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Let’s Encrypt and DANE
CaribNOG 13 | Barbados | 18 Apr 2017
The Deploy360 Programme
The Challenge:
– The IETF creates protocols based on open standards, but
some are not widely known or deployed
– People seeking to implement these protocols are confused by
a lack of clear, concise deployment information
The Deploy360 solution:
– Provide hands-on information on IPv6, DNSSEC, TLS for
Applications, Securing BGP, and Anti-spoofing to advance
real-world deployment
– Work with first adopters to collect and create technical
resources and distribute these resources to fast following
networks
Web Portal – http://www.isoc.org/deploy360
IPv6, DNSSEC, Securing BGP, TLS for Applications, Anti-
Spoofing knowledge base including tutorials, case
studies, training resources, etc..
Content specific to:
– Network Operators
– Developers
– Content Providers
– Consumer Electronics
Manufacturers
– Enterprise Customers
Blog posts
Social media integration
Some IPv6 resources
NAT64check
Checks websites display properly over
IPv4, IPv6-only and NAT64
https://nat64check.go6lab.si/
BGP@Go6
Compare BGP peering polices
between IPv4 and IPv6 for different
ASNs
https://bgp.go6.si
The Deploy360 Team
• Kevin Meynell – Content & Resource Manager
• Megan Kruse – Technology Outreach and Strategic Planning Manager
• Aftab Siddiqui – Technical Engagement Manager
• Jan Žorž – Operational Engagement Programme Manager
Disclaimer:
I do not work for Let’s Encrypt,
but the Internet Society is a sponsor
Slides contributed by:
Josh Aas (Let’s Encrypt)
Jan Žorž (Internet Society)
Thanks also to Viktor Dukhovni
A Free, Automated and Open Certificate Authority (CA)
– To encourage and simplify adoption of TLS and provide platform for
advancing CA and end user security.
– Certificates are free for anyone owning a domain name
– Software running on a web server can automatically obtain,
configure and renew a certificate
– All certificates issued or revoked will be publicly recorded and
available for anyone to inspect.
– The automatic issuance and renewal protocol is published as an
open IETF standard that others can adopt.
– Let’s Encrypt is an effort to benefit the community beyond the control
of any one organisation.
Why do we need it?
– The Internet is inherently insecure, unencrypted traffic can be read
and modified.
– TLS (formerly SSL) is used to encrypt web connections using
HTTPS, but can also be used for e-mail, instant messaging,
streaming, VoIP and other applications.
– Around 55% of Firefox page loads are HTTPS, and 62% of emails
received by Gmail are over STARTLS.
– Aim is to have 100% of Internet traffic encrypted, and by default.
– CAs are (currently) needed to validate domains and link them with
public keys used to establish encrypted connections.
But, authentication via traditional CA is not easy
– CAs issue the X.509 certificates required for TLS on the Web
– Interaction with CAs for certificate issuance and management is
complex
In fact, it’s too hard…
I can’t f’ ing figure out
how to get a cert …
God help people that
don’t know what a CSR
is…
I am like 45 minutes in.
Cullen Jennings, Cisco Fellow
The traditional way…
– Figure out you need a certificate
– Work out where to get the certificate from
– What type of certificate you need - DV, OV, EV or maybe you want the
Regular, Pro, Gold or Platinum versions? Hmm...
– Figure out how to request a certificate, including making a CSR
– Go through manual verification process, hoping that responses go to the
right e-mail addresses (assuming they exist in the first place), and your
organisation has a publicly listed phone number and/or DUNS number etc..
– Pay
– Figure out how to install your certificate
– Don’t forget to renew it on time!
Let’s Encrypt is born...
– Josh Aas and Eric Rescorla decided to address this problem after
discussions in IETF HTTP/2 Working Group
– Decided solution was to establish CA offering free certificates
globally, but (only) supporting automated processes.
– Established Internet Security Research Group in May 2013, a
foundation with IRS 501(c)(3) status
– Mission is to reduce financial, technological and educational barriers
to secure communication over the Internet.
– Let’s Encrypt announced on Nov 2014, started trials in Sep 2015,
public beta in Dec 2015, and entered production service in Apr 2016
– Funded by 30+ sponsors making long-term commitments
What’s different?
– Automated Certificate Management Environment (ACME), the key to
Let’s Encrypt
– Provides API for requesting, validating, revoking and otherwise
managing certificates
– Clients must request certificates from Let’s Encrypt via ACME
– Certbot is recommended client software, but others are available
– ACME is being standardized:
The technical details…
– Let’s Encrypt certificates are Domain Validation (DV) – asserts that
holder has control over a domain
– Validation is undertaken through challenge verification
 HTTP: a file on your web server
 DVSNI: provisioning virtual host at your domain’s IP address
 DNS: provision a DNS TXT record for your domain
– Certificates have 90-day lifetime
 Encourages automation
 Limits damage from key compromise or mis-issuance
 Mitigates the problems of certificate revocation
Trust anchor…
– End entity certificates are validated through a chain-of-trust
originating from a root certificate, known as the trust anchor
– Root certificate trust is established through distribution of root
certificates in operating systems or browsers
 Main certification programs are Microsoft, Apple and Mozilla
– Let’s Encrypt issues certificates from intermediate CA called Let’s
Encrypt Authority X3, signed by ISRG Root X1
– ISRG Root X1 accepted by Mozilla, Apple and Google root
programs
– ISRG Root X1 is cross-signed by IdenTrust DST Root CA X3 to
support other OSs and browsers
ACME Clients…
– Let’s Encrypt uses ACME protocol to verify and issues certificates
– Need to use ACME-compliant client software
– Recommended to use Certbot developed by EFF
 Supports MacOS, Linux and various Unix flavours
 This also works with other CAs supporting ACME
 https://certbot.eff.org
– Many other clients supporting other platforms (e.g. Windows)
 https://letsencrypt.org/docs/client-options/
How successful is it?
Is it encouraging use of TLS?
Issues with conventional Internet PKI
Inherent weakness is that third parties (CAs) are able to
issue certificates for any name or organisation
– CAs have issued incorrect certificates in the past
– Risk of CA issuing incorrect certificate increases with number of CAs
– Particular concern with code-signing certificates as comprise can
allow malware to be distributed as digitally-signed trusted
applications
– OV and EV were introduced to improve checks, but still problematic
on a global scale + largely requires users to identify these types of
certificates are being used
– Not ideal for automated systems such as e-mail servers
Using the DNS and DNSSEC
DNS is the main method to locate Internet services, and allows domain
name holders to control the records related to their services
DNS Security Extensions (DNSSEC) uses public key cryptography to
digitally sign their DNS records, ensuring only the domain name holder
can make changes
DNSSEC records can be validated through chain-of-trust up to the root
zone, ensuring that a client making a query can verify the returned
information is from the entity authorised to provide it
DNSSEC can also be used to authenticate TLS client and server entities
DNS-Authenticated Name Entities (DANE)
DANE is a protocol that allows certificates to be cryptographically bound
to DNS names
– Domain administrators can certify the keys used for establishing TLS
sessions by storing them in the DNS
– Aims to improve inherent situation whereby any CA can issue
certificate for any name
– Requires DNS records to be signed with DNSSEC
– Uses TLSA records to associate a TLS certificate or public key with
a domain name
– Clients need to be DNSSEC and DANE aware
DNS TLSA Records
DNS TLSA records associate certificates or public keys with domains
– Defined in RFC 6698
– Usage, Selector and Matching Types fields determine which CAs,
certificates and hashes can be accepted
– Let’s Encrypt recommends 2 1 1 and 3 1 1 records
TLSA record for mx.go6lab.si
_25._tcp.mx.go6lab.si. IN TLSA 3 0 1
B4B7A46F9F0DFEA0151C2E07A5AD7908F4C8B0050E7CC25908DA0
5E2 A84748ED
The above is a hash of TLS certificate on mx.go6lab.si
When do things fail in DANE?
When do things fail in DANE?
– TLSA record is published in non-DNSSEC zone (therefore can’t trust
the data)
– Domain where looked up records (e.g. MX) reside are not DNSSEC
signed (therefore no verification)
– Wrong certificate hash in TLSA record
Let’s Encrypt & DANE Experiment
Internet Society & Go6Lab experimented with DANE & e-mail
– Setup DNSSEC on PowerDNS and signed with OpenDNSSEC
– Used Postfix mail server with TLS support (3.0.1, although 3.2 now
available)
– Requested and downloaded Let’s Encrypt certificate
– Generated TLSA record for mx.go6lab.si (using chaingen)
– Added TLSA record to DNS
– Verified TLS certificates on domains known to have DANE support
(e.g. nlnetlabs.nl)
– Developed script that fetched top 1 million Alexa domains and sent
an e-mail to each of them
Experiment Results
ISOC / Go6Lab tested SMTP connections to Alexa Top 1
million domain names
– 70% of attempted sessions were encrypted with TLS
– 60% of TLS sessions were established with trusted certificate
– Other sessions used untrusted certificate or opportunistic TLS
– None of the top 10 mail servers and their domains were DNSSEC
signed (as of Jan 2016)
– Only 128 sites could be verified with TLSA by DANE!
– How can this be improved?
Let’s Encrypt Issues
Validity of Let’s Encrypt certificate is 90 days
– By default the underlying key is changed when renewing
– So also is hash, so work needed if planning to publish 3 1 1 TLSA
– Using 2 1 1 TLSA means lack of DST Root CA X3 in certificate chain
– So need to fetch DST Root CA X3 certificate and add it to
fullchain.pem file
– However, how do we know if root certificate has changed?
– Trick is to use same CSR when Let’s Encrypt certificate is renewed,
and generate 2048 bit RSA private key
– This means same underlying key can be used for 3 1 1 TLSA
records, so hash doesn’t change
– Underlying key can be rotated on different schedule
Moral of the story…
70% of e-mail can already be encrypted in some way – so enable TLS on
your server!
Let’s Encrypt offers free certificates and automated ordering/installation,
so no excuse not to make encryption the default on the Internet
Using DANE is not that difficult and can be automated
But…
We need more DNSSEC signed domains!
We need even more DANE/TLSA verified servers!
Further Information
Deploy360 - DNSSEC
http://www.isoc.org/deploy360/dnssec/
Let’s Encrypt
https://letsencrypt.org/
HOWTO
http://www.internetsociety.org/deploy360/blog/2016/01/lets-encrypt-
certificates-for-mail-servers-and-dane-part-1-of-2/
http://www.internetsociety.org/deploy360/blog/2016/03/lets-encrypt-
certificates-for-mail-servers-and-dane-part-2-of-2/
https://dane.sys4.de/common_mistakes
Thank You!
Kevin Meynell
Deploy360@isoc.org

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Let's Encrypt + DANE

  • 1. Let’s Encrypt and DANE CaribNOG 13 | Barbados | 18 Apr 2017
  • 2. The Deploy360 Programme The Challenge: – The IETF creates protocols based on open standards, but some are not widely known or deployed – People seeking to implement these protocols are confused by a lack of clear, concise deployment information The Deploy360 solution: – Provide hands-on information on IPv6, DNSSEC, TLS for Applications, Securing BGP, and Anti-spoofing to advance real-world deployment – Work with first adopters to collect and create technical resources and distribute these resources to fast following networks
  • 3. Web Portal – http://www.isoc.org/deploy360 IPv6, DNSSEC, Securing BGP, TLS for Applications, Anti- Spoofing knowledge base including tutorials, case studies, training resources, etc.. Content specific to: – Network Operators – Developers – Content Providers – Consumer Electronics Manufacturers – Enterprise Customers Blog posts Social media integration
  • 4. Some IPv6 resources NAT64check Checks websites display properly over IPv4, IPv6-only and NAT64 https://nat64check.go6lab.si/ BGP@Go6 Compare BGP peering polices between IPv4 and IPv6 for different ASNs https://bgp.go6.si
  • 5. The Deploy360 Team • Kevin Meynell – Content & Resource Manager • Megan Kruse – Technology Outreach and Strategic Planning Manager • Aftab Siddiqui – Technical Engagement Manager • Jan Žorž – Operational Engagement Programme Manager
  • 6. Disclaimer: I do not work for Let’s Encrypt, but the Internet Society is a sponsor Slides contributed by: Josh Aas (Let’s Encrypt) Jan Žorž (Internet Society) Thanks also to Viktor Dukhovni
  • 7. A Free, Automated and Open Certificate Authority (CA) – To encourage and simplify adoption of TLS and provide platform for advancing CA and end user security. – Certificates are free for anyone owning a domain name – Software running on a web server can automatically obtain, configure and renew a certificate – All certificates issued or revoked will be publicly recorded and available for anyone to inspect. – The automatic issuance and renewal protocol is published as an open IETF standard that others can adopt. – Let’s Encrypt is an effort to benefit the community beyond the control of any one organisation.
  • 8. Why do we need it? – The Internet is inherently insecure, unencrypted traffic can be read and modified. – TLS (formerly SSL) is used to encrypt web connections using HTTPS, but can also be used for e-mail, instant messaging, streaming, VoIP and other applications. – Around 55% of Firefox page loads are HTTPS, and 62% of emails received by Gmail are over STARTLS. – Aim is to have 100% of Internet traffic encrypted, and by default. – CAs are (currently) needed to validate domains and link them with public keys used to establish encrypted connections.
  • 9. But, authentication via traditional CA is not easy – CAs issue the X.509 certificates required for TLS on the Web – Interaction with CAs for certificate issuance and management is complex
  • 10. In fact, it’s too hard… I can’t f’ ing figure out how to get a cert … God help people that don’t know what a CSR is… I am like 45 minutes in. Cullen Jennings, Cisco Fellow
  • 11. The traditional way… – Figure out you need a certificate – Work out where to get the certificate from – What type of certificate you need - DV, OV, EV or maybe you want the Regular, Pro, Gold or Platinum versions? Hmm... – Figure out how to request a certificate, including making a CSR – Go through manual verification process, hoping that responses go to the right e-mail addresses (assuming they exist in the first place), and your organisation has a publicly listed phone number and/or DUNS number etc.. – Pay – Figure out how to install your certificate – Don’t forget to renew it on time!
  • 12. Let’s Encrypt is born... – Josh Aas and Eric Rescorla decided to address this problem after discussions in IETF HTTP/2 Working Group – Decided solution was to establish CA offering free certificates globally, but (only) supporting automated processes. – Established Internet Security Research Group in May 2013, a foundation with IRS 501(c)(3) status – Mission is to reduce financial, technological and educational barriers to secure communication over the Internet. – Let’s Encrypt announced on Nov 2014, started trials in Sep 2015, public beta in Dec 2015, and entered production service in Apr 2016 – Funded by 30+ sponsors making long-term commitments
  • 13. What’s different? – Automated Certificate Management Environment (ACME), the key to Let’s Encrypt – Provides API for requesting, validating, revoking and otherwise managing certificates – Clients must request certificates from Let’s Encrypt via ACME – Certbot is recommended client software, but others are available – ACME is being standardized:
  • 14. The technical details… – Let’s Encrypt certificates are Domain Validation (DV) – asserts that holder has control over a domain – Validation is undertaken through challenge verification  HTTP: a file on your web server  DVSNI: provisioning virtual host at your domain’s IP address  DNS: provision a DNS TXT record for your domain – Certificates have 90-day lifetime  Encourages automation  Limits damage from key compromise or mis-issuance  Mitigates the problems of certificate revocation
  • 15. Trust anchor… – End entity certificates are validated through a chain-of-trust originating from a root certificate, known as the trust anchor – Root certificate trust is established through distribution of root certificates in operating systems or browsers  Main certification programs are Microsoft, Apple and Mozilla – Let’s Encrypt issues certificates from intermediate CA called Let’s Encrypt Authority X3, signed by ISRG Root X1 – ISRG Root X1 accepted by Mozilla, Apple and Google root programs – ISRG Root X1 is cross-signed by IdenTrust DST Root CA X3 to support other OSs and browsers
  • 16. ACME Clients… – Let’s Encrypt uses ACME protocol to verify and issues certificates – Need to use ACME-compliant client software – Recommended to use Certbot developed by EFF  Supports MacOS, Linux and various Unix flavours  This also works with other CAs supporting ACME  https://certbot.eff.org – Many other clients supporting other platforms (e.g. Windows)  https://letsencrypt.org/docs/client-options/
  • 18. Is it encouraging use of TLS?
  • 19. Issues with conventional Internet PKI Inherent weakness is that third parties (CAs) are able to issue certificates for any name or organisation – CAs have issued incorrect certificates in the past – Risk of CA issuing incorrect certificate increases with number of CAs – Particular concern with code-signing certificates as comprise can allow malware to be distributed as digitally-signed trusted applications – OV and EV were introduced to improve checks, but still problematic on a global scale + largely requires users to identify these types of certificates are being used – Not ideal for automated systems such as e-mail servers
  • 20. Using the DNS and DNSSEC DNS is the main method to locate Internet services, and allows domain name holders to control the records related to their services DNS Security Extensions (DNSSEC) uses public key cryptography to digitally sign their DNS records, ensuring only the domain name holder can make changes DNSSEC records can be validated through chain-of-trust up to the root zone, ensuring that a client making a query can verify the returned information is from the entity authorised to provide it DNSSEC can also be used to authenticate TLS client and server entities
  • 21. DNS-Authenticated Name Entities (DANE) DANE is a protocol that allows certificates to be cryptographically bound to DNS names – Domain administrators can certify the keys used for establishing TLS sessions by storing them in the DNS – Aims to improve inherent situation whereby any CA can issue certificate for any name – Requires DNS records to be signed with DNSSEC – Uses TLSA records to associate a TLS certificate or public key with a domain name – Clients need to be DNSSEC and DANE aware
  • 22.
  • 23.
  • 24. DNS TLSA Records DNS TLSA records associate certificates or public keys with domains – Defined in RFC 6698 – Usage, Selector and Matching Types fields determine which CAs, certificates and hashes can be accepted – Let’s Encrypt recommends 2 1 1 and 3 1 1 records TLSA record for mx.go6lab.si _25._tcp.mx.go6lab.si. IN TLSA 3 0 1 B4B7A46F9F0DFEA0151C2E07A5AD7908F4C8B0050E7CC25908DA0 5E2 A84748ED The above is a hash of TLS certificate on mx.go6lab.si
  • 25. When do things fail in DANE? When do things fail in DANE? – TLSA record is published in non-DNSSEC zone (therefore can’t trust the data) – Domain where looked up records (e.g. MX) reside are not DNSSEC signed (therefore no verification) – Wrong certificate hash in TLSA record
  • 26. Let’s Encrypt & DANE Experiment Internet Society & Go6Lab experimented with DANE & e-mail – Setup DNSSEC on PowerDNS and signed with OpenDNSSEC – Used Postfix mail server with TLS support (3.0.1, although 3.2 now available) – Requested and downloaded Let’s Encrypt certificate – Generated TLSA record for mx.go6lab.si (using chaingen) – Added TLSA record to DNS – Verified TLS certificates on domains known to have DANE support (e.g. nlnetlabs.nl) – Developed script that fetched top 1 million Alexa domains and sent an e-mail to each of them
  • 27. Experiment Results ISOC / Go6Lab tested SMTP connections to Alexa Top 1 million domain names – 70% of attempted sessions were encrypted with TLS – 60% of TLS sessions were established with trusted certificate – Other sessions used untrusted certificate or opportunistic TLS – None of the top 10 mail servers and their domains were DNSSEC signed (as of Jan 2016) – Only 128 sites could be verified with TLSA by DANE! – How can this be improved?
  • 28. Let’s Encrypt Issues Validity of Let’s Encrypt certificate is 90 days – By default the underlying key is changed when renewing – So also is hash, so work needed if planning to publish 3 1 1 TLSA – Using 2 1 1 TLSA means lack of DST Root CA X3 in certificate chain – So need to fetch DST Root CA X3 certificate and add it to fullchain.pem file – However, how do we know if root certificate has changed? – Trick is to use same CSR when Let’s Encrypt certificate is renewed, and generate 2048 bit RSA private key – This means same underlying key can be used for 3 1 1 TLSA records, so hash doesn’t change – Underlying key can be rotated on different schedule
  • 29. Moral of the story… 70% of e-mail can already be encrypted in some way – so enable TLS on your server! Let’s Encrypt offers free certificates and automated ordering/installation, so no excuse not to make encryption the default on the Internet Using DANE is not that difficult and can be automated But… We need more DNSSEC signed domains! We need even more DANE/TLSA verified servers!
  • 30. Further Information Deploy360 - DNSSEC http://www.isoc.org/deploy360/dnssec/ Let’s Encrypt https://letsencrypt.org/ HOWTO http://www.internetsociety.org/deploy360/blog/2016/01/lets-encrypt- certificates-for-mail-servers-and-dane-part-1-of-2/ http://www.internetsociety.org/deploy360/blog/2016/03/lets-encrypt- certificates-for-mail-servers-and-dane-part-2-of-2/ https://dane.sys4.de/common_mistakes