Leading Tank Squadron commander of 1965 war dismissed the myth that Major General Sahibzada Yaqub Ali Khan was a great commander

1. Leading Tank Squadron
commander of 1965 war
dismissed the myth that
Major General Sahibzada
Yaqub Ali Khan was a
great commander
DOI: 10.13140/RG.2.2.33164.13447
A.H Amin
Colonel Sami commanded 24 Cavalrys leading squadron in India
Pakistan 1965 war.

2. In an interview spread in three parts Colonel Sami dismissed the
myth that Major General Sahibzada Yaqub Ali Khan was a great
commander as falsely asserted in Pakistan Armys official
quarters.
The comical high point of this myth came when Yaqub was
proclaimed as Pakistan Armys greatest strategist and a library of
Pakistans National Defence University named in his supposed
honour.
His contribution to strategy was such that Pakistan Army had no
strategic plan to counteract an Indian attack on East Pakistan as
my father discovered when he took over as GSO 1 Plans in
Military Operations Directorate of Pakistan Army.
Sami in the interview which can be heard on links below
described Sahibzada as a paper tiger who had little role in war.
Sami also described the FIASCO that was PAKISTANS 1ST
ARMOURED DIVISIONS ATTACK IN KHEM KARAN
SUMMARISED as :---
1. Samis commanding officer collapsed with a nervous break down
even before actual operations of 1965 war started.
2. Samis units squadrons did not lead in the order of march ordered
and Sami commanding depth squadron was forced to lead.

3. 3. The total confusion prevailing in the 1st
Armoured Division in
1965 War.

4. Army impressions
colonel Sami
https://anchor.fm/omnib
us-
dubitandum/episodes/A
rmy-impressions-
colonel-Sami-e3j01b
Pakistan armoured corps officer on
1965 war and main Pakistan Army
Tank attack-part 1
https://anchor.fm/omnibus-
dubitandum/episodes/Pakistan-
armoured-corps-officer-on-1965-
war-and-main-Pakistan-Army-Tank-
attack-part-1-e3itg4

5. Pakistan armoured corps officer
speaks on 1965 war—2
https://anchor.fm/omnibus-
dubitandum/episodes/Pakistan-
armoured-corps-officer-speaks-on-
1965-war2-e3ito1

6. (1) SAHIBZADA never commanded armoured division in 1965 war (2)
He avoided going to 1st Armd Div where his detailed armour plan was
being exercised in khem karan and was total disaster –

7. (3) He planned relief of phillora a DISASTOROUS operation which was
total FAILURE
(4) As deputy corps commander 1 Corps he caused immense confusion
changing ORBATS of 4 and 3 Armd Bdes under command 1 Corps--
The list is long –
His command in kashmir was also much exaggerated.
History of Pakistan
Army - Volume Two -
1948 to 1965 War: 1948
to end of 1965 War
https://www.amazon.com/History-Pakistan-Army-1948-
1965/dp/1546566309/ref=sr_1_4?dchild=1&keywords=HISTORY+OF+PAKISTAN+ARMY%2C+AGHA+H+A
MIN&qid=1595250219&sr=8-4

8. History of Pakistan
Army- Volume Three-
1965 War Analysed:
Analysis of 1965 War

9. https://www.amazon.com/History-Pakistan-Army-Three-
Analysed/dp/1546566376/ref=sr_1_3?dchild=1&keywords=HISTORY+OF+PAKISTAN+ARMY%2C+AGHA+
H+AMIN&qid=1595250270&sr=8-3
Battle of assal uttar 1999
The Battle of Lahore and Pakistans Main
Attack in 1965

10. The Battle for Ravi-Sutlej Corridor 1965
A Strategic and Operational Analysis
by
Agha.H.Amin
December 2001
This is part of one of the chapters of my book
Pakistan Army till 1965 published on 17
August 1999 and later summarised and
published as a journal article in December
2001

16. The Indian attack on Lahore in particular and Ravi-
Sutlej Corridor in general has remained the subject
of too much propaganda and too little analysis. On

17. Pakistani side the Battle for Lahore was seen as a
superhuman effort while on the Indian side it
exposed many glaring weaknesses in the Indian
Army at unit, brigade, divisional and corps level.
On the other hand the total failure of the main
Pakistani attack in Khem Karan was ignored or
forgotten in the smoke screen of glory created by
official propagandists who successfully shifted the
entire public attention on laurels of Aziz Bhatti etc.
Thus, many glaring failures like surrender of an
entire tank regiment on Pakistani side in Khem
Karan were overlooked. If Niranjan Parshad was
sacked on the Indian side no one realized that the
Pakistani GOC 1st Armoured Division survived
unceremonious dismissal simply because he was
close to the then army chief.
Unfortunately, instead of dispassionate analysis
the Battle for Lahore or Ravi-Sutlej Corridor as
one may call it was overclouded by tales of
heroism at individual and unit level on the
Pakistani side.On the Indian side, it led to various
drastic changes in high command and re-thinking

18. about unit employment. After the war, Indian High
Command spent a very large fortune on increasing
terrain friction by construction of spurs, bunds,
drains etc to ensure that something like a tank
thrust against their strategic line of communication
to Kashmir and Amritsar may never again take
place. In 1971, thus little activity took place in
Ravi-Sutlej Corridor and the emphasis shifted to
area south of Sutlej.
We will analyse the corps level battle in this article
in the Ravi-Sutlej Corridor in 1965 which involved
a total force of some five infantry divisions and one
armoured division and an independent armoured
brigade.
Orientation withthe battle area
The Ravi-Sutlej Corridor from the point where the
River Ravi finally enters Pakistan near BRB Syphon
north of Lahore till Kasur measures roughly
160,000 yards in frontage. The main Pakistani
town Lahore, a place which had immense strategic,
political as well as psychological significance for
Pakistan was located just 29 kilometres from the
border while the main Indian town Amritsar was

19. about 28 kilometres from the border. Khem-Karan,
a small Indian town which made many headlines in
the first four days of the war was located about 60
kilometres south west of Amritsar and 5 kilometres
to the border. Ravi, the river comprising the
northern boundary of the corridor was relatively
smaller than Sutlej, the river which formed the
southern boundary of the corridor and entered
Pakistan in the Sejhra Bulge, going into India again
for a few miles into Hussainiwala Headworks before
re-entering Pakistan again a few miles south of
Kasur, a small Pakistani town 5 kilometres from
the border.
Since there was no natural boundary between
India or Pakistan in this corridor, Pakistan had
constructed the BRBL (Bambanwalla Ravi Bedian
Link) Canal which the Indians referred to as
Ichhogil Canal. The BRBL canal ran from north to
south from Ravi in the north till Sutlej in the south,
after it entered the corridor passing through a
siphon on the Ravi from Sialkot District.
The canal was constructed in the 1950s with the
express purpose of serving as a defence

20. obstacle against a possible Indian attack on
Lahore. Its western banks were higher than its
eastern banks to provide good fields of fire and
observation for the defender and lined with
bunkers.
It was approximately five metres deep and 45
metres wide and was a “complete water obstacle”,
formidable in subcontinental terms where attack
across water obstacles was regarded as a
formidable and extremely difficult operation!1
The BRB running in a nearly ninety degree
direction flows 5 to 14 kilometres from the Indian
border. It has various branches which run from
east to west like the Lahore Branch, Kasur Branch.
All these branches ran from northeast to
southwest and thus no cause of any ground
friction for any attacker advancing from east to
west.
The BRB crossed the GT Road at Dograi a village

21. located on its east bank. The other obstacles in the
corridor were the Hudiara Drain, Rohi Nala and the
Nikasu Nala.
The first two could be crossed with minor engineer
effort or recce while the third required greater
engineer effort. Both Ravi and Sutlej were
complete water obstacles with width varying from
150 to 350 metres and were in near full flow in
the season. The fields of fire in the area were
limited from 300 yards to 1200 yards and the area
near the canals, their branches and the nalas were
boggy, limiting tank movement and requiring
careful reconnaissance.
The main roads in the area were the GT Road
linking Lahore with Amritsar and onwards to
Jullundhur and Ludhiana. Lahore-Harike Road
linking Lahore with Ferozepur-Ludhiana Road and
the Ferozpur Road linking Lahore with Ferozpur,
after passing through Kasur and crossing the Sutlej
over the Hussainiwala Headworks near Ferozpur.
The major bridges from where the BRB could be
crossed were at Dograi on the GT Road, Bhaini,

22. Malikpur, Bedian, Barki, Kasur etc. In addition,
there were various aquaducts and viaducts on the
BRB. The area had thick vegetation trees etc and
various crops specially sugar cane severely limited
fields of observation and fire.
Indian Plan

23. The Indian war plan was finalized on 9th August
1965.2 The plan envisaged a major attack in the
Ravi-Sutlej Corridor employing 11 Corps (4
Mountain Division, 7 Infantry Division and 15

24. Infantry Division) along three axis i.e 15 Infantry
Division on Amritsar-Lahore axis, 7 Infantry
Division on Khalra-Barki-Lahore axis and 4
Mountain Division on Khem Karan-Kasur axis.
Each division had two brigades while their third
brigade was held by the 11 Corps as reserve or for
other tasks. 29 Brigade (ex-7 Division) was
directly under corps headquarter and tasked to
defend the area opposite the Dera Baba Nanak
Enclave, Dharm Enclave and the Jassar Bridge.
The corps boundary of the 11 Corps extended
from Dera Baba Nanak (Included) some 56
Kilometre North of Amritsar in the north till the
north bank of Sutlej River in the south and
onwards till Ganganagar which was defended by 67
Infantry Brigade (three battalions) supported by 4
Independent Squadron (Sherman-75mm). The 2
Independent Armoured Brigade was the corps
reserve of 11 Corps.
It consisted of 3rd Cavalry (Centurions) and 8th
Light Cavalry (AMX-13). 15 Infantry Division had

25. 14 Scinde Horse (Shermans-76 mm), and 1st
Skinners Horse (Shermans) an additional regiment
which was on move on 6th September 1965 from
Benares to the frontline.
This unit joined the 15 Division only on 11th
September. The 7th Division’s integral armour unit
was the 21 Central India Horse (Sherman-75mm)
while the 4th Mountain Division (less 33 Mountain
Brigade deployed on Chinese border) had the 9
Deccan Horse (Sherman-76 mm).
In addition after 6th September the 7th Light
Cavalry (PT-76) equipped with fully amphibious
PT-76 tanks was moved to the corps area with
restrictions placed on the unit for utilization in only
highly sensitive missions because of conversion
and armour vulnerability reasons since the PT-
76 was newly inducted and had very thin armour
plates.
This brigade also had 1 Field Regiment (SP) and 1
Dogra (Lorry borne). In addition the corps also had
a reserve infantry brigade i.e 96 Infantry Brigade
(three infantry units) (ex-15 Division) initially

26. placed at Tarn Taran.
The reader may note that Joginder Singh claims
that at one point General Harbaksh Singh had
agreed to transfer 7 Division to 1 Indian Corps
involved in Operation Nepal opposite Chawinda but
the decision was changed on Joginder’s
remonstrances to the Indian Army chief. This if
done would have left a big gap in between Indian
15 and 4 Mountain Division.3
Each Indian division had an organic artillery
brigade known as divisional artillery in Pakistan. In
addition there was the 21 Independent
Artillery Brigade consisting of one medium and
one heavy regiment.
In addition the 11 Corps was also given three other
formations which were not in its area of operations
on 6th September 1965.
These were 41 Mountain Brigade (forced to move
to Akhnur after Grand Slam), 50 Para Brigade
which was on move from Agra to 11 Corps area on
6th September and the 23 Mountain Division which

27. was initially Indian Army Reserve and did not
arrive in the battle area and had no influence on
the conduct of operations till end of the war.
The reader may note that this formation was last
ordered to concentrate in area Dera Baba Nanak
by 26th September 19654 while ceasefire took
place on night 22/23rd September 1965.
In the strategic sense the prime Indian aim in 11
Corps area was to launch a thrust at Pakistani vital
centre of Lahore which would compel Pakistan to
“retain large portion of her reserves in that
Sector”.5
Another major strategic benefit that the Indians
visualised to derive from 11 Corps attack was
ensuring defence of Indian territory in Ravi-Sutlej
Corridor by utilising the BRB as a water obstacle.
The Indian planners had assessed that with all
territory from the border till BRBL in Indian hands
the Indian territory in Ravi-Sutlej Corridor was
secure against any Pakistani attack. This was so
since no water obstacle like BRB was available with
the Indians for the defence of their side of the
Ravi-Sutlej Corridor.

28. The reader may note that before the war if
Joginder Singh the Chief of Staff Western
Command is to be believed some people (Harbaksh
Singh) in the Indian Higher Command regarded
the Ravi-Sutlej Corridor as indefensible and were
in favour of taking a defensive position on the Beas
River.6
In classical strategic terms the Indian 11 Corps
attack was a “Thrust” defined by Andre Beaufre
as “Reach a vulnerable point in spite of opposition
of the enemy” and aimed at “Depriving the enemy
of his freedom of action by wearing him down”.7
In pure operational order terminology 11 Corps
tasks were:—8
Advance to the Ichogil Canal (BRBL) along the
axes GT Road, Bhikiwind-Khalra and Bhikiwind-
Khem Karan to capture Pakistani territory from
opposite Ranian inclusive to its junction with
Dipalpur Canal opposite Hussainiwala inclusive and
capture intact:—
a. GT Road Bridge over Ichogil Canal.

29. b. GT/Jallo Link Road Bridge. Barki Bridge over
Ichogil Canal.
c. Destroy any enemy which may enter the Punjab
and Ganga Nagar Sector in Rajhastan.
d. Simultaneously with point “a” above eliminate
Bridgehead in the area Dera Baba Nanak, and if
possible capture the bridge intact.
e. Finally on completion of task “a”, be prepared to
continue the advance to Lahore.
15 Division Plan
Translated into tangible terminology the above
mentioned objectives were to be acomplished by
commencing the advance of 15 Infantry Division in
two phases. In Phase One commencing on night
5/6 September with two brigades and one task
force.
54 Infantry Brigade (three battalions) of this
divison supported by a tank squadron (14 Scinde
Horse) and engineer field company was to
advance along GT Road after crossing the
international border at 0400 Hours 6th September

30. and capture two bridges on BRB at Jallo and
Dograi. Simultaneously, a battalion group task
force i.e 1 Jat (ex-38 Infantry Brigade) half tank
squadron (14 Scinde Horse), engineer field
company, under direct command of HQ 15
Division were to capture road bridge in area
Bhaini-Dhilwal.
In the second phase not before six hours after
0400 Hours 38 Infantry Brigade was to capture
area Bhasin and Dograic.
7 Division Plan
The 7 Infantry Division was also given a two phase
plan. In Phase one, it was to advance with one
infantry brigade (48 Brigade) supported by tank
squadron less one troop (21 Central India Horse)
advancing along axis Khalra-Barki capturing Barki
and securing the adjacent bridge over the Ichogil
Canal (BRBL) by last light 6th September.
Simultaneously and independent task force directly
under 7 Division Headquarter comprising 17 Rajput
and one tank troop (21 Central India Horse),

31. supported by a regiment strength of artillery and a
field company of engineers was to cross the border
at axis Wan-Bedian and secure Bedian by last light
6th September.
In Phase two, 65 Infantry Brigade was to carry out
mopping up operations along BRBL and also
destroy all bridges on BRBL within 7 Division area
of responsibility.
4 Mountain Division Plan
4 Mountain Division comprising two infantry
brigades and one tank regiment (9 Deccan Horse)
was the southern most division of the advancing
force. It was tasked to secure Pakistani territory
upto Ichhogil Canal which in this area was just
about 4 kilometres from the Indian border,
destroying bridge over Ichhogil Canal over road
Khem Karan-Kasur and to occupy a defensive
sector to contain possible Pakistani offensive
consisting of an armoured division and two infantry
brigades.

32. This division was also assigned the support of 2
Indian Independent Armoured Brigade on priority.
The reader may note that initially the Indian
planners had correctly assessed that Pakistani 1st
Armoured Division may be employed in this sector.
However, once Pakistan’s 7th Infantry Division the
sister division of the 1st Armoured Division had
moved into Gujrat area the Indian Intelligence
equally incompetent like their Pakistani
counterparts had by September assessed that the
Pakistani 1st Armoured Division was in Wazirabad
area!9
Thus the 11 Corps was in a relaxed mood and had
no clue that the Pakistani 1st Armoured Division
was dispersed in Changa Manga Forest area about
to commence an attack which in leading Indian
military analyst Ravi Rikhyes word had the
potential to be India’s Fourth Battle of Panipat.
Pakistani Plan 10 Division Plan
The Pakistani plan in this corridor had two different
dimensions. One was the defence of Lahore the
prime Pakistani defensive consideration. The
second was the main Pakistani attack originating

33. from Kasur aimed at severing the entire Indian 11
Corps line of communication. There were three
Pakistani divisions in the corridor.
The 10 Division responsible for defence of Lahore
from BRB Syphon till Bedian in the south a
frontage of approximately 60,000 yards.10 The
newly raised 11 Division responsible for defence of
the area from Bedian till and including
Hussainiwala Headworks, a total frontage of
some 100,000 yards11 in gunner terminology!
The 10 Division had three infantry brigades, two of
which were deployed in defensive role and one
along with a tank regiment (23 Cavalry), two
infantry battalions, a field artillery regiment in
direct support and an R & S Company was
designated as the Division Strike Force
responsible for counterattacks.
Before the war this brigade had been trained to
carry out counterattacks to destroy any enemy
penetration west of BRBL.
The reader may note that 23 Cavalry had one M-
47 Squadron while the remaining two squadrons

34. were equipped with Shermans.12 The TDU
regiments were also equipped with Shermans.
114 Brigade was responsible for defence of Ravi
Syphon through Bhaini Bridge till and including the
main GT Road at Wagah. It had three infantry
battalions, an R & S Company less one platoon, a
TDU tank squadron (30 TDU) and was directly
supported by a field artillery regiment. The main
defensive positions of the brigade were on the
BRBL.
103 Brigade was responsible for defence of area
excluding GT Road till Bedian. It had two infantry
battalions, a TDU tank squadron (30 TDU), an R &
S Company less a platoon, and a field artillery
regiment in direct support.
The 10 Divisional artillery’s strong point and one
which gave it a marked advantage over the
Indians, was in possession of 30 Heavy Regiment
consisting of latest US eight 155 mm guns and
four 8 inch Howitzers. In addition, the division had
three medium regiments supporting three infantry
brigades, a medium regiment and two locating
batteries.

35. 11 Division Plan
The 11 Division was raised in 1965 around May
1965.13 It consisted of three infantry brigades i.e
21 Brigade, (two battalions), 52 Brigade (three
battalions) and 106 Brigad(two battalions).
In addition it had two tank regiments (15 Lancers
and 32 TDU). The division had two roles i.e
defending the line of BRB and also providing a
bridgehead to the main Pakistani attack force i.e
the 1st Armoured Division. Its artillery consisted of
three field regiments, one mortar troop,one
medium regiment, one heavy regiment (eight 8
inch Howitzers and four 115 mm guns) and most
valuable a corps locating regiment.
The dual operational task of the 11 Division was
defence of Kasur, destroy enemy advance on axis
Ferozpur-Kasur and Khem Karan-Kasur, capture
Pakistani side of Hussainiwala enclave and destroy
all enemy likely water crossings in the divisional
area. Its offensive role was to be prepared to
secure a bridgehead across the Rohi Nala for the
1st Armoured Division.

36. In this task the division was to secure general line
Patti-Harike inclusive of bridge over Harike and
Bhikkiwind on axis Lahore-Harike. In the Phase
two, the division was to get the 5 Armoured
Brigade to capture Jandiala Guru Bridge over the
Beas River.14
Conversely, if the GHQ decided to launch the whole
of 1st Armoured Division in conjunction with 11
Division, 11 Division was then to provide a firm
base to facilitate operations of 1st Armoured
Division.
In this eventuality the 5 Armoured Brigade was to
revert to under command 1st Armoured
Division.15
Lately, Major General Naseerullah Babar in an
interview conducted by this scribe for the Defence
Journal claimed that the originator of this offensive
plan was Major General Altaf Qadir.16
1st Armored Division Plan
As per the initial war plans of the Pakistani
GHQ Headquarter, 1 Corps was supposed to
control the operations of 8 Division, 15 Division,

37. 10 Division, 11 Division and 1st Armoured Division.
Humanly speaking, this was an impossible task and
a tribute to Ayub and Musa’s grasp of strategic
and organisational depth or lack of it! Even the
officially sponsored historian Shaukat Riza
admitted “nothing could be farther away from
intention or capability of HQ 1 Corps” .17

38. The reader may, note that the 1st Armoured
Divisions prime task was to function as a reserve
for the Ravi-Sutlej Corridor along with 7 Infantry
Division.

39. However, later on the 7 Division was diverted to
Operation Grand Slam North of Chenab River.18
The first armoured division as it stood in 1965 was
one of the finest armoured formations that the sub
continent had seen till 1965.
To be precise in the words of Gul Hassan the last
C-in-C of the Pakistan Army and the then Director
Military Operations in 1965, the 1st Armoured
Division was the “best equipped division that we
fielded and far superior to any armour formation
the Indians had”19
In September 1965, the 1st Armoured Division
consisted of three armoured brigades (3rd, 4th and
5th) each with two tank regiments and one APC
borne (Armoured Personnel Carrier) mechanised
infantry battalions.
In addition the division had a recce regiment and
the normal divisional artillery component of three
self propelled (tracked) artillery regiments, one
medium regiment, one self-propelled (tracked)
Light Anti Aircraft Regiment. In addition there was
the usual component of engineer signal and other

40. supporting arm and service battalions.
On 1st September 1965, Headquarter 1 Corps still
in command of 1st Armoured Division and still
retaining some mental equilibrium which it was
soon to lose from 6th September 1965 issued its
grand operational instruction to the 1st Armoured
Division:—
“1st Armoured Division on orders from GHQ was
required to debouch from a bridgehead
provided by 11 Division and to cut Grand Trunk
Road in area Jullundhur”!20
In other words, 1 Corps Headquarter was assigning
the 1st Armoured Division an objective some 100
miles inside India and one which required crossing
of one major river !
As per this instruction the 5 Armoured Brigade was
initially placed under command 11 Division for
establishment of bridgehead.21
The initial 1st Armoured Division plan is illustrated
on the adjoining map. It envisaged an advance by

41. 3rd Armoured Brigade along Sobraon Branch to
secure the Beas Bridge, a distance of 60 miles, an
advance by the 4 Armoured Brigade along Kasur
Branch to Jandiala Guru on Grand Trunk Road east
of Amritsar, a distance of some 50 miles. 5
Armoured Brigade was to revert to command of
1st Armoured Division in the breakout phase and
act as reserve.22
If 1st Armoured Division succeeded in
accomplishing the above mentioned tasks this
would have meant that complete Indian 11 Corps
was encircled and forced to either surrender or
withdraw northwards towards Pathankot.
In the process the Indians would have forced to
sue for ceasefire and would have lost all territory
including crucial cities like Amritsar till the Beas
River. This is why Ravi Rikhye called it a possible
fourth battle of Panipat for India.
Conduct of Battle
On 4th September at precisely 2230 Hours the
Pakistani GHQ sent a signal to all formations which
asked them to take “necessary defensive

42. measures” against India. War had not yet broken
out but Pakistan had already launched an infantry
division/armoured brigade size attack in Indian
Held Kashmir from 1st September. The signal
whose language was described by Shaukat Riza as
“not peremptory”23 read as following:--
Pak
Army DTE Sept 042230 E
Latest Intelligence reports indicate Indian
concentration on both East and West Pakistan and
such flash announcements on All India Radio as
QUOTE Pakistanis attacking Jammu etc. UNQUOTE
indicate their aggressive intention, formations will
take necessary defensive measures (.) All
Informed
Gul Hassan states that there was no ambiguity in
this signal and that all formations took immediate
action on it barring 10 Division in Lahore. This in
view of Gul Hassan was a clear case of
complacency.24
10 Division area

43. All that 10 Division did on receipt of the above
mentioned signal was to warn forward troops to
exercise greater vigilance and ordered troops to
move into defensive positions on night 5th and 6th
September.25 Gul’s assertion is confirmed by
Shaukat Riza who states that GOC 10 Division on
4th September brushed aside Commander 114
Brigades suggestion to move into defences but
later relented and ordered move to defensive
positions during night 5/6 September 1965 on the
morning of 5th September.26

46. THE BRB CANAL WAS MOST DECISIVE IN STOPPING THE INDIAN
ATTACK ON LAHORE.IT WAS WHAT THE ENGLISH CHANNEL WAS TO
THE GERMANS IN 1940
Shaukat did not give any reason in his book in
which he repeatedly praised Ayub and Musa as to
why the Pakistan Army had so non-military in the
language of it signals while stating that the 10
Division was not in full deployment because of the
GHQ!27 Even the Indian armour historian noted

47. that “for some unaccountable reason the 114
Brigade was not in its defences when the Indian
attack came on the morning of 6th September “.28
The two forward brigades of the 10 Division were
occupying their positions when the Indian attack
commenced at 0400 Hours 6th September 1965. 3
Jat the leading battalion of the 54 Indian Brigade
reached the BRB bridge near Dograi which had
been destroyed by the Pakistani defenders.
The Indians claim that two companies of this
battalion crossed the BRB walking over the
partially destroyed debris of the bridge and
occupied Batapur for sometime but were forced to
withdraw since the Indian 54 Brigade/15 Division
did not reinforce it.29 The reader may note that in
this case the weakest link in the whole affair was
not the Indian soldier or 3 Jat but the Indian 54
Brigade Commander and GOC 15 Division who did
not respond to CO 3 Jat’s repeated requests for
reinforcements!
The claim of 3 Jat having crossed the BRBL,
however, is denied by Major General Tajammul

48. Hussain Malik who was then defending that area as
Commanding Officer 3rd Baluch.30
Lieutenant Colonel Tajammul Hussain Malik commanding 3rd Baluch
played the most decisive role in repelling main Indian attack on Lahore

49. In the final analysis 54 Brigade accomplished little
except 3 Jat’s singular accomplishment of
contacting the BRBL opposite Batapur.
1 Jat Group similarly performed miserably. It failed
to reach the BRBL and was repulsed by the
combined effect of artillery fire and left forward
battalion of the 114 Brigade. It panicked and
dispersed back to the Indian side of the border by
mid-day.31 It was replaced by 6 Kumaon along
with two tank troops which deployed at Ranian.32

50. The 38 Infantry Brigade of the 15 Division also
advanced very slowly at H + 6 and according to
Harbaksh’s narrative had just advanced within
2000 yards of the BRBL by 2200 Hours 6th

51. September.33
By 1300 Hours 6th September GOC 15 Indian
Division Niranjan Parshad reported that the
situation in his sector was serious on account of
high casualties and no further offensive action was
possible! On hearing this report, Harbaksh Singh
accompanied by Commander 11 Corps personally
visited 15 Division battle area and found that
“the situation had been grossly exaggerated and
the fighting potential of the formation were in no
way impaired — only the GOC had failed to
measure upto certain local reverses, inevitable in
any battle”. Harbaksh found the GOC 15 Division
“drained of all will and vision ...his attitude was
passively negative and there was the unmistakable
air of the defeatist about him. He stated his
inability to undertake any further offensive action
on the plea that his formation had lost all capacity
for operations”.34
On 7th September afternoon GOC 15 Division while
on the way to visit 38 Brigade towards Bhasin was

52. ambushed35 by 18 Baluch.
The GOC escaped but his jeep was captured and is
still retained by 18 Baluch (now 3 Sind) as a war
trophy.

53. Harbaksh Singh sacked GOC 15 Division on 7th
September and Major General Mohinder Singh
succeeded Niranjan Parshad as the new GOC 15
Division on night 7/8 September 1965.36

54. On night 7/8 September 38 Brigade based in Pul
Kanjri area attempted to capture Bhasin but failed.
54 Brigade on Jallo and Dograi villages with a
battalion each also failed on night 7/8 September.
Meanwhile, the Pakistani GOC 10 Division ordered
a counterattack to put 15 Division on the
defensive. The Divisional Strike Force 22 Brigade
was given orders to attack Indians east of BRB,
something which they had not practiced in pre-war
training manoeuvres.
The 22 Brigade crossed the BRB at Maqboolpur
Syphon with 23 Cavalry leading, Brigadier Qayyum
Sher37, captured area Bhaini by 0830 Hours 8th
September and had cut the GT Road at Milestone
13 in Dograi area by 1330 Hours.

57. This audacious counterattack threw the Indian 15
Division into utter confusion. Harbaksh Singh
states that two Indian units 13 Punjab and 15

58. Dogra in Dograi area broke the line and abandoned
their defences.38
The battalions were later goaded, rallied and
brought back to the defences. This forced 11
Indian Corps to reinforce the area with their

59. reserve brigade i.e 96 Infantry Brigade which was
now deployed immediately behind 54 Brigade in
depth in the Hudiara Drain area.
The 22 Brigade Force was too weak to stay in
Dograi area. Therefore, it withdrew back to the
west bank of the BRB after executing their
counter-attack.
On 10th September 1965, 1 Jat and 6 Kumaon
again abandoned Ranian area39 in face of alleged
heavy artillery, tank and infantry small arms fire.
This produced another crisis in the 11 Corps. The
right flank of the Indian 11 Corps was exposed and
Amritsar could be threatened from this direction.
This produced an operational crisis of
magnanimous proportions in the 11 Indian Corps
Headquarter. To plug this gap, 96 Infantry Brigade
was rushed forward to Ranian area and its position
at the Hudiara Drain as the reserve brigade was
taken over by the 50 Para Brigade.
Meanwhile, the 7 Indian Division performed
better.
It crossed the international border at 0530 Hours

60. 6th September with 48 Brigade in lead and
secured the Hudiara Drain defended by a company
size advanced position by an outflanking
manoeuvre from the left. 65 Brigade commenced
the advance from Hudiara Drain onwards towards
Barki and contaced the BRB opposite Barki which
was held in strength by elements of a unit of 103
Brigade.
Barki defended by a company of 17 Punjab and a
company of 12 Punjab was captured by the 7
Division employing one battalion (4 Sikh)
supported by Central India Horse less two
squadrons on night 10th/11th September.
Major Aziz Bhatti who was later awarded the
Nishan-I-Haidar was the 17 Punjab Company
Commander at Barki and survived this action.
He was killed by enemy shelling on 11th
September on the west bank of the BRBL the next
day.40
The Indian Commanding Officer of Central India
Horse Lt Col Joshi who was leading from the front

61. was mortally wounded once his jeep was blown up
by an anti-tank mine and died on 12th
September.41
17 Rajput advanced successfully till the BRBL on
6th September 1965 but failed to capture the
Bedian bridge since the Pakistani battalion
defending the area inundated the area. Nothing
significant took place in this sector till ceasefire.
The last significant event which took place in the
10 Division area was the recapture of Dograi by
the Indians. Dograi on the east bank of the BRBL
was defended by the 16 Punjab.

62. It was attacked by two infantry battalions
supported by a squadron plus of tanks and
captured by a multi-directional night attack on
night 21/22 September 1965. The village had little

63. strategic significance specially when compared with
the casualties suffered by both the attackers and
defenders who were involved in the Dograi battle.
11 Division area
4 Mountain Division attacked the 11 Division area
on 6th September 1965. The attack was on too
wide a front and too diluted to make any impact.
The Indians were overconfident in this sector since
they thought that Pakistan’s 1st Armoured Division
was in Wazeirabad as earlier discussed. Ballanwalla
a small village and securing all area upto the east
bank of the BRBL from area opposite Rajoke till
opposite Kasur was the main Indian objective in
the area.
The Indians had planned a two brigade attack
(they only had two brigades in this division) with 7
Mountain Brigade (two battalions supported by a
tank squadron) going in the north and 62 Mountain
Brigade (three battalions and a company
supported by a tank squadron), in the South while
1/9 Gurkha along with Deccan Horse less two
squadrons was the Divisional Reserve.

64. At mid-day Pakistan’s 52 Brigade mainly 7 Punjab
supported by tanks and well directed artillery
fire launched a determined counterattack on the
62 Brigade.

65. Harbaksh Singh notes that “the 13 Dogra gave
away and broke the line”.42 13 Dogra was the left
forward attacking battalion of the 62 Brigade and
its bolting away disoriented the whole Indian
attack.

66. Similarly, the 7 Mountain Brigade opposite
Ballanwalla was thrown back by artillery fire and
the small arms fire of the 106 Brigade units.

67. The Indian Armour historian claims that “Pattons
unexpectedly appeared east of the canal through
a viaduct located 500 metres south of the road
bridge”43 (Khem Karan-Kasur on the BRBL).
However, Shaukat Riza has made no mention
about this either because of anti-armour bias or
because he wanted to unduly project the 52
Brigade.
K.C Praval notes that 9 Jammu and Kashmir right
forward attacking battalion of the 62 Mountain
Brigade became so demoralized by the combined
effect of 52 Brigade attack and artillery/tank fire
that it retreated as far back as Valtoha !
Another significant affair in the 11 Division battle
area was the moverment of the 21 Brigade its
reserve brigade. Initially, on 5th September the
brigade was ordered to be ready to move north
and moved north towards Bhimbhar at 0430 Hours
6th September.
Later the move was countermanded and the
brigade reverted to command 11 Division whose

68. area it reached on around 0200 Hours 7th
September!44
1st Armoured Division/11 Division Attack
Since this article is devoted to the overall battle in
Ravi-Sutlej Corridor the 1st Armoured Division
attack will be covered in brief.
The Pakistani Attack plan from Lieutenant General Mahmuds book
which a serving three star general states was actually command and
staff college Quettas teaching handbook and was a common effort of
command and staff college Quetta
At 1430 Hours 6th September, 2 FF (reserve
battalion of 52 Brigade) was ordered by 11
Division Headquarter to capture a bridgehead
across the Rohi Nala by first light 7th September.

69. Similarly the 5 Armoured Brigade which was
placed under command 11 Division on 5th
September was ordered on 5th September to

70. secure “line Bhikkiwind-Patti as soon as
possible”.45
Major Dost Mohammad Utras tank fell in the BRB during the crossing
and he drowned in the BRB

71. The 2 FF launched its attack astride road Khem
Karan-Kasur across the Rohi Nala at 1930 Hours
6th September 1965 and by 2130 Hours secured
a bridgehead across the Rohi Nala.46 6 Lancers
the leading regiment of 5 Armoured Brigade was to
cross the Rohi Nala.
The bridge over Rohi Nala was completed by 1130
Hours but since its exit ramp was too steep the
first tank of 6 Lancers crossed it at 1300 Hours 7th
September.47
After one squadron of 6 Lancers had crossed the
Rohi Nala at 1600 hours one tank got stuck and
blocked the Rohi Nala bridge. At this time there
were ten tanks across the Rohi Nala and about a
company strength of 1 FF.
Colonel Sahibzad Gul, CO 6 Lancers made some
forward movement putting some Indians in front
on the run shooting three Indian tanks and
capturing about 25 prisoners.

72. 1st ArmouredDivision Attack
The 1st Armoured Division was involved in the
main battle from 6th September when 5 Armoured
Brigade was placed under command 11 Division.
The 5 Armoured Brigade attack was to commence
at 0500 Hours on 7th September, however, it was
delayed to 1130 Hours because of delay in bridge
construction on Rohi Nala which was within
Pakistani territory.
Gul Hassan the then DMO later claimed in his
memoirs that a bridge was not required since the
Rohi Nala was fordable but did not explain what he
had done as DMO to bring this point in any pre-war
planning discussion ! By evening 1600 Hours only
about a tank squadron strength of the 6 Lancers
leading unit of 5 Armoured Brigade had crossed
the Rohi Nala since one of its tanks had got stuck
on the Rohi Nala Bridge.
Thus 7th September was lost with just ten tanks
across the Rohi Nala. All this was happening at a
time when the situation in 4 Mountain Division as

73. per Harbaksh Singh was so serious that ‘out of six
battalions two and half had left the line and the
remaining three and half were under severe enemy
pressure”.
Harbaksh states that it was under these
circumstances that GOC 4 Mountain Division
sought permission from GOC 11 Corps to withdraw
and take a position at Assal Uttar in the rear.48
Harbaksh states that early in the morning of 8th
September he received a handwritten letter from
GOC 11 Corps recommending that four infantry
units i.e 18 Rajputana, 7 Grenadier, 9 J & K, AND
13 Dogra be disbanded and that another infantry
division should replace 4 Mountain Division.49

75. At this stage Harbaksh had no reserves and
exhorted GOC 4 Mountain Division and GOC 11
Corps to be more resolute.
While all this was happening Brig Bashir
commander 5 Armoured Brigade was throwing to
winds Pakistan’s Armour superiority by dividing his
brigade into two directions with 24 Cavalry to
advance along axis Khem Karan-Bhikiwind and 6
Lancers towards Valtoha Railway Station.

76. Naik Abdul Hameed , played a crucial role in repelling Pakistani tank attack on 2 Mountain Division
and was awarded Indias highest military award Param Vir Chakra
24 Cavalry contacted defences of 4 Mountain

77. Division and tried to develop the situation from the
west but failed because of lack of infantry support
and timely arrival of 3rd Cavalry (Centurions)
which reached the 4 Mountain Division area after
mid-day.

78. 6 Lancers reached Valtoha Railway Station but was
recalled after last light back to Khem Karan by
Brigadier Bashir to leaguer in line with the old

79. British practice which in this scenario was not
required.50

80. By 9th September when the Pakistani armour once
again commenced advance the Indian armour was
well poistioned with 3rd Cavalry Centurions
plugging flanks which could have enabled 5
Armoured Brigade to get into rear of 4
Mountain Divisioon 8th September.

81. The critical time span was over. The ancient
Greeks used to say that the Goddess of Victory
favours those who are bold. Boldness was sadly
missing in 5 Armoured Brigade less Sahibzad Gul
the only tank commander who wanted to lead and
fight from the front.

82. oured Brigade recommenced advance from its
leaguers near Khem Karan, 6 Lancers was greeted
by Centurion fire of 3rd Cavalry while 24 Cavalry
also made nominal progress.

83. Indian
Centurions of 3rd Cavalry in defensive position
To compound things further Sahibzad Gul the only
man in the whole senior lot was killed on 9th
September near Valtoha.

84. This indomitable man was only given an SJ since
he was not from the more pampered regiments of
the then Pakistan Army!

87. By 10th September the Indians were well poised to
meet any outflanking attack.

88. They had taken a horse shoe position with about
three tank regiments, one in 4 Mountain Division

89. defences, another less one squadron in Valtoha
area and the third and the most formidable in
technical terms i.e the 3rd Cavalry covering the
western deep flank of the 4 Mountain Division.
Naseer now launched 4 Cavalry into this valley of
death. The result was catastrophic. 4 Cavalry got
bogged down and was forced to surrender. The
Indians claimed that they captured all tanks of the
unit, the Commanding Officer and 12 officers
including six majors and several other ranks.51

90. Shaukat Riza states that “some tank crew of 4
Cavalry trickled into HQ 4 Armoured Brigade.They
reported that the regiment had been taken
prisoner...at the end of the day 4 Cavalry reported

91. 4 Officers and 25 Other Ranks missing and a total
of ten killed. Almost all the tanks had been lost”.52
The layman reader should not get shocked.In tank
warfare such things happen. In WW two an
illustrious British tank unit 8th Hussars along with
4 Armoured Brigade was captured by the
Germans.53

92. Captured tanks of Pakistans 4 Cavalry

93. The fault in 4 Cavalry fiasco was not of the unit but
its CO and GOC 1st Armoured Division.
Indian armour historian admits that 4 Cavalry
fought well but ran out of fuel because of poor
planning and was caught in a well laid ambush.
Thus ended an offensive which had the potential to
knock the Indian Army out of the war. The 3rd
Armoured Brigade was never employed and from
11th September the 1st Armoured Division less 5
Armoured Brigade and 4 Cavalry which was totally
written off was despatched to Chawinda.

94. The Indians launched some very fool hardy frontal
attacks on 11 Division from 11th September till
22nd September. All were repulsed since surprise
had been lost and defence keeping in view terrain
and relative strength was the superior form of war.
Analysis
Level of strategic success
On the strategic level the Indians failed in their
prime aim i.e in compelling Pakistan to “retain
large portion of her reserves in that Sector” i.e
Ravi-Sutlej Corridor.
The Pakistani 1st Armoured Division successfully
disengaged from Khem Karan and was redeployed
opposite Chawinda. The Pakistanis thus defended
Lahore successfully with existing formations except
5 Armoured Brigade whose one tank regiment (4
Cavalry) was completely lost, having been
captured by Indians while two (6 Lancers and 24
Cavalry) suffered serious losses.
Thus at ceasefire in strategic terms the Pakistani
position opposite Chawinda was far superior. It is

95. another thing that Ayub and Musa lacked strategic
resolution to launch Operation Wind Up which had
the potential of bagging two Indian Infantry
divisions in Chawinda area.
Element of Surprise
Both the sides started with the element of surprise,
the Indians having achieved surprise opposite
Lahore and Pakistan having achieved complete
strategic surprise opposite Khem Karan.
Ironically the Intelligence agencies of both sides
were a complete negation of the “Two Nation
Theory” in terms of comparative levels of ‘grey
matter’, keeping in view the fact that both
miserably failed to detect the location of each
other’s armoured division till the last minute!
Employment of Armour
The conduct of 5 Armoured Brigade on 7th, 8th
and 9th September was the most crucial aspect of
the battle. Commander 5 Armoured Brigade totally
failed in his job.
His initial orders divided his brigade into three

96. directions, with 6 Lancers going towards the right
and 24 Cavalry going in the centre and left.
Had he kept his two tank regiments concentrated
in any one direction with a squadron on the main
Khem Karan-Bhikiwind axis the Pakistanis would
have outflanked the 4th Mountain Division on the
8th September.
This would have enabled GOC 1st Armoured
Division to pump in the 4th Armoured Brigade to
reinforce the success of the 5th Armoured Brigade
with the 4th Armoured Brigade while still retaining
3rd Armoured Brigade for the final push to the
Beas River Bridge.
By 9th September the Indians were well poised to
defeat any outflanking move and the “critical time
span” i.e had run out for the Pakistanis.
In every battle, campaign and a war there are/is
one or more period/s when one side is greatly
exposed to the risk of being decisively defeated,
due to material factors or psychological factors like
perception of the opposing commander that his

97. cause is doomed, with the other side being
possibly aware of it or not.54
Superior decision making means the ability or
talent to identify the critical time span and
seize it relentlessly! Brigadier Basheer failed
in it on 7th, 8th and 9th September!
Alas, the truth in Schillers saying “what is lost in a
moment is lost for eternity”.
The current of history now started moving in the
reverse direction and Pakistan Army paid a very
heavy price for the failure at Khem Karan six years
later in 1971!
Chances ofStrategic Success
At the strategic level the plan was excellent. It was
in planning and at operational level that it failed.
Even Indian military writers like K.C Praval
admitted that the plan was “well conceived”...”that
the advance throughout would be along the grain
of the country and no water obstacles would have
to be crossed”...and that “Pakistani armour had

98. the capability for the thrust but the plan failed due
to inept execution”.55
Harbaksh Singh admitted that “it was a simple but
foolproof plan” and that “only the 4 Mountain
Division stood in its way”.
Gurcharan Singh Sandhu the tank corps historian
also admitted that
“The loss of any bridge over the Beas was expected to
pose such a serious threat to Delhi that the rest of the
Indian Army would be forced to contain it rather than
make an attempt to rescue the stranded XI Corps”.56
In Clausewitzian terms the strategic plan
decides “when, where and with what forces”
the battle is to be delivered.57 Again in the
light of Clausewitz’s teachings, one of the
principal objects of strategy is “always to be
strong, first generally and then at the
decisive point”.58
In this regard, strategy placed at Naseer’s
disposal an initial superiority at the decisive

99. point of about 7 to 1 but he failed to translate
it into success because he and his 5
Armoured Brigade Commander were
incompetent and the men who handpicked
them based on personal likes were worse!
After all Naseer was Musa’s handpicked choice. The
fault was not that he was a non-armour officer as
Gul Hassan fallaciously alleges but simply that
Naseer was incompetent! After all, Ibrar who did
far better was also an infantry man. Rommel was
an infantry man. Macarthur, Lee and Meade were
from Corps of Engineers!
The greatness of the German General Staff as this
scribe stated in an article written in 1994 was not
that it produced a Manstein but that it discovered a
Manstein and allowed a Manstein to reach the
highest ranks!59 It was here that the Indo-Pak
Armies failed. They are simply a conspiracy against
originality and boldness!
If successful the 1st Armoured Division attack had
great chances of success.Indian GOC Western
Command Harbaksh Singh frankly admitted that

100. “A Blitzkrieg deep into our territory towards the GT
Road or the Beas Bridge would have found us in a
helpless position of a commander paralysed into
inaction for want of readily available reserves while the
enemy was inexorably pushing deep into his vitals.It is
a nightmarish feeling even when considered into
retrospect at this stage.” 60
The BRB Canal as the key to the battle
It may sound unheroic and unromantic but the
BRBL proved the English Channel that saved
Pakistan’s strategic position in the crucial Ravi-
Sutlej Corridor.
This man made obstacle severely restricted the
Indian freedom of manoeuvre and nullified their
relative superiority in infantry. The canal acted as
the anvil vis-a-vis Pakistani artillery fire, tank fire
and infantry small arms fire which played the role
of hammer which crushed the Indians inflicting
heavy casualties on them.
Without BRB there is no doubt that nothing could
have stopped the indians from entering Lahore on

101. 6th September. Similarly, without BRB the 1st
Armoured Division could not have as easily
disengaged from the Khem Karan battle as it did.
Conversely, the BRB also slowed down the
induction of the 1st Armoured Division into the
bridgehead but this was less because of the BRB
and more due to incompetence in Pakistani
planners at GHQ (DMO), corps and divisional level.
Musa admitted BRBL’s role, once he stated that
Pakistani plan was based on making use of the
BRB canal which to a great extent compensated for
disparity in resources and enabled Pakistani
formations in the Ravi-Sutlej Corridor to deploy on
“very extended frontages”. 61
Indecision,Vaccillation and Procrastination in
the Pakistani GHQ
The Pakistani GHQ particularly the Military
Operations Directorate acted as catalysts towards
increased confusion. Their contradictory orders to
a certain extent retarded the pace of advance of
the 1st Armoured Division.

102. Twice the GHQ gave orders which created great
doubt and confusion in the 1st Armoured Division.
See the case of 3rd Armoured Brigade. On 6th
September it was told to concentrate east of
Zafarke by first light 7th September.
The brigade carried out the move successfully by
0600 Hours 7th September. The same day at 1400
Hours it was told to move to Lahore and at 1500
hours on the same day these orders were
cancelled!62 Imagine the state of mind of the
brigade commander and his commanding officers.
On the second occasion, the 4 Armoured Brigade
was ordered by the DMO to move to Daska in Ravi-
Chenab Corridor at 1300 Hours 7th September.
While the brigade was preparing for the move it
was cancelled the same day at 1600 Hours.
Naturally, GOC 1st Armoured Division Naseer could
not have ordered these moves on his own.
There were men higher up in the chain of
command who were not clear about many things

103. connected with operational strategy and
generalship! 63
Lack of initiative atbattalion, brigade and
divisional level
There was a marked lack of initiative at the
battalion, brigade and divisional level.
Lieutenant Colonel Ihsan ul Haq Malik who later
rose to the rank of major general and participated
in the Khem Karan operations as the CO of the
indomitable 15 SP (it was a privilege for this scribe
to have served in the “Romeo Battery” of this fine
unit after a disciplinary problem in 11 Cavalry from
9th August 1984 till 10th October 1984) states
that “senior officers were conspicuously absent
from the frontline in war. I saw a command post of
one of them in the rear areas. The bunker was a
massive job.Only a direct hit by a 5 KT would
disturb it!”64
Barring exceptions like Qayyum Sher who as
earlier discussed led from the front. GOC 1st
Armoured Division and Commander
5 Armoured Brigade preferred staying many

104. miles away from the line of action!
Brigadier Shami the Artillery Commander was
killed simply because in confusion of battle he was
disoriented and travelled too forward under the
assumption that he was in territory held by own
troops.
Star plate of Brigadier Shamis jeep
On the decisive 8th of September when the 1st
Armoured Division could have achieved a
breakthrough no officer of colonel level except
Sahibzad Gul was anywhere within 1000 yards of
action! In a personal conversation with this scribe
Brigadier (then captain Asmat Beg Humayun) then
GSO-3 of the 5 Armoured Brigade stated that

105. Brigadier Bashir had pitched his headquarter in a
rest house many miles behind the actual scene of
action.
Triumph of defenceover offence
All battles were triumph of defence over offence.
The attacker was stopped whether it was the
Indian opposite BRB or the Pakistani opposite Assal
Uttar or Valtoha.
If one Pakistani tank unit stopped the Indian
Armoured Division opposite Gadgor, one Indian
tank unit and later one brigade stopped the
Pakistani Armoured Division at Assal Uttar. If there
was a Harbaksh Singh at Assal Uttar prodding 4
Mountain Division to hold on there was an Abrar at
Chawinda reviving the spirits of the 6 Armoured
Division.
There were historic reasons for triumph of
defence.The pre-1947 Indian Army was primarily
used by the Britisher as a shield rather than a
spear. While Indian Infantry dug in, the main
manoeuvres in North Africa were performed by the
purely British armoured divisions.

106. Burma was a different case altogether since in
Burma the Indian tank brigades overwhelmed the
Japanese with a ratio of 100 to 10 in qualitative
and quantitative terms. Offensive action required
initiative,independent judgement, swiftness in
decision making, all of which were sadly missing in
both the armies beyond tank troop level.
Men like Sahibzad Gul or Tarapur were solitary
exceptions and that is why once they were killed in
action there was no one who could replace them.
Excellence in decision-making had not been
institutionalised in both the armies and I dare say
this is the state till to date. A convincing proof
being the latest Kargil affair!
Role of Artillery
Artillery played a decisive role in breaking many
Indian attacks opposite Lahore and Kasur,
however, it lost its effectiveness when Pakistani
armour was distributed in too wide an area on the
8th of September. In the case of 1st Armoured
Division offensive its role was severely mauled due
to overemphasis on secrecy.

107. Ehsan then an artillery CO thus noted “In peace we
had not even seen the maps of this area.Nobody
had ever thought that we could be committed in
this area for an ofensive task”.65
Ehsan further noted that such was the confusion
that “another artillery unit in our formation moved
by rail. Understandably, it never got to the
required place in time”.
Artillery was even ignored in award of gallantry
awards.Thus while infantry officers particularly
belonging to Ayub’s Punjab Regiment Group got
the Lion’s share of gallantry awards artillery and
armour were the underdogs in receipt of gallantry
awards.
Thus Shaukat Riza caustically albeit realistically
noted “Three of our observers were killed while
bringing fire on the enemy.
One captain stood up in his post to engage enemy
tanks with better effect.He was killed with a bullet
in his right eye. After ceasefire we recommended

108. them for gallantry awards. None of them got
anything.” 66
Organisational failures
One of the most serious failures which laid the
foundation of Pakistani 1st Armoured Division’s
failure was failure to have a higher command
organisation to control and coordinate the
operations of the Pakistani infantry and armoured
divisions.
On the Indian side on the other hand the situation
was to a great extent since all Indian divisions in
the corridor were controlled by a corps
headquarter. The responsibility for this failure can
be laid squarely on the shoulders of Ayub and
Musa and to some extent on the then CGS and
DMO.
Staff and Planning Failures
Ironically while all the blame for failure was
heaped on the shoulders of GOC 1st Armoured
Division and Commander 5 Armoured Brigade, the
underlying and some more serious failures were

109. ignored.
Starting from the top, the prime culprit in the
planning was the Military Operations Directorate.
Planning for attacks which decides the fate of a
war at the strategic level cannot be relegated to
divisional headquarters.
The Khem Karan Offensive plan was prepared
many years before the war started. Obstacles like
Rohi Nala and the Nikasu Nala were pre-partition
obstacles, the Nikasu Nala being so prominent that
it was even prominently marked on the maps of
the Radclife Award Boundary Commission maps.
The fault lay not in the fact that the 1st Armoured
Division was launched in bad terrain but in the fact
that adequate preparations in planning were not
made to ensure that ground friction was reduced.
Compare this with another similar operation i.e the
Inchon landing. The terrain and amphibious factors
at Inchon were formidable. Macarthur’s own Chief
of Staff Major General Almond described Inchon as
the worst possible place to land!67

110. The reader may note that the water channel from
where the amphibious force of Macarthur had to
approach could be conveniently mined or simply
blocked by a sunken or disabled vehicle.
Thus, at Inchon terrain did not favour a landing but
the advantage of strategic surprise were far
greater than terrain odds.The important fact which
differentiated Inchon and Khem Karan was that the
planners at Inchon took terrain as well as
movement factors into account, thereby reducing
terrain friction and the time and space required to
concentrate while at Khem Karan the Pakistani
planners starting from the Military Operations
Directorate,1 Corps Headquarter, 1st Armoured
Division Headquarter down till brigade
headquarters of the 1st Armoured Division did not
plan meticulously for the move into bridgehead
and for getting out of the gap between Rohi Nala
and Nikasu Nala as soon as they could.
The governing element in this whole situation was
getting out of the Nikasu-Rohi bottleneck so as to
gain complete freedom of manoeuvre where

111. Pakistani superiority of nine to three in tank
regiments could be fully exploited.
If BRB saved the Pakistani position in this corridor
then the Rohi Nala and the Nikasu Nala to a great
extent saved the Indian position. Nothing in the
instructions passed to 1st Armoured Division
indicated that the Pakistani GHQ was even aware
of closeness of two obstacles within Pakistani
territory i.e the Rohi Nala and the BRB which could
and did produce traffic jams which severely
delayed the induction of the 1st Armoured Division
into the bridgehead and enabled the Indians to
bring their independent armoured brigade into the
battle area before the Pakistani 1st Armoured
Division had crossed the crucial Rohi-Nikasu
Corridor which was a serious operational
bottleneck.
It was not Nasir or Bashir who failed but the whole
staff system inherited from the British. Nasir
and Bashir were just tips of the iceberg!
The British staff college at Cambrai in words of
Montgommery’s biographer Nigel Hamilton was an

112. institution preoccupied with “hunting and
socialising”! 68 A British officer who rose to
considerable height in the British Army in WW Two
“ frankly ascribed his selection for staff duty to
having played golf regularly with a senior
commander”!69
It was a failure of command as well as staff system
where even the staff officers on both sides were
too slow for armoured warfare and worked on
yards and furlongs rather than miles.
Their orientation was position oriented rather than
mobility oriented and their idea of a battlefield was
a typical linear battlefield. Their Burma or North
African experience where the Japanese and
Germans frequently appeared in their rear had
made them extra sensitive about their flanks.
These were men who thought in terms of
security rather than speed. Conformity rather
than unorthodox dynamism, having been
trained in the slavish colonial orders oriented.
British Indian Army was the cardinal script of
their life.

113. It was this British system in which every senior
commander was more interested in doing the job
of those one step junior to him that led to the lack
of dash and initiative at brigade and battalion
level.
They were trained that way and their behaviour as
far as the timidity at brigade and divisional level
has to be taken in this context.
Analysis of Casualties
Contrary to popular imagination created by the
propaganda that Chawinda was the greatest battle
since WW II it was in the Ravi-Sutlej Corridor that
the Indians suffered the maximum casualties.
Thus, while the 1 Indian Corps which fought the
Battle of Chawinda suffered a total of 575 killed
casualties, the Indian 15 Division opposite
Lahore alone suffered some 486 killed
casualties.70 Thus if the casualties of all three
Indian divisions and the independent brigade in 11
Corps area are combined, these far exceed those
suffered by the 1 Corps which fought the Battle of
Chawinda.

114. Influence of Higher Headquarters on lower
headquarters
In the case of Indian 4 Mountain Division the GOC
4 Mountain Division lost the will to carry on as
proved by Harbaksh’s narrative.
In this case the situation was restored by
Harbaksh’s personal visit and exhortations to carry
on. In the final analysis 4 Mountain Division
gradually regained its spirit and functioned
effectively in the defensive role.
Comparative Differences in the two armies
Many ridiculous myths were propagated in
Pakistan about differences in the two armies.
Racially by and large both the armies were of the
same stock.
The Pakistan Army bulk of which some 65% to
75% being Punjabis who were converted to Islam
in the period 1000-1600 or Pathans or Ranghars
who were of Hindu Rajput origin.
On the other hand the bulk of the Indian Army

115. was Punjabi or North Indian again with Sikhs who
were converted to Sikhism in the period from
1500-1800.
The remaining larger portion of the Indian Army
was Dogra (Punjabi Hindu Rajput), Punjabi Hindu
Jat, and some Madrasis, Kumaonis and Gurkhas.
Racially by and large the armies were alike.
Where a unit did not do well had a deeper
connection with poor leadership at battalion,
brigade or divisional level. Units panicked on both
sides, artillery fire had the same effect on both
sides and if one side had better guns it definitely
gave it an advantage.
Thus, there was no major differences in both the
armies at soldier to soldier level.
This fact was noted by some officers soon after
1965 but the majority were victims of the
psychosis of Islamic Martial Military superiority that
overwhelmed the West Pakistani psyche during the
period 1966-1971!
Brigadier A.R Siddiqi in his book on the Pakistan

116. Army’s press image thus narrated a thought-
provoking incident soon after the war.
Siddiqi met Brigadier Qayyum Sher who as just
discussed had distinguished himself as an infantry
brigade commander in the battle opposite Lahore.
Qayyum Sher was unhappy about the unrealistic
expectations and myths that were being created as
a result of the official propaganda.
Qayyum Sher told Siddiqi, “Miracles he mused,
‘may indeed have happened, but they happen only
once. Let me tell you that your press chaps are
doing a lot of harm to the soldier psychologically
by publishing all those foolish stories. I wonder
what they are really trying to tell the world. That
the Pakistani soldier can fight his war only with the
help of his celestial allies. That he is facing an
enemy inferior to him in all respects. I admit God’s
help is of the utmost importance but it’s no
substitute for one’s own performance. It would be
quite stupid to forget that the Indian soldier is as
much of a professional as his Pakistani
counterpart. He has been trained in similar military

117. systems and institutions and fights like hell when
he has to. The only reason why the Pakistani
soldier put up a comparatively better performance
in this war was that he fought largely on his own
home ground as a defender”.
Siddiqi further noted that “The Pakistani image
makers, however, had little use for such sterile
talk. They had their own mental picture of the war
and regarded it as the only correct one. Anybody
who dared to speak of the war more realistically
simply betrayed a ‘diffident and defeatist
mentality’ ...The merest suggestion of the criticism
of the military performance became a taboo”.71
Sher was not alone in entertaining these views.
Major General Tajammul Hussain Malik who very
ably commanded the 3rd Baluch opposite Lahore
on the BRB states in his memoirs that the Indian
superiority opposite Lahore was not as
overwhelming as later portrayed in the Pakistani
official propaganda.
Tajammul thus stated,

118. “We had Patton Tanks whereas Indians had
mostly Sherman Tanks which were
comparatively much inferior. Similarly our
artillery guns out ranged the Indian artillery
guns. They had an overall superiority of
infantry, perhaps of about 1 to 2 but most of
their divisions were comparatively ill-
equipped and untrained and they had to
guard a much bigger frontier”. 72
Conclusion
The battles fought in the Ravi-Sutlej Corridor are
fit to be subject of a Shakespearian comedy of
errors. On a more serious note Pakistan Army lost
its last chance to force a military solution on the
Indians.
It failed not because failure was inevitable but
because seeds of failure were sown once soldiering
was mixed with politics, merit was sidelined and
men of limited grey matter were elevated to the
highest ranks. After 1965 the current of history
started flowing against Pakistan and its full results
came into light only in December 1971.

119. There was logic in Bhutto and his hawk’s position
that Pakistan had the potential to knock India out
in a swift war like the Israelis did in 1956 and
1967.
Unfortunately, Pakistan failed not because of
material reasons but because of qualitative
reasons. The finest steel goes through the hottest
fire. This unfortunately was not the case with the
Pakistan Army of 1965 in terms of higher
leadership.
____________________________
Endnotes and bibliography
1. Gul Hassan the then Pakistani Director
Military Operations (DMO) from 1961 to 1965
stated in his memoirs that all Pakistani planning
was based on the fact that “both sides would
refrain from undertaking a crossing over a major
water obstacle at the outset of operations”. See
Page-173-Memoirs of General Gul Hassan Khan-
Oxford University Press-Karachi-1993. The
Indians similarly were equally timid and Harbaksh
Singh the GOC Western Command noted that the
Indian GHQ was also hesitant in attempting to
cross a major water obstacle even within Indian

120. territory which was close to the border. See Page-
16 & 17-War Despatches-Lieut Gen Harbaksh
Singh-Lancer International-New Delhi-1991. The
reason for this was hesitation in taking any risk
and in being unconventional, the cardinal
common trait in both Indian and Pakistan Army’s
higher leadership since the Indians commissioned
in the pre-1947 British Indian Army in any case
were not trained to go beyond company or
platoon commander level. The WW II changed
everything and speeded up the process of
transfer of power!
2. Page-18-War Despatches-Op Cit.
3. Page-132 & 133- Behind the Scene-An
Analysis of India’s Military Operations-1947-71-
Major General Joginder Singh-Lancer
International-New Delhi-1993.
4. Pages-122 & 127-Ibid.
5. Page-15-War Despatches-Op Cit. Harbaksh
Singh had visualised that a major attack in Ravi-
Sutlej Corridor with 11 Corps would force
Pakistan to retain a large proportion of her
reserves in Lahore Sector and resultantly
minimise the opposition againt the Main Indian

121. Attack in Ravi-Chenab Corridor opposite
Chawinda.
6. Page-134-Joginder Singh-Op Cit- The reader is
advised to read Joginder’s book with a pinch of
salt. It was published after publication of
Harbaksh’s War Despatches and was more of a
rejoinder than a detached analysis of the war.
Joginder was Harbaksh’s Chief of Staff in the war
and it appears that Harbaksh was tough with
Joginder. Joginder retired in the same rank soon
after the war while Harbaksh the most deserving
candidate for Indian Army Chief was not
promoted since he was a Punjabi Sikh. It is hard
to believe Joginder’s unsubstantiated assertion
that Harbaksh a staunch Sikh would advocate
taking position behind the Beas abandoning holy
places like the Sikh Vatican City i.e Amritsar.
7. Page-38-An Introduction to Strategy-General
Andre Beaufre-Faber and Faber-London-1965.
8. Page-18-War Despatches-Op Cit.
9. Page-365-The Indian Armoured Corps-History
of the Indian Armoured Corps-1940-71-Major
General Gurcharan Singh Sandhu-Vision Books-
New Delhi-1991.

122. 10. Page-189-The Pakistan Army-War-1965-
Major General Shaukat Riza-Army Education
Press-1984.
11. Page-215-Ibid.
12. Page-189-Ibid.
13. Page-211-Ibid.
14. Pages-213 and 214 -Ibid.
15. Page-215-Ibid.
16. Page-10-” Remembering our Warriors”
series-Interview of Major General Naseerullah
Khan Babar (Retired), SJ and Bar conducted by
A.H Amin - Defence Journal-April 2001 Issue-
Pathfinder Fountain -Clifton Karachi-2001. The
reader may note that General Babar avoids self-
publicity and propaganda.He agreed to an
interview on the personal request of Mr Ikram
Sehgal who had served with him in the Corps of
Aviation in the period 1968-71.
17. Page-215-Ibid.
18. Page-76-Gul Hassan Khan -Op Cit.
19. Page-200-Gul Hassan Khan-Op Cit.
20. Page-235-Shaukat Raza-Op Cit.
21. Ibid.

123. 22. Pages 235 & 236-Ibid.
23. Page-135 & 135-Ibid.
24. Page-189-Gul Hassan Khan-Op Cit.
25. Ibid.
26. Pages-192 & 193-Shaukat Riza-Op Cit.
27. Pages-191 & 192-Ibid.
28. Page-355-History of The Indian Armoured
Corps -Op Cit.
29. Page-90-War Despatches-Op Cit and Page-
268-The Indian Army Since Independence-Major
K.C Praval-Lancer International-New Delhi-1993.
30. Pages-52, 53 & 54-Story of My Struggle-
Major General Tajammul Hussain Malik-`Jang
Publishers-Lahore-1991.
31. Page-356-History of the Indian Armoured
Corps-Op Cit.
32 . Ibid.
33. Page-92-War Despatches-Op Cit.
34. Ibid.
35. Page-356-History of the Indian Armoured
Corps-Op Cit.
36. Page-92 -War Despatches-Op Cit.

124. 37. Page-203-Shaukat Riza-Op Cit.
38. Page-94-War Despatches-Op Cit.
39. Ibid.
40. Page-202-Shaukat Riza-Op Cit.Harbaksh
claims that Bhatti was killed on the east bank of
BRB (page-96-War Despatches-Op Cit) but
Shaukat states that Bhatti was killed by enemy
tanks shooting from across the BRB Canal (Page-
202-Shaukat Riza-Op Cit).
41. Page-362-History of the Indian Armoured
Corps-Op Cit.
42. Page-99-War Despatches-Op Cit.
43. Page-366-History of the Indian Armoured
Corps-Op Cit.
44. Pages-218 and 219-Shaukat Riza-Op Cit.
45. Page-224-Ibid.
46. Pages-221 & 222-Ibid.
47. Page-227-Ibid.
48. Page-100-Harbaksh Singh-Op Cit.
49. Pages-100 & 101-Ibid.
50. We shall discuss the leaguer concept which
seriously jeopardised the success of Pakistani

125. armour operations in Khem Karan. The British,
mostly withdrew from the final battle positions in
North Africa because they feared the German 88
Anti-Tank Guns and wanted to have a peaceful
next morning. In any case the operational
situation in North Africa was not area oriented, as
in Punjab, but mobility oriented since any
outflanked force could easily move in any
direction and regain its equilibrium. In Punjab
where defence was a relatively far more superior
type of warfare than in the desert and holding
every inch of captured territory was important,
the operational situation was totally different
from North Africa. Here every locality once
captured had to be held since manoeuvre was far
more difficult due to heavy terrain, friction and
large number of artificial and natural obstacles
and bottlenecks. This was a serious doctrinal
failing which should have been resolved in the
School of Armour. No one gave it a serious
thought since it was thought that the Pattons
were invincible. These pedants failed to realise
that the British repeatedly failed to defeat
Rommel despite possessing numerical and
qualitative superiority as was admitted by Captain
B.H Liddell Hart.
51. Page-109-Harbaksh Singh-Op Cit.

126. 52. Page-245-Shaukat Riza-Op Cit.
53. Page-220- The Sidi Rezeg Battles 1941- J.A.I
Agar Hamilton and L.F.C Turner-0xford University
Press-Cape Town-1957
54. Page-33- Plain as well as Subtle aspects of
Military Decision-Making- A.H Amin-Citadel
Magazine-Issue-1/94-Command and Staff College
Quetta-1994-Term coined and defined by this
scribe.
55. Page-278 & 279-Maj K.C Praval-Op Cit.
56. Page-371-History of the Indian Armoured
Corps-Op Cit.
57. Page-174-On War-Carl Von Clausewitz-Edited
by Anatol Rapoport-Pelican Books-London-1974.
58. Page-276-Ibid.
59. Page-35-Plain as well as Subtle Aspects of
Military Decision Making-Op Cit.
60. Page-161-Harbaksh Singh-Op Cit.
61. Page-23-My Version-Indo Pakistan War
1965-General Musa-Wajid Alis-Lahore-1983.
62. Page-237-Shaukat Riza-Op Cit.
63. Ibid.

127. 64. Page-24-Observations of an Artillery
Commander-Major General Ihsan ul Haq Malik
(Retired)-Defence Journal-Volume One-Number -
8-1975-Karachi.
65. Page-22-Ibid.
66. Page-20-Article-Back to Square One-Major
General Shaukat Riza- Defence Journal-Volume
One-Number -8-1975-Karachi.
67. Page-24-Hell or High Water-MacArthurs
landing at Inchon-Walt Sheldon-Macmillan and
Company-Newyork-1968 and Pages 19 to 23 and
Pages-186 & 187-Victory at High Tide-The Inchon
Seoul Campaign-Robert.D.Heinl Junior-J.B
Lippincott Co-Philadelphia-1968.
68. Page-151-Monty-The Making of a General-
1887-1942-London-Hamilton Books-1981.
69. Footnote-25-Page-87-Op Cit-Sidi Rezeg
Battles-Op Cit.
70. Page-404,405 & 409-Major K.C Praval-Op
Cit .
71. Pages-108 & 109-The Military in Pakistan-
Myth and Reality-Brig A.R Siddiqi-Vanguard-
Lahore-1996.

128. 72. Footnote on page-78-General Tajammul-Op
Cit.