a failure;
• The non-Aboriginal partner must recognize, that while every effort will be made
to keep politics out of the deal, that the reality is that is difficult to keep entirely
out;
• All parties must be prepared to compromise on issues and recognize the items that
are important to the other partners and stakeholders, e.g., Chief & Council;
• If all the parties are responsible to a large constituency, then they will work hard
to get a project done. It took approximately one year to put this partnership
together; and
• All partners and stakeholders should be treated with respect.


45

• Be prepared to deal with the tough issues at the negotiation table and invest the
time to get through the difficult issues. Putting them off will not make them easier
nor will it cause them to go away;
• Identify and put mechanisms in place at the start to deal with tough issues that
may crop up later, e.g., the First Nation’s expectation regarding employment;
• When all parties have equal share in the project and therefore equal to lose, they
are all highly motivated to search for win-win solutions to conflict situations; and
• Include conflict resolution clauses in all formal agreements.


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4 Lessons Learned

The preceding ten case studies supply data and information that can provide insights into
characteristics of successful partnerships and critical issues that influence the success of
partnerships between Aboriginal and non-Aboriginal interests. These lessons learned
may help existing and future partnerships to enhance their potential for success. The
following analysis, drawn from the preceding case studies, discusses and presents the
lessons learned in three key areas: the motivation of partners and stakeholders; crucial
success factors, and conflict management strategies. This analysis is followed by a
discussion on lessons learned from failed partnerships and an overview of two innovative
projects aimed at encouraging and understanding Aboriginal/non-Aboriginal
partnerships.

4.1 Motivation of Partners and Stakeholders

The partners in the above cases consistently cited motivational factors that are rooted in
self-interest. Of course, in many instances it was enlightened self-interest. For example,
Weyerhaeuser’s collaboration in the Iisaak partnership may have been driven by a need
to mitigate damage and make the best of a difficult situation. Our conclusion is that self-
interest is the motivator in virtually every case we examined. There is nothing
fundamentally wrong with this. In fact, we would argue that a partnership is not
sustainable if it is not in the self-interests of each of the partners.

Our analysis identified five different motivations5 for the ten cases we reviewed. This is
not to suggest that these are the only motivations that can result in successful
partnerships, rather these are simply the motivations that spurred the creation of these


47
partnerships. Nonetheless, the presence of one or more of these motivators can signal an
opportunity to develop a partnership.

1. Mitigating the impact of an economic downturn – A downturn in one or more
sectors of the local economy can help create conditions where there is an active
search for opportunities to rejuvenate, or at least mitigate the decline in the local
economy. This type of situation can stimulate creativity and encourage Aboriginals
and non-Aboriginals to seek out opportunities for collaboration, with the expectation
that the collaboration will help each partner to adjust more effectively to the changing
conditions.

2. Make services work better – Federal and provincial governments are recognizing
that many of the services they have traditionally delivered to Aboriginal Peoples are
less effective than they would be if they were delivered directly by Aboriginal
organizations. There are numerous cultural and logical reasons for this, including the
fact that delivery by Aboriginal People is generally done in a more culturally
sensitive manner and with improved community ownership of the process and results.
As well, there is a growing expectation that Aboriginal Peoples have the right to
deliver services to their people.

3. Synergies – Many partnerships are launched because the partners, by working
collaboratively, are able to accomplish much more than they could by working alone
i.e., generating a one plus one equals three phenomenon. This often happens when
one partner has access to financial and operational capacity and the other partner has
an enhanced position in the market and access to labour, natural resources and other
inputs. For example, a non-Aboriginal partner may have the financial and technical
capacity to bid on a contract or launch a project, while the Aboriginal partner has
preferred access to contracts and/or natural resources, access to local labour or other

5
As all of the motivations are basically linked through the self-interest of the parties, the division into five different
types of motivation may be seen as arbitrary. However, we believe that it is useful in that it sets out a more systematic
process against which the motivation for establishing new partnerships can be reviewed.


48
inputs. For instance, in the Gallagher Canyon Development none of the parties,
working independently, could have hoped to achieve a solution as effective as the
agreement that they worked out together. Similarly, it is unlikely that either of the
partners in the Greater Massett Development Corporation could have been successful
in persuading the Department of National Defense to make the financial and asset
commitment that they did. As well, it is extremely doubtful that either party working
alone could have successfully maneuvered the agreement through the eleven different
government departments.

Other examples include the establishment of a park through the collaborative efforts
of the Tsilqot’in People of Xeni and BC Parks, Skwlax Sanders, which was able to
secure and execute construction contracts that neither party could have gotten on their
own, and Iisaak Forest Resources, where a range of environmental and economic
objectives was able to be addressed through collaboration.

4. Environmental and economic opportunities – The opportunity to develop and
implement environmental and/or economic initiatives is often a significant motivator
for Aboriginal/non-Aboriginal partnerships. Often there are opportunities that are
difficult or impossible for one party to develop on their own, but through
collaboration with other stakeholders they can achieve critical objectives. This was
the case with Iisaak Forest Resources and the Tsilqot’in People of Xeni and BC
Parks. In both cases it is doubtful that the environmental or economic objectives of
the parties could have been achieved without systematic collaboration and
partnership.

5. Improve communication and collaboration – For example, participation in the
North Thompson Monthly Licensee Meetings is motivated by the parties’ recognition
that a regular, structured forum that enables them to exchange information on
activities and issues will facilitate improved collaboration and synergies, and
minimize the potential for conflict, making all of their operations more efficient.


Aboriginal and Non-Aboriginal Partnerships: Building Blocks for Sustainable Community Development

Aboriginal and Non-Aboriginal Partnerships: Building Blocks for Sustainable Community Development

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