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Webinar: Securing Mobile Banking Apps

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Webinar: Securing Mobile Banking Apps

  1. 1. Prague Securing Mobile Banking Apps You Are Only as Strong as Your Weakest Link
  2. 2. 10-20% rise in digital banking use across Europe in April 2020 Facts & Numbers 40% of Android users have phones which no longer received security updates
  3. 3. " The digital banking leaders also happen to be the leaders in security.
  4. 4. PIN/Password Policy Secure Networking App Shielding (RASP) Malwarelytics malware protection on Android Transaction Signing (SCA) Security Advisor
  5. 5. PSD2 Strong Customer Authentication Secure Standards for Communications Detecting Signs of Malware Infection Mobile Secure Execution Environment Transaction Risk Analysis Fraud Detection Systems Auditing and Documentation
  6. 6. Money Heist The same thing as always, but digital…
  7. 7. Current Mobile Threats Weak Activation After-Theft Attack Weak RuntimeMobile Malware
  8. 8. 1,2M+ App Samples 0,04% Malware 0,17% Highly Dangerous 1900+ Accessibility 22k+ Screen Override 5k+ SMS Access Mobile Malware
  9. 9. QRecorder(Q4/2018)
  10. 10. StrandHogghttps://www.youtube.com/watch?v=XtabRTVQT6Q
  11. 11. StrandHogghttps://www.youtube.com/watch?v=C7IB62jYf4o
  12. 12. Real App Fake App Mobile Malware
  13. 13. 4major malware attacks in Q1 €100k highest single client loss €500k total cost impact estimates in Q1 Mobile Malware Czech Republic, Q1/2019
  14. 14. Mobile Malware Cerberus Banker Trojan (1/3)
  15. 15. Mobile Malware Cerberus Banker Trojan (2/3)
  16. 16. Mobile Malware Cerberus Banker Trojan (3/3)
  17. 17. Mobile Malware EventBot targets users of over 200 different financial applications, including banking, money transfer services, and crypto-currency wallets.
  18. 18. Malwarelytics
  19. 19. Weak Activation Using an SMS OTP during a mobile app enrollment. Attackers use social engineering to trick users into confirming a new mobile banking activation on their own devices. After an attacker activates mobile banking, the bank account and the user's identity are fully compromised. Mobile app authentication is only as strong as the elements that were used during the activation process.
  20. 20. Weak Activation How to improve activation security? "Slow Channels" "Identity Aging"HW OTP
  21. 21. After-Theft Attack Weak PIN codes and passwords. 4-digit PIN = 10 000 combinations
  22. 22. After-Theft Attack Weak PIN codes and passwords. 11% of users choose "1234" Top 20 PIN codes can open over 25% of all devices. https://www.datagenetics.com/blog/september32012/
  23. 23. After-Theft Attack Weak PIN codes and passwords. Enforce strong PIN codes!→
  24. 24. After-Theft Attack What is a strong PIN code? 1234, 1111, 2222, 3333, …
  25. 25. After-Theft Attack What is a strong PIN code? 1234, 1111, 2222, 3333, … 2468, 1357, 1212, 1313, …
  26. 26. After-Theft Attack What is a strong PIN code? 1234, 1111, 2222, 3333, … 2468, 1357, 1212, 1313, … 1984, 2000, 1968, 1989, …
  27. 27. After-Theft Attack What is a strong PIN code? 2580
  28. 28. After-Theft Attack What is a strong PIN code? 2580 1 2 3 4 5 6 7 8 9 0 Patterns…
  29. 29. After-Theft Attack What is a strong PIN code? 3719 1379 9713 1937 1 2 3 4 5 6 7 8 9 0 Patterns… Patterns…
  30. 30. After-Theft Attack What is a strong PIN code? 6428 4628 6842 2846 1 2 3 4 5 6 7 8 9 0 Patterns… Patterns… Patterns everywhere!
  31. 31. After-Theft Attack What is a strong PIN code? The last safe PIN code! 8068
  32. 32. After-Theft Attack What is a strong PIN code? The last safe PIN code! 8068
  33. 33. Open-Source Freebie! https://github.com/wultra/passphrase-meter
  34. 34. After-Theft Attack Forensic cryptographic data extraction. Built-in security measures in mobile OS can be bypassed. PIN code or cryptographic keys can leak from the memory. Implement cryptography as a low- level C/C++ module with strict memory management. Uses HW backed key storage (SecureEnclave, StrongBox).
  35. 35. Weak Runtime Nothing is guaranteed on a jailbroken/rooted device… To mitigate risks related to compromised devices, implement RASP / App Shielding technology. Your app could have been: → modified by repackaging ("at rest") → modified after connecting a debugger ("at runtime") → modified by a fake system library (framework or native library injection) A ticking time bomb…
  36. 36. " Xposed is a framework for modules that can change the behavior of the system and apps without touching any APKs. That's great because it means that modules can work for different versions and even ROMs without any changes…
  37. 37. Weak Runtime On the system level, iOS and Android are equally secure… Dispelling The “Sufficiently Secure iOS” Myth and the Importance of App Shielding on iOS — by Tomáš Kypta https://bit.ly/3gan7V1
  38. 38. Current Mobile Threats Weak Activation After-Theft Attack Weak RuntimeMobile Malware
  39. 39. " The digital banking leaders also happen to be the leaders in security.
  40. 40. Consulting document "Principles of a Secure Mobile Banking on iOS and Android" — by Petr Dvořák
  41. 41. Thank You Petr Dvořák petr@wultra.com Any questions? Tereza Gagnon tereza.gagnon@wultra.com

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