The Truth of Robert E. Lee

Cracks in the Marble Man:
Considering the Gap between the Legend and Reality of Robert E. Lee
Michael Metz
HIS 378
4/30/12

2
There are certain people in history who have the ability to shed their humanity and become a god.
These people were so powerful, respected, and loved that it became a veritable sin to criticize any part of
their existence. These legends, however, do not always measure up to the truth. They are almost never
accurate descriptions of what truly happened in the person‟s lifetime. Even the most perfect man does not
measure up to his reputation.
Robert Edmund Lee is a well-studied example of a man who has lost the faults that make him
human. General Lee has been hailed as the unbeatable leader of the Confederate Army during the
American Civil War. The myth is that the only reason he lost the war is because the North merely had
better resources and more manpower than the South, a trap many history students fall into.
Contemporaries believed that no general, not even Ulysses S. Grant, could truly be considered Lee‟s
match in an even fight. He was a man who sacrificed his position in the Union Army to defend a cause he
did not truly believe in, bearing the weight of the entire war on his shoulders. After the war, he lived a
quiet, secluded life as the head of Washington University, secluding himself from politics and money. It
seems as though he was universally loved by the North and the South during and after the war. This is the
story told in the history books, but how much of it is actually true?
The perfect reputation of Robert E. Lee as an unbeatable soldier does not match up with historical
realities; in fact, his reputation did not even exist during his lifetime. By examining Lee‟s actions before,
during, and after the Civil War, one can clearly see that Lee was not the universally loved and respected
general that modern day students of history learn about. He had serious military faults that do not fit well
with his modern image of invincibility. Lee was not even the most well loved general of the war. To the
South, Lee was no higher on the pedestal than other Civil War generals such as Stonewall Jackson and
General Albert Johnston.1
To the North, Lee was not considered a threat and was barely known to the
public until the end of the Civil War. It was not until after Lee‟s death in 1870 that his reputation as “the
1
William G. Piston, From Manassas to Appomattox: James Longstreet (1989; repr., New York: Barns & Noble Inc.,
2004), 88.

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marble man” was born.2
Lee‟s death was the South‟s chance to change history; the North was too
moderate and easy-going to care about the switch.
When studying the military prowess of a figure such a Lee, it is important to not focus on
comparisons between opposing armies and the ease of hindsight when reviewing battles.3
Instead, it is
necessary to examine the personal actions and military dogma of Lee himself to determine the disparity
between reality and his reputation. To start off, Lee had several key flaws in the way he neglected the
logistics of battles and the handling of the details of an operation. In particular, Lee did not like to review
paperwork, staffing, organization, and other data.4
He found these tasks tedious and instead piled the
work on subordinates who were not as able as himself to comprehend and process the data. Lee often
missed specific details on his army‟s position. In Lee‟s early fights with McClellan, Lee often planned for
grand flanking and cut-off maneuvers that would have caused serious damage to the Union army. Lee did
not realize, however, that the troops providing the manpower for the maneuver led by Jackson was an
hour behind schedule.5
If he had paid attention to the specifics, he could have coordinated more effective
strikes and not left openings on his plan for a Union counterattack. General James Longstreet had
suggested that Jackson be given more time to enter the fight, but Lee dismissed this advice.6
Lee had very
selective attention when paying attention to the size of his army. He would pay attention to recruitment
numbers but preferred to not hear about the devastating death tolls after battles.7
Not knowing the exact
2
Ernest C. Hynds, "The Press and the Generals: Media Influence Images, Aspirations.” Atlanta History: A Journal Of
Georgia & The South 42, no. 1/2 (March 1998), 53.
3
Ibid., 475.
4
Michael A. Palmer, Lee Moves North: Robert E. Lee on the Offensive (New York: John Wiley & Sons, 1998), 122.
5
Tom Boeche, "Robert E. Lee Takes Center Stage." America's Civil War 21, no. 1 (March 2008): 52,
http://ehis.ebscohost.com/ehost/detail?sid=22980074-474f-4bce-82e9-
4e91fd5a7b3f%40sessionmgr113&vid=4&hid=102&bdata=JnNpdGU9ZWhvc3QtbGl2ZSZzY29wZT1zaXRl#db=mth&
AN=28052532 (accessed March 19, 2012).
6
2004), 97.
7
Alan T. Nolan, Lee Considered: General Robert E. Lee and Civil War History (Chapel Hill: University of North
Carolina Press, 1991), 88.

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strength of his army caused him to send broken and fatigued brigades into battles that would end up being
a waste of manpower. Lee should have had reliable officers providing updates and battle statistics every
half an hour, but he instead preferred summaries of what was happening during the course of the battle.8
Lee also paid poor attention to military equipment and supplies of his army. Possibly the most
embarrassing of examples is the fact that Lee often had incorrect or outdated maps of territories in his
backpack.9
The lack of geographic knowledge on Lee‟s person led to a lack of preparation for
complicated deployment maneuvers at battles such as Antietam and Bristoe Station. Lee‟s army often
went on the offensive without proper supplies. At Bristoe Station, General Longstreet observed that
Ewell‟s troops were only able to refresh themselves from the supplies of captured enemy soldiers.10
At
Antietam, his soldiers could not find anything to eat.11
Lee also had difficulty dealing with new military
equipment when he had studied tactics Napoleon had used fifty years earlier. For example, Lee used
aggressive Napoleonic charges and flanking maneuvers at Gettysburg against modern weaponry such as
rifled muskets, artillery, and the Minié bullet.12
Lee had several strategic disputes with artillery
commander Edward Porter Alexander, who was touted as one of the sharper military minds of the war by
modern historians. At the battle of Fredericksburg, Lee wanted guns higher up on the hill behind
Confederate lines in order to respond to any potential Federal batteries firing at them.13
Alexander
strongly argued to place the artillery lower on the hill to fight against Union assaults coming up the hill
towards the Confederate position. Alexander‟s strategy proved far more effective than Lee‟s, revealing a
8
Edward Porter Alexander and Gary W. Gallagher, Fighting for the Confederacy: The Personal Recollections of
General Edward Porter Alexander (Chapel Hill: University of North Carolina Press, 1989), 110.
9
Christine M. Kreiser, "7 days that made Robert E. Lee an icon." America's Civil War 25, no. 2 (May 2012): 55,
10
2004), 139.
11
Stephen W. Sears, Landscape Turned Red: The Battle of Antietam (Boston: Houghton Mifflin Co., 1983), 174.
12
13

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key flaw in how Lee viewed long range artillery. Lee overestimated the accuracy of long range firepower
and used it for that purpose; younger artillery generals such as Alexander realized the destructive power
that artillery had against medium range, supporting Confederate counter-attacks.
Another aspect of Lee‟s military prowess that did not match his reputation was his skills at
getting his army into proper positions, particularly when going on the offensive. Lee was rather unusual in
how he made use of his cavalry. More often than not, Lee used General Stuart and his cavalry as scouting
parties or defending the rear of his army. At Gettysburg, however, Lee allowed the cavalry to get too far
away from the infantry for raids in enemy territory that had little impact on the overall battle. “The first
axiom of war is to mass one‟s strength. Then and only then can its fullest power be brought into play.”14
Instead of using the cavalry for scouts and skirmishers, Lee would have profited more by using them
directly in the fight as Napoleon often did. In the contest for controlling Five Forks in 1865, Lee
disconnected his cavalry from his army to defend his right flank, inadvertently helping Grant achieve his
objective of lowering the defenses of Lee by forcing him to split up his army.15
Instead, Lee should have
either moved his army en mass or accommodated for the fall of Five Forks.
There are several cases of inefficient use of battle lines and coordinated attacks with Lee‟s
infantry as well. On the first day of Gettysburg, General Richard Ewell convinced Lee that he would be
able to take Little Round Top. However, his initial positioning was in a topographical position that made
his artillery useless. Furthermore, Lee had positioned Ewell in a location far enough away from the core
of the Rebel army that it was difficult to support and reinforce the attacks that happened on the second
day of the battle.16
Part of the problem was Lee‟s refusal to believe the information presented to James
Longstreet by his scout Henry Harrison on the first day of the battle, leading Lee to overextend his army.
14
Ibid., 228.
15
Stephen W. Sears, Controversies & Commanders: Dispatches from the Army of the Potomac (Boston: Hougton
Mifflin Co., 1999), 263.
16
General Edward Porter Alexander (Chapel Hill: University of North Carolina Press, 1989), 232-234.

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17
At Fredericksburg, Lee positioned a key part of his defensive line on a hilly ridge called the Sunken
Road. Due to the elevated location compared to the rest of Lee‟s line, the Sunken Road became virtually
impossible to resupply under Union artillery fire.18
Lee should have been able to see this flaw in
positioning and withdrew his line to a better defensive position from Union artillery. At the battle of
Bristoe Station, Lee did not properly coordinate attack formations between the 2nd
and 3rd
Confederate
Corps. The two corps attacked at different intervals, causing gaps in the Confederate lines that the Union
army flanked.19
To make matters worse, Lee did not reach the battlefield until several hours after the
attack failed. If he really was a master tactician, why was he not within eyesight of the battle and properly
coordinating what turned out to be the Confederacy‟s last chance at an offensive maneuver against the
North? The Confederate army simply did not have the strength for another offensive.
During his time at West Point and in the Mexican War prior to the Civil War, Lee gained a
reputation for being a master engineer; in war, this means being able to observe the battlefield terrain and
make proper tactical decisions based off of geography.20
The skills that he learned in the Mexican War,
however, did not transfer well to fighting on Eastern American soil. The Mexican War used relatively
little artillery and was primarily fought on flat desserts and prairies; this landscape is relatively easy to
work with when compared to rolling hills and cannons used during the Civil War.21
At Antietam, Lee
17
2004), 294.
18
Frank A. O'Reilly, "Lee's Incomplete Victory." America's Civil War 14, no. 5 (November 2001): 30,
http://ehis.ebscohost.com/ehost/detail?sid=22980074-474f-4bce-
82e94e91fd5a7b3f%40sessionmgr113&vid=5&hid=102&bdata=JnNpdGU9ZWhvc3QtbGl2ZSZzY29wZT1zaXRl#db=
mth&AN=5188532 (accessed March 19, 2012).
19
20
21
Ibid., 111.

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chose a location to fight where his army had a river at their back and one ford to cross.22
As an engineer,
Lee should have realized the terrible position he put his army in. If McClellan had pushed the attack the
next morning, Lee‟s entire army would have been crushed. General Longstreet considered themselves
lucky that “McClellan‟s plan of the battle was not strong, the handling and execution were less so.”23
Lee
relied too much on what he expected his opponent to do, which is a dangerous gamble. At Gettysburg,
Lee refused to retreat to a better defensive position on the first day because he did not believe that his
army could survive long by foraging for food in Pennsylvania.24
This decision led his army to fight Union
forces that had the high ground, a position that no engineer should allow the enemy to hold. Alexander
notes that Lee‟s army did well foraging for food in Pennsylvania for over a week during the retreat from
Pennsylvania.25
Keeping this in mind, Lee should have fallen back to Cashtown and forced Meade to fight
on ground that Lee himself chose. This stubbornness to not retreat in face of a bad offensive position is
not desirable for somebody leading the Confederacy‟s only chance at survival.
By examining battle orders and recollections of Lee from some of his close lieutenants, several
military flaws become glaringly apparent. The first flaw of Lee as a military leader was his desire to keep
his subordinates “blindfolded.” He was often unwilling to share his full battle plans with his immediate
subordinates.26
He simply believed that he could give his generals a basic outline of what the battle was
supposed to look like and they would follow suit. This type of activity increases what is called the fog of
war, which can be surmised as a lack of information leading to blind decisions. The only one of Lee‟s
subordinates who was truly talented enough to follow this style of leadership was Stonewall Jackson, but
22
23
2004), 218.
24
Gary W. Gallagher, Lee and his Generals in War and Memory (Baton Rouge: Louisiana State University Press,
1998), 52.
25
Ibid., 232.
26

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he died long before the war was over. This was known as Lee‟s decentralized system of command.27
While this system works while an army is on the defensive and within close proximity to each other, this
type of strategy becomes derailed while going on the offensive. Lines stretch out, attacks become
uncoordinated, and serious casualties are inflicted when every last minute detail is not hammered out by
the one creating the battle plan. In the words of General Edward Porter Alexander, “generals should
supervise the execution of orders, not just give them.”28
However, Lee was a distant man when the time
came to discussing battle tactics. Francis Lawley, a British ambassador observing Gettysburg, noted that
Lee was “unresponsive to his generals‟ advice.”29
A lack of communication is a main source for military
defeats throughout history. Even the generals closest to him such as Longstreet were often ignored, much
to the army‟s expense.30
Following Gettysburg, Lee was noted to having read Northern newspaper reports
on the battle that claimed the South would have won if he had followed Longstreet‟s suggestions.31
It is possible to blame Lee‟s subordinates in this case for not being able to follow their
commander‟s orders. However, it was Lee himself who put his subordinates in the positions in the first
place. Lee “lacked an eye for talent” and often appointed military leaders who could be considered
average at best.32
Lee did not encourage “unusual promotions” within the ranks, which often squashed the
possibility of potential military geniuses to come out of the dark and into command.33
General Longstreet
is one example of a subordinate who followed orders but was later blamed for the loss at Gettysburg. The
27
28
29
Thomas L. Conelly, The Marble Man: Robert E. Lee and his Image in American Society (New York: Alfred A. Knopf,
1977), 57.
30
2004), 179.
31
Ibid.,338.
32
Daniel Mark Epstein, "Who cares about Robert E. Lee?." New Criterion 26, no. 1 (September 2007): 26,
http://web.ebscohost.com/ehost/pdfviewer/pdfviewer?sid=2aae63a0-59b4-443a-b20c-
fc10ab94fe39%40sessionmgr13&vid=7&hid=111 (accessed February 25, 2012).
33
Ibid., 26.

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foolhardy offensive maneuvers on the second day of the Battle of Gettysburg, along with the suicidal
Pickett‟s charge on the third day, are both blamed on Longstreet disobeying Lee‟s orders to follow a more
defensive tactic. This story of Longstreet‟s disobedience, however, did not come up in the battle reports
until seven years later, when General Jubal Early turned Longstreet into the scapegoat for Lee‟s faults.34
General Early himself made poor offensive maneuvers on the first day of the Battle of Gettysburg that
potentially caused the outcome of the battle itself. Longstreet described Early as one who was “ready to
champion any reports that could throw a shadow over its record, but the charge most pleasing to him was
that of treason on the part of its commander.”35
Clearly, Early enjoyed taking the initiative to shift the
blame from himself to Longstreet, while simultaneously glorifying Lee‟s memory.36
Aside from his immediate subordinates and advisors, Lee also had a way of trying to get around
the political system in order to achieve his own ambitions during war. Jefferson Davis and the politicians
at Richmond wanted to follow a far more defensive policy than Lee executed. Lee was „supposed to
sustain the war through wit and maneuver to the point where the North grew thoroughly tired on a conflict
that posed no immediate threat to its own basic way of life.”37
Instead, Lee shaped his battle plan to a
much more aggressive strategy than the Confederate army could afford. In fact, Lee never even fully told
Davis and the Cabinet about his planned invasions of the North in 1862 and 1863. The Maryland invasion
of 1862 was only approved by Davis after the fact.38
In 1863, Lee lied about the amount of resources
necessary for an offensive into Pennsylvania, in order to get Davis‟s approval. This blatant lie caused the
34
Stephen W. Sears, "Getting right with Robert E. Lee." American Heritage 42, no. 3 (May 1991):
35
2004), 334.
36
1977), 54.
37
Early S. Miers, Robert E. Lee: A Great Life in Brief (New York: Alfred A. Knopf, 1956), 75.
38

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Confederate army to invade the North without enough ammunition and proper equipment. Lee tended to
believe that his soldiers were in prime condition to fight. In reality, they often were marching hundreds of
miles without food or shoes. Lee‟s commitment to his battle plan despite the lack of resources available
caused him to make poor political decisions that kept the Confederate government in the dark as to his
intentions throughout the war.
Lee‟s decision to go with his own course of action instead of his government‟s decision comes off
as arrogant, almost aggressive in nature. The character trait of aggressiveness is another one of Lee‟s
military faults that manifested time after time throughout the Civil War. Lee is described as having the
“instincts of a boxer, anxious to disconcert his opponent with counterpunches, swift and unexpected.”39
The ability to counterpunch in military tactics derives from the ability to read your opponent‟s moves.
While I am not denying that Lee had moments of incredible brilliance in predicting the timid nature of
Northern Generals McClellan and Meade, in general, Lee proved to be too aggressive for his own good.
At the battle of Antietam, Lee took enemy inactivity as “faltering” and would order his generals to press
the attack.40
This often backfired because the opposing army at Antietam was not faltering as Lee
assumed, but instead taking a leaf out of Lee‟s book and adopting a defensive position. At Antietam, Lee
made several great bluffs during the course of the battle, hoping to scare off the Union army. Towards the
end of the battle, Lee ordered to put in every artillery gun possible and open fire with long and short range
weapons.41
He had no more reserves left and knew that the Union reserves were waiting just a few miles
behind the front lines. Luckily for Lee, McCellan did not press the attack. If they had, however, they
would have called Lee‟s bluff and completely overrun the Confederate army. Lee chose a battlefield with
a terrible retreat route, backed against a river with only one faulty exit at Boteler‟s Ford.42
Lee position
39
40
41
Ibid., 160.
42
Ibid., 175.

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and tactics at Antietam were far too aggressive for a general who should have known the limitations of his
own army.
Lee‟s aggressive nature derives from another aspect of his life that should not have been brought
onto the battlefield: his faith in God. “He saw the Southern army as controlled by a divine hand, and
believed that battles were determined by God.”43
While confidence in your success is indeed important,
putting your faith in the hands of an unseen power is not good military judgment. Lee himself is the
commander of the army and should not rely on supernatural forces of the next world to help protect the
physical world and its realities. Lee “trusted in God that his blunders might not prove calamitous, that
somehow the Confederacy could muddle through.”44
This quote does not paint the picture of a soldier
confident in his own abilities. Instead, it shows how Lee would push forward with over aggressive
actions, backed only by the belief that God would protect them. Lee believed that with God would protect
his soldiers during the battle of Gettysburg; he should have been focusing on how he could form better
strategies to protect his soldiers.
Lee also had a tendency to let glory and past victories take precedence over logistical truths, thus
clouding his vision from the truth. At the battle of Antietam, Lee had only 35,000 soldiers facing
McCellan‟s force of 87,000, but Lee pressed onward because he believed these were the “best soldiers” in
the world.45
Even if his soldiers were indeed superhuman, superior numbers and the disparity in military
equipment should have ended any delusions of military success. In the Virginia Wilderness campaigns of
1864, Lee actively pitted 60,000 poorly equipped soldiers against Ulysses S. Grant‟s 125,000 soldiers.
Despite being outnumbered by a force twice his size, Lee continued because they would be fighting in the
same forests that Union General Hooker had lost in two years prior, so it was likely that Grant would lose
43
1977), 191.
44
45

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as well.46
This type of logic has no strategic backing. Lee should have pulled back to a more defensive
position, but he instead actively engaged Grant in bloody contests that shattered the remainder of the
Confederate army. Lee‟s aggressiveness and unrelenting faith in his soldiers shows a poor sense of
judgment and what his army was truly capable of accomplishing, often sending his army north “without a
fully developed plan of operations.”47
He did plan out his offenses but instead trusted in God that his
opponents would slip up. “Assumptions about the incompetence of one‟s opponents are not the basis for
sound strategic planning.”48
Some historians will argue that Lee had political reasons for being aggressive in strategy. It is
possible that Lee believed a quick knock-out punch against the enemy capital would end a war that the
South could not sustain in the long run; this could explain his great focus on the war in Virginia and less
in the Western theatre. In 1864, it would have been a better political victory to send the army southwest,
crush Sherman‟s advance into Atlanta, and then returned to Virginia.49
Simply put, Lee focused too much
on the northeastern theatre. Furthermore, it has been suggested that Davis wanted Lee to inspire enough
fear into the North to prevent Lincoln from winning the 1864 election and likely ending the war by
deterring the population of the North. However, “Lee relied too heavily on the 1864 political loss of
Lincoln. He pushed too fast for an offensive with heavy casualties…giving Lincoln a boost by ending up
on the defensive himself.”50
Lee even failed in his objective to inspire fear into the north when invading
Pennsylvania in 1863. Most of the citizens did not join an emergency militia to stop Lee‟s advance
46
47
Ibid., 105.
48
Ibid., 105.
49
50
Alan T. Nolan, Lee Considered: General Robert E. Lee and Civil War History (Chapel Hill: University of North
Carolina Press, 1991), 88.

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towards Gettysburg because they did not feel as if Lee was really a threat. To inspire fear, Lee should
have torched the entire area he invaded, but he was too much of a gentleman to do so.51
Lee‟s reputation as an amazing general was not even known to the North during and after the war.
The earliest that Lee is mentioned in the New York Times is 1862. He is described as “far from being
popular at the South…he has no political strength there now of any importance.”52
In fact, the North knew
so little about Lee at the beginning that the first picture they had of him in the Northern newspapers was
from his younger years at West Point. Lee simply was not somebody that the North cared about. “He
must be looked upon simply as the right arm of an unscrupulous authority which he can neither hope to
advise nor to control.”53
After Lee‟s victory at the 2nd
Battle of Bull Run in 1862, The North was not
afraid of Lee‟s military prowess. To the contrary, the North was quite impressed with Lee‟s ability to
shake off the disastrous defeats and in turn throw the northern army onto the offensive. Instead of putting
a dent in Northern morale, Lee had taught the North a “lesson of perseverance.”54
By August of 1863, Lee had begun to be openly criticized by northern newspapers. Lee‟s military
prowess was described as such: “talent serves a defensive war, while genius takes an offensive war.”55
This stab at Lee‟s skills was clearly in response to the two failed offenses that Lee attempted throughout
the war. Lee had proven successful while on the defense, but his skills at attacking the enemy, a
51
William Alan Blaire,““A Source of Amusement”: Pennsylvania versus Lee, 1863.” The Pennsylvania Magazine of
History and Biography 115, no. 3 (Jul., 1991), 334. http://www.jstor.org/stable/20092629 (accessed February 25,
2012)
52
The Rebel Generals, New York Times, September 16, 1862,http://www.nytimes.com/1862/09/16/news/the-
rebel-generals.html?scp=19&sq=%22robert+e+lee%22&st=p (accessed March 13, 2012)
53
Ibid.
54
A Lesson from the Enemy, Albany Evening Journal, September 1, 1862
.http://www.newsinhistory.com/blog/northern-and-southern-reaction-second-battle-bull-run-manassas (accessed
March 14, 2012).
55
The Chivalry of the Rebel Gen. Lee, New York Times, May 23, 1864,
http://www.nytimes.com/1864/05/23/news/the-chivalry-of-the-rebel-gen-
lee.html?scp=74&sq=%22robert+e+lee%22&st=p&gwh=53A65173D89E5CE0A4A7FA5BBC58698 3 (accessed
March 15, 2012).

14
fundamental aspect of war, was a far cry from greatness. He was compared to Frederick the Great in that
his strength came from being on the defensive with offensive returns, a strategy that would not win the
war for the South.56
. On May 14th
, 1864, the north attacked Lee‟s honor and revealed an address that Lee
had given to his soldiers on that status of the war. Every section of the address was a blatant military lie,
and now the entire North had direct evidence of the faults of Lee‟s character. “Fidelity lies at the very
core of sound character, and when that rots, all rots.”57
The north had no respect for Robert E. Lee; in fact,
they believe that he took credit for all of Stonewall Jackson‟s victories and noticed that he had not had a
major victory since Jackson‟s death.58
1865 was the last year that Lee received harsh criticism from the South, which later opened up a
window for the remolding of his reputation to begin. Prior to 1865, Lee‟s defensive nature had at least
been considered admirable. It was the one tactic that Lee was good at executing. In March 1865, Northern
newspapers made a point that it took no skill to build and defend fortifications. In fact, the only reason
that the majority of his defensive efforts had worked in the first place could blamed on the timidity of
McClellan and the overall lack of Northern efforts to press the attack on Lee.59
Northern critics did not
understand how it is possible to honor a man who caused a prolonged bloodshed in a pointless war. Lee‟s
honor was attacked again when Northern newspapers questioned how any sane Christian could allow
thousands of Union soldiers to starve to death on Belle Isle prison.60
What sort of gentleman would allow
56
Gen. Lee and the Rebellion, New York Times, August 25, 1863, http://www.nytimes.com/1863/08/25/news/gen-
lee-and-the-rebellion.html?scp=38&sq=&pagewanted=1 (accessed March 15, 2012).
57
The Chivalry of the Rebel Gen. Lee, New York Times, May 23, 1864.
58
Ibid.
59
The First and Last Test of Lee’s Generalship, New York Times, March 16, 1865,
http://www.nytimes.com/1865/03/16/news/the-first-and-last-test-of-lee-s-
generalship.html?scp=96&sq=%22robert+e+lee%22&st=p&gwh=FA1B47B43F439BC3D256DD0ABCE76405
(accessed March 17, 2012).
60
The Rebel Chiefs, Harper’s Weekly, May 13, 1865, http://app.harpweek.com.navigator-
kutztown.passhe.edu/IssueImagesView.asp?titleId=HW&volumeId=1865&issueId=0513&page=2 90 (accessed
February 29, 2012).

15
this atrocity to occur? The North did not have to alter the facts to show that Lee was an aggressive traitor
who made excuses for his actions, as all traitors do.61
So when did Lee‟s reputation switch? How did the man who was known as a traitor and a failed
tactician turn into a flawless symbol of the American legend? The origins of the switch were a
combination of two factors: the easing of tensions from the victorious north and the needs of a bitter,
defeated south for a hero to exploit. The turning point came after Robert E. Lee‟s death on October 12,
1870. After the fiery accusations of Northern newspapers died down in 1865, Lee‟s life became one of
quiet obscurity.62
He took a low key job at Washington University and stayed removed from politics. By
the time of his death, newspapers had become bored with writing about Lee. He was a regional hero, not a
national one.63
In the few articles written about Lee in response to his death, he was viewed in a far more
moderate light than he was during the Civil War. He was described as an amiable man who made the
wrong choice in the war; he would be remembered as unfortunate.64
After these mild descriptions ended,
The North had little to say about Lee. This opened the door for Lee‟s reputation to blossom.
In New Orleans, the death of Lee meant an opportunity for the South to take control of the
political direction of the city. By 1870, moderate northern Republicans had been placed in New Orleans
to head the Reconstruction efforts. Northern Republicans were charged with healing the divisions
between themselves and Southern, white conservative communities. “White conservatives…saw Lee‟s
61
Extraordinary Conduct, Harper’s Weekly, May 13, 1865,
http://app.harpweek.com.navigatorkutztown.passhe.edu/IssueImagesView.asp?titleId=HW&volumeId=1865&issu
eId=0513&page=290 (accessed February 29, 2012).
62
James C. Cobb, "How did Robert E. Lee Become and American Icon?." Humanities 32, no. 4 (July 2011): 30,
http://ehis.ebscohost.com/ehost/detail?sid=0373755d-f904-413b-8294-
59366c77ad20%40sessionmgr111&vid=15&hid=109&bdata=JnNpdGU9ZWhvc3QtbGl2ZSZzY29wZT1zaXRl#db=a9h
&AN=62984560 (accessed March 19, 2012).
63
1977), 99.
64
Robert E. Lee, Harper’s Weekly, October 29, 1870,http://app.harpweek.com.navigator-
kutztown.passhe.edu/IssueImagesView.asp?titleId=HW&volumeId=1870&issueId=1029&page=691 (accessed
February 28, 2012).

16
death as an opportunity to reassert their continued commitment to the old racial order.”65
These
Southerners used Lee‟s death as a way to hoodwink the northern Republicans into uniting under the
banner of a single white hero. Southerners beckoned their Northern neighbors to join them in the
mourning of a hero‟s passing.66
They capitalized on the wishes of the North to reconcile with the South by
commemorating Lee as a man who lacked corruption, and blamed the dwindling state of the city on the
new biracial government. Republican Judge Dibble stationed in New Orleans allowed a powerful eulogy
for Lee to be said because he saw nothing wrong with letting it happen.67
Moderate Republican politicians
in New Orleans went along with the mourning process because the majority of the population would have
been angry at them if they refused to recognize Lee. Northern businessmen followed the mourning
process because it was better for business to accept it.68
Throughout the years, Lee has been built up into an unbeatable general who only lost because of a
lack of resources and faulty subordinates. These claims, however, have little historical truth and were
more often than not created after he died. The men who created this image were bitter Southern
politicians and generals seeking to justify their cause as righteous. Subordinates of Lee such as Longstreet
were turned into scapegoats, taking the blame for Lee‟s losses.69
Lee was indeed a very capable general
whose tactics proved useful while on the defensive and displayed great intuition on the battlefield.
However, the record of his offensive engagements reveal a general who did not listen to his subordinates,
trusted more in the supernatural than reality, and made unwise decisions when positioning his army on the
offensive.
65
Michael A. Ross, "The Commemoration of Robert E. Lee's Death and the Obstruction of Reconstruction in New
Orleans." Civil War History 51, no. 2 (June 2005): 135.
http://ehis.ebscohost.com/ehost/detail?vid=3&hid=109&sid=95eb5024-dfff-4a99-8b13-
9785b407f307%40sessionmgr14&bdata=JnNpdGU9ZWhvc3QtbGl2ZSZzY29wZT1zaXRl#db=ahl&AN=16795572
(accessed February 25, 2012).
66
Ibid., 140.
67
Ibid., 143.
68
Ibid, 140.
69
2004), 487.

17
HIS 378 Research Paper Bibliography
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manassas
Alexander, Edward Porter, and Gary W. Gallagher. Fighting for the Confederacy: The Personal
Recollections of General Edward Porter Alexander. Chapel Hill: University of North Carolina
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Harper’s Weekly. Extraordinary Conduct. May 13, 1865.
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18
New York Times. The First and Last Test of Lee’s Generalship. March 16, 1865.
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http://www.jstor.org/stable/20092629
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Cobb, James C. "How did Robert E. Lee Become and American Icon?." Humanities 32, no. 4 (July 2011):
28-33. Academic Search Complete, EBSCOhost (accessed March 19, 2012).
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T1zaXRl#db=a9h&AN=62984560
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A. Knopf, 1977.
Epstein, Daniel Mark. "Who cares about Robert E. Lee?." New Criterion 26, no. 1 (September 2007): 22-
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19
Gallagher, Gary W. Lee and his Generals in War and Memory. Baton Rouge: Louisiana State University
Press, 1998.
Hynds, Ernest C. "The Press and the Generals: Media Influence Images, Aspirations.” Atlanta History: A
Journal Of Georgia & The South 42, no. 1/2 (March 1998): 45-58.
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50-55. Military & Government Collection, EBSCOhost (accessed March 19,
2012).http://ehis.ebscohost.com/ehost/detail?sid=22980074-474f-4bce-82e9-
Miers, Early S. Robert E. Lee: A Great Life in Brief. New York: Alfred A. Knopf, 1956.
Nolan, Alan T. Lee Considered: General Robert E. Lee and Civil War History. Chapel Hill: University of
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Athens: University of Georgia Press, 1987.
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in New Orleans." Civil War History 51, no. 2 (June 2005): 135-150. America: History & Life,
EBSCOhost (accessed February 25, 2012).
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20
Sears, Stephen W. Landscape Turned Red: The Battle of Antietam. Boston: Houghton Mifflin Co., 1983.

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