Abstract. The number of terrorist attacks that have brought about bloodshed and left a mark on recent history have spotlighted once again the need to stem the attempts by terrorist organizations to conduct attacks within the EU, forestalling the intentions of the martyrs-to-be. The Islamic State of Iraq and Syria (ISIS) is undoubtedly the terrorist group that, more than others, has taken advantage of Internet, not only as a tactical means of coordination, but also as a tool to carry out proselytism, recruitment, propaganda, and fundraising. As one could imagine, constantly monitoring the Internet for these activities is an extremely complex and time-consuming activity, requiring a huge amount of money and manpower, and resulting in very poor – and only temporary – outcomes. To stem this rapidly spreading phenomenon, it can be useful to focus the attention of decision-makers, intelligence and law enforcement on a possible profile of a “cyber terrorist”. This paper aims at tracing the identikit of a possible “cyber terrorist” that is as broad and consistent as possible. Keywords. Al-Qaeda, cyber terrorist, Internet, ISIS, Islamic State, profiling, propaganda, proselytism, recruiting, terrorist organizations

1. Countering Terrorism, Preventing
Radicalization and Protecting
Cultural Heritage
The Role of Human Factors and Technology
Edited by
Alessandro Niglia
Atlantic Treaty Association
Amer Al Sabaileh
MEMPSI
and
Amani (Amneh) Hammad
NAMA Strategic Int. Solutions
Amsterdam • Berlin • Washington, DC
Published in cooperation with NATO Emerging Security Challenges Division

2. Proceedings of the NATO Advanced Research Workshop on Human Factors in the Defense
Against Terrorism: The Case of Jordan
Amman, Jordan
21–23 November 2016
© 2017 The authors and IOS Press.
All rights reserved. No part of this book may be reproduced, stored in a retrieval system,
or transmitted, in any form or by any means, without prior written permission from the publisher.
ISBN 978-1-61499-754-2 (print)
ISBN 978-1-61499-755-9 (online)
Library of Congress Control Number: 2017940897
Publisher
IOS Press BV
Nieuwe Hemweg 6B
1013 BG Amsterdam
Netherlands
fax: +31 20 687 0019
e-mail: order@iospress.nl
For book sales in the USA and Canada:
IOS Press, Inc.
6751 Tepper Drive
Clifton, VA 20124
USA
Tel.: +1 703 830 6300
Fax: +1 703 830 2300
sales@iospress.com
LEGAL NOTICE
The author(s) of this publication is/are solely responsible for its content. This
publication does not reflect the opinion of the publisher. The publisher cannot be held
liable for any loss or damage that may occur because of this publication.
PRINTED IN THE NETHERLANDS

3. Contents
Foreword v
Fabrizio W. Luciolli
Preface vii
Alessandro Niglia
Introduction ix
Jason Wiseman
Lead Authors and Editors xi
Special Feature
Preventing Terroristic Attacks Against Cultural Heritage as Part of a Critical
Infrastructure Protection Strategy 1
Alessandro Niglia and Letizia Torretta
Part I. Radicalization and Terrorism: New Challenges and Solutions
“Terrorism” and “Extremism” and the Implications for CVE Strategy 19
Hussein Al Majali and Robert Akira Watson
Jordan Faces New Waves and Challenges of Terrorism: Enough Theorizing,
Time for Action 34
Amer Sabaileh and Mohammed Abu Dalhoum
Italian Foreign Terrorist Fighters: A Quantitative Analysis of Radicalization
Risk Factors 40
Alessandro Boncio
Profiling Violent Actions Through Values – An Analysis of the Mindset
of People Justifying Violence, MENA Region in Comparison 52
Bi Puranen and Frej Welander
Part II. Technology and Human Factors – Two Faces of the Same Coin
Against Terrorism
How to Counter the Extremists on Social Media 71
Awni Al Adwan and Daniel Brancalion Lind
The Resurgence of al-Qaeda? Consequences of the Syrian Conflict’s
Denouement 84
Halistair Harris, Frej Welander, Daniel Lind and Robert Akira Watson
Terrorism and the Internet: Finding a Profile of the Islamic “Cyber Terrorist” 103
Stefano Mele
xiii

4. Part III. Enhancing Information Sharing Among NATO Member and
Partner Countries
The Importance of Information Sharing in the Fight Against Terrorism 117
Selene Picozzi
Preventing Terrorism Through International Support for Border Security 123
Jamal Madain and Frej Welander
Subject Index 135
Author Index 137
xiv

5. Terrorism and the Internet: Finding
a Profile of the Islamic “Cyber Terrorist”
Dr. Stefano MELE1
Director of “Information Warfare and Emerging Technologies” Observatory,
Italian Institute of Strategic Studies “Niccolò Machiavelli”
Abstract. The number of terrorist attacks that have brought about bloodshed and
left a mark on recent history have spotlighted once again the need to stem the at-
tempts by terrorist organizations to conduct attacks within the EU, forestalling the
intentions of the martyrs-to-be. The Islamic State of Iraq and Syria (ISIS) is un-
doubtedly the terrorist group that, more than others, has taken advantage of Internet,
not only as a tactical means of coordination, but also as a tool to carry out proselyt-
ism, recruitment, propaganda, and fundraising. As one could imagine, constantly
monitoring the Internet for these activities is an extremely complex and time-con-
suming activity, requiring a huge amount of money and manpower, and resulting in
very poor – and only temporary – outcomes. To stem this rapidly spreading phe-
nomenon, it can be useful to focus the attention of decision-makers, intelligence and
law enforcement on a possible profile of a “cyber terrorist”.
This paper aims at tracing the identikit of a possible “cyber terrorist” that is as
broad and consistent as possible.
Keywords. Al-Qaeda, cyber terrorist, Internet, ISIS, Islamic State, profiling, prop-
aganda, proselytism, recruiting, terrorist organizations
1. Introduction
The number of terrorist attacks that have brought about bloodshed and left a mark on
recent history have spotlighted once again the issue never settled about the need to stem
attempts by terrorist organizations to conduct attacks within the EU, forestalling the in-
tentions of the martyrs-to-be.
Even though official data are not yet available on the level of such a threat in 2016,
the latest Europol “European Union Terrorism Situation and Trend Report 2016”
1
Stefano Mele is “Of Counsel” to the Italian Carnelutti Law Firm, where he is in charge of the Technology,
Privacy, Cybersecurity and Intelligence Legal Department. He holds a PhD from the University of Foggia, and
cooperates with the Department of Legal Informatics at the Faculty of Law of the University of Milan. He is
the co-founder and Partner of the Moire Consulting Group. He is the President of the “Cyber Security Working
Group” of the American Chamber of Commerce in Italy (AMCHAM), and member of the “Cyber Security
Roundtable” of Regione Lombardia and of the “Advisory Board on Cyber Security” of Assolombarda. He is
Director of the “InfoWarfare and Emerging Technologies” Observatory of the Italian Institute of Strategic
Studies ‘Niccolò Machiavelli’, and co-founder and President of the CyberPARCO non-profit Organization.
Stefano is also a lecturer for several universities and military research institutions of the Italian MoD and
NATO, and he authored several academic papers and articles, and provided legal and strategic insights on
specialized magazines and websites on cyber security, cyber intelligence, cyber terrorism and cyber warfare
topics. In 2014, his name appeared in the list of NATO Key Opinion Leaders for Cyberspace Security. In 2014,
the business magazine Forbes listed Stefano as one of the world’s best 20 Cyber Policy Experts to follow
online.
Countering Terrorism, Preventing Radicalization and Protecting Cultural Heritage
A. Niglia et al. (Eds.)
IOS Press, 2017
© 2017 The authors and IOS Press. All rights reserved.
doi:10.3233/978-1-61499-755-9-103
103

6. stresses the fact that in 2015 no less than 211 terrorist attacks took place within the Eu-
ropean Union, all in the same six Member States: Denmark (2 attacks), France (73 at-
tacks, 15 of which were jihadist attacks), Greece (4 attacks), Italy (4 attacks), United
Kingdom (103 attacks) and Spain (25 attacks).
Such attacks have caused 151 fatalities and over 360 injured.
Meanwhile, still in 2015, 1,077 individuals were arrested for terrorism-related
crimes, 687 of whom were charged with conducting religiously-inspired terrorist activi-
ties. The highest concentrations of arrests was in France (424 arrests, 377 of which for
jihadist affiliation), Spain (187 arrests, 75 of which for jihadist affiliation), Belgium (61
arrests, 60 of which for jihadist affiliation), United Kingdom (134 arrests for non-speci-
fied reasons), while 40 individuals were arrested in Italy, all of whom were presumably
ISIS members.
Almost two thirds of those arrested (63%) proved to be European citizens, 58% by
birth.
Figure 1. Europol “European Union Terrorism Situation and Trend Report 2016”.
Figure 2. Europol “European Union Terrorism Situation and Trend Report 2016”.
S. Mele / Terrorism and the Internet: Finding a Profile of the Islamic “Cyber Terrorist”
104

7. 2. The Use of Internet for Terrorist Purposes by ISIS
Due to the ever-increasing number of European citizens involved in terrorist acts, experts
have focused greater attention on the methods used by terrorists to radicalize and shape
the thoughts of European shahid-to-be, despite being so close to Western principles both
by birth and culture, and also distant from religious radicalization areas.
The Internet is one of the most popular and effective means to this end. Indeed, it is
through the Internet that ISIS has cheated geographic distance to gain supporters world-
wide, fostering their emotional involvement and adhesion to the principles of jihad and
martyrdom.
Despite being considered by the media as capable of conducting significant com-
puter attacks, i.e. attacks to national critical infrastructures, or the creation of cyber weap-
ons on its own, this terrorist organization has never actually raised the bar.
The four main groups supporting the Islamic State – the Cyber Caliphate, the Elite
Islamic State Hackers, the Islamic Cyber Arm, and the Islamic State Hacking Division
have shown poor capabilities in computer attacks. They have simply carried out Distrib-
uted Denial of Service attacks (using very basic software, like the “Caliphate Cannon”
DDoS tool), defaced websites and social network accounts, and disclosed personal data
of government personnel, obtained through basic social engineering techniques.
Instead, what the Islamic State is more focused on is finding the most secure means
of communication possible.
Using the Internet to recruit new supporters is a double-edged sword; in some cases,
ISIS members spreading jihadi propaganda online have been identified, geolocated, and
even killed due to the high levels of exposure. This is the case with Junaid Hussain, also
known as Abu Hussain al-Britani, born in Birmingham and leading member of the Cyber
Caliphate. Al-Britani was located and killed by an American drone in Raqqa last August,
as a result of the “traces” left of his on-line activity.
Although ISIS propaganda, and subsequently the media, depict ISIS as capable of
developing software for secure – as in the recent case with the mobile app called Alrawi –
there is actually no trace on the Internet of such software, nor of the Alrawi app. On the
contrary, most evidence suggests that ISIS primarily uses popular mobile chat applica-
tions like Conversations, Telegram, Threema, and Signal. All the rest is merely propa-
ganda.
In this context, in order to deeply understand the role actually played by the Internet
and the reasons behind its massive use for terrorist purposes, the “ease” this tool offers
must be highlighted. The benefits it offers are obvious:
• the opportunity to create long-distance networks of individuals almost effort-
lessly, and at a low cost;
• the ability to act totally anonymously;
• the opportunity to create cost-free, real-time information sharing;
• the ability to access shared information worldwide;
• the ability to easily reactivate accounts linked to existing “social networks”, in
order to prevent a website blackout or removal from jeopardizing the stability
of the active network.
In addition, terrorist organizations’ broader internet strategy also needs to be inves-
tigated. In this regard, it is useful to consider that the use of the Internet:
S. Mele / Terrorism and the Internet: Finding a Profile of the Islamic “Cyber Terrorist” 105

8. • makes it easier for new recruits to join a terrorist organization;
• assures that the organization can communicate with the remotest extremist cells;
• allows extremists to easily strengthen their messages and terrorist acts, backing
them with videos, sounds and images;
• creates a new “social context” where the terrorist-to-be realizes that even the
least socially-acceptable and most disgusting ideas are actually considered “nor-
mal” and desirable.
Hence, by simply analyzing the above elements, it is undeniable that the Internet has
acquired quite a significant role in this field, encouraging, increasing, and accelerating
the usual process of propaganda and radicalization.
Still, mere propaganda and proselytism activities are not the only benefits arising
from the use of Internet and technology by terrorist groups, even if they certainly repre-
sent the main ones. Further possible activities are to be included in the threat spectrum,
such as:
• recruit, radicalize and incite toward terrorist acts;
• train terrorists-to-be via videos and instructions released on online forums, sites,
or direct-messaging platforms;
• finance terrorist acts by directly calling for donations, using e-commerce plat-
forms, and online payments or even by creating fake charities;
• plan, organize and coordinate terrorist acts.
3. Islamic Terrorists and the Internet: Past and Present Protagonists
As it is easy to guess, constantly monitoring the Internet looking for the above-mentioned
events is an extremely complex and time-consuming activity, requiring a huge amount
of money and manpower, and resulting in very poor, temporary outcomes. In an attempt
to stem such a clearly spreading phenomenon, it can be useful to focus the attention of
decision-makers, intelligence, and law enforcement on a possible “profile” of a cyber
terrorist.
To this end, it is crucial to analyze the information about some of the most important
militants active in recruiting online, radicalizing, making propaganda and proselytism,
and sponsoring some of the most relevant and bloody terrorist organizations, so as to
trace a common “profile” of such individuals, to be used for future investigations.
4. The Case of “Azzam the American”
Adam Yahiye Gadahn, also called “Azzam the American”, is historically the symbol of
the West joining the ranks of Islamic radicalism.
Born in 1978 to a Jewish father and an Orthodox Christian mother, Gadahn took
after his father’s revolutionary and contrarian nature early on. His father, in fact, was
first a Jew and then converted to Christianity shortly before Gadahn was born. Keen on
death metal music and occultism, Gadahn moved to his grandparents’ house in the sum-
mer of 1995 and started working in a computer shop, where he became very interested
in the Internet, spending all his free time browsing the web.
S. Mele / Terrorism and the Internet: Finding a Profile of the Islamic “Cyber Terrorist”
106

9. Gadahn soon found in Islam the purpose of his life, joining the Orange County Is-
lamic Society in California, and permanently converting on November 17th, 1995. He
renounced his past life and became very radicalized, eventually even attacking even the
Imam of his mosque, Haitham Bundakji, in May 1997. Shortly after, and through the
agency of two militants of the Orange County Islamic Society – Hisham Diab and Khaled
Deek – Gadahn travelled for the first time to Pakistan and visited training camps funded
by Diab and Deek’s Charity Without Borders.
By the time he turned thirty, Gadahn had become an institution in Al-Qaeda’s Inter-
net propaganda committee, even heading Osama Bin Laden’s public relations. Al-
Qaeda’s media revolution is due almost entirely to Gadahn, thanks to the videos released
by “As-Sahab Media”: which, under his supervision, became more elaborate and more
adaptable, learning from past mistakes (draping a jute tarp behind Bin Laden was an
emblematic gesture, following an attempt made by some geologists to identify the area
in which the shooting had taken place).
5. The Case of “Irhabi 007”
If “Azzam the American” is the typical case of a Westerner converted to Islam, then the
case of the 22-year old Moroccan Younes Tsouli – alias “Irhabi 007” (“Terrorist 007”)
is the classical example of a non-Westerner that was unable to integrate properly in the
West. His activities took place in the United States, but in Italy as well. According to
Scotland Yard, in fact, he is responsible for the threats sent to Italy by “Khaled ibn al-
Walid Brigade” and “Abu Hafs al-Masri Brigade” in the summer of 2004; fortunately,
these attacks were never carried out.
From 2003 to October 2005, in fact, and without ever leaving his house in London –
Younes Tsouli managed to become first the correspondent of Abu Maysara al-Iraqi, then
a press agent for Al-Qaeda and Al Zarqawi, eventually becoming a figurehead for Al-
Qaeda online propaganda via the forums Muntada al-Ansar al-Islami and al-Ekhlas.
S. Mele / Terrorism and the Internet: Finding a Profile of the Islamic “Cyber Terrorist” 107

10. Highly computer-literate, Tsouli has
always studied and worked, even after
moving to London together with his father.
Nonetheless, he was unsatisfied with the
world around him, and found little solace in
the few friends he had; so Tsouli spent
many hours at the computer, creating a par-
allel life, spent spreading Al-Qaeda decla-
rations and propaganda videos. On May
11th, 2004, Muntada al-Ansar al-Islami
was the first to release the video showing
Nick Berg’s beheading, probably received
directly from Abu Maysara al-Iraqi; this so-
lidified Tsouli’s role as the encomium of
Al-Qaeda propaganda. He has also carried
out real hacking, in order to gain access to
valid credit card numbers or to breach U.S.
companies’ information systems and web-
sites so as to use them for propaganda. He
also started projects aimed at using his technical and IT skills by means of e-books, which
are still in use today.
The international scientific community has paid much attention to the case of Younis
Tsouli because he is an unusual exception. An essential aspect to be found in extremist
indoctrination and recruitment phases is still mainly linked to the ties established through
interpersonal relations. Many experts in the field have in fact highlighted several times
that, although the Internet plays a primary role in supporting and facilitating ideological
radicalization, it never totally replaces the need for direct human contact between terror-
ists-to-be and their recruiters. The case of “Irhabi 007” is instead the classical “exception
which proves the rule”.
6. The Case of Faisal Errai
Faisal Errai is another Moroccan “leading” figure in Al-Qaeda-related cyber-terrorism.
From 2008 until his arrest in 2010, Errai has been the spearhead of the Ansar Al
S. Mele / Terrorism and the Internet: Finding a Profile of the Islamic “Cyber Terrorist”
108

11. Mujahideen forum, despite his young age (26 years old), also becoming the forum
webmaster in 2009.
At the highest point of his jihadist propaganda career, not only has Errai pursued
promotional activities through the forum – earning a prominent role as the contact point
for the most relevant terrorist organizations linked to Al-Qaeda – but he has also worked
as a recruiter of shahid-to-be, helping them move from virtual world to the reality of
training camps. Up to the moment it was temporarily closed, following Errai’s arrest,
Ansar Al Mujahideen forum has in fact been considered as one of the biggest and most
fruitful channels to distribute “merchandising” material for Al-Qaeda propaganda and
recruit future martyrs, totaling 5,500 registered users and over 100,000 published mes-
sages.
Faisal Errai is very young, has a passion for IT, few friends, and found it difficult to
completely integrate with his new environment. So, he created a double life: one in which
he seems to be a “westernized” person, even appearing uninterested in religion, and a
second which exists in the international jihadist propaganda network, where he is a real
Muslim warrior devoted to the common cause.
7. ISIS and Media
So far, no terrorist organization has managed to equal ISIS’s success in exploiting media
and the Internet. Massive use of IT means for public communication is an integral part
of their strategy to attack the West It is not a case in fact that the speech made on July
4th 2014 – in which Abu Bakr al-Baghdadi officially declared the caliphate – was antic-
ipated on Twitter with some pictures taken directly from his speech: it was a device to
create the right “waiting” atmosphere for the followers.
Abu Amr Al-Shami presently leads the ISIS online propaganda section. A Syrian
citizen, but born in Saudi Arabia in 1979, Al-Shami is the head of a very fragmented
group of sympathizers scattered around North Africa and the Gulf Region. Led by al-
Shami, these sympathizers have made ISIS the most effective and fruitful terrorist group
S. Mele / Terrorism and the Internet: Finding a Profile of the Islamic “Cyber Terrorist” 109

12. online, publishing a modern magazine “Dabiq”, as well as blogs, social media, and web-
sites – all of which are unprecedented in quality and quantity.
In addition, the organization’s message is spread through the al-Ḥayāt Media Cen-
ter, as well as the mobile app for jihadist propaganda known as “The Dawn of Glad
Tidings.” A huge proselytism effort is carried out on alternative and emerging social
networks, such as Quitter and Diaspora, or also on websites such as http://www.al-
furqan.com/ and https://alhayatmedia.wordpress.com/ (this latter being used as a real
channel for recruitment).
As of now, only the head of the ISIS propaganda section has been publicly identified;
but analysis of contents and IT methodologies suggests that a number of figures lie be-
hind the leader, mainly from North Africa and the Gulf Region. However, these people
have such a advanced computer skills that it is highly likely they have been living in
Western countries for a long time.
8. The Case of Junaid Hussain
Junaid Hussain was born in 1994 and grew up in Birmingham, England, in a Pakistani-
origin family. By day, he was an aspiring rapper. By night, he was TriCk, an outspoken
and respected member of the disbanded pro-Palestinian hacker-crew TeaMp0isoN and
an ally of the well-known hacktivist collective Anonymous.
In 2012, Hussain, then still identifying as TriCk and a member of TeaMp0isoN crew,
had been sentenced to six months in prison for hacking the Gmail account of Tony Blair
and posting his personal information online.
After his short sojourn in prison, Hussain had traded in TeaMp0isoN for ISIS, put-
ting his hacker skills to work for the Cyber Caliphate, the “digital army” for the ISIS.
By then he was also known as Abu Hussain al-Britani, a charismatic British jihadist and
a celebrity for the jihadist network.
Hussain, who was married to ex-punk rocker Sally Jones, is thought to have also
fled to Syria in 2013 while he was on bail in the UK.
In his career as a leading member of the Cyber Caliphate, he is believed to have
aided ISIS in obtaining the passwords of the U.S. Central Command’s Twitter and
S. Mele / Terrorism and the Internet: Finding a Profile of the Islamic “Cyber Terrorist”
110

13. YouTube accounts in January 2015 and briefly using them to send pro-ISIS messages.
He was also involved in defacing French websites during the January 2015 Île-de-France
terrorist attacks.
In March 2015, Hussain released a list of 1,300 U.S. military personnel requesting
that ISIS followers execute people on the list. While Hussain claimed to have breached
U.S. Department of Defense servers, the FBI insisted that the list was cobbled together
from news articles, social media posts, and public records.
More important were Hussain’s efforts as an online recruiter. According to court
records, he communicated with at least four men in four states, imploring them to initiate
attacks or help spread the Islamic State’s message.
Hussain was listed as the third highest ISIS target on the Pentagon’s “kill list”, be-
hind Abu Bakr al-Baghdadi and Mohammed Emwazi, due to his role in inspiring inter-
national lone wolf terrorism.
He was located and killed by an American drone in August 2015, outside Raqqa,
because of the “traces” left of his online activity.
9. Islamic Terrorists and the Internet: Who to Look For?
Despite focusing exclusively on the leading figures of the movement, the framework
outlined still seems to be useful to trace origins and behavior common to all those active
in the field of terrorist propaganda, for whatever reason.
The first useful element is about sex and age. All those analyzed are males, with an
average age presently identified as ranging between 20 and 35 years old, of whom the
highest inclination trend is to be found in those aged 20 to 25. This can also be easily
attributed to the higher inclination of users aged 20–25 to be seduced and captivated by
propaganda and radicalization activities carried out through the Internet. In addition,
“cyber-terrorism” related matters seem to be extremely popular in North Africa. That is
in fact where youngsters moved to/born in Europe (or, more generally speaking, in a
Western country) draw information from. The Persian Gulf area, instead, is the place
where youngsters still living in their birthplace operate.
The education level of those analyzed also does not seem to be very low – many of
them having attended university, especially if “second generation” or residing in the
West for a long time. On the other hand, though, they do not seem to be particularly
computer literate and have high-level IT and hacking skills. Although the majority of
those aged 20–25 today have an inclination/passion for these subjects, it is jihadist fo-
rums and websites that actually train directly on secure communication techniques, how
to mask IP (Internet Protocol) addresses, cryptography, steganography, and use of the
so-called “darknets” as well as malware.
As for behavior, one common factor is that the subjects are poorly-integrated –
which is something that often goes unnoticed in everyday life (also inside the mosques)
and at work. Even though such individuals are never completely isolated, they spend all
their free time on the Internet, creating on jihadist forums and websites their “real” world
made of relationships, recognition, and personal revenge.
During the first phases of their commitment for the jihadist cause, these individu-
als – often suffering from an avoidant personality disorder – do not mean to be personally
involved in the war of religion they undertake to promote. As time passes, though, they
become first eager to visit their families’ place of origin; then, they tend to feel the need
S. Mele / Terrorism and the Internet: Finding a Profile of the Islamic “Cyber Terrorist” 111

14. (pushed by those around them) to visit training camps and become actively involved in
terrorist activities. So, it goes full circle: the propaganda and radicalization process of
extremist ideology has in fact its first effects on the very same individuals involved in
the propaganda itself.
Today the radicalization process is opposite to what happened in the past: starting
from the bottom, trying to reach the top. These young people, in fact – more and more
frequently “second generation” individuals – while first approaching jihadist ideology
through their family or their few friends/acquaintances, then start a lonely, silent research
journey to discover jihadist ideology on their own on the Internet, getting radicalized and
spontaneously volunteering for the cause, hoping to be “noticed” by the leaders.
10. Identikit of an Islamic “Cyber Terrorist”
SEX: Male.
AGE: 20/35 years old.
CITIZENSHIP: Mainly European or Western, more and more
often by birth.
RELIGION: Muslim.
ORIGIN OF THE FAMILY: Mainly North Africa or the Persian
Gulf.
SOCIAL STATUS OF THE FAMILY: Lower middle class; in
some cases, also middle class.
EDUCATION: Good education, often attended university.
PERSONALITY: Often characterized by behaviors ascribable to or caused by avoidant
personality disorders.
BEHAVIOR CHARACTERISTICS:
Shy and with few friends but not completely unsociable.
Curious about Islamic extremist theological doctrines, become acquainted
through family or the narrow circle of friends.
Regularly goes to the mosque, but does not discuss his role or the propaganda
he carries out on the Internet.
Somewhat skilled in the use of the Internet and technologies, but not necessarily
an expert.
Eager to take revenge on the surrounding society and strongly linked to his fam-
ily’s (for “second generation” individuals) or his own home country.
Looking for a personal identity and a well-defined role in society: religious ex-
tremism and the “distance” given by the Internet are a perfect mix.
Carries out most of the propaganda usually at home or in places he considers
familiar and “safe”.
As time passes, he proves available to move from the virtual world to the reality
of training camps; something not taken into consideration at all in the first
phases of engagement in jihadist propaganda.
S. Mele / Terrorism and the Internet: Finding a Profile of the Islamic “Cyber Terrorist”
112

15. References
Barrett R., “The Islamic State”, The Soufan Group, 2015.
Europol, “European Union Terrorism Situation and Trend Report 2016”, 2016. https://www.europol.
europa.eu/activities-services/main-reports/european-union-terrorism-situation-and-trend-report-te-sat-
2016.
Goldman A., Schmitt E., “One by One, ISIS Social Media Experts Are Killed as Result of F.B.I. Program”, The
New York Times, 2016. https://www.nytimes.com/2016/11/24/world/middleeast/isis-recruiters-social-
media.html?_r=0
Hegghammer T., “The Rise of Muslim Foreign Fighters: Islam and the Globalization of Jihad”, International
Security, Vol. 35, No. 3 (2010), 53–94. http://belfercenter.ksg.harvard.edu/publication/20601/rise_of_
muslim_foreign_fighters.html.
Jacobson M., “Terrorist Financing and the Internet”, Studies in Conflict Terrorism, 2010.
Jarvis L., Macdonald S., “What Is Cyberterrorism? Findings from a Survey of Researchers”, Terrorism and
Political Violence, 2014.
Khatchadourian R., “Azzam The American: The making of an Al Qaeda homegrown”, The New Yorker, 2007.
http://www.newyorker.com/magazine/2007/01/22/azzam-the-american?currentPage=all.
Kohlmann E.F., “The Real Online Terrorist Threat”, Foreign Affairs, Vol. 85, No. 5 (2006), 115–124.
Mele S., “Terrorism: Islamic State”, Cyber Strategy Policy Brief, Volume 02 – February 2016, 2016. http://
stefanomele.it/public/documenti/452DOC-866.pdf.
Neumann P.R., “Foreign fighter total in Syria/Iraq now exceeds 20,000; surpasses Afghanistan conflict in the
1980s”, The International Centre for the Study of Radicalisation and Political Violence, 2015. http://icsr.
info/2015/01/foreign-fighter-total-syriairaq-now-exceeds-20000-surpasses-afghanistan-conflict-1980s/.
Neumann P.R., “The New Jihadism. A Global Snapshot”, The International Centre for the Study of Radicali-
sation and Political Violence, 2014. http://icsr.info/wp-content/uploads/2014/12/ICSR-REPORT-The-
New-Jihadism-A-Global-Snapshot.pdf.
Sageman M., “Leaderless Jihad: Terror Networks in the Twenty-First Century”, Pennsylvania University
Press, 2008.
Site Institute, “Irhabi 007 Unveiled: A Portrait of a Cyber-Terrorist”, SITE Report, 2006.
Torres-Soriano M.R., “The Hidden Face of Jihadist Internet Forum Management: The Case of Ansar Al Mu-
jahideen”, Terrorism and Political Violence, 2014.
Von Behr I., Reding A., Edwards C., Gribbon L., “Radicalisation in the digital era”, RAND Corporation, 2013.
http://www.rand.org/pubs/research_reports/RR453.html
Weimann G., “Cyber-Fatwas and Terrorism”, Studies in Conflict Terrorism, 2011.
S. Mele / Terrorism and the Internet: Finding a Profile of the Islamic “Cyber Terrorist” 113
The author(s) of this publication is/are solely responsible for its content. This
publication does not reflect the opinion of the publisher. The publisher cannot be held
liable for any loss or damage that may occur because of this publication.