Institutional analysis on performance in education (Porciuncula&Rozo)
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This is a short and quick exercise on the application of institutional analysis tools to a development performance problem. In this case we took a quick look at performance in secondary education in Colombia and Uruguay. On a side note, I personally think our countries need to get their act together in this.
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Institutional analysis on performance in education (Porciuncula&Rozo)
- 1. COLOMBIA AND URUGUAY: PERFORMANCE IN SECONDARY EDUCATION Development Effectiveness Unpacking the Concept Mateo Porciúncula Soraya Rozo
- 2. Performance issues in secondary education in both countries Intervention: Policy goal Improvement of quality in secondary education Gov Budget PISA COL 16% 2012: 62 2009: 54 URU 9% to 14% 2012: 55 2009: 48
- 3. Provision of quality education as a collective action issue Context matters! - inequality (both) - #COL: conflict - #UY: left-wing government Adverse selection of teachers for public sector Public / private dichotomy Too much centralization Reckless spending
- 4. Provision of quality education as a collective action issue Policy fragmentation • Many different organizations and actors: same goals or different? Principal agent- problems • Motivation misallignment • Information flows
Notes de l'éditeur
- We consider that both Uruguay and Colombia have failed to deliver quality education in the recent years, particularly when considering secondary education. In order to look at this from an evidence-based perspective we researched on budget allocation for education (available for 2006 and 2011) and, in order to operationalize performance, we took PISA (Program for International Student Assessment) results for two measurements, in 2009 and 2012. Budgets: In the case of Uruguay expenditure in Education has increased from 9% (2006) to 13,7 (2011) of government spending). In Colombia, national expenditure in Education is roughly stable, though slightly lower (16,1% (2009) ; 15,8% (2012). Despite the budget situation, the performance in education has worsened in the period, if we take into account available PISA results. Both countries had a worse results in the second instance of the study. Uruguay moved down from rank 48 (2009) to 55 (2012) of 65 countries in the survey. Colombia moved down from rank 54 (2009) to 62 (2012), three short from the bottom. Note: PISA evaluates Reading, Math and Science performance of sample students for each country. 65 countries participated in the study. In term of test results, both Uruguay and Colombia ranked low and worsened their results in the second measurement. In 2012 Colombia scored 376, 403, and 399 respectively for Reading, Math and Science. In 2009 the results were 413, 381 and 402. In 2012 Uruguay scored 409 , 411, and 416 respectively. In 2009 the results were 426, 427 and 427. Both results are worse in 2012 than in 2009.
- “A collective-action situation (…) occurs whenever the input of several individuals is required to achieve a desirable joint outcome” (Ostrom 2001: 10) This case is a collective action issue due to the number of actors involved in the provision of the public good “quality education”(police makers, public servants, private sector, students, teachers, families), and the need of incentives in order to achieve good results. We will take a look to “external” factors related to context, and to institutional aspects drawing on collective action theory. Context: Inequality: income inequality is high and affects , geographical inequality in access to services (urban rural) Colombia: conflict situation (lower priority to education, higher expenditure on security issues). Uruguay: left wing government in power, higher expenditure on education, coming from very low allocation. Strong, highly ideologized Unions. Adverse selection of teachers for public sector (asymmetric information about characteristics) Public and private sector share a common pool of teachers (teachers can be considered a rival non excludable good). Uruguay: Poaching of good teachers from public sector to private due to higher salaries and especially, better working conditions. This reinforces bad results in public schools (adverse selection). Colombia: There are differences in salaries and working conditions within the private system. Best teachers go to the top private institutions. Common for both countries: In the Public system, the best teachers choose first and tend to select the easiest schools. Worst teaches pick last and usually go to the schools that are more “difficult”. Reckless spending (moral hazard part of the asymmetric information) Public budget is allocated and measured based on performance. It is rewarded according to spending not on results or efficiency. Institutions at each level of authority have incentives to spend all of the budget before end of year. However, centralized processes for purchasing make spending difficult and time-consuming. Local institutions and boards usually device fast-implementation projects, usually near the end of year just to comply with expenditure requirements. Too much centralization: In both Colombia and Uruguay education policy usually follows a very hierarchical, centralized, top-down approach. This comes from path dependency and leads to lack of incentives for innovation and problems of inadequate motivation among teachers at the bottom level. Evaluation and benchmarking is conducted on basis of a common national program which aims at a set of minimum achievement goals, not rewarding top performers and reinforcing problems of inadequate motivation // rethinking appropriate institutional arrangements at all levels can work to allow individuals to devise local solutions, and leave more room for agency. Public / private dichotomy Both public and private actors are involved in the provision of education. It is interesting to focus on the interaction of the market and government in this particular sector. In both Colombia and Uruguay delivery of secondary education services is divided into two parallel systems, public and private sectors. The coexistence of public high schools and independent, paid-for private ones leads to a phenomenon comparable to a “dual economy” with two strata. Political and budget support for public education is undermined as powerful interest groups and constituencies can simply exit the public system and go to the private sector. This interaction contributes to the long-term weakening of public provision of education and reinforces stratification.
- Policy Fragmentation In Uruguay, steering directives for secondary education programs, coordination and evaluation depend on the Ministry of Education and Culture. However, delivery of public education services depends on a separate entity, the National Administration of Public Education (ANEP), this entity is ruled by a committee including government (3), and teachers (2) -usually union representatives. Down the chain of command, education is provided by local high schools, headed by a principal. In Colombia, there are regional Secretariats of education, who act as intermediate level institutions as well. There are information flow and motivation alignment problems at each stage of the vertical chain. Principal-agent problems and Motivation not aligned. Motivation: Independent policy structures makes the Ministry and Administration owe accountability to different principals and thus be motivated differently. The Ministry is usually aligned to executive presidential policy whereas the intermediate institution tends to develop an autonomous position. Board members are divided among union and faction party lines. Positions at ANEP are usually awarded as political rewards and there are incentives for conflict with the Ministry line, as education policy is a highly public arena of political posturing and discourse. Local principals have a hard time making effective demands of their interests and needs to the Board, and this feedback further diluted in relation to those demands reaching the central Ministry. Responsibility for failure to perform is diluted, and collective action is not rewarded by incentives. Information: As explained above, information flows, particularly feedback flows from bottom to top are weak. Curriculum design is usually carried out far away from local institutions, and there are few institutionalized means to incorporate local learning into decision making structures. The board of education has incentives not to disclose full information to the Ministry.