Following Russia's invasion of Ukraine, Kosovo has requested that the US construct a permanent military presence in the nation and expedite its accession to NATO. As part of a Nato peacekeeping operation, the US has already sent 635 troops to the Balkan nation to protect the fragile peace. Kosovo's Defense Minister Armend Mehaj stated that 'Accelerating Kosovo's membership in Nato and having a permanent base of American soldiers is an essential requirement to preserve peace, security, and stability in the Western Balkans.' Kosovo has joined the list of nations imposing sanctions on Russia, and Mehaj has said that Kosovo is prepared to assist Ukraine militarily if requested by the US. However, Kosovo remains a non-member of
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Why Kosovo Wants US Military Base And NATO Membership
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Why Kosovo wants permanent US military
base? And Nato membership?
How can a nation become a NATO member?
What exactly is NATO, and who exactly are its members?
How does the United States maintain bases in other countries?
What variables in
fl
uence the location of US troops?
What are the consequences of having a permanent US military
post in another country?
What are the consequences of joining NATO?
Kosovo has requested that the US construct a permanent
military presence in the nation and expedite its accession to
NATO.
The actions are an "urgent requirement to ensure peace,
security, and stability in the Western Balkans," says Kosovo's
Defense Minister, Armend Mehaj.
Fort Bragg is home to almost 260,000 people, 54,000 of whom
are current military personnel. The United States has far fewer
(1.4 million) troops than any other country-Russia and China
have the most (2.8 million).
NATO's goal is to protect the independence and security of all
its members by political and military means.
2. Collective defence is central to the Alliance, and it fosters a
sense of unity and cohesiveness among its members. The
Washington Treaty outlines NATO's primary security
responsibilities (also known as the North Atlantic Treaty).
Russia has invaded Ukraine, and it is unclear what shape this
assault will take. Sanctions have no statistically signi
fi
cant
in
fl
uence on either Russian GDP or the FX rate. The economic
impact on Russia will most certainly be reduced by deeper
energy links between Russia and China.
The Ukrainian economy would need signi
fi
cant Western
assistance to preserve macroeconomic stability.
Russia is concerned about Ukraine's relative deterioration in
relation to the West and NATO in all
fi
elds:
Political, military, economic, and
fi
nancial. The country's
fragility will decrease its capacity to maintain a robust military
armed with cutting-edge technologies and conduct offensives
overseas over time.
The Minsk talks could be one channel through which the
diplomatic process could be resumed, potentially with stronger
concessions to Russia, writes Andrew Bostock of the Carnegie
Foundation for International Peace (CFPP) in Washington.
CFPP: Ukraine's population is weary of stagnant living
standards and malfunctioning municipal services and is split
over the threat of war.
There is a strong likelihood that Russia is playing a much
longer game than many in the US and EU believe. Sanctions
against Russia's banking sector, as well as senior military and
government of
fi
cials, are "crippling" for Ukraine. Western
sanctions will be imposed in retaliation, but it is hard to
foresee what they will look like.
The actions, according to the Defense Minister, are an "urgent
requirement to ensure peace, security, and stability in the Western
Balkans."
Following Russia's invasion of Ukraine, Kosovo has requested that
the US construct a permanent military presence in the nation and
expedite its accession to NATO.
As part of a Nato peacekeeping operation, the US has already sent
635 troops to the Balkan nation to protect the fragile peace.
3. "Accelerating Kosovo's membership in Nato and having a
permanent base of American soldiers is an essential requirement to
preserve peace, security, and stability in the Western Balkans," said
Kosovo's Defense Minister Armend Mehaj on Sunday.
Kosovo has joined the list of nations imposing sanctions on Russia.
Mehaj has said that his administration is prepared to assist Ukraine
in any military action if Washington requests it.
Kosovo, a former Serbian autonomous territory, proclaimed
independence in 2008.
It is recognised by over 110 countries, the majority of which are
Western nations, but not by Serbia or Belgrade's longtime ally
Russia. Four Nato nations have also refused to acknowledge
Kosovo's independence.
Due to Russia's concerns, Kosovo remains a non-member of the
United Nations.
Serbia acknowledged earlier this week that Russia's invasion of
Ukraine was "wrong," but it refused to censure the country.
Serbian President Aleksandar Vucic remarked: "They (Russia) were
the only nation that did not apply sanctions against us in the 1990s."
They also advocated for our territorial integrity in the United
Nations. That is something we must never forget. "
How does one become a NATO member?
What are the prerequisites for joining NATO?
A functioning democratic political system based on a market
economy; fair treatment of minority groups; a commitment to
peaceful con
fl
ict resolution; and the ability and desire to contribute
militarily to NATO operations.
What exactly is NATO, and who exactly are
its members?
NATO is a military alliance founded in 1949 by twelve nations,
including the United States, the United Kingdom, France, and
Canada. NATO is now a collection of 30 member nations that have
agreed to collaborate to safeguard the security of the Northern
Atlantic region. The NATO headquarters are in Brussels, Belgium.
What is the name of the biggest military
base in the United States?
4. Fort Bragg, North Carolina
Fort Bragg tops the list of the world's biggest military bases. This is
in the state of North Carolina in the United States. It is also
regarded as the hub of the military domain by military a
fi
cionados.
Fort Bragg is home to almost 260,000 people, approximately
54,000 of whom are current military personnel.
Do any other nations have military bases in
the United States?
Taiwan, Italy, the Netherlands, Germany, Singapore, and the United
Kingdom all have bases in the United States. The only nation I am
aware of
fi
rsthand is Singapore, which has a Royal Singaporean Air
Force (RSAF) unit stationed at the Grand Prairie Reserve Training
Base (former Naval Air Station Dallas).
Who has the world's most powerful military?
The United States of America:
The armed forces
In contrast, the United States has far fewer (1.4 million), but when
considering the entire might of the world's armed forces, the United
States comes out on top, ahead of Russia and China in second and
third place, respectively.
How does the United States maintain bases
in other countries?
Because no other country can pull it off, the United States has a
plethora of bases. The United States spends much more on
defence than any other country, enabling it to maintain military
outposts all around the world. No other nation could afford to do
what the United States does.
Why do other nations allow the United
States to maintain military bases?
Background The building of military outposts overseas allows a
government to project power, for example, to undertake
expeditionary warfare and thereby in
fl
uence events in other
countries. They may be used as staging locations or for logistical,
communications, and intelligence assistance, depending on their
size and infrastructure.
5. What variables in
fl
uence the location of US
troops?
Duty locations are decided by the demands of the Armed Forces
and the service member's military credentials. Active component
military men spend their days preparing for battle while they are not
in combat. Training takes place either at their home station or at
one of a variety of training facilities throughout the globe.
What are the advantages of NATO
membership?
Equipment and troops
NATO bene
fi
ts from being able to call on its members' military skills
and capabilities. Tanks, submarines, and
fi
ghter planes are
examples of this. When the Alliance chooses to execute an
operation, it requests soldiers and equipment from allies to be put
under NATO command.
What is NATO's impact?
Essentially, NATO not only assists its members in defending their
territories, but also participates when feasible and when required in
projecting its ideals farther a
fi
eld, preventing and managing crises,
stabilising post-con
fl
ict circumstances, and assisting in rebuilding.
NATO's fundamental and permanent goal is to protect the
independence and security of all its members by political and
military means. Collective defence is central to the Alliance, and it
fosters a sense of unity and cohesiveness among its members.
NATO works to ensure a durable peace in Europe by promoting
shared principles such as individual liberty, democracy, human
rights, and the rule of law.
As the spread of crises and con
fl
icts outside of Allied boundaries
threatens this goal, the Alliance also helps to promote peace and
stability via crisis management operations and partnerships.
Essentially, NATO not only assists its members in defending their
territories, but also participates when feasible and when required in
projecting its ideals farther a
fi
eld, preventing and managing crises,
stabilising post-con
fl
ict circumstances, and assisting in rebuilding.
NATO also represents the transatlantic connection that connects
North America's security to that of Europe. It is an international
6. organisation that offers a venue for members to consult on any topic
they choose to raise, as well as make choices on political and
military issues impacting their security.
No single member country is compelled to depend only on its own
capabilities to achieve critical national security goals. The
consequent feeling of shared security among members contributes
to European-Atlantic stability.
The Washington Treaty outlines NATO's primary security
responsibilities (also known as the North Atlantic Treaty).
They are broad enough to stand the test of time and are expanded
upon in the organisation's strategic conceptions. Strategic ideas are
the of
fi
cial expression of the Alliance's objectives; they provide the
highest level of direction on the political and military methods to
achieve these goals and serve as the foundation for the overall
implementation of Alliance policy.
During the Cold War, NATO prioritised collective defence and the
protection of its members from possible Soviet Union attacks.
Many new security challenges have arisen as a result of the fall of
the Soviet Union and the growth of non-state entities impacting
international security.
As described in the 2010 Strategic Concept, NATO is
fi
ghting these
risks via collective defence, crisis management, and supporting
cooperative security.
As follows, NATO members and having a permanent US military
installation may provide actual instances of the effect bene
fi
ts and
downsides as follows.
The Russian Invasion of Ukraine, Sanctions Scenarios, and
Potential Economic Impact on Russia, Ukraine, and the EU
Russia has in fact invaded Ukraine, and it is unclear what shape
this assault will take.
In this note, we offer two main scenarios:
Targeted Russian attacks in Ukraine supplemented by further non-
military destabilisation measures, and we analyse the rami
fi
cations
of both.
In the
fi
rst scenario, we would anticipate more restricted penalties,
notably from the EU, but a complete invasion would result in
widespread sanctions from the West.
7. Using a stylised VARX model on Russian quarterly time series, we
conclude that sanctions have no statistically signi
fi
cant in
fl
uence on
either Russian GDP or the FX rate.
The researchers believe, however, that Russia is particularly
sensitive to a decrease in the price or volume of its energy exports.
This genuinely nuclear option of banning energy commerce
between Russia and the EU is improbable given the signi
fi
cant
negative effect on both sides.
Aside from energy, the most severe measures would include
disconnecting Russian banks from the SWIFT system and dollar
markets, as well as prohibiting the sale of high-tech commodities to
Russia.
While Russia has grown more isolated from the dollar-based global
economy and has built up enormous reserves that it can deploy in
the event of sanctions, the state would have to conduct large-scale
interventions to ensure economic and
fi
nancial stability in the worst-
case scenario.
Under either scenario, the Ukrainian economy would suffer and
would need signi
fi
cant Western assistance to preserve
macroeconomic stability. In the short term, the present crisis will
further isolate Russia economically, resulting in a continuation of the
country's fairly dismal growth record since 2014.
It will also most likely hasten the EU's efforts to diversify its energy
sources away from Russia. The economic effect on Russia,
however, will most certainly be reduced by even deeper energy
links between Russia and China.
Why has Russia intervened in Ukraine now?
From Russia's standpoint, Ukraine is becoming more aggressive
and powerful. Ukraine has taken signi
fi
cant measures in the last
year to increase its relative strength in relation to Russia.
Since the beginning of 2021, the Ukrainian government has put
restrictions on its own people whom it suspects of being Russian
spies, and it has purchased from Turkey the Bayraktar TB2 armed
drones that Azerbaijan used so effectively in Nagorno Karabakh in
2020. These actions, as seen from Moscow, imply both a hardening
of Ukraine's attitude and an increase in its military capabilities
compared to Russia.
8. Russia is opposed to Ukraine's growing integration with euro-
Atlantic organisations, notably NATO. This involves the installation
of NATO military systems, the provision of equipment, training, and
joint exercises, with the goal of shifting the balance of military
strength between Russia and Ukraine.
In accordance with a policy outlined by President Vladimir Putin in a
speech in Munich in 2007, Russia seeks assurances that NATO will
not march any farther east. Russia has shown its willingness to
fi
ght
to implement this philosophy, most notably in Georgia in 2008 and
Ukraine in 2014.
Putting these short- and medium-term developments together,
Russia is now of
fi
cially declaring its concerns about both a
Ukrainian offensive against separatist forces in the breakaway
territories of Donetsk and Luhansk, as well as Kyiv acquiring
military capabilities capable of targeting Russian cities, though the
assessment on both of these issues could be questioned given
Russia's overwhelming military superiority over Ukraine.
Nonetheless,
Russia's leadership is concerned about the
country's relative deterioration in
comparison to the West and NATO in all
fi
elds:
Political, military, economic, and
fi
nancial. The economy's fragility
will decrease the country's capacity to maintain a robust military
armed with cutting-edge technologies and capable of conducting
offensives overseas over time.
Since 2008, Russia has tried to establish a new economic model
that does not depend on ever-increasing oil prices (it is
questionable whether this has ever really been seriously
attempted).
The convergence of the Munich address, the global
fi
nancial crisis,
and the invasion of Georgia is not coincidental: it reinforces the
political-military-economic-
fi
nancial linkage from a Russian
standpoint.
Russia has established a buffer zone, which has recently been
reinforced by developments in Belarus and Kazakhstan, as well as
9. occupied territories in Georgia, Moldova, and Ukraine, as well as
close ties with Armenia and several Central Asian countries,
providing it with a relatively stable zone of in
fl
uence.
It is critical that Ukraine, with its western orientation, does not
present a model of economic success and political stability in
Russia's immediate neighbourhood.
The fear of military intervention might prevent the expansion of
NATO's de facto military presence in Ukraine (as well as Georgia
and Moldova) and delay the probability of a successful membership
application farther into the future. Actual military incursions into
Ukraine's territory, on the other hand, may have the opposite
impact.
It would very probably result in a stronger alliance between the rest
of Ukraine and the West (greater economic backing and building up
of Ukraine's military capabilities; growth of anti-Russia sentiment,
and so on).
This may also motivate other nations to take steps to improve their
defence capabilities in the face of Russia, such as prospective
NATO membership for Sweden or Finland, or a larger permanent
NATO force presence in the alliance's current members in CEE.
The Russian population widely believes the of
fi
cial argument, which
is that Russia must defend itself against NATO's ever-increasing
aggression on its borders. However, there is no appetite in Russia
for a fresh military engagement. The populace is tired of stagnant
living standards and malfunctioning municipal services, and it is
split over the threat of war2.
An intriguing aspect is that the Normandy group has been
resurrected thanks to interventions by France and Germany, and it
appears – assuming no military intervention – that the Minsk
process could be one channel through which the diplomatic process
could be resumed, potentially with stronger concessions to Russia.
Sanctions and the Baseline Scenario
The baseline scenario is an escalation of the Russia-Ukraine war,
but not an invasion. Russia may have to wait until at least mid-
February for the COVID-19 pandemic's Omicron wave and the
Beijing Winter Olympics to pass. Following the Georgia 2008
scenario, it may be looking for a Ukrainian blunder to offer a
justi
fi
cation to invade. There is also a strong likelihood that Russia
10. is playing a much longer game than many in the US and EU
believe.
Although Washington has issued warnings of an impending
invasion, Russia may be preparing its force build-up near Ukraine's
borders with a much longer time horizon in mind. Ukraine's
president, Volodymyr Zelenskiy, has expressed scepticism over US
warnings of an impending invasion.
It is also probable that the Russian leadership has not yet decided
how to proceed, and it does not have a speci
fi
c timeline in mind.
However, one may argue that an invasion would have occurred
regardless of the robust US reaction.
In a limited escalation of the war, Russia may strive to harm
Ukrainian defence capabilities and the economy, but not invade the
nation outright or concentrate just on the Donbass area.
This scenario would also include an increase in non-conventional
warfare, such as the cyberattacks that have already been observed.
This would boost Moscow's bargaining power with Kyiv while also
destabilising the government.
This might be achieved in a number of ways, including the
employment of Russia's superior long-range artillery capability. If
military involvement occurs, we anticipate it to be restricted to a
very small area of Ukraine (the east or south), with the geographical
scope determined to minimise the possibility of long-term counter-
insurgency.
Western sanctions will be imposed in retaliation, but it is hard to
foresee what they will look like. This is due not just to the enormous
number of available possibilities, but also to the diverse variety of
viewpoints within the "West."
In the United States, there is bipartisan support for harsh sanctions
on Russia. Four Republican and four Democratic senators met on
January 24th to discuss "the mother of all sanctions" legislation.
The talks were based on legislation introduced by Democratic
Senator Bob Mendez, which contained the following provisions in
the case of "hostile" Russian action against Ukraine:
Sanctions against Russia's banking sector, as well as senior military
and government of
fi
cials, are "crippling." Transactions on Russia's
primary and secondary sovereign debt are prohibited. Sanctions
against Russia's extractive industries, as well as providers of
11. specialised
fi
nancial messaging services (e.g., SWIFT), are
authorised.
transfer of defence goods to strengthen Ukraine's defence
capability; Ukraine will receive $500 million in emergency security
assistance.
Expansion of the United States' efforts to
fi
ght "Kremlin
misinformation" and improve connections with important regional
allies confronted by "Kremlin aggression"
There is signi
fi
cant debate, particularly in Germany, over the stance
it would take in the event of a substantial Russian invasion, and it
now seems that it will adhere to a uni
fi
ed "transatlantic approach"
on sanctions in such a situation. The intentions for EU-level
collaboration on energy security, as well as the assistance that the
US may give, are critical in this regard. Furthermore, the French
president is eager to establish a European stance in the continuing
heated diplomatic dynamic, and the resurrection of the Normandy
track in order to make some progress on the delayed Minsk accord
is one of the venues through which Europeans are contributing to
this dynamic. In the baseline scenario, with Russian military actions
in Ukraine but short of a complete invasion or long-term occupation,
the US and allies would implement a lesser version of the proposed
sanctions. The EU would take part, but maybe in a watered-down
form meant to safeguard vital commercial interests.
SANCTIONS AND AN IMPOSSIBLE
SCENARIO
A forceful and coordinated EU-US sanctions reaction is quite
probable in the event of a full-
fl
edged Russian invasion of Ukraine
with huge deaths. Following Russia's invasion of Crimea in 2014,
the EU imposed signi
fi
cant sanctions on Russia, ignoring popular
opinion and corporate pressure in certain Russia-friendly EU
nations. The participation of German Chancellor Angela Merkel in
pressing for swift action was critical at the time; Berlin will almost
certainly play a role in how harsh the penalties are this time.This
would very certainly be based on a hardline set of bipartisan
proposals that are now being discussed in the US8. If Russia
chooses to invade and occupy Ukraine on a large scale, the West
has two "nuclear" options:
12. First, the most nuclear option is to limit or eliminate Russian energy
imports. This would involve delaying the start-up of the Nord Stream
2 gas pipeline. This would signi
fi
cantly harm the Russian economy
while also causing high in
fl
ation and a recession in the world
economy, particularly in the EU. It is the economic equivalent of
mutually assured annihilation, and hence exceedingly improbable.
Second, the West might target Russian banks, preventing them
from receiving dollar funds. This would generate considerable
fi
nancial upheaval in Russia as well as a drop in lending and
investment, and the country would need large-scale governmental
capital infusions into the banking industry.
Third, a half-nuclear alternative would be to prohibit the sale of
high-tech components to Russian industry. There are still critical
industrial inputs that Russia cannot get from other countries, such
as China. Certain sectors in Russia would be "nuclear," but not the
economy or
fi
nancial system as a whole.
Existing Sanctions' Impact on the Russian Economy
Studies on the effects of current sanctions
on Russia have shown that they are
ineffective, as evidenced by the following
fi
ndings:
Ex-post analysis found that sanctions had minimal in
fl
uence on the
aggregate real economy. Estimates based on time series variance
(Dreger et al. (2015) and Tuzova and Qayub (2016) show that the
oil price shock was the primary cause of Russia's GDP loss in 2015.
Our own estimates re
fl
ect a similar viewpoint. Using a stylised
VARX model on Russian quarterly time series, we conclude that
sanctions have no statistically signi
fi
cant in
fl
uence on either
Russian GDP or the FX rate.
On the contrary, the oil price seems to be a considerably better
predictor, with a 50-point drop resulting in a 3-point decrease in the
baseline GDP growth rate and a 7-point reduction when the lower
limit is included (see Annex).
These results contradict micro-level research, which does imply that
penalties are effective at the level of individual
fi
rms. According to
Stone (2016), Ahn and Ludema (2020), and Mamonov et al. (2021),
13. sanctions have a detrimental in
fl
uence on company returns and
asset composition.
According to Ahn and Ludema (2020), who have the greatest
sample coverage of the studies above, implementing penalties
would result in a 31% loss in income. They discover, however, that
the income decrease is entirely compensated for
fi
rms in Russia's
vital sectors. There are many causes for the apparently
contradicting results:
According to Ahn and Ludema (2020), Russian protective measures
counteracted Western sanctions. Following the imposition of
sanctions, the Russian government used
fi
scal reserves to maintain
the income and capital of the major sanctioned
fi
rms. This shielding
effect might have been the reason sanctions did not spread at the
aggregate economic level.
Sanctions data is chaotic and inaccurate. Most sanctions studies
use news-based sanctions proxies to adjust for exposure to
particular forms of penalties. Sanctions do not have an immediate
effect. Decisions on penalties typically have a temporary duration
and need adequate oversight from authorities to ensure
compliance.
Researchers typically make simpli
fi
ed assumptions regarding time,
albeit at the expense of reduced accuracy. The main point is that
sanctions had an impact on people and businesses, but had little
in
fl
uence on the overall economy.
However, the data implies that the government is likely to transfer
money to the most damaged
fi
rms in order to compensate for the
consequences, passing the costs on to Russian taxpayers while
also safeguarding the revenue streams of the major targeted
enterprises and people.
The Ukraine disagreement between Russia and the West has
pushed Europe to the verge of a disastrous military clash. Many
pundits consider the increasing tensions a watershed moment in
postwar history, particularly in the post-1991 period.
The conclusion is that Russia's decision to increase its troop
presence along Ukraine's borders appears to be a reaction to what
Moscow perceives as a hardening anti-Russian stance within
Ukraine, as well as concerns about what Moscow perceives as a
14. gradual increase in Ukraine's offensive capabilities and creeping
integration into euro-Atlantic institutions.
Any increasing Ukrainian collaboration with NATO is especially
hazardous from the Russian standpoint. This culminated in Russian
President Vladimir Putin's December demands, which included a
formal guarantee from Ukraine that it would never join the alliance.
However, Russia's plan remains ambiguous, with an invasion of
Ukraine being just one of numerous potential outcomes to the
present con
fl
ict.
The most likely possibility is a limited military intervention into
Ukraine, or at the very least, an increase in non-military pressure on
Ukraine outside of separatist-controlled territories in the Donbass.
This would try to bolster Russia's present position in Donetsk and
Lugansk, as well as potentially seize control of the region.
While occupying more of the Donbass, while undermining parts of
Ukraine's military capabilities and wreaking havoc on infrastructure
and port facilities, More broadly, this scenario would reveal Russia's
signi
fi
cant potential to destabilise Ukraine politically, economically,
and
fi
nancially.
A complete military entry into Ukraine's borders cannot be ruled out,
but it is much less plausible than the baseline scenario, given the
near inevitability of severe sanctions against Russia. Russian banks
would be largely shut off from foreign transactions, and some
businesses would suffer as a result of export prohibitions on critical
higher-tech components and items that are dif
fi
cult to replace with
local manufacturing or Chinese imports.
Further rouble devaluation would increase in
fl
ationary pressures,
diminish family real incomes, and have a negative in
fl
uence on the
terms of trade. The central bank would respond by raising interest
rates to preserve the rouble, but this would drag on economic
growth even more. In this scenario, Russia would have to use a
considerable portion of its
fi
scal and external buffers to preserve
macro-
fi
nancial stability.
Nonetheless, the Russian government is willing to subordinate
economic expansion to security concerns. Since President Vladimir
Putin's Munich address in 2007 and the invasion of Georgia the
following year, Russia has been ready to invest considerable
15. economic and
fi
nancial resources in order to prevent the integration
of former Soviet nations into euro-Atlantic institutions.
It seeks to consolidate or re-establish a sphere of in
fl
uence
throughout the majority of the former Soviet Union by propping up
authoritarian governments in Belarus and Central Asia and
preserving frozen con
fl
icts in sections of Georgia, Moldova, and
Ukraine.
The timing of Russia's statement of its demands that Ukraine never
join NATO, as well as its buildup of military along Ukraine's borders,
may not have been wholly coincidental. Because of Europe's
dependence on Russian gas throughout the winter months, Russia
wields enormous power.
Any serious Western sanctions imposed on Russia would have a
long-term impact on the country's isolation from the global
economy. A shift toward more autarkic economic growth would be
detrimental to Russian economic modernization and a much-
needed drive toward diversi
fi
cation and increased competitiveness.
Russia could compensate in part by strengthening economic ties
with China, particularly in the energy sector, but further restricting
access to Western capital and technology would exacerbate the
economy's already bleak growth prospects, widening the real
income gap with more successful middle-income economies.
Politically, a Russian invasion may result in more integration of the
rest of Ukraine into euro-Atlantic institutions as well as an enlarged
NATO presence on Ukraine's eastern
fl
ank.
Ukraine will suffer economically as a result
of the current con
fl
ict, and the effects are
already being felt:
Pressure on its currency and in
fl
ation, a deterrence of capital
in
fl
ows from private investors, increased reliance on international
fi
nancial assistance, and a further slowing of the move toward
domestic institutional reforms.
Over time, the struggle with Russia may draw a clear dividing line,
with the remainder of Ukraine becoming more securely entrenched
in the Western alliance and getting major economic and military
backing. However, it is probable that the current crisis will further
16. destabilise the nation as a whole, economically, politically, and
socially.
Furthermore, without diminishing Russia's involvement, it is obvious
that many of the challenges Ukraine confronts in attaining sustained
economic, institutional, and governance growth arise from other
domestic causes.
The EU's conclusion is expected to remain fairly unfavourable in the
coming months. Even in the absence of a full-
fl
edged war, energy
costs are certain to stay high and may climb higher.
This will exacerbate already high in
fl
ation, further squeezing real
earnings and having a negative impact on economic development.
Beyond that, the effect will be felt primarily by certain sectors and
corporate groups having a vested interest in continuing involvement
with the Russian economy.
This includes the (carbon-based) energy industry, several Western
banks (Société Generale, Raiffeisen, Unicredit, and Citibank), and
high-tech and high-quality consumer goods providers to the
Russian market. However, excluding energy, there has been a trend
of diminishing EU-Russia commercial and investment connections
since the invasion of Crimea in 2014.
Longer-term consequences include increased energy supply
diversity and decreased EU energy dependency on Russia. In
terms of security, the crisis has highlighted the EU's persistent
dependence on the US, while this is something that the majority of
the union can live with.
References
1. N. (2018, July 11). NATO - Topic: NATO’s Purpose. NATO.
https://www.nato.int/cps/en/natohq/topics_68144.htm.
2. Understanding the Military: The Institution, the Culture, And the
People. (n.d.). samhsa.gov. https://www.samhsa.gov/sites/
default/
fi
les/military_white_paper_
fi
nal.pdf.
3. Roget, S. (n.d.). 15 Reasons Why The US Has Military Bases
All Over The World. Ranker. https://www.ranker.com/list/how-
america-has-military-bases-all-around-the-world/stephanroget.
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13. Photo by What Is Picture Perfect on Unsplash
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