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Consultants of Security Operations d.o.o. Sarajevo
Strong Authentication in Web Application
         “State of the Art 2012”


      Sylvain Maret / Digital Security Expert / OpenID Switzerland

                              @smaret
                      Version 1.01 / 22.11.2012
Who am I?
   •   Security Expert
        –   17 years of experience in ICT Security
        –   Principal Consultant at MARET Consulting
        –   Expert at Engineer School of Yverdon & Geneva University
        –   Swiss French Area delegate at OpenID Switzerland
        –   Co-founder Geneva Application Security Forum
        –   OWASP Member
        –   Author of the blog: la Citadelle Electronique
        –   http://ch.linkedin.com/in/smaret or @smaret
        –   http://www.slideshare.net/smaret


   •   Chosen field
        – AppSec & Digital Identity Security
22 per minute……
Protection of digital identities: a
topical issue…




                         Strong AuthN
RSA FAILED ?
«Digital identity is the cornerstone
of trust»




                 http://fr.wikipedia.org/wiki/Authentification_forte
Definition of strong authentication




          Strong Authentication on Wikipedia
Strong Authentication

 A new paradigm?
Which Strong Authentication
technology ?
OTP   PKI (HW)   Biometry
    Strong
 authentication
  Encryption

Digital signature

Non repudiation

Strong link with
    the user
Strong Authentication
      with PKI
PKI: Digital Certificate
                           Hardware Token (Crypto PKI)
                              Strong Authentication
   Software Certificate
     (PKCS#12;PFX)
SSL/TLS Mutual Authentication :
how does it work?
                                  Validation
      CRL                         Authority
        or
   OCSP Request

                      Valid
                      Invalid
                      Unknown




                    SSL / TLS Mutual Authentication
                                                      Alice
       Web Server
Strong Authentication with
Biometry (Match on Card
technology)
   • A reader
      – Biometry
      – SmartCard




   • A card with chip
      – Technology MOC
      – Crypto Processor
         • PC/SC
         • PKCS#11
         • Digital certificate X509
Strong Authentication


         With


(O)ne (T)ime (P)assword
(O)ne (T)ime (P)assword
   • OTP Time Based    • Others:
     – Like SecurID
                         –   OTP via SMS
   • OTP Event Based     –   OTP via email
                         –   Biometry and OTP
                         –   Phone
   • OTP Challenge
                         –   Bingo Card
     Response Based
                         –   Etc.
OTP T-B?
OTP E-B?
OTP C-R-B?


Crypto - 101
Crypto-101 / Time Based OTP
                           HASH Function


K=Secret Key / Seed

                                           OTP
 T=UTC Time




          ie = OTP(K,T) = Truncate(HMAC-SHA-1(K,T))
Crypto-101 / Event Based OTP

                           HASH Function

K=Secret Key / Seed


                                           OTP
  C = Counter




          ie = OTP(K,C) = Truncate(HMAC-SHA-1(K,C))
Crypto-101 / OTP Challenge
Response Based

                      HASH Function

K=Secret Key / Seed

                                        OTP
                                      Challenge
          nonce




                               ie:
Other[s] OTP technologies…



    OTP Via SMS




                    “Flicker code” Generator Software
                          that converts already
                           encrypted data into
                         optical screen animation
How to Store and
   Generate
my Secret Key ?

   A Token !
OTP Token: Software vs Hardware ?
Software OTP for Smartphone




      http://itunes.apple.com/us/app/iotp/id328973960
Where are[is] the seed ?
Seed generation & distribution ?
Still a good model ?
                       K1


   Threat                    Editor / Vendor
   Agent
   (APT)                     Secret Key are[is]
                            generated on promise




            K1                        K1
                                            K1
TokenCode
New Standards

     &
Open Source
Technologies accessible to
everyone 
   • Initiative for Open AuTHentication (OATH)
      –   HOTP
      –   TOTP
      –   OCRA
      –   Etc.


   • Mobile OTP
      – (Use MD5 …..)
Initiative for Open AuTHentication
(OATH)
   • HOTP
                                • Token Identifier
     – Event Based OTP
                                  Specification
     – RFC 4226

                                • IETF KeyProv Working
   • TOTP                         Group
     – Time Based OTP                – PSKC - Portable Symmetric
                                       Key Container, RFC 6030
     – Draft IETF Version 8
                                     – DSKPP - Dynamic
                                       Symmetric Key Provisioning
                                       Protocol, RFC 6063
   • OCRA
     – Challenge/Response OTP • And more !
     – Draft IETF Version 13
                              http://www.openauthentication.org/specifications
(R)isk

(B)ased

(A)uthentication
RBA (Risk-Based Authentication)
= Behavior Model
Use OATH-HOTP & TOTP
http://code.google.com/p/google-authenticator/
Integration with
web application
Web application: basic
authentication model
Web application: Strong
Authentication Implementation
Blueprint
“Shielding" approach: perimetric
authentication using Reverse
Proxy / WAF
Module/Agent-based approach
API/SDK based approach
ICAM:

a changing paradigm

on Strong Authentication
Federation of identity approach a
     change of paradigm:

using IDP for Authentication and
     Strong Authentication
Identity Provider
SAML, OpenID, etc
Strong Authentication
Strong Authentication and
Application Security


             &

   Application Security
Threat Modeling

“detecting web application

threats before coding”
Questions ?
Resources on Internet 1/2
    •   http://motp.sourceforge.net/
    •   http://www.clavid.ch/otp
    •   http://code.google.com/p/mod-authn-otp/
    •   http://www.multiotp.net/
    •   http://www.openauthentication.org/
    •   http://wiki.openid.net/
    •   http://www.citadelle-electronique.net/
    •   http://code.google.com/p/mod-authn-otp/
Resources on Internet 2/2
    •   http://rcdevs.com/products/openotp/
    •   https://github.com/adulau/paper-token
    •   http://www.yubico.com/yubikey
    •   http://code.google.com/p/mod-authn-otp/
    •   http://www.nongnu.org/oath-toolkit/
    •   http://www.nongnu.org/oath-toolkit/
    •   http://www.gpaterno.com/publications/2010/du
        blin_ossbarcamp_2010_otp_with_oss.pdf

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Strong Authentication State of the Art 2012 / Sarajevo CSO