This document discusses the field of art education cognitive research (AECR). It provides historical context, noting influences from John Dewey's work on experience and cognition, as well as Howard Gardner's theory of multiple intelligences. AECR examines how art education relates to disciplines like neuroeducation and mind brain educational science. The document explores goals of inquiry within art education, such as how artmaking can produce knowledge, and debates around defining knowledge production. It also analyzes the epistemological paradigms commonly used in AECR, such as arts-based educational research.

1. ART EDUCATION COGNITIVE RESEARCH1
Art Education Cognitive Research
7/17/17
Kyle A. Guzik
Virginia Commonwealth University

2. ART EDUCATION COGNTIVE RESEARCH 2
Introduction
Art education is an expansive field that can be deconstructed in alignment with any number of
schema. An example of one could be the trichotomy of gifted, general, and special art
education. Another useful construction is the triumvirate of curriculum, instruction, and
assessment in art education. Critical theory, as it relates to art education, provides a useful
framework with its focus on social justice for marginalized and/or vulnerable individuals and
communities, such as persons facing low socioeconomic status (SES), poverty, and
homelessness, cultural, ethnic, and racial groups, subaltern populations, sexual minorities,
women, religious minorities, substance abusers, the incarcerated, individuals with physical,
mental, and intellectual disabilities, children, seniors, non-human animals, and other living
things. There are divisions in art education along the same fault lines present in contemporary
art movements such as conceptual and post-conceptual art, hyperrealism, academic realism,
stuckism, shock art, pop art, abstract expressionism, constructivism, cubism, photo realism,
social realism, kinetic art, suprematism, futurism, symbolism, minimalism, pointillism,
impressionism, feminist art, modernism, postmodernism, and posthumanism. Another
framework could involve art educational interdisciplinarity; art education could be defined by its
interactions with other fields such as in science, technology, engineering, art, and math
(STEAM) education, psychology in art education, philosophy in art education, art education and
art therapy, early childhood art education, political art education, etc. Indeed, there are many
potential frameworks along which a theory of art education could be constructed. However, for
the scope of this response I will focus on those disciplines involving the field of art education
that relate to cognitive research. In this response I will examine the field of art education, find
cognitive themes within the body of the field, and explain my objectives for finding a place
within art education. To describe cognitive art education, I will identify its historical
antecedents and identify goals of inquiry within the discipline. Art education cognitive research
(AECR) is a discipline within the field of art education.
Historical Antecedents for AECR
One point of origin for AECR comes from John Dewey (1859 -1952), an American psychologist,
philosopher, and educational reformer (Martin, 2003). Dewey studied at the University of
Vermont and Johns Hopkins University and taught at the University of Michigan, the University
of Chicago, where he founded the University of Chicago Laboratory Schools, and Columbia
University (Martin, 2003). Dewey exhibits a commitment to causal structure in reasoning:
We live from birth to death in a world of persons and things which in large
measure is what it is because of what has been done and transmitted from
previous human activities. When this fact is ignored, experience is treated as if it
were something which goes on exclusively inside an individual's body and mind...
A primary responsibility of educators is that they not only be aware of the general
principle of the shaping of actual experience by environing conditions, but that
they also recognize in the concrete what surroundings are conducive to having
experiences that lead to growth. Above all, they should know how to utilize the
surroundings, physical and social, that exist so as to extract from them all that

3. ART EDUCATION COGNTIVE RESEARCH 3
they have to contribute to building up experiences that are worth-while (Dewey,
1981, p. 22).
The natural world is the source of evidence for argumentative claims. These claims are subject
rational interrogation, validation, and/or rejection. Experience is an element of cognition, and,
although a subjective phenomenological process specific to the individual, has a psychophysical
basis. Material objects such as persons and things influence qualia both physically, as sources of
sense perceptions, and, over time influence perception and interpretation of qualia as well.
Cognition involves description and interpretation of the material world via memory and learning.
A second antecedent for AECR can be found in Howard Garner’s (1983, 1999) theory of
multiple intelligences. Gardner (1983) describes previous attempts to “establish independent
intelligences” as “unconvincing, chiefly because they rely on only one or, at the most, two lines
of evidence” (p. 9). Gardner’s evidence comes from “studies of prodigies, gifted individuals,
brain-damaged patients, idiot savants, normal children, normal adults, experts in different lines
of work, and individuals from diverse cultures” (p. 9). Gardner (1983) views intelligence in
relationship to genetic and neurobiological causes; while these factors might not fundamentally
constrain an individual’s potential, “it may be useful to consider certain individuals as ‘at
promise’ for the flowering of a certain talent” (p. 35). One example of separate grounds for
Gardner’s (1983) claims about intelligence, memory, and cognition comes from descriptions of
learning in nonhuman animals:
In my view, a veritable treasure trove of information that has stimulated the
thinking of cognitively oriented scholars has been obtained by students of bird
song… In the face of many differences across bird species, a few generalizations
seem warranted. Early in the first year of life, the male bird produces as subsong-
a babbling output which continues for several weeks. This is followed by the
period of plastic song, a longer interval, where the bird rehearses a large number
of the bits of those songs that it will eventually use to communicate its territory to
other birds and also to advertise for a mate. This “playful” rehearsal, resembles
the exploratory activities exhibited by primates in many realms of activity…
Where avian species differ from one another is in the flexibility and the
conditions of song learning (p. 45).
This is a good example of psychophysical reductionism in education. Observations about
the natural world, in this case from ornithology, provide independent sources of
justification for educational claims. Gardner then uses this evidence, from multiple
sources to deconstruct a problem or subject of inquiry into its constituent parts.
Gardner’s (1983) initial theory of intelligence (from Frames of Mind) consists of seven
constructs: linguistic, musical, logical-mathematical, spatial, bodily-kinesthetic,
intrapersonal, and interpersonal. Later in Intelligence Reframed, he considers three
additional candidate intelligences: naturalist, spiritual, and existential (Gardner, 1999).
Gardner (1999) sets criteria for what qualifies as an intelligence, including a
neurobiological basis, variation of the trait in the human population, and “susceptibility to
encoding in a symbol system” (p. 52). Gardner’s (1999) naturalistic intelligence qualifies

4. ART EDUCATION COGNTIVE RESEARCH 4
because it encompasses “valued human cognitions… previously ignore[d] or smuggle[d]
in under spatial or logical mathematical” intelligence (p. 52); “certain individuals are
gifted in recognizing naturalistic patterns, others are impaired in this respect” (p. 51).
Gardner views a putative spiritual intelligence as not readily definable:
I am struck by the problematic nature of the ‘content’ of spiritual
intelligence, its possibly defining affective and phenomenological aspects,
its often privileged but unsubstantiated claims with respect to truth value,
and the need for it to be partially identified through its effect on other
people” (p. 59).
However, while Gardner (1999) considers a spiritual intelligence too broadly defined, a
subcategory related to religious experience, existential intelligence “explores the nature
of existence in its multifarious guises” (p. 59). For Gardner (1999), existential
intelligence is a “concern with ‘ultimate’ issues,” and seems “the most unambiguously
cognitive strand of the spiritual” because it does not include considerations “not
germane” to Gardner’s definition (p. 60). In this act of discrimination, we see the
importance of symbolic coding in cognition. When allowing a naturalist intelligence,
Gardner (1999) proclaims: “I have thus acknowledged an eighth intelligence by a simple
performative speech act” (p. 52). Via a verbal cognitive process Gardner encoded the
definition symbolically in written text.
Other possible, nonverbal text-based forms of symbolic coding involved in the
intelligences include mathematical modeling, visual spatial relationships, and kinetic
actions. Mathematical language is similar to verbal language but does not have to be
expressed in writing. For example, a rope with 6 knots could express the length of a tract
of farmland along a road. However, metalanguage in logic uses metasyntax to describe
an object language; this form of cognition is fundamentally communicative and reliant on
linguistic structures.
Symbolic coding need not result in language or communication. If a human uses
technology to extract resources from the environment, for example, by burning down a
forest to create agricultural land, the kinesthetic process of creating the fire originates
from a cognitive process symbolically encoded in the human’s brain that results in
performative activity. The event, regardless of its consequences for other life, need not
qualify as any form of language. Violence could be considered language; it could also be
considered the absence of language. Regardless, it uses cognition mediated by multiple
intelligences. One might also imagine or create art that does not use verbal syntax, is
devoid of all language, and yet is still cognitively generated via symbolic coding. An
example could be the individual subjective aesthetic experience of floral arrangements.
Cognitive nonlinguistic symbolic coding could also be experienced collectively, such as
the onset of sadness in a group upon the death of one of the individuals in its community.
ACER relates also to the developing disciplines of neuroeducation and mind brain
educational science (MBE). Willis (2011) defines neuroeducation as the integration of
mind, brain, and educational science. In this schema, the construct of education consists

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of “teaching practices, methodology, content, subject matter, age group knowledge,
classroom management, differentiation, planning, assessment, educational research,
educational philosophy, [and] educational technology” (Willis, 2011, p. XX).
Neuroscience encompasses the study of the "nervous system, brain, neurons, synapses,
neurotransmitters, neural networks, sensory systems, motor control, learning, memory,
cognition, [and], arousal mechanisms” (Willis, 2011, p. XX). Psychology involves the
study of “consciousness, perception, motion, personality, behavior, cognition, [and]
interpersonal relationships” (Willis 2011, p. XX). Tokuhama-Espinoza (2011) describes
mind brain educational science as “an academic discipline, not a professional field”
(p.18) Academic disciplines have specific features including the tendency to be
government regulated and/or guided by a society or membership (Tokuhama-Espinoza,
2011, p. 18). Members of an academic discipline “recognize one or more peer reviewed
journal(s), which embrace(s) and challenge(s)” the norms, “epistemology, findings, and
practices of the discipline” (Tokuhama-Espinoza, 2011, p. 18). Researchers in a
discipline also possess a shared mission, accepted standards, and shared vocabulary
(Tokuhama-Espinoza, 2011, p. 18). For Tokuhama-Espinoza (2011), MBE is not a
professional field because professional fields “license members in addition to all of the
above criteria for academic disciplines. Licensure brings additional rights and
responsibilities, which might include the right to treat clients, prescribe medication and
implement other interventions or resources” (p. 19). If this definition seems inapplicable
to some fields such as biology or physics, consider that in many ways a higher degree
functions as a license. This is due to the objective institutionalized function of a
certificate or degree as a form of cultural capital (Pérez, 2009).
Goals of Inquiry within Art Education
Elkins (2009) characterizes the difficulty of defining goals for inquiry within the field of art
education:
For the majority of artists, knowledge isn’t what art produces. Expression, yes.
Emotion, passion, aesthetic pleasure, meaning. But not usually knowledge…. So
do we want to write that concept into the official statements of purpose of the new
programs, when it may fit only a tiny minority of students (p. 116)?
One might “defend the idea that the studio produces knowledge” by investing “the materials of
art with an intellectual or conceptual status” (Elkins, 2009, p. 115). According to Elkins (2009)
“younger scholars in art history, such as Hanneke Grootenboer, have explored the idea that
painting, or paint, is a kind of thought” (p. 115). Elkins (2009) makes arguments in service of a
critique of the contemporary trend toward the development of studio art doctoral programs:
Here the claim is that whatever counts as knowledge or research (or any other
source of sense or meaning) simply is the artwork. No instructor can come along
with a clipboard and extract that information…many artists want to believe a
version of this claim, because it means that what they produce cannot be reduced
to words; but at the same time, they are willing to write dissertations about their

6. ART EDUCATION COGNTIVE RESEARCH 6
work, and read what others may write about it. That misunderstands the radical
nature of the claim itself (p. 125).
While this critique is specific to inquiry in the studio arts; studio art practice informs art
educational practice. Art educators work in both studio and classroom environments. A
pejorative for representational artwork is “academic realism.” In the contemporary context, this
connects the practices of post-enlightenment artistic academies with the rigid, procedural
mentalities required in socialist realism. Simply, artworks influenced by socialist and/or
academic realism commonly appear unimaginative. In this critique, these representations suffer
from an appreciable stylization, simultaneously primitive and devoid of novelty. Style inhibits
the illusion or impression of representation.
Like other artistic movements, socialist realism operates in relationship to extant individual and
socially constructed schema. However, art students typically begin to study art after significant
exposure to verbal text, and while they often possess complex verbal literacy, they have little
acquaintance with the syntax of visual language. Art students engage in a process of translation
in which they convert their lexical vocabulary into a visual-spatial and kinetic one. How to
engage in this process is nonobvious and usually requires the intervention of an instructor.
Consider the concept of negative space. It can be defined as the space between objects, such as
the spokes in a wheel, the rungs in a chair, the gaps between leaves where the sky may be
observed. An art teacher uses conversation to define the concept, images and objects as
examples, and creates the conditions and environment where students can use negative space as a
medium within their artistic practice. During the process of the group critique, students speak to
each other and with the instructor to provide feedback concerning the successes and failures they
observe in their own work and that of their peers as it concerns the use of this new medium.
Gradually, the medium loses its unfamiliarity and becomes integrated into the students’ visual-
spatial syntax. Now the students use their art to communicate information that previously they
could only express lexically. While artworks may or may not be considered knowledge, art
educators can study the process of cognitive translation that occurs in art students as they study
and create art.
Epistemological Paradigmatic Assumptions
An epistemological paradigm describes the norms for knowledge generation in a field.
Specifically, it defines how researchers discriminate between statements believed to be true and
opinion in their field. Previously, I analyzed the discourse in four articles published in Art
Education, a primary journal in the field of art education, that explore AECR themes
(Constantino et al., 2010; Cotner, 2011; Kantrowitz, Fava, and Brew, 2017; Rolling, 2013).
These publications exhibit some comparable features: “each article includes photographic
documentation of art products produced by research participants and a written description of
some sort of intervention” (Guzik, 2017, p. 4). These studies employ similar research
methodologies; the authors “use photographs mainly to document works of art, production of art,
or the occurrence of art instruction, and do not considered non-visual art or creative products”
(Guzik, 2014, p. 5) Judging from these select examples from Art Education, I concluded that
when AECR occurs in in art educational research, it “seems to be primarily conducted in

7. ART EDUCATION COGNTIVE RESEARCH 7
alignment with an arts-based educational research (ABER) paradigm that includes post-positivist
elements.” (Guzik, 2017, p. 3).
Paul, Graffam, and Fowlder (2005) define ABER epistemology as distinct from that of
postpositivism, in ABER “knowledge, represented through a work of art, ‘results from careful
reflection upon and recasting of qualities experienced by the artist into a form that is unique’” (p.
47). In post-positivist epistemology “knowledge is information about the world, constrained by,
yet not fully determined by the world. Knowledge is produced through evaluation of evidence
and causal events: it cannot, however, be absolutely secure” (Paul et al., 2005, p. 46). Post-
positivism developed in response to post-structural critiques of positivism. These arguments
suggest that understanding of a subject requires knowledge derived both from study of the
subject and the epistemological schema surrounding the subject. Posivitist objectives include the
systematic study of “what is factual and open to observation” (Pring, 2015, p. 109). Positivists
distrust and reject “philosophical and religious beliefs which [give] a non-empirical account of
the world” (Pring, 2015, p. 109). However, while there are relatively independent research
methodologies employed in ABER and post-positivist educational research, at the
epistemological foundation, what researchers in these disciplines count as new knowledge, may
not be so different.
An ABER epistemological framework in which artist-researchers synthesize qualia into creative
representations that function as knowledge is not incompatible with the positivist-empirical
imperative for a naturalistic worldview devoid of mystical and supernatural elements. Pring
(2015) describes political arithmetic as “a quantitative research tradition which requires the
gathering of hard data… and of discovering the correlation of such data with subsequent
performance and achievement” (p.115). Some might argue that political arithmetic, with its
focus on the quantitative, correlation, and causality, is the antithesis of the ABER paradigm. But
consider the consequences of this potentially unnecessary epistemological bifurcation:
Political arithmetic claims to be ‘atheoretical’ and descriptive, letting the facts
speak for themselves. There is a danger that such a tradition might be undermined
by those who, associating it with ‘positivism’ wholesale, reject this as a valid
approach to educational research. This danger is reflected in the decline inside
department of educational studies of people trained within the traditions of
political arithmetic.… There is a shortage of good quantitative researchers. (Pring,
2015, p. 115).
Could excessive adherence to the arguments from critical theory lead to overspecialization of the
educational researcher? Are the technical skills required to investigate causality so burdensome
that researchers who are concerned with issues of equality, reparation, and social justice cannot
acquire them simultaneously while considering arguments from critical theory. The academic
fascination with postmodernism may be coming to an end as researchers pragmatically observe
the negative consequences of its alethology (objective truth does not exist). Heer (2017)
describes the Trump presidency as “the culmination of our epoch of unreality” (para. 1).
Preservation of the concept of reality as a social construction may not be worth the ideological
power this notion yields to those who are not at all concerned with questions of social justice or
the nature of truth.

8. ART EDUCATION COGNTIVE RESEARCH 8
The utility of critical theory is its supposed capacity to ask questions that deconstruct social
practices. However, Beam (2012) argues that “everyone asks;” “the ubiquity of asking and,
thereby, the ubiquity of unreliable information, is evident, in part, by the number of
organizations and individuals that ask” (p. 3). Beam’s (2012) concern involves survey research:
“documentation that answers to questions are not reliable has fostered widespread
acknowledgement of The Problem with survey research” (p. 108). However, Beam’s (2012)
explanation for the continued popularity of survey methodology parallels conceptual holes in
critical theory:
The best explanation for the continuing use of survey research, even though it’s
extensive documented and widely acknowledged that all components of the
asking method (instruments, settings, and askers themselves), as well as
respondents, contribute to The Problem and make answers unreliable, is that
askers are addicted to asking. Consequently, and invariably, they’re also addicted
to answers (p. 215).
To what are postmodernists addicted? Survey research has some utility but claims grounded in it
must be verified via multiple lines of evidence. The answers survey researchers obtain from
survey research are unreliable because they are contingent upon the knowledge and honesty of
the respondents. Postmodern critiques do not have to be grounded in observation, facts, or
evidence. Postmodern critiques do not have to be honest. However, postmodern critiques can be
evaluated in the degree of their alignment to semantic, typically lexical, variations allowed and
disallowed in theoretical schema. This is “deconstructed” knowledge. It may not be useful to
respond to postmodern critiques with additional empirical evidence to invalidate claims from
these researchers (like, for example, when biologists continue to respond to critiques from the
intelligent design community about the irreducible complexity of the eye with new molecular,
genetic, and evolutionary evidence). Why not allege that postmodern researchers reject objective
reality because they lack competency in the methodologies required to understand it?
Theoretical critiques in education become less of a bold stand against scientism than a product of
fear concerning one’s limited capacity to understand and participate in reductionist techniques.
The slur of illiteracy and/or luddism semantically mirrors the charge of scientism. It signifies a
deficit that the critic identifies in the other and expects the other to correct. Postmodernists
expect those they identify as exhibiting a worldview characterized by excessive reliance on
reductionism to respond to and accommodate their critiques within the rules of the various forms
of critical schema. However, they decline to employ objectivist or empirical methodologies to
connect their arguments to the subjects they critique. Without this connection, there are many
questions, but the rational response requested from those critiqued is nonspecific and unclear.
Direction of the Field of Art Education
Sullivan (2010) exemplifies the desire of art-based researchers to consider themselves as
practitioners of a modern or contemporary human endeavor in his description of the objectives of
“early researchers” working in the 18th century:
The intention was to explain human activity by applying the same strategies used
to explain the workings of the natural world. This contrasted to the belief among

9. ART EDUCATION COGNTIVE RESEARCH 9
others that a more worthwhile research purpose was to understand human agency
– the capacity to make choices and to act on them (p. 96).
Paraphrasing Habermas, Morrow and Brown (1994) employ a critical theoretical approach that
creates an epistemological false dichotomy between humans and nature:
We seek to know in order to control social and natural realities (the empirical
analytic interest), to qualitatively interpret and understand such realities (the
hermeneutic-historical interest), and to transform our individual and collective
consciousness of reality in order to maximize the human potential for freedom
and equality (the critical – emancipatory interest) (p. 146).
Despite the good intentions (freedom and equality), this world view exhibits a philosophical
dualism or pluralism, also present in religion, in which physical and mental objects and events
are fundamentally different in kind. One example of this is the religious evidence, considered
separate and equally valid to observational evidence, collected by the Committee for the
Promotion of Virtue and the Prevention of Vice, or religious police, in Saudi Arabia (Jacobs,
2013). Given the power dualism concedes to those who do not share the noble goals of the
critical theorists, and the obvious negative consequence of this concession, I suspect
philosophers of art education will move away from postmodernism and towards psychophysical
reductionism. In this worldview, educational claims are connected in a chain of reasoning to
psychology and neuroscience which in turn are supported by evidence from genetics, molecular,
and evolutionary biology. Ultimately all claims in the humanities are grounded in fundamental
physics. Reductionists create understanding by breaking an object of inquiry into its constituent
parts. Fields operate as levels of resolution in a universal human project of rational
deconstruction of the natural world and its reassembly into a model whose internal consistency is
subject to objective verification.
Cognitive research in art education acknowledges the psychological and neurobiological
connections in art educational research between curriculum, instruction, and assessment of
intended learning outcomes. This is a rejection of mind as an immaterial substance and the
disembodied rationality of Cartesian dualism. In art education, there is already a longstanding
tradition of the collection and evaluation of the artwork created by students for research
purposes. We can see this both in the Art Education articles where images document
instructional interventions and student products and in books that focus on the relationship
between human development and art creation, particularly through reproduction and synthesis of
student drawings (Brooks, 1986; Millbrath, 1998; Fineberg, 1998; Hurwitz and Carroll, 2008).
I have held onto a copy of Brookes’ (1986) Drawing with Children, which my uncle gave me
when I was in elementary school, for more than twenty years. It demonstrates an observational
approach to drawing with an emphasis on the development of a visual vocabulary via pattern
recognition. Milbrath (1998) demonstrates that quantitative approaches can be useful for the
description of constructs relevant to the field. The book features student drawings and
qualitative analysis of these, but also uses coding to analyze drawings by groups of students to
create tables such as “percentage of children using pictorial devices” for features such as “no
projection,” “oblique projection,” “naïve perspective,” and “linear perspective” (Milbrath, 1998,

10. ART EDUCATION COGNTIVE RESEARCH 10
p. 162). These features are distributed differently across age and ability level. Fineburg (1998)
compares children’s drawings with those of practicing adult artists to investigate cognitive
processes such as composition and describe a relationship between primitivism and modernism.
Carroll and Al Hurwitz (2008) collect drawings “to provide a cross-cultural pool of drawings that
can be studied for insights about the effects of different factors [such as age, lived experiences,
general education, art education, and cultural background] on children’s drawings from memory
and experience (p. 193). This type of research attempts to answer enduring questions in the
field:
What is universal and what is not, about the way children come to draw and
develop a graphic language… Why do children’s drawings, specifically ones from
memory and experience, look the way they do? In what ways is drawing a social
proposition and what evidence is there that children learn from their peers… What
expertise does a teacher need to teach drawing well and what evidence is there
that well trained teachers cause students to create richer imagery and personally
meaningful drawings? (Carroll and Al Hurwitz, 2008, p. 198)
My argument is not against the asking of questions but to acknowledge that questions are not
particularly useful without the proposition of an accompanying methodology with which to
attempt to answer them. Caroll and Al Hurwitz (2008) ask questions about drawing from
memory. This leads me to questions about drawing from sight and how these two distinct forms
of drawing are cognitively distinct. I do not know the answers to these questions but coding and
analysis of collections of student artwork seems to be an engaging methodology.
I am also interested in the process of translation that occurs as students learn to develop a visual
vocabulary. Humans can see before they can speak and typically can draw before they are able to
write. Art teachers do not simply direct students to replace lexical descriptions of concepts with
nonverbal representations. I am interested in the interplay of cognitive interactions across
multiple intelligences occurring both within the individual and in the social environment that
surrounds them. Coding of student artwork seems to me to be an effective way to characterize
meaningful constructs in art education. A second line of inquiry in alignment with this
methodology would involve coding of teacher-student and student-student interactions in the art
classroom. This would require video recordings and coding of behavior and also audio
recordings, transcriptions of the recordings into text, and quantitative discourse analysis of that
text. The quantitative discourse analysis package (qdap) for the R programming language seems
to me to be the most efficient prospect for bridging the gap between qualitative data and
quantitative analysis (Goodrich, Kurkiewicz, and Rinker, 2016). As recording and transcription
technology continues to improve I believe a unique opportunity beckons to make use of
quantitative discourse analysis to advance our understanding of cognition in art education.

11. ART EDUCATION COGNTIVE RESEARCH 11
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