The role of Non-Nuclear Weapon States in breaking the disarmament deadlock

The role of Non-Nuclear
Weapon States in breaking the
disarmament deadlock:
Policy recommendations from a
Brazilian perspective
Renata H. Dalaqua
2015
This publication is available at the FGV website: ri.fgv.br @cpdocfgv

2
The role of Non-Nuclear Weapon States in breaking
the disarmament deadlock: Policy recommendations
from a Brazilian perspective
This publication is available at the FGV website: ri.fgv.br
About the Author
Abstract

3
Renata H. Dalaqua
Contents
1. Introduction...................................................................................................................................................4
2. Avenues for future action on nuclear disarmament
a) Take greater responsibility over disarmament .....................................................................................6
b) Work to fulﬁll the transformative potential of international agreements.........................7
c) Get society on board..................................................................................................................................................8
d) Pursue innovative solutions...................................................................................................................................9
3. Conclusions..................................................................................................................................................12
4. Bibliography................................................................................................................................................13
5. Appendix: List of Acronyms.............................................................................................................16

4
1. Introduction
1
2
3
4
1 The NPT defines a Nuclear Weapon State (NWS) as “one which has manufactured and exploded a nuclear weapon or other nuclear
explosive device prior to 1 January, 1967” (art. IX, Treaty on the Non-Proliferation of Nuclear Weapons, 1968). Only the U.S, Russia, the U.K,
France and China qualify as de jure NWS.
2 As of March 2015, the United Nations Office for Disarmament Affairs (UNODA) database registers 191 states parties to the NPT, including
the Democratic People’s Republic of Korea (DPRK). Although there are divergent views as to whether North Korea is still a party to the
NPT, this paper will not include it among the states parties. Hence, the total number of NPT states parties considered here is 190 (5 NWS
and 185 NNWS).
3 In addition to the five NWS recognized by the NPT, there are four other countries that possess nuclear arms: India, Israel, Pakistan and
the DPRK. The first three never signed the NPT and the DPRK pulled out of the Treaty, in 2003, invoking the withdrawal clause.
4 According to The Bulletin of the Atomic Scientists’ Nuclear Notebook (2015), there were more than 64,000 nuclear warheads at the apex
of the nuclear arms race in 1986. Currently, the global nuclear stockpile is estimated in more than 16,000 warheads (Norris and Kristensen,
2014a).

5
Renata H. Dalaqua
5
6
››
››
››
››
5 The U.S. stockpile is estimated in 7,350, while the Russian is around 8,000 (Reaching Critical Will, 2015).
6 See Dalaqua, 2015.

6
2. Avenues for future action on nuclear disarmament
a) Take greater responsibility over disarmament
7
8
7 As a recent article of The Economist (2015) observed, “there has been no attempt to reduce the role of nuclear weapons in the military
and security doctrines of the five permanent members of the UN Security Council, despite their commitments under the NPT.” This is
evident in some of their recent declarations. For instance, at the 2014 NPT Preparatory Committee, the British Ambassador, Dr. Mathew
Rowland, said his country did not share the view that nuclear weapons per se are inherently unacceptable. On that same occasion, he
also added: “We consider that nuclear weapons have helped to guarantee our security, and that of our allies, for decades” (NPT Preparatory
Committee, 2014a). In February 2015, Major-General Michael Fortney, Director of the US Air Force Global Strike Command, was quoted
saying “The role of our [US] nuclear arsenal is at least as important today as it was in decades past” and “I believe US nuclear weapons
have an important role for our country, our allies, and… a role for the world” (Sputnik, 2015). Likewise, the president of France, François
Hollande, recently stated that “the time of the nuclear deterrent is not a thing of the past. There can be no question of lowering our guard,
including in that area”. Accordingly, he proceeded highlighting the benefits of nuclear deterrence, which “contributes to maintaining
our freedom of action and decision, under any circumstances” and “prevent any threat of blackmail by another State aimed at paralysing
us” (Presidency of the French Republic, 2015). These words are only one indicative. For an overview of the recent modernization efforts
undertaken by all nine countries that have nuclear weapons, see Norris and Kristensen, 2014b.
8 See the joint communique of the P5 issued on the eve of the 2013 Oslo Conference on the Humanitarian Impact of Nuclear Weapons.
Available at: http://www.reachingcriticalwill.org/images/documents/Disarmament-fora/oslo-2013/P5_Oslo.pdf [Accessed on 1 March 2015].
See also the Statement to the high-level meeting on nuclear disarmament on behalf of France, the United Kingdom, and the
United States, delivered by the United Kingdom, New York 26 September 2013. Available at: http://www.un.org/en/ga/68/meetings/
nucleardisarmament/pdf/GB_en.pdf [Accessed on 11 March 2015].

7
Renata H. Dalaqua
9
b) Work to fulﬁll the transformative potential of international agreements
10
Legal arrangements – such as the Biological Weapons Convention (BWC), the Chemical
Weapons Convention (CWC), the Mine Ban Treaty, the Convention on Cluster Munitions –
have undermined the legitimacy of using certain types of weapons, strengthened the legal and
moral norm against those weapons, placed practical difficulties for those investing in their
development and advanced the larger cause of the rule of law.
11
9 A list compiling statements in support of a nuclear weapons ban counts over 60 countries and is available at ICAN’s website: http://www.
icanw.org/why-a-ban/positions/ [Accessed on 11 March 2015].
10 On these issues, see Price (1995) and Tannenwald (1999).
11 Although the U.S. has not joined the Mine Ban Treaty, it has not used, produced, or transferred anti-personnel landmines since the treaty
was signed in 1997 (Acheson, et. al., 2014).

8
c) Get society on board
12
13
12 There are some organizations opposed to nuclear energy in Brazil that have expressed concern over the risk of nuclear proliferation.
Nevertheless, the issue of nuclear disarmament is not part of the core activities of any civil society organization in Brazil.
13 The New Agenda Coalition (NAC) was established in 1998, in the aftermath of the NPT’s indefinite extension, by states concerned with
the lack of progress in nuclear disarmament and the implications of India’s and Pakistan’s nuclear tests. It congregates the following
countries: Brazil, Egypt, Ireland, Mexico, New Zealand and South Africa.

9
Renata H. Dalaqua
d) Pursue innovative solutions
14
15
14 In December 2014, Russia announced it would terminate the bilateral cooperation under the Multilateral Nuclear Environment
Programme in Russia, an initiative that followed the Cooperative Threat Reduction (1991-2012) (Bender, 2015).
15 More information about this test, code-named “Castle Bravo”, can be found at the CTBTO website: http://www.ctbto.org/specials/testing-
times/1-march-1954 -castle-bravo/ [Accessed on 11 March 2015 ].

10
16
17
18
Strengthening the NPT in general and article VI in particular is important because that is
the only biding disarmament commitment in a multilateral treaty. Unlike the chemical and
biological weapons, nuclear arms are not yet subjected to an explicit legal prohibition.
19
16 The list of countries that have issued declarations recognizing the jurisdiction of the Court as compulsory is available at the ICJ’s website:
http://www.icj-cij.org/jurisdiction/?p1=5&p2=1&p3=3 [Accessed on 11 March 2015].
17 Article 63 of the ICJ statute states the following: “1. Whenever the construction of a convention to which states other than those
concerned in the case are parties is in question, the Registrar shall notify all such states forthwith. 2. Every state so notified has the right to
intervene in the proceedings; but if it uses this right, the construction given by the judgment will be equally binding upon it” (UN, 1945).
18 Article 62 of the ICJ statute states the following: “1. Should a state consider that it has an interest of a legal nature which may be affected
by the decision in the case, it may submit a request to the Court to be permitted to intervene. 2. It shall be for the Court to decide upon
this request” (UN, 1945).
19 The updated list of countries that have endorsed the Austrian Pledge is available at ICAN’s website: http://www.icanw.org/pledge/
[Accessed on 11 March 2015].

11
Renata H. Dalaqua
de facto

12
3. Conclusions
Policy Recommendations
1. A New Nuclear Disarmament Process led by NNWS
2. Promote a Constructive View of Arms Control Agreements
3. Get Civil Society and Academia on Board
4. Fill the Legal Gap

13
Renata H. Dalaqua
4. Bibliography
Primary sources
›› Austrian Pledge delivered at the Vienna Conference on the Humanitarian Impact of Nuclear Weapons
›› Statement by the Delegation of Cuba at the Vienna Conference on the Humanitarian Impact of Nucle-
ar Weapons,
›› Legality of the Threat or Use of Nuclear Weapons
›› Statement by the Delegation of Mexico at the Vienna Conference on the Humanitarian Impact of Nu-
clear Weapons,
›› Statement of The United Kingdom of Great Britain and Northern Ireland deliv-
ered by Dr. Matthew Rowland
›› Statement on behalf of the Group of Non-Governmental Experts from Countries Belonging to the New
Agenda Coalition delivered by Mr. Noel Stott
›› Speech by the President of the French Republic on the Nuclear Deterrent,
››
›› Statute of the International Court of Justice
›› Statement delivered by Angela Kane, High Representative for Disarmament Affairs

14
›› Statement of Costa Rica delivered by Minister Counselor Maritza Chan
›› Resolution adopted by the General Assembly 68/32. Follow-up to the 2013 high-level meeting of
the General Assembly on nuclear disarmament
››
››
Secondary sources
›› A treaty banning nuclear weapons: developing a legal framework for the prohibition and
elimination of nuclear weapons
›› The Boston Globe
›› After Oslo: Humanitarian Perspectives and the Changing Nuclear Weapons
Discourse
›› First
Committee Monitor
›› The Bulletin of the Atom-
ic Scientists
››
››
The Telegraph
››
European Leadership Network

15
Renata H. Dalaqua
››
EU Non-Proliferation Consortium
››
›› The Bulletin of the
Atomic Scientists
››
The Bulletin of the Atomic Scientist
›› European Leadership
Network
›› First
Committee Monitor
›› International Organization
›› NPT action Plan Monitoring Report
››
›› Ethics & International
Affairs
›› International
Organization
›› Nuclear Notebook
››

16
5. Appendix: List of Acronyms

@cpdocfgv

The role of Non-Nuclear Weapon States in breaking the disarmament deadlock

Recommandé

Recommandé

Contenu connexe

Tendances

Tendances (19)

Similaire à The role of Non-Nuclear Weapon States in breaking the disarmament deadlock

Similaire à The role of Non-Nuclear Weapon States in breaking the disarmament deadlock (18)

Plus de FGV Brazil

Plus de FGV Brazil (20)

Dernier

Dernier (20)

The role of Non-Nuclear Weapon States in breaking the disarmament deadlock