Günter Oberdorster_How to assess the risks of nanotechnology?
Chris Groves_Is it all about risk learning the right lessons from gm for nanofoods
1. Is it all about risk?
Learning the right lessons
from GM for nanofoods
Dr Chris Groves
External Associate
BRASS, Cardiff University, UK
grovesc1@cf.ac.uk
Image from Friends of the Earth
2.
3. Nano-risk: a UK government view
UK Nanotech Strategy
stressed management of
risks over support for
benefits
Must ensure the public is
“informed and
confident about
nanotechnologies” (p.
2)
“reassured that
products on the
market are safe for
them to buy” (p. 9)
5. Who will put their „head over the
parapet‟?
Representative of a food industry body:
“It is very difficult for them to say anything. If they
don't say anything then people will think they are
doing it anyway and if they say well we are not going
to involve ourselves in this nanotechnology thing then
I don't believe that. With all these benefits of course
they are looking at it. [...]”
“I have companies that do not want us to use the
word nano, they are happy to join the focus group,
they are happy to join in things, but they just say “take
the word nano out, don't use it at all!”’
Source #6
6. Reducing the deficit
Classic deficit model of Kearnes and Wynne
science communication (2007)1: a model of
Public is scientifically
affective deficit
ignorant Public has lost trust in
science and technology
Ignorance breeds fear of
the unknown Information does not
affect emotion
must educate public
must appeal directly
…but is the public
to emotion
educable?
(“confidence”,
“enthusiasm”)
1. Kearnes, M. and B. Wynne (2007). "On nanotechnology and ambivalence: the politics of
enthusiasm." Nanoethics 1: 131-142.
8. Reputational risk
Contemporary salience of
reputational risk
Regulators need to be seen
to be precautionary
Businesses need to „keep
their heads down‟
Frames „stakeholders as
sources of threat to
legitimacy‟
Organisations „may be
over-responsive to public
concerns‟
9. Theoretical support
Cognitive science view of
cognitive biases
Public lacks
understanding of risk and
chance
NGOs
and/or governments
and/or corporations
and/or media
may encourage
overreaction to some risks
10. Lessons learnt from GM?
A new deficit model
The public is a risk (to reputation, to
innovation) & deep irrationality is the root
cause
Organisations need to encourage positive
affect, thus protecting reputations
Governments: act to restore „confidence‟, „be
seen to be precautionary‟
Companies: create exciting products and build
markets on enthusiasm
12. Learning other lessons
“ [...] we have learnt that it is
necessary with major technologies to
ensure that the debate takes place at
an early stage, as new areas emerge
in the scientific and technological
development process. This involves
engaging with the public and
understanding their aspirations
and concerns around science and
new technologies.”
UK Government (2005), Response to the
RS/RAEng report, p. 3
14. So what worries “the public”?
Four main areas of concern
1. naturalness: with respect to “Contrary to what scientists tend
e.g. food uses. to worry about, public fears about
technology risks are less about
2. access: will benefits be fairly risks directly attributable to a
distributed? technology than the social and
3. trust: will any unanticipated regulatory context in which
they are embedded.”
risks be handled responsibly?
Cobb, M. D. and Macoubrie, J. 2004.
Who is responsible?
Public perceptions about nanotechnology:
4. transparency: can experts be risks, benefits, and trust.
Journal of Nanoparticle Research 6(4), pp.
trusted to admit the limits of 395-405.
their knowledge about
potential hazards?
15. In a wider context...
Two key conclusions from a broad range of research1
Awareness of nanotech remains low
Nonetheless, attitudes generally positive or neutral across a
range of countries (USA, UK, EU, Japan, Korea)
Where nano-concerns exist, they are not
primarily about health and environmental risk
Instead, are rooted in social and political
context (lack of trust in business, worries
about transparency, etc.)
1 See e.g.
Evidence from other technology Gaskell, G., Ten Eyck, T., Jackson, J. &
Veltri, G. Imagining nanotechnology: Cultural
controversies support for technological innovation in
Europe and the United States. Public
GM, nuclear power, BSE etc. (Brian Wynne, Understanding of Science 14, 81–90 (2005).
Currall, S. C., King, E. B., Lane, N., Madera,
Sheila Jasanoff) J. & Turner, S. What drives public
acceptance of nanotechnology? Nature
Nanotechnology. 1, 153–155 (2006).
16. Contrasting lessons, contrasting
assumptions
“Public as risk” “Participatory publics”
Defensive Early/ongoing
reputational risk deliberative
management engagement
Irrationality – only „knee- Individuals already engaged
jerk‟ responses with technology – implicitly
Isolated consumers deliberative
Media as sole source of „Publics‟ not „public‟
info Draw on diverse sources of
information
17. Brittle or resilient innovation?
13-member expert panel
(industry associations,
nanoscience, social sciences,
NGOs, policymakers)
Four scenarios for nanotech in
the UK to 2020
Lack of public engagement
seen as potential obstacle to
innovation
Nanofood identified as
potential flashpoint
18. Extreme reactions?
“Biotechnology, like nanotechnology,
represents the ultimate stage in
increasing the power to exercise a more
total dominion [...] of man over nature,
Il Silvestre animals and other humans – [...] the
(Italy)
attack on life will assume new
proportions and open up
unimaginable scenarios”
Silvia Guerini, Il Silvestre, May 2006
I n d i v i d u a l s Te n d i n g
“The ever more rapid acceleration of this
To w a r d s S a v a g e r y
technology will lead to the creation of
(Individualidades tendiendo a lo nano-cyborgs that can self-replicate
salvaje, Mexico)
automatically without the help of a human”
Manifesto at http://liberaciontotal.lahaine.org/?p=3581
19. Thank you for your attention
grovesc1@cf.ac.uk
http://cardiff.academia.edu/ChristopherGroves
Notes de l'éditeur
This year saw in March the publication by the previous govt of a nanotech strategy for 2010-2014 published in March which was widely criticized on a number of grounds – one of the features of it which drew fire was how it covered the topic of public engagement. As some commentators noted (see here quote from Richard Jones), it made a marked contrast with the foregoing efforts by govt to promote upstream dialogue. Indeed, there was practically no mention of engagement at all.What happened?
Various critics of the strategy noted that there also, in general, seemed to be a heavy emphasis on the governance of risk, that the potential negative outcomes of nanotechnological applications were receiving more attention than the potential benefits.The strategy uses the word risk/risks 60 times – approx 3 times as often as either benefits or opportunities The document no doubt concentrated on how best to do precautionary regulation in a position of ongoing data gaps, including uncertainty about toxicological effects and so on.But this was felt to have led to a failure to provide a strategic response to fundamental issues regarding the funding of nanotechnology innovation.Richard Jones remark – from the same blog post I just quoted – reflected these concerns nicely: that you need to ensure that innovation exists in the first place in order to be in a position where people can have something to talk and deliberate about. Upstream public engagement was clearly inspired by the American program which aimed at understanding the ethical, legal, and social issues (ELSI) surrounding the Human Genome Project (National Human Genome Research Institute 2008). The British, however, brought in a participatory approach. This was based on three points of critique towards the American ELSI approach (cf. Wilsdon and Willis 2004; Macnaghten et al. 2005). First, the ELSI program was thought to be too expert-oriented (as Jasanoff also observes), and thus more diverse and plural forms of public knowledge should enter the debate on science. Second, ELSI research was “framed as being able to scrutinize only the impacts or effects of the technology rather than deeper social and political considerations” (Macnaghten et al. 2005, p. 6). It was argued that, besides the risk issue, more fundamental social issues around ownership, control and social ends, should be part of the debate. Third, advocates of upstream engagement also pointed at the lack of impact of ELSI research, and stressed that upstream activities should be linked back to the decision-making of scientists, industry, and policy makers.
it is necessary with major technologies to ensure that the debatetakes place at an early stage, as new areas emerge in the scientific and technological developmentprocess. This involves engaging with the public and understanding their aspirations and concernsaround science and new technologies.
What marks these reactions out is their ideological context: the unknown – what nanotechnology may become in the future – is interpreted against the backdrop of a set of ethical prejudgements regarding the inherent direction of technological societies as such.