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US Army in Afghanistan

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US Army in Afghanistan

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US Army in Afghanistan

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  3. 3. 3 US Army in Afghanistan: Black and White Low Price Edition at Zero Profit distributed in public interest Paperback – July 22, 2017 https://www.amazon.com/US-Army-Afghanistan-distributed- interest/dp/1548823139/ref=sr_1_2?s=books&ie=UTF8&qid=1502948552&sr =1-2&keywords=agha+h+amin+US+Army+in+afghanistan
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  5. 5. 5 The author with dear friend Colonel David Osinski in front of NATO Headquarters Kabul 29 June 2010
  6. 6. 6 The author with great friend and mentor Professor Rasul Amin in Kabul November 2007
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  16. 16. 16 Introduction This is a personal as well as historical account. Personal in the sense that I saw closely Afghanistan from 29 June 2004 till todate
  17. 17. 17 permanently being based in Kabul as a consultant. During this period I met many Americans as well as Europeans and closely saw US Army Operations in Kandahar and Helmand where many of my projects were located. Being a student of history I first studied US Army in detail from 1983 .During this study “Crisis in Command” a book by two US Army officers remained the bible of my analysis. Accounts of civilians like Carlotta Gall were useful but devoid of true understanding of the nature of the US Army. What I saw of the US Army in Afghanistan once again proved the solid worth of analysis carried out by Richard A .Gabriel and Paul L.Savage initially published in 1978. The higher cadre in the US Army as proven in Afghanistan remains plagued by
  18. 18. 18 careeristic opportunism and continue to regard the rank and file useful cannon fodder for their personal advancement. As a second generation Pakistan Army officer I closely saw Pakistan Army from the earliest age till March 1994 when I retired as a major. Countless conversations with my relative and friend Colonel Salman who trained all the major so called Jihadis from Hekmatyar and Massoud till Osama Bin Laden made me understand the ISI mindset. My dear coursemate and friend Major General Asif Khattak was another great aide in understanding the ISI mindset. Countless other ISI officers that I met enabled me to understand , how they think and how the ISI operates. This account is a summary of those observations grounded in the initial period
  19. 19. 19 1947-79 and reinforced by direct observations from 1979 till todate. This small book is written and distributed in public interest and has no profit motive. Since I have no faith in nationalism or narrow religion of any kind there is no ideological axe to grind in this short work. It is hoped that this work will act as a primer of more detailed studies. Major Agha H Amin (Retired) Chapter One Background Low Intensity conflict was inherited by Pakistan from the British Indian Empire. Low Intensity conflict remained the central part of Pakistani history from the earliest days.
  20. 20. 20 The Pakistani state waged the first Low Intensity war in Kashmir with major inputs by British officers civilian and military serving in Pakistan after independence. In the 1960s the ISI supervised small low intensity conflicts in Indias North East Frontier areas. The greatest experiment however took place when the Afghan war commenced in 1978 initially with British support and from 1979 with US support and Pakistan became a massive Proxy base against the USSR forces in Afghanistan. While the USA withdrew in 1979 the ISI inherited a huge proxy war base that was maintained and diverted to other fronts like Indian held Kashmir as well as civil war plagued Afghanistan. The huge Afghan proxy war base was now remodeled to support Pakistani proxies in Afghanistan.
  21. 21. 21 The so called Afghan Mujahideen proxies of USA and Pakistan and the west were now divided on ethnic basis with non Pashtuns and moderate Muslim Pashtuns becoming US/Western/Indian/Russian proxies and Pashtuns/extremist Muslims becoming Pakistani proxies. In 1994 Pakistan midwife the so called Taliban movement which captured Kabul with Pakistani. The Pakistani establishment saw Afghanistan as a massive proxy reservoir with which Pakistan could redress and balance the strategic grievance that it was with India over the Jammu and Kashmir state since 1947. The USA had strategically abandoned Pakistan after 1989 and came close to declaring Pakistan a terrorist state by 1999. The Pakistani establishment searched for alternatives and by 1999-2002 came to the
  22. 22. 22 conclusion that China was Pakistans best strategic choice. Traditionally the Muslims of India and Pakistan were saved from total subjugation and political extinction by Hindus and Sikhs by the English East India Companys arrival in 1803-49 , when English East India Company destroyed the Hindu Marathas and the Sikhs in the period mentioned. After Independence Pakistani ruling establishment searched for strategic allies and saviours and found the USA in the period 1947-54.So Pakistan became a US concubine in return for US economic and military aid. The Pakistani US love affair lasted till 1971 after which Pakistans charismatic civilian Premier courted with idealism in shape of quest for nuclear weapons ,Islamic bloc and third world.This romantic experiment collapsed in 1977 with a US bank rolled
  23. 23. 23 agitation movement and a coup detat by a US cultivated Pakistani army general. Pakistan again became a US concubine and a massive proxy base for US led Soviet Afghan Proxy war. The USA abruptly left the scene in 1989 practically surrendering Afghanistan to the Pakistani state. In 2001 when the USA occupied Afghanistan it did not invade the Taliban but Pakistans strategic backyard. This important fact was not fully grasped and understood by the USA. Meanwhile Ironically for the USA , during the Soviet Afghan War the USA had deliberately turned a blind eye to Pakistans nuclear program as the USA regarded its development as best deterrent against a USSR ground invasion of Pakistan.
  24. 24. 24 Thus by 1984-87 Pakistan had acquired a nuclear weapon capability thanks to US policy of not interrupting Pakistans nuclear program and the shuffling juggling game between Symington and Pressler amendments. It was a twist of fate for the USA that when it occupied Afghanistan in 2001 ,Pakistan had acquired a complete nuclear weapon capability and USA was in no position to invade Pakistan. This remained USAs strategic dilemma all along and the USA did not find any solution to this strategic dilemma to date. Meanwhile the USA in order to satisfy its public opinion resorted to drone strikes in Pakistans wild west FATA region where actually the USA was attacking absolute non entitites , with the secret agreement of Pakistans Punjabi dominated establishment, while the “ Real Enemy” of the USA presence in Afghanistan all along
  25. 25. 25 was the Pakistani state as correctly defined and the term coined by Carlotta Gall. But the USA had failed to arrive at any solution how to deal with the real enemy , hence the surge which was in reality a bad tactical response to attacking the tail of a snake ,because the USA had allowed the snake to acquire the Nukes and was in no position to attack the head of the snake. Chapter Two Understanding Pakistans Geopolitical architecture In 1974-75 my father attended the armed forces war course.He wrote a paper on Pakistans geopolitics.
  26. 26. 26 The conclusion as taught at the National Defence College was that Pakistans geopolitical heartland was the triangle Rawalpindi Lahore Faisalabad. While other areas had some relevance and value the heartland was North Punjab. Thus 6 of Pakistans nine corps were guarding this triangle. The map below gives an idea of what it is like.
  27. 27. 27 On the other hand Pakistans Strategic missile groups defend it against far bigger threats.
  28. 28. 28 In the US Afghan war US forces were thus strategically degraded into carrying out puny pin pricks against FATA with drones
  29. 29. 29 and against Afghan Taliban proxies of Pakistan in the so called surge. In reality both these players were minor players while the centre of gravity of Afghan war was the Pakistani establishment in Islamabad and Rawalpindi. Since North Punjab was Pakistans heartland Pakistans military usurper Musharraf had no sympathy with the tribal Pashtuns who were regarded by Pakistans establishment as lesser beings . When my father attended the basic military engineering officers course in 1955 at Military College of Engineering Risalpur he described Royal Pakistan Air Force ( Royal was dropped in 1956) bragging in the Risalpur Club in the eveing about how many tribal Pashtuns they had killed in straffing in North Waziristan till as late as 1954.They bragged that whole North Waziristan Agency was their firing range.
  30. 30. 30 At that time an operation was being conducted against Faqir of Ippi which ended in 1954-55. But US leverage in carrying out drone strikes was limited to the FATA tribal area or some outlying parts of KP province as this province was regarded as an outer appendage of Pakistan. The Pakistani establishment had regarded tribal Pashtuns as useful proxies and had deliberately kept their FATA region under developed and subject to a very harsh medieval type British law known as Frontier Crime Regulations. Thus allowing US drone strikes in FATA or Pashtun areas of KP Province was not regarded as a political risk by Pakistans establishment as these were minority ethnic groups. Pakistans power structure was dual with the Nuclear weapons ,Afghan and Indian
  31. 31. 31 policy controlled by the army headquarters and ISI since 1977. Afghanistan was seen by the Pakistani military as Pakistans strategic depth and the balancing factor against India with which Pakistan was involved in a major land dispute of Jammu and Kashmir since 1947. US occupation of Afghanistan was viewed by the Pakistani military establishment (Army + ISI) controlling major part of Pakistans foreign policy as an occupation of Pakistan. While fear of a joint Indian US nut cracker destroying Pakistan forced General Musharraf to be a US ally or subsidiary , the Pakistani Military was fully resolved not to abandon the Afghan Taliban proxies cum vassals cum minor allies. This important strategic fact was not fully grasped by the US ruling establishment and decision makers.
  32. 32. 32 The key to engage or win Pakistan was to solve its basic dispute with India ie Kashmir Dispute and to respect Pakistans special role and dominance in Afghanistan which the US itself had practically surrendered to Pakistan in 1989-92. The US government in DC did not realize this central strategic reality .The key to winning Afghan war was held by the politicians ruling USA in DC. A military solution itself in Afghanistan was not practicable unless Pakistan was politically engaged or won over. The second option was to invade Pakistan and make it submit to US policy.This was impossible as Pakistan was a nuclear armed state. Further the USA lacked the resolution to confront Pakistan or to pressurize it to abandon its support of Taliban. On the other hand things were very complicated as the Pakistani military junta
  33. 33. 33 while professing to be a US ally was supporting the Afghan Taliban all along. There was something wrong with US political objectives in Afghanistan where the USA wanted to totally eliminate the Taliban politically .This was an unrealistic objective , unless Pakistan was engaged or Afghanistan partitioned with US presence in the north which supported USA and a Taliban Bantuistan or Botswana type land in the south where the Pashtun population was more anti US or dominated and intimidated by the Pakistani Afghan Taliban proxies. Further Pakistan with more Pashtuns than Afghanistan could influence Afghan politics more effectively than the Afghan government in Kabul. All these political realities were not understood in DC . There was no military solution to the Afghan War by conducting any type of
  34. 34. 34 surge unless the Pakistan problem was solved either by accommodating Pakistan or destroying Pakistan ! As both solutions were beyond the political (former) and military (latter) capability of the US government. A third solution could be searched for in weakening Pakistan by encouraging irredentist/separatist tendencies in Pakistan in areas like Baluchistan or Sindh but this too was beyond the shallow political maturity of the USA. The USA wasted 5 years in Afghanistan in a state of indecision vacillation and procrastination thrusting a foreign made proportional representation solution of democracy in Afghanistan. The cardinal fact that Afghanistan had been ruled by the gun coupled with a lose system of tribal customs was not understood by the USA and its NATO allies.
  35. 35. 35 Finally the US Armys junior ranks were made the scapegoats in the so called surge where ambitious selfish generals like Mc Chrystal and Petraeus , sent some 1400 US soldiers into pointless death. As Anatol Rappooport while editing Carl Von Clausewitz wrote that war is actually a failure of policy . Afghanistan war was thus a failure of US policy. The US unlike the USSR had a far safer entry in Afghanistan and for first four years viewed positively , it lost the initiative after it refused to accept the hard political reality of Afghanistan ‘ i.e Pakistans army and the ISI as well as their proxies the Taliban. These three parties had to be accommodated and if it was done a solution was possible . Failure to accommodate Pakistans military and their proxies was to be the main reason for US failure.
  36. 36. 36 This did not require total surrender but an acceptance of Pakistani influence in the Pashtun south while USA could easily control the more moderate north and retain a small military presence there. Pakistans military establishment understood that the USA would get fed up with its small war like the USSR had done and would leave one day. This would form the corner stone of the ISI led Afghan insurgency with General Musharraf in control. The Musharraf template would be followed by his military successors. This is not to imply that Afghanistan is a total US failure. A compromise solution is still possible if the above mentioned reality is understood . As they say nothing is inevitable in history. Chapter Three
  37. 37. 37 The Fallacy about non state actors There is a huge fallacy about non state actors in the ongoing Afghan war in particular and about the many so called Islamist wars in the world. In reality as far as I have studied and observed non state actors account for less than 10 percent of all so called insurgents while 90 % of all insurgents are proxy of some state , USA in lead ,followed by Pakistan,Iran ,Russia,Israel,India,Saudi Arabia,Turkey,NATO states etc. Thus Al Qaeda all along has been a marginal player in Af Pak. However it is politically simpler and easier for USA and all states to blame non state actors as well as attack them as the fallout is very limited. On the other hand it requires far greater strategic resolution to attack state actors , especially when these are nuclear armed like Pakistan or North Korea.
  38. 38. 38 As this map shows the larger and major groups are state proxies like Mulla Omar group and Haqqani etc while the TTP etc shown in white are much smaller, and the so called non state actors.
  39. 39. 39 In pragmatic terms for the USA Mulla Omar group although a Pakistani proxy was a much smaller actor and it was politically far more convenient to attack it than Mulla Omars strategic base in Pakistani Balochistan. Similarly it was far more convenient and least risky to attack small time players in Pakistans FATA and satisfy the US public that we are attacking the Al Qaeda than attacking or droning nuclear armed Pakistans ISI headquarters in Islamabad or Quetta. These harsh strategic realities were never understood by the US public.
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  41. 41. 41 Chapter Four US occupation of Afghanistan The US occupation of Afghanistan in itself was a mickey mouse affair. The US did not lose a single soldier in occupying Afghanistan in real fighting less an over enthusiastic CIA civilian who died because of his own rashness at Mazar Sharif.
  42. 42. 42 What happened was that the Taliban simply carried out a strategic retreat into Pakistani Balochistan.
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  45. 45. 45 Understanding what had happened was the first strategic failure of the USA , and above all visualizing what all this would finally lead to . From 2001 to 2006 US officials in DC , Kabul and Islamabad simply slept while the Taliban reorganized and recouped in Pakistan. These were no non state actors but Pakistani strategic proxies but all along US officials kept talking about Al Qaeda and non State actors who in reality were mickey mouse minor players.
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  48. 48. 48 Chapter Five Musharraf Deception Pakistans military usurper ruler General Musharraf carried out a brilliant strategic deception which was understood and known to y very few in Pakistan and least understood or known to those who mattered in US decision making circles. Musharraf housed the retreating Taliban in Pakistani Balochistan and other provinces while he diverted US attention towards Pakistans FATA region which Musharraf painted as the centre of all evil and the Scorpions deadly tail. In reality the so called Scorpions tale was a totally bogus threat and a diversion.
  49. 49. 49 Musharraf was an ISI commando officer trained by professionals like Brigadier Syed Raza Ali.
  50. 50. 50 While outwardly US occupation of Afghanistan was a major strategic snub for Pakistan, Musharraf in words of an Indian observer “ snatched victory out of the jaws of defeat” by running with the foxes (Afghan Taliban) and chasing with the hounds (USA). In Pakistan he was much criticized for a U Turn and a volte face and for stabbing the Taliban in the back.But in reality Musharraf saved Pakistan and the Taliban from a major defeat. Like a bold and audacious poker player Musharraf housed Osama Bin laden in Pakistan while professing to be the best US strategic ally and milked the US tax payer of some 25 Billion US Dollars although he did not deploy a single battalion to interdict the Afghan Taliban from infiltrating and attacking US troops all along the 1500 Km border of Pakistani province of Balochistan with Afghanistan.
  51. 51. 51 The same Musharraf strategy was blindly followed by his successor General Ashfaq Pervez Kiani in 2008-13 when the US surge took place and Kiani supervised a massive Afghan Taliban infiltration in Afghanistan that accounted for 90 percent US fatal casualties in Afghanistan.
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  53. 53. 53 Chapter Six Hibernation and Calm and the reason for Pakistani decision to escalate in the south In 2001 Pakistan had signed a strategic agreement with China to develop the port as a future Chinese short cut to Middle East oil without reliance on the far longer and vulnerable sea route via Strait of Malacca. This action was seen by pakistans ethnic Baloch minority as ademographic attack by Pakistans Punjabi dominant establisgment aimed at turning the Baloch into a minority in their own province. A guerrilla insurrection had thus commenced in Balochistan in 2002. The insurrection was indigenous but supported by Pakistans arch enemy India from bases in Afghanistan.The insurrection assumed alarming proportions by 2006.
  54. 54. 54 This led General Musharraf into taking a strategic decision to step up Taliban guerrilla operations in Southern Afghanistan.
  55. 55. 55 Although the Americans were not directly aiding the Baloch insurrection in Afghanistan , the impact of Indian support to Baloch insurgents in Pakistan was not assessed by American decision makers in Kabul or Islamabad , thus this was a major US strategic failure. But the US decision makers lacked the strategic resolution to do that. Another Machiavellian but far more effective approach by the US could have been to massively reinforce the Baloch insurrection thus arm twisting Pakistan into not supporting its Afghan Taliban proxies surge in Afghanistan.But the US decision makers lacked the long term vision or talent to attempt any such political genius to do that. Chapter Seven
  56. 56. 56 Understanding Strategy and major US errors Strategy as defined by Clausewitz is the theory of the use of combats for the object of the war. Strategy deals with combination of different actions or combats with a view to the ultimate object of the war. Strategy deals with battles to gain end of the war. Clausewitz also stated that in strategy everything moves very slowly and much more strength of will is required to make a decision in strategy than in tactics. From 2001 to 2006 when the Taliban surge started things moved slowly and USA failed to devise any strategy.It failed to assess and foresee the Taliban resurgence.It failed to devise any plan to pressurize Pakistan into not reasserting in Afghanistan.
  57. 57. 57 It failed to hit at the drug trade that provided the financial muscle to Taliban.
  58. 58. 58 2002 was an eventless year in which nothing strategic occurred.Minor company level actions were fought.
  59. 59. 59 Operation Anaconda exaggerated to the level of Battle of Cannae was in reality a
  60. 60. 60 puny tactical affair where overwhelming US airpower reduced a small insurgent force in Paktia to pulp.The US suffered just 7 fatal casualties.
  61. 61. 61 Two US casualties at Shkin in Paktika occurred because of a most stupidly sited post
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  63. 63. 63 2003 was yet another eventless year where US small units fought small actions but US commanders sitting in Kabul and Arlington failed to see the strategic picture. US military culture was dominated by a philosophy that passed the buck to small units so that higher commanders did not have to waste their time with strategic assessments.
  64. 64. 64 2004 was another eventless year. 1 Fleischer, Jacob R. Deh Rawood P ROVINCE NOT M ENTIONED WHICH SHOWS C A RELESSNESS. KU NNAR URUZGAN
  65. 65. 65 2 Fracker Jr., Dale E. Deh Rawood 3 Kearney III, James C . Salerno P ROVINCE NOT M ENTIONED KHOST 4 Gomez, Billy Landstuhl Reg. M ed. C enter, Landstuhl, Germany-NOT STUPIDLY C LARIFIED BY MILITARY T IMES T HAT HE DIED IN PAKTIKA P ROVINCE 5 Hobbs, Brian S. M iam Do –NOT STUPIDLY CLARIFIED BY M ILITARY T IMES O R IC ASUALTIES T HE ACTUAL P ROVINCE WAS FOB LAGHMAN IN LA GHMAN P ROVINCE 6 Fernandez, Kyle Ka Eo M iam Do NO T STUPIDLY C LARIFIED BY M ILITARY T IMES OR IC ASUALTIES T HE ACTUAL P ROVINCE WAS FOB LAGHMAN IN LA GHMAN P ROVINCE 7 Wells, Wesley R. Naka NOT STUPIDLY C LARIFIED BY M ILITARY TIMES OR IC ASUALTIES T HE ACTUAL P ROVINCE WAS PAKTIKA. 8 O laes, T ony B. Shkin M O ST STUPIDLY SITED POST 9 Goodwin, Robert S. Shkin 10 Beasley, Bobby E. Ghazikel NOT STUPIDLY C LARIFIED BY M ILITARY TIMES OR IC ASUALTIES T HE ACTUAL P ROVINCE WAS WA RDAK 11 C herry, C raig W. Ghazikel NOT STUPIDLY C LARIFIED BY M ILITARY TIMES OR IC ASUALTIES T HE ACTUAL P ROVINCE WAS WA RDAK 12 T hacker, Juston T yler Barikowt P ROVINCE NOT M ENTIONED WHICH SHOWS C A RELESSNESS. KU NNAR 13 M cClenney, Daniel B. Barikowt 14 Fraise, David M . Deh Rawood U RU ZGAN 15 O uellette, Brian J. Q alat 16 Jeffries, Joseph A . Q alat 17 M ogensen, Robert J. Q alat 18 Eggers, Daniel W. Q alat 19 P rice, Bruce E. Kajaki 20 P ayne Jr., Ronald R. T awara P ROVINCE NOT M ENTIONED WHICH SHOWS C A RELESSNESS. HELMAND 21 Lagman, A nthony S. O ruzgan province 22 Esposito, Jr., M ichael J. O ruzgan province 23 Golding, Nicholes Darwin Ghazni P rovince
  66. 66. 66 2005 was a major turning point as the US fatal casualties from enemy action jumped from 23 in 2004 to 66 in 2005. Some 20 of these however occurred due to air crashes attributed to enemy action and many observers attributed these to over confidence on part of US pilots , severely underestimating the enemy factor.
  67. 67. 67 The writing on the war was clear but US commanders in Kabul as well as in the Pentagon lacked that rare clarity described by Carl Von Clausewitz as “An intellect which can operate in circumstances where 75% data is unavailable” ! These were ordinary minds with ranks of generals who lacked that intellect “ which ,even in the midst of this intense obscurity, is not without some traces of the inner light, which lead to the truth ! ”
  68. 68. 68 They probably had read Dale Carnegies books that teach you that flattery will certainly take you to high ranks and places but had not digested the essence of Vom Kriege !
  69. 69. 69 2006 was yet another study in how not to command an army. While US commanders and Pentagon should have been droning Chaghai district in Pakistan opposite Helmand and Kandahar , all that these musketeers did was “ Do Nothing” ! 2006 again did not justify the future US surge of troops in Helmand and US lost only 5 soldiers killed in Helmand in this year.
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  71. 71. 71 The US/NATO conduct was most irrational in 2006 in establishing Camp Bastion in Helmand in 2006 which attracted insurgent attention and caused pointless UK casualties in 2006-8 finally leading to US jumping in the mess and causing highest US casualties in 2009 and 2010. This is despite the fact that US lost just 1 soldier in Helmand in 2005 and establishment of Camp Bastion in 2006 was the most stupid thing that USA and UK did in whole Afghan war.
  72. 72. 72 On the other hand the decision to go for the so called surge by the USA was also a strategic failure as this led to pointless US casualties.
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  76. 76. 76 Robert Gates described choice of Helmand for US surge as desire of marines to operate independently under sole marine command which is an amateur way of conducting war. Now this is a rather amateur way to conduct war as Gates stated in his memoirs that Marines Commandant General Jim Conway wanted marines to fight in one area , under one command , so a rather sick reasoning to dump US marines into a slaughterhouse called Helmand . The Taliban based in Pakistani Baluchistan were presented on a platter a very easy
  77. 77. 77 target distributed in gift pack penny packets all across Helmand to be killed at leisure by IEDs brought from the Kharotabad IED market across an Afghan Pakistan border that was most non chalantly unmonitored by USA. Helmand was a vast desert and the Soviets never deployed more than a regiment in Helmand. The decision to distribute US soldiers in penny packets in Helmand was no doubt a non sensical decision which led to maximum US casualties in Afghan war without any strategic objective being achieved. Since most of US casualties were due to IEDs, Taliban casualties were far lower than US casualties.
  78. 78. 78 2008 was another year of vacillation , procrastination on part of the US/NATO command in Afghanistan The butchers bill for 2008 was as below :--
  79. 79. 79 The US/NATO commanders acted like glorified clerks and doing nothing remained their cardinal command attribute !
  80. 80. 80 2009 was a fateful year for the US Army in Afghanistan as a general well described in the book Crisis in Command entered the scene. One described on page .85 as obsessed with selfish , promotion oriented behavior. General Mc Chrystal preferred playing with lives of US soldiers rather than looking the Pakistani state straight into the eyes.Brave in tactical gambling and extremely timid in strategic resolution.
  81. 81. 81 As per US journalist Michael Hastings , later murdered in ambiguous circumstances for being too upright bold and iconoclastic , General Mc Chrystal simply dismissed the CIA assessment that the Taliban centre of gravity was the Quetta Shura.
  82. 82. 82 The most important job of the higher commander is to make assessments where we enter the realm of strategy. As described by Carl Von Clausewitz “ the Commander in War must commit the business he has in hand to a corresponding space which his eye cannot survey, which the keenest zeal cannot always explore, and with which, owing to the constant changes taking place, he can seldom become property acquainted.”
  83. 83. 83 It should have been clear to the US/NATO commanders that the USA/NATO were fighting a proxy war where the Pakistani state was seeing both USA/NATO as an existential threat.
  84. 84. 84 The response should have been to address Pakistani fears or offer Pakistan very
  85. 85. 85 generous incentive or worse come to worst to intimidate Pakistani the state ! All three were not tried or done ! General Mc Chrystal was the ultimate macho man ! Ran five miles by day as eulogized by a sycophant New York Times journalist ! Aggressive where it meant dividing US soldiers into penny packets and launching them piecemeal against an IED player enemy who killed US soldiers by IED remote as if playing the game mortal combat.
  86. 86. 86 But when it came to strategic resolution like confronting the Pakistani state Mc Chrystal was an absolute mouse. The fate of the US soldier was “ Ordered to Die” so that Mc Chrystals glory was reinforced and Mc Chrystal was not required to take any strategic decision
  87. 87. 87 that may cause him any degree of dissonance ! Mc Chrystals greatest inner fear was the friction that confronting Pakistani state may cause to his personal serenity or to his spotless career.
  88. 88. 88 The right US response should have been to attack the Taliban base in Balochistan, if not by crossing the border with ground troops then at least by drones.
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  93. 93. 93 Chapter Eight Pakistan’s FATA War Pakistans FATA war has been the most ignored part of US decision making.No threat for the USA existed in Pakistans FATA region.
  94. 94. 94 It appears that General Musharraf conceived a brilliant albeit Machiavellian deception plan to deceive the Americans. Gist of the plan appears to be as following :--  Convince the US decision makers that FATA was the centre of gravity of all terrorism.  Provide secret sanctuary to Afghan Taliban in Pakistani Balochistans where they ethnically and culturally blended with the local population and could not be identified.  Launch a military action in FATA to convince the USA that Musharraf was USAs best ally in so called war on terror and to milk the USA to grant more military aid. A subtle campaign was launched by Pakistani media under manipulation by the Pakistani state that FATA region
  95. 95. 95 was the source of all terrorism and needs to be reformed . A military action was thus launched by General Musharraf in 2003 in Waziristan without any provocation of tribals part. Even US casualties in Afghanistan did not justify any operation.
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  104. 104. 104 Chapter Nine The Use of Islam as a tool by Pakistani state exposed In every fight , tactical or strategic both opponents lose something , suffer some superficial but many internal damages. Pakistans General Musharrafs strategic deception was also therefore a mixed affair. Musharraf milked the USA of some 25 Billion USD and did nothing to help the USA . But even then the Pakistani military lost its credibility with the Islamists in particular and with its population in general. The Muslim elite had misused Islam as a cheap tool to galvanise the Muslim masses from earliest history of Islam in general and in Indo Pak sub continent in particular. When Musharraf succumbed to US pressure and became a US ally at least
  105. 105. 105 outwardly , a “ Confusion in Principle” was introduced in Pakistans body politics. For first time in history of Pakistan , the Pakistan Army and ISI were resisted and attacked in Pakistans key provinces of Sindh , Punjab and NWFP ( now KPK). Musharrafs strategic courting of China in response to US presence in Afghanistan and as a counter balance to US opposition to Pakistan since 1989 led to an ethnic insurrection in Baluchistan that continues. While Pakistani military deceived the USA , in the process it was forced to fight the tribal Pashtuns since 2002 and the crisis has not ended. For first time in Pakistans history senior army commanders like the corps commander in Karachi were attacked in 2004, the Pakistani army headquarters was attacked in 2009 and ISI headquarters were attacked in Lahore,Multan and other places.
  106. 106. 106 Pakistani military was shaken and is still looking for a solution to this dilemma created as a result of US arrival in Afghanistan and Musharrafs forced decision , however brilliant to align with the USA. This particular phenomenon holds many opportunities for the USA and any power that wants to destabilize Pakistan. Chapter Eleven The Surge and careerism of Mc Chrystal and Petraeus The USA regarded the Afghan war as a small war and regarded Afghanistan as a minor threat. While USA under the force of historical circumstances occupied Afghanistan , it showed no seriousness in stabilizing Afghanistan or in engaging Pakistan by solving Pakistans strategic dilemmas i.e its strategic rivalry with India or solving
  107. 107. 107 Pakistans economic problems by creating tariff free zones etc. The bill of the tariff free zones still lies in the US congress and is a classic case of US political indecision. The so called surge of 2009-12 was basically a cheap political attempt by a social climber lawyer turned president of USA whose statesmanship was of a very low caliber. Like a short term vision politician Obama decided to hoodwink the US public by ordering a temporary troop surge with a promised withdrawal frame for US troops in Afghanistan and Iraq. The surge thus had no viable military aim. 30,000 additional US troops could not achieve anything. The US lacked the resolution to confront Pakistan , lacked the vision to accommodate Pakistan and stabilize
  108. 108. 108 Afghanistan , it decided to attempt the third best solution, i.e fool its public by false promises and sacrifice some 1400 young soldiers and officers in a waste land of drug mafia called Helmand. General Mc Chrystal who supervised the surge was a simple ambitious careerist who saw it as a stepping stone to the next rank. He was described by US journalist Michael Hastings who just wanted his picture on the front page. Characters like Mc Chrystal and Petraeus were well identified by two brilliant US authors of the book Crisis in Command in 1974 or so. The surge was a pointless massacre of US troops divided in penny packets sent to certain deaths by sneaky enemies who killed them with triggers of IEDs from a safe distance and whose faces were never seen by the US troops.
  109. 109. 109 While the so called surge was not a formula to victory both Mc Chrystal and Petraeus failed to carry out certain actions which could have reduced US casualties to one fourth.
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  118. 118. 118 All along drone strikes were carried out in an area which had nothing to do with 90 percent US deaths in Afghanistan. If instead drone strikes were carried out in Pakistani Baluchistan on the Taliban base area Pakistan could have been pressurized into reducing its support to its Taliban proxies. Chapter Twelve The US Drone program This was the biggest scam in US history designed to fool the US public that USG was very harsh with the so called terrorists in the great war on terror. I am not against drone strikes in particular but I am against drone strikes in two small districts which had little to do with US deaths in Afghanistan.
  119. 119. 119
  120. 120. 120
  121. 121. 121
  122. 122. 122
  123. 123. 123
  124. 124. 124
  125. 125. 125
  126. 126. 126
  127. 127. 127
  128. 128. 128
  129. 129. 129
  130. 130. 130
  131. 131. 131
  132. 132. 132
  133. 133. 133
  134. 134. 134
  135. 135. 135
  136. 136. 136
  137. 137. 137 Chapter Thirteen Pakistani claims about sacrifices in so called war on Terror Pakistans claims about having suffered in so called war on terror were by and large a case of shedding crocodiles tears. It is a documented fact that Pakistans economy saw record economic growth in Soviet Afghan war and in US Afghan war. Prices of property and real state rose from 10 to 20 times in Pakistans Punjabi heartland as well as in urban areas of Karachi and Hyderabad. Yes the Pashtuns and Baluch suffered but these are regarded as second rate citizens
  138. 138. 138 by Pakistans ruling North Punjabi establishment. Pakistans ruling establishment is the main culprit in Pakistans two strategic problems i.e not constructing hydel power mega projects which was entirely possible during Soviet Afghan War and US Afghan war and not taxing the rich. Both the issues had no connection with Pakistans so called sacrifices as US ally in so called war on terror. Chapter Fourteen Future options There is nothing inevitable in history and it would be incorrect to state that Afghanistan war is a lost war. Conversely some 65 % of the population wants the USA to stay.
  139. 139. 139 The solution lies in creating a confederal state with US forces in the north .
  140. 140. 140 A political solution can be holding referendum under UN supervision in all Afghan districts whether they want Taliban rule or want to be ruled by Kabul de facto and de jure Afghan state. A massive tariff free status for Afghanistan and Pakistans border district to export all types of manufactured goods to EU and USA without any quota controls or tariffs can be a very workable incentive. Pakistan must be engaged and allowed some influence in Taliban controlled area so that its fears about Indian penetration are addressed. The USA had three broad options and still has them . The first is the MONGOL option which is EXTERMINATION , which is neither desirable nor advisable . The second is the MACHIAVELLIAN option which can work if combined with a third option of a MARSHALL PLAN.
  141. 141. 141 President Bush went one fourth distance towards a MARSHALL PLAN but got entangled in the IRAQ war and dissipation of effort. Obama tried an apology of a MONGOL option and was bound to fail , in the process sacrificing 1400 US military lives pointlessly.
  142. 142. 142 Nothing is lost even now if MACHIAVELLI and MARSHALL are combined imaginatively and the TRUMP administration can do it if hard work is put
  143. 143. 143 in and statesmanship combined with carrots of economic incentives. ANNEXURES
  144. 144. 144
  145. 145. 145
  146. 146. 146
  147. 147. 147
  148. 148. 148
  149. 149. 149
  150. 150. 150
  151. 151. 151
  152. 152. 152
  153. 153. 153
  154. 154. 154
  155. 155. 155
  156. 156. 156
  157. 157. 157
  158. 158. 158
  159. 159. 159
  160. 160. 160
  161. 161. 161
  162. 162. 162
  163. 163. 163

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