Pasukan Siber, Manipulasi Opini Publik dan Kebangkitan Otoritarianisme Digital.pptx
1. Pasukan Siber, Manipulasi Opini
Publik dan Kebangkitan
Otoritarianisme Digital di
Indonesia
Wijayanto, Ph.D
Direktur Pusat Studi Media dan Demokrasi,
LP3ES/Dosen Ilmu Pemerintahan, Universitas
Diponegoro
2. Wijayanto
• Dosen Departemen Politik dan
Pemerintahan, Universitas
Diponegoro, sejak 2006.
• Direktur Center for Media and
Democracy, LP3ES, Jakarta, 2019
- sekarang
• Ph.D Universitas Leiden, Belanda
2019
• Fokus kajian: demokrasi digital,
komunikasi politik, pemilu,
korupsi, pupulisme Islam, teori
kewarganegaraan dan
demokrasi.
6. CYBER TROOPS AND
COMPUTATIONAL PROPAGANDA
• Computational propaganda is
defined as: “the use of algorithms,
automation, and big data to
shape public life”. (Howard and
Bradshaw, 2019: page i)
• Cyber troop is defined as
“government or political party
actors tasked with manipulating
public opinion online” (Howard
and Bradshaw, 2019: page 1)
6
7.
8.
9. Pasukan Siber
Suatu jaringan yang bersifat cair yang terdiri dari
pendengung (buzzers), pesohor (influencer),
koordinator, dan pembuat konten yang bekerja
sama untuk mengorkestrasi penggalangan opini
publik di media sosial dengan menciptakan satu
narasai politik tertentu di mana setiap mata rantai
dari jaringan itu tidak selalu saling mengenal satu
sama lain dan tidak selalu menyadari bahwa
mereka bekerja bersama-sama untuk mendukung
narasi tersebut.
10. Metamorfosis pasukan siber di
Indonesia
• 2012 pemilihan gubernur di Jakarta: relawan
• 2014 pemilihan presiden: operasi sistematik pasukan siber
• 2017 pemilihan gubernur Jakarta: politik identitas
• 2019 pemilihan presiden: pemilu yang terpolarisasi
• 2019 pasukan siber menyerang KPK
• 2020 normalisasi New Normal
• 2020 “menjual” Omnibus law
• 2020 pilkada langsung: propaganda yang terpolarisasi
• 2021 mendukung KLB Partai Demokrat
• 2021 #PolriSesuaiProsedur
11. CYBER TROOPS RESEARCH
TEAM
Cyber Troops and Public Opinion
Manipulation: A Mixed-Method
Study of Social Media Propaganda
in Indonesia (CYTPOM):
1. Presidential election 2019
2. Bills on revision of KPK law 2019
3. New normal 2020
4. Omnibus law 2020
5. Direct election of the local head
amid the corona pandemic 2020
34. Kondisi sosial media yang
sedemikian rupa
mempengaruhi agenda
setting dari media arus
utama.
Ada 250 artikel di media
daring yang
mengamplifikasi isu yang
mengaitkan KPK dan
Taliban. 34
Kondisi di atas menyebabkan banyaknya penduduk
yang pro terhadap revisi berbanding terbalik dengan
KPK sebagai lembaga yang tingkat kepercayaannya
tinggi di mata publik.
35. KPK Sarang Taliban
“Kalau mas mau tahu, ada faksi
polisi, ada faksi Kejaksaan, dan
faksinya Novel. Nah, yang dituduh
KPK sarang Taliban itu yang di faksi
Novel. Karena apa, dia dekat
dengan Abdullah Hehamahua,”
(Wawancara dengan Arjuna, 3
Februari 2021)
36. Organisasi dan Pendanaan
Posisi Insentif
Pendengung 50.000 – 100.00/akun (1 – 7
juta)
Pencipta konten +/- 4 juta
Koordinator 200.00/akun (5-15 juta)
Pesohor 20 juta/posisi komisaris/projek
BUMN
37. Pasukan Bayaran Dukung Revisi UU KPK
“Terlepas dapat fee atau segala macem itu urusan
belakangan menurut saya, sama halnya yang di sisi
kontra, mereka juga menyiapkan tim buzzingnya
kok, tim influencer juga kok. Bohonglah, mas,
kalau nggak ada itu, bohong. Itu sah, dalam
demokrasi digital itu sah-sah aja.” (Wawancara
dengan Arjuna, 3 Februari 2021)
38. Pola Rekrutmen
“kemaren itu kan isunya itu kan, kita kan dapat informasi, mas.
Saya dapat informasi kaya itu WA ini dari beberapa temen to
yang ada dalam grup itu ngasih tau itu kita kumpul yuk, kita
kumpulin pasukan kaya gitu loh, mas. Informasinya kaya gini,
yaudah kita juga oke kalau gitu. Kita sepakat ya, kita share juga
kaya gitu, akhirnya kan nyebar ke semua kelompok kelompok
buzzer kaya gitu. Nah kan buzzer kan punya kelompok kelompok
gitu, nah akhirnya nyebar nyebar ya yaudah akhirnya viral”
(Wawancara dengan Duryudana, 19 Februari 2021)
56. Who are they
• Mostly young and educated mean
• Bellow 45 years old, mostly 25-35 years old
• Well educated, computer savy
• Social media militancy
57. Funding and organization
Position Salary
Buzzers 50.000 – 100.00/account (2 – 7
million/project)
Content creators +/- 4 million/project
Coordinators 200.00/account (5-15 million/project)
Influencers 20 millions/political position as
commissioner/ government’s project
58. Funding’s sources: (1).
Individual politician…
• “It's usually from a politician's personality. Legislative
candidates during the presidential election. They have a lot of
money. Hehe…” (Informant 10, 10 July 2021)
• “…in the case of campaign support or raising the name of a
figure to be appointed to enter the upcoming election market
(mentioning the name of one of the major party leaders who
is also a minister in Jokowi's cabinet today). Here I am paid
only for comments on his twitter account to make it more
famous. It's been three months now." (Informant 1, 26 May
2021)
59. Funding’s sources: (2). Political
party…
“….the source of the funds came from
elements of political parties, some from
elements of donations. So that's how it is,
those who donate are the ones who have
the money. Those who don't have money
contribute energy and thought. " (Informant
15, 24 May 2021)
60. Funding’s sources: (3). Government…
“Yes, if... we are, eee. There are several—if the
ministry asks for it, you get it from the ministry.
It's a socialization fund. …The socialization fund
doesn't have to go to TV, you see. You don't have
to go to the media. So, I have a projection that
later [pause] the budget for socialization, public
relations, will be divided into three. Divided into
three. Social media, online media, TV media.”
(Informant 11, 17 February 2021)
61. "The New Normal is different. New
Normal is Jokowi's interest! There is a
minister in charge… there are three
ministries in charge. Well, maybe the
funds come from there, the budget….”
(Informant 1, 4 March 2021)
62. Funding’s sources: (4). Business
person
“…there are many businessmen
approaching. Most were rejected. But of
course some of them were accepted by him
(daughter of the vice presidential
candidate). It seems that it is certain which
entrepreneur has the least risk. Because this
(vice presidential) campaign certainly needs
funds…” (Informant 13, 28 May 2021)
72. “…. authoritarian regimes in Southeast Asia
have adapted to new technologies and are
increasingly using social media and the internet
for their own ends. They have enhanced
censorship and online repression and are
employing the internet to co-opt certain social
groups, repress critics and legitimize their rule.
The young democracies in the region are
unstable and weakly institutionalized. Social
media is furthering polarization and distrust in
Southeast Asian societies, often based on
disinformation campaigns and growing
sectarianism. Here, elections have become
virtual battlegrounds between contestants and
internet and social media are actively used to
misinform and intimidate.” (Bunte, 2021)
73. The rise of digital authoritarianism
• digital authoritarianism as a practice of repression and
control in cyberspace in the form of privacy violations,
dissemination of misinformation, content filtration, and so
on (Anthony, Iii, & Gauchan, 2019; Mare, 2020; Scott, 2021).
• “Digital authoritarianism is, in short, the use of different
digital technologies with the purpose of surveilling, repressing
and manipulating citizens (Scott, 2021).”
• “…practices using information and communication
technology designed to either invade privacy, deny access to
information, spread misinformation, limit expression, and limit
political participation (Anthony et al., 2019).”
74. Conclusion
1. There has been a manipulation of public opinion by using
propaganda on social media to support problematic policies that
have the following characteristics:
There was a sudden tsunami of tweets with narratives
supporting certain political narratives;
Content creation intentionally and by a team of professionals
to support that narrative;
Use of give away to attract organic twitter accounts;
This narrative at first gets a match but in the end wins in
terms of quantity and duration
This narrative was amplified by the mainstream media and
became a public conversation
75. 2. This manipulation was conducted by a cyber mercenary i.e. the fluid
networks of buzzers, coordinators, influencers, content creators and political
consultants who work together to orchestrate public opinion on social
media by creating a certain narrative on certain political issues. The funding of
this mercenary came from individual politicians, political party, government and
business person.
3. At the end, the operation of cyber mercenaries and the public opinion
manipulation they have conducted was aimed to manufacture consent to the
problematics policy through, among other things: spreading hoaxes, fake news,
doxing and trolling.
76. 4. These, in turn, have been successfully co-opting the Indonesian
digital public sphere and have been preventing it from becoming
a free public sphere where the voice of the civil society can be
heard. In this regard, the online public opinion manipulation by
the cyber mercenaries can be seen as one of the most significant
signs of the rise of the digital authoritarianism in this fourth
largest country in the world.
