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Inequality, redistribution 
and fiscal policy 
Juan Pablo Jiménez 
Economic Commission for Latin America and the Caribbean 
Second European-Latin America Economic Forum 
Europe and Latin America in the wake of global paradigm shifts 
and new trends in the world economy 
Paris, OECD Headquarters 
20-21 May, 2014
Motivation 
 Inequality in Latin America has decreased in 
recent times 
 There is a kind of consensus about what fiscal 
policy (by the expenditure side) can do to promote 
more equal societies… 
 However, there remains a better understanding 
about what is the role of tax policy in reducing 
inequality
Objectives 
I. Evaluate the evolution of inequality with different 
information sources (household surveys; PIT microdata…). 
II. Analyze with more detail high income concentration, 
comparing our results with other studies. 
III. Study taxation of PIT and how to improve its performance 
IV. Evaluate the impact of potential reforms 
V. Promote a regional debate about income distribution and 
taxation.
Since 2002: tendency change, inequality fall in 
most of the countries of the region 
LATIN AMERICA (17 COUNTRIES): INEQUALITY, 
GINI INDEX, 2002-2011 
LATIN AMERICA AND OTHER REGIONS OF THE WORLD: GINI 
CONCENTRATION COEFFICIENT, AROUND 2009 a 
0.52 
0.44 
0.41 
0.38 0.38 
0.35 
0.33 
0.6 
0.5 
0.4 
0.3 
0.2 
0.1 
0 
Latin America 
and the 
Caribbean 
(18) 
Sub- 
Saharan 
Africa 
(37) 
East Asia 
and the 
Pacific 
(10) 
North Africa 
and Middle 
East 
(9) 
South 
Asia 
(8) 
Eastern 
Europe and 
Central Asia 
(21) 
OECD 
(20) 
Source: Economic Commission for Latin America and the Caribbean (ECLAC), on the basis of special tabulations of data from household surveys conducted in the respective countries; 
World Bank, World Development Indicators [online]. 
a The regional data are expressed as simple averages, calculated using the latest observation available in each country for the 2000-2009 period. 
b Organization for Economic Co-operation and Development.
The relationship between the richest and 
poorest decil is significantly higher than in 
other region of the world 
STRUCTURE OF INCOME DISTRIBUTION, CIRCA 2009 
(In percentages and number of times) 
100% 
90% 
80% 
70% 
60% 
50% 
40% 
30% 
20% 
10% 
Source: World Bank, World Development Indicators. 
35 
30 
25 
20 
15 
10 
5 
0 
0% 
Europa y Asia Central 
Sur de Asia 
Oriente Medio y Norte de África 
América del Norte 
Asia Oriental y Pacífico 
África Subsahariana 
América Latina y el Caribe 
Income ratio (times) 
Income share 
Q1 Q2 Q3 Q4 Q5 D10/D1 Q5/Q1
The distribution of wealth is even more 
unequal than income 
INEQUALITY OF INCOME AND WEALTH IN SELECTED ECONOMIES, EARLY 2000S 
Source: International Monetary Fund (2014), “Fiscal policy and income inequality”, policy paper (Washington).
Problems for the measurement of inequality 
 Current discussion: better understand the recent fall and 
its possible sustainability, and discuss about inequality 
measurement 
 Questioning the indicators used to reflect inequality and 
the sources of information used 
 Information sources: Main limitation of household 
surveys: problems to capture high incomes. 
 There is not an entirely appropriate way to solve this 
problem. One possibility are the adjustments with 
National Accounts, which implies assuming this source is 
of better quality. 
 Another possibility: incorporating estimates of income 
tax records.
The top 1% of the income distribution captures 
more than 10% of total income, higher than other 
developing and developed countries 
25.0 
20.0 
15.0 
10.0 
5.0 
0.0 
Participación en el ingreso del 1% más rico 
INCOME SHARE OF THE RICHEST 1% 
(alrededor de 2005) 
(circa 2005) 
Source: Amarante and Jiménez (2014) based on Atkinson et al (2011), Alvaredo and Londoño (2013) and Burdin et al 
(2013)
Fiscal policy has a limited role to improve 
income market distribution in LA 
LATIN AMERICA AND OECD: INEQUALITY OF MARKET INCOME AND DISPOSABLE INCOME – Total population 
(Gini indexes – circa 2011) 
0,60 
0,55 
0,50 
0,45 
0,40 
0,35 
0,30 
0,25 
Ingreso de mercado Market income InDgisrpeossoa bdleis ipncoonmibe lien ceans hefectivo 
BRA RDO CHL ARG PAN COL CRI PRY BOL MEX PER ECU NIC URY SLV VEN ALC OECD 
Source: ECLAC elaboration based on household surveys for Latin America and OECDSTAT.
The impact of pensions and transfer is 
more significant than taxes 
LATIN AMERICA: DECREASE IN INEQUALITY ACCORDING TO FISCAL POLICY INSTRUMENT 
(Gini points – circa 2011) 
8 
7 
6 
5 
4 
3 
2 
1 
0 
-1 
BRA URY ARG CHL CRI MEX ALC PAN ECU PER BOL VEN NIC COL RDO SLV PRY 
Pensiones públicas Otras trasferencias Public pensions Other public transfe rps úinb cliacsahs en efectivo ISPRe rpseornsaol ninaclo ym CeS tSax and CSS 
Source: ECLAC elaboration based on household surveys.
Althought PIT rates are very progressive… 
LATIN AMERICA: KAKWANI INDEX OF PERSONAL INCOME TAX, circa 2011 
0 0,1 0,2 0,3 0,4 0,5 0,6 
VEN 
ECU 
NIC 
URY 
CHL 
MEX 
PAN 
BRA 
PRY 
ARG 
PER 
SLV 
CRI 
HND 
RDO 
COL 
Source: ECLAC elaboration
… and is concentrated in income high decils… 
12 
LATIN AMERICA: CONCENTRATION OF THE PERSONAL INCOME TAX COLLECTION 
(Percentages – circa 2011) 
100 
90 
80 
70 
60 
50 
40 
30 
20 
10 
0 
-10 
DDeecciilless1 1to a 4 4 DDeecciillses5 5to a 8 8 DDeecciill 99 DDeecciill 1100 
ECU BRA HND PAN RDO CHL PRY NIC VEN COL ARG CRI PER MEX SLV URY 
Source: ECLAC elaboration
… its redistributive impact is very limited 
13 
LATIN AMERICA: REYNOLDS SMOLENSKY INDEX AND AVERAGE EFFECTIVE RATE OF PIT 
Circa 2011 
0,023 
0,017 
0,014 
0,012 
0,010 
0,009 0,008 
0,006 
0,005 
0,004 
0,002 
6 
5 
4 
3 
2 
1 
0 
0,025 
0,020 
0,015 
0,010 
0,005 
0,000 
MEXARG URY CHL BRA CRI NIC PER PAN COL RDO SLV HND ECU VEN PRY 
Tasa media efectiva 
Reynolds Smolensky 
Reynolds Smolensky Tasa media efectiva 
Average effective rate 
Average effective rate 
Source: ECLAC elaboration
The average rate of the top decil is 
significantly low…. 
PROGRESSIVITY OF THE INCOME TAX OF INDIVIDUALS IN LATIN AMERICA, circa 2011 
Country Year 
Average rates progression 
Source: ECLAC based on households surveys. 
Notes: Results subject to review. The calculations were made with respect to disposable income. 
a It was only considered part of the tax on labor income, since in the survey capital income are aggregated with other 
income. 
b Simulation according to the current tax. 
Kakwani 
index 
Concentration of 
(in percentages of income) collection (in %) 
D1 D2 D3 D4 D5 D6 D7 D8 D9 D10 Total bottom 
40% 
top 20% 
Argentina 2011 0.0 0.0 0.0 0.0 0.1 0.2 0.4 0.9 2.5 9.0 3.9 0.42 0.0 96.0 
Brazil a 2011 0.0 0.0 0.0 0.0 0.0 0.0 0.1 0.2 0.7 6.6 2.8 0.43 0.0 99.2 
Chile 2011 0.0 0.0 0.0 0.0 0.0 0.1 0.1 0.3 0.9 7.1 3.2 0.44 0.0 98.5 
Colombia 2011 0.2 0.2 0.2 0.2 0.3 0.3 0.4 0.5 0.8 4.4 2.1 0.37 1.0 93.1 
Costa Rica 2011 0.0 0.0 0.0 0.0 0.1 0.1 0.2 0.5 1.6 5.3 2.4 0.40 0.0 96.5 
Ecuador 2011 0.0 0.0 0.0 0.0 0.0 0.0 0.0 0.0 0.0 2.5 0.9 0.52 0.0 99.9 
El Salvador 2011 0.0 0.0 0.0 0.1 0.2 0.3 0.5 0.8 1.3 3.6 1.6 0.41 0.4 88.0 
Honduras 2010 0.0 0.0 0.0 0.0 0.0 0.0 0.0 0.0 0.4 2.9 1.3 0.40 0.0 99.8 
Mexico 2010 -2.1 -1.9 -1.4 -0.9 -0.2 0.6 1.4 2.6 4.7 10.6 5.0 0.44 -3.6 94.7 
Nicaragua 2009 0.0 0.0 0.0 0.0 0.0 0.0 0.1 0.2 0.5 4.8 1.8 0.48 0.0 98.2 
Panama 2011 0.0 0.0 0.0 0.0 0.0 0.0 0.1 0.2 0.5 4.5 1.9 0.43 0.0 98.6 
Paraguay b 2011 0.0 0.0 0.0 0.0 0.0 0.1 0.0 0.1 0.1 1.2 0.5 0.43 0.1 96.8 
Peru 2011 0.0 0.0 0.0 0.1 0.1 0.2 0.4 0.7 1.2 4.7 2.0 0.42 0.2 92.6 
Dominican Rep. 2011 0.0 0.0 0.0 0.0 0.0 0.0 0.0 0.1 0.6 4.3 2.0 0.39 0.0 99.5 
Uruguay 2011 0.0 0.0 0.1 0.1 0.3 0.6 1.0 1.9 3.6 8.8 3.7 0.44 0.3 89.1 
Venezuela 2011 0.0 0.0 0.0 0.0 0.0 0.0 0.1 0.1 0.3 2.3 0.7 0.54 0.1 96.2
Why tax policy has had such low 
influence on income distribution? 
 Tax burden low and volatile 
 Low when compared with its relative development as well with other regions 
 Tax revenue depend on volatile tax bases, such as consumption and the prices 
of natural resources 
 Tax revenue is three times more volatile than in developed countries 
 Unbalanced structure 
 Biased towards consumption taxes 
 While income taxes increased, there is a significant gap in the personal 
income tax when compared with other regions 
 The income tax is mainly based on corporations and the personal income tax 
on wage income 
 Low property taxes, mainly based on financial transactions 
 Narrow tax base 
 High informality added to evasion limits already narrow tax bases 
 Widespread use of tax expenditures generates significant tax collection loss 
 Widespread use of simplified procedures
Low property taxes, mainly based on 
financial transactions 
STRUCTURE OF THE COLLECTION OF PATRIMONIAL TAXES IN LATIN AMERICA AND THE OECD, 2011 
(in percentages of GDP) 
2,0 
1,8 
1,6 
1,4 
1,2 
1,0 
0,8 
0,6 
0,4 
0,2 
0,0 
Real estate Net wealth Inheritance and 
donations 
Source: Own elaboration based on Gomez Sabaini and Moran (2014) 
Financial and 
capital 
transactions 
Others on 
patrimony 
Total taxes on 
patrimony 
AL (18) OECD (34)
Impact of potential reforms 
 Impact of potential reforms in PIT structure 
 PIT w-o tax expenditure 
 PIT household 
 PIT flat 
 PIT dual 
 PIT standard 
 Impact of potential reforms in PIT revenue 
 Increase average rate of tenth decil to 20% 
 Increase average rate of tenth decil to 20% and 
10% to eight and ninth decil.
There is space to strenght the “redistributive 
muscle” of PIT in LA 
LATIN AMERICA: REYNOLDS SMOLENSKY INDEX AND AVERAGE EFFECTIVE RATE OF PIT UNDER 
DIFFERENT SCENARIOS – circa 2011 
12,0 
10,0 
8,0 
6,0 
4,0 
2,0 
0,0 
0,045 
0,040 
0,035 
0,030 
0,025 
0,020 
0,015 
0,010 
0,005 
0,000 
Escenario 
actual 
Escenario 
i 
Escenario 
ii 
Escenario 
iii 
Average effective rate 
Escenario 
iv 
Escenario 
v 
Escenario 
vi 
Escenario 
vii 
Tasa media efectiva 
Reynolds Smolensky 
Reynolds Smolensky Tasa media efectiva 
Source: ECLAC elaboration 
Note: Scenarios: i- PIT without tax expenditures; ii- PIT household; iii- PIT Flat; iv- Dual PIT; v- Standard PIT; vi- Rate 
of 20% for D10 and vii- Rate of 20% for D10 and 10% for D 8 and 9. 
Average effective rate 
Current 
scenario
Conclusions and challenges 
 Beyond the fall of inequality since 2002-2003 in most countries of the 
region….. 
 ..remains the need to debate whether its measurement from household 
surveys is not underestimating the high concentration of income. 
 PIT: Two things were noted: an increase in minimun rates, which helped to 
increment collection, and a decrease of the marginal maximum rate, which 
lead the tax to lose progressivity. 
 There is space to improve the distributional impact of PIT 
 The utilization of tax microdata opens an interesting research agenda for 
studies of inequality; complementing the information of household surveys 
 It also allows to evaluate possible tax reforms to strengthen the distributive 
muscle of our tax systems 
 This line of work implies two challenges: 
 A challenge for the statistical systems: their scope and potential depend 
of the quality and integration of these statistical systems 
 A challenge for the tax authorities: regular access to tax records is 
required
Merci beaucoup! 
Juanpablo.jimenez@cepal.org 
Second European-Latin America Economic Forum 
Europe and Latin America in the wake of global paradigm shifts 
and new trends in the world economy 
Paris, OECD Headquarters 
20-21 May, 2014

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2014_05-21_OECD-ECLAC-PSE EU-LAC Forum_jimenez

  • 1. Inequality, redistribution and fiscal policy Juan Pablo Jiménez Economic Commission for Latin America and the Caribbean Second European-Latin America Economic Forum Europe and Latin America in the wake of global paradigm shifts and new trends in the world economy Paris, OECD Headquarters 20-21 May, 2014
  • 2. Motivation  Inequality in Latin America has decreased in recent times  There is a kind of consensus about what fiscal policy (by the expenditure side) can do to promote more equal societies…  However, there remains a better understanding about what is the role of tax policy in reducing inequality
  • 3. Objectives I. Evaluate the evolution of inequality with different information sources (household surveys; PIT microdata…). II. Analyze with more detail high income concentration, comparing our results with other studies. III. Study taxation of PIT and how to improve its performance IV. Evaluate the impact of potential reforms V. Promote a regional debate about income distribution and taxation.
  • 4. Since 2002: tendency change, inequality fall in most of the countries of the region LATIN AMERICA (17 COUNTRIES): INEQUALITY, GINI INDEX, 2002-2011 LATIN AMERICA AND OTHER REGIONS OF THE WORLD: GINI CONCENTRATION COEFFICIENT, AROUND 2009 a 0.52 0.44 0.41 0.38 0.38 0.35 0.33 0.6 0.5 0.4 0.3 0.2 0.1 0 Latin America and the Caribbean (18) Sub- Saharan Africa (37) East Asia and the Pacific (10) North Africa and Middle East (9) South Asia (8) Eastern Europe and Central Asia (21) OECD (20) Source: Economic Commission for Latin America and the Caribbean (ECLAC), on the basis of special tabulations of data from household surveys conducted in the respective countries; World Bank, World Development Indicators [online]. a The regional data are expressed as simple averages, calculated using the latest observation available in each country for the 2000-2009 period. b Organization for Economic Co-operation and Development.
  • 5. The relationship between the richest and poorest decil is significantly higher than in other region of the world STRUCTURE OF INCOME DISTRIBUTION, CIRCA 2009 (In percentages and number of times) 100% 90% 80% 70% 60% 50% 40% 30% 20% 10% Source: World Bank, World Development Indicators. 35 30 25 20 15 10 5 0 0% Europa y Asia Central Sur de Asia Oriente Medio y Norte de África América del Norte Asia Oriental y Pacífico África Subsahariana América Latina y el Caribe Income ratio (times) Income share Q1 Q2 Q3 Q4 Q5 D10/D1 Q5/Q1
  • 6. The distribution of wealth is even more unequal than income INEQUALITY OF INCOME AND WEALTH IN SELECTED ECONOMIES, EARLY 2000S Source: International Monetary Fund (2014), “Fiscal policy and income inequality”, policy paper (Washington).
  • 7. Problems for the measurement of inequality  Current discussion: better understand the recent fall and its possible sustainability, and discuss about inequality measurement  Questioning the indicators used to reflect inequality and the sources of information used  Information sources: Main limitation of household surveys: problems to capture high incomes.  There is not an entirely appropriate way to solve this problem. One possibility are the adjustments with National Accounts, which implies assuming this source is of better quality.  Another possibility: incorporating estimates of income tax records.
  • 8. The top 1% of the income distribution captures more than 10% of total income, higher than other developing and developed countries 25.0 20.0 15.0 10.0 5.0 0.0 Participación en el ingreso del 1% más rico INCOME SHARE OF THE RICHEST 1% (alrededor de 2005) (circa 2005) Source: Amarante and Jiménez (2014) based on Atkinson et al (2011), Alvaredo and Londoño (2013) and Burdin et al (2013)
  • 9. Fiscal policy has a limited role to improve income market distribution in LA LATIN AMERICA AND OECD: INEQUALITY OF MARKET INCOME AND DISPOSABLE INCOME – Total population (Gini indexes – circa 2011) 0,60 0,55 0,50 0,45 0,40 0,35 0,30 0,25 Ingreso de mercado Market income InDgisrpeossoa bdleis ipncoonmibe lien ceans hefectivo BRA RDO CHL ARG PAN COL CRI PRY BOL MEX PER ECU NIC URY SLV VEN ALC OECD Source: ECLAC elaboration based on household surveys for Latin America and OECDSTAT.
  • 10. The impact of pensions and transfer is more significant than taxes LATIN AMERICA: DECREASE IN INEQUALITY ACCORDING TO FISCAL POLICY INSTRUMENT (Gini points – circa 2011) 8 7 6 5 4 3 2 1 0 -1 BRA URY ARG CHL CRI MEX ALC PAN ECU PER BOL VEN NIC COL RDO SLV PRY Pensiones públicas Otras trasferencias Public pensions Other public transfe rps úinb cliacsahs en efectivo ISPRe rpseornsaol ninaclo ym CeS tSax and CSS Source: ECLAC elaboration based on household surveys.
  • 11. Althought PIT rates are very progressive… LATIN AMERICA: KAKWANI INDEX OF PERSONAL INCOME TAX, circa 2011 0 0,1 0,2 0,3 0,4 0,5 0,6 VEN ECU NIC URY CHL MEX PAN BRA PRY ARG PER SLV CRI HND RDO COL Source: ECLAC elaboration
  • 12. … and is concentrated in income high decils… 12 LATIN AMERICA: CONCENTRATION OF THE PERSONAL INCOME TAX COLLECTION (Percentages – circa 2011) 100 90 80 70 60 50 40 30 20 10 0 -10 DDeecciilless1 1to a 4 4 DDeecciillses5 5to a 8 8 DDeecciill 99 DDeecciill 1100 ECU BRA HND PAN RDO CHL PRY NIC VEN COL ARG CRI PER MEX SLV URY Source: ECLAC elaboration
  • 13. … its redistributive impact is very limited 13 LATIN AMERICA: REYNOLDS SMOLENSKY INDEX AND AVERAGE EFFECTIVE RATE OF PIT Circa 2011 0,023 0,017 0,014 0,012 0,010 0,009 0,008 0,006 0,005 0,004 0,002 6 5 4 3 2 1 0 0,025 0,020 0,015 0,010 0,005 0,000 MEXARG URY CHL BRA CRI NIC PER PAN COL RDO SLV HND ECU VEN PRY Tasa media efectiva Reynolds Smolensky Reynolds Smolensky Tasa media efectiva Average effective rate Average effective rate Source: ECLAC elaboration
  • 14. The average rate of the top decil is significantly low…. PROGRESSIVITY OF THE INCOME TAX OF INDIVIDUALS IN LATIN AMERICA, circa 2011 Country Year Average rates progression Source: ECLAC based on households surveys. Notes: Results subject to review. The calculations were made with respect to disposable income. a It was only considered part of the tax on labor income, since in the survey capital income are aggregated with other income. b Simulation according to the current tax. Kakwani index Concentration of (in percentages of income) collection (in %) D1 D2 D3 D4 D5 D6 D7 D8 D9 D10 Total bottom 40% top 20% Argentina 2011 0.0 0.0 0.0 0.0 0.1 0.2 0.4 0.9 2.5 9.0 3.9 0.42 0.0 96.0 Brazil a 2011 0.0 0.0 0.0 0.0 0.0 0.0 0.1 0.2 0.7 6.6 2.8 0.43 0.0 99.2 Chile 2011 0.0 0.0 0.0 0.0 0.0 0.1 0.1 0.3 0.9 7.1 3.2 0.44 0.0 98.5 Colombia 2011 0.2 0.2 0.2 0.2 0.3 0.3 0.4 0.5 0.8 4.4 2.1 0.37 1.0 93.1 Costa Rica 2011 0.0 0.0 0.0 0.0 0.1 0.1 0.2 0.5 1.6 5.3 2.4 0.40 0.0 96.5 Ecuador 2011 0.0 0.0 0.0 0.0 0.0 0.0 0.0 0.0 0.0 2.5 0.9 0.52 0.0 99.9 El Salvador 2011 0.0 0.0 0.0 0.1 0.2 0.3 0.5 0.8 1.3 3.6 1.6 0.41 0.4 88.0 Honduras 2010 0.0 0.0 0.0 0.0 0.0 0.0 0.0 0.0 0.4 2.9 1.3 0.40 0.0 99.8 Mexico 2010 -2.1 -1.9 -1.4 -0.9 -0.2 0.6 1.4 2.6 4.7 10.6 5.0 0.44 -3.6 94.7 Nicaragua 2009 0.0 0.0 0.0 0.0 0.0 0.0 0.1 0.2 0.5 4.8 1.8 0.48 0.0 98.2 Panama 2011 0.0 0.0 0.0 0.0 0.0 0.0 0.1 0.2 0.5 4.5 1.9 0.43 0.0 98.6 Paraguay b 2011 0.0 0.0 0.0 0.0 0.0 0.1 0.0 0.1 0.1 1.2 0.5 0.43 0.1 96.8 Peru 2011 0.0 0.0 0.0 0.1 0.1 0.2 0.4 0.7 1.2 4.7 2.0 0.42 0.2 92.6 Dominican Rep. 2011 0.0 0.0 0.0 0.0 0.0 0.0 0.0 0.1 0.6 4.3 2.0 0.39 0.0 99.5 Uruguay 2011 0.0 0.0 0.1 0.1 0.3 0.6 1.0 1.9 3.6 8.8 3.7 0.44 0.3 89.1 Venezuela 2011 0.0 0.0 0.0 0.0 0.0 0.0 0.1 0.1 0.3 2.3 0.7 0.54 0.1 96.2
  • 15. Why tax policy has had such low influence on income distribution?  Tax burden low and volatile  Low when compared with its relative development as well with other regions  Tax revenue depend on volatile tax bases, such as consumption and the prices of natural resources  Tax revenue is three times more volatile than in developed countries  Unbalanced structure  Biased towards consumption taxes  While income taxes increased, there is a significant gap in the personal income tax when compared with other regions  The income tax is mainly based on corporations and the personal income tax on wage income  Low property taxes, mainly based on financial transactions  Narrow tax base  High informality added to evasion limits already narrow tax bases  Widespread use of tax expenditures generates significant tax collection loss  Widespread use of simplified procedures
  • 16. Low property taxes, mainly based on financial transactions STRUCTURE OF THE COLLECTION OF PATRIMONIAL TAXES IN LATIN AMERICA AND THE OECD, 2011 (in percentages of GDP) 2,0 1,8 1,6 1,4 1,2 1,0 0,8 0,6 0,4 0,2 0,0 Real estate Net wealth Inheritance and donations Source: Own elaboration based on Gomez Sabaini and Moran (2014) Financial and capital transactions Others on patrimony Total taxes on patrimony AL (18) OECD (34)
  • 17. Impact of potential reforms  Impact of potential reforms in PIT structure  PIT w-o tax expenditure  PIT household  PIT flat  PIT dual  PIT standard  Impact of potential reforms in PIT revenue  Increase average rate of tenth decil to 20%  Increase average rate of tenth decil to 20% and 10% to eight and ninth decil.
  • 18. There is space to strenght the “redistributive muscle” of PIT in LA LATIN AMERICA: REYNOLDS SMOLENSKY INDEX AND AVERAGE EFFECTIVE RATE OF PIT UNDER DIFFERENT SCENARIOS – circa 2011 12,0 10,0 8,0 6,0 4,0 2,0 0,0 0,045 0,040 0,035 0,030 0,025 0,020 0,015 0,010 0,005 0,000 Escenario actual Escenario i Escenario ii Escenario iii Average effective rate Escenario iv Escenario v Escenario vi Escenario vii Tasa media efectiva Reynolds Smolensky Reynolds Smolensky Tasa media efectiva Source: ECLAC elaboration Note: Scenarios: i- PIT without tax expenditures; ii- PIT household; iii- PIT Flat; iv- Dual PIT; v- Standard PIT; vi- Rate of 20% for D10 and vii- Rate of 20% for D10 and 10% for D 8 and 9. Average effective rate Current scenario
  • 19. Conclusions and challenges  Beyond the fall of inequality since 2002-2003 in most countries of the region…..  ..remains the need to debate whether its measurement from household surveys is not underestimating the high concentration of income.  PIT: Two things were noted: an increase in minimun rates, which helped to increment collection, and a decrease of the marginal maximum rate, which lead the tax to lose progressivity.  There is space to improve the distributional impact of PIT  The utilization of tax microdata opens an interesting research agenda for studies of inequality; complementing the information of household surveys  It also allows to evaluate possible tax reforms to strengthen the distributive muscle of our tax systems  This line of work implies two challenges:  A challenge for the statistical systems: their scope and potential depend of the quality and integration of these statistical systems  A challenge for the tax authorities: regular access to tax records is required
  • 20. Merci beaucoup! Juanpablo.jimenez@cepal.org Second European-Latin America Economic Forum Europe and Latin America in the wake of global paradigm shifts and new trends in the world economy Paris, OECD Headquarters 20-21 May, 2014

Notes de l'éditeur

  1. 1
  2. Como se documentó en forma enfatica en las presentaciónes anteriores, la desigualdad ha disminuido en la región Como se ha discutido previamente, existe cierto consenso sobre cual ha sido el esfuerzo hecho por la PF para afectar esa desigualdad, pero sobre todo por el lado del GP Pero creemos que aun hay espacio para discutir cual es el rol de la politica de ingresos (trib o no trib) para reducir la desigualdad distrubutiva Acorde con esta motivación, los objetivos de mi presentación serán ……
  3. Evaluar algunas dimensiones de la desigualdad, tratando de incorporar información adicional, relevante para mejorar el impacto distrib de la PF ……………………………………………… Desde 2002 caída de la desigualdad del ingreso en la mayoría de los países de la región……… The overall aim of the project has two ways: on the one hand, improve indicators that allow us to improve the map of inequality in the region On the other hand, an assessment of the limitations and potential of the tax system to reduce the high level of concentration existing in the income distribution in the region.
  4. Importante caída de la desigualdad en la región, No obstante seguimos siendo campeones del mundo en desigualdad del ingreso…..más allá de la alta heterogeneidad entre países……. La principal característica de la desigualdad es la alta concentración del ingreso en pocas manos….. As has been repeated enough in recent years, in the last decade there has been a shift in the evolution of inequality. This change has been widespread in the countries of the region as seen in the graph from the left. Beyond that, the levels of the Gini coefficients of the region remains the highest when compared with other regions INEQUALITY REMAINS A CENTRAL PROBLEM IN THE REGION Gini: 2007 2008 2009 2010 2011 LATIN AMERICA 0.525 0.515 0.510 0.505 0.502 Gini coefficient ranges from 0.40 in Venezuela to 0.57 in Honduras. A comparison of recent findings with data from around 2002 confirms a marked trend towards improved distribution. The graph at the left shows clearly that most of the countries of the region are not just below the diagonal (with inequality indices lower in 2011 than in 2002), they are well below it. The Gini coefficient fell by at least 1% per year in 9 of 17 countries. The countries with the most significant decreases were Argentina, the Bolivarian Republic of Venezuela, Nicaragua and the Plurinational State of Bolivia, all of which saw their Gini coefficient fall by more than 2% a year. Even though the inequality indicators for the Dominican Republic and Costa Rica did not improve, they did not go up appreciably, either. The economic crisis that broke out in 2008 and had its greatest impact on GDP in 2009 had no particular effect on the improvement in distribution. As with the poverty rate, this behaviour of distribution during a cycle episode differs from the pattern most frequently seen in similar situations in prior decades, when distribution usually worsened (often significantly) and recovery took several years. As income distribution improved in Latin America, income concentration rose in the developed countries. According to the Organisation for Economic Cooperation and Development (OECD, 2011), the Gini coefficient for OECD countries went from 0.29 in the mid-1980s to 0.316 in the late 2000s —an increase of nearly 10%. It rose significantly in 17 of the 22 countries with long-term series available.
  5. ………………………… Este alto nivel de concentración es aún más acentuado cuando se observan los niveles de riqueza en algunos países de la región y se comparan con otros países de afuera de la región…………………… If anything characterizes inequality in our region is the high concentration of income Fragmented societies in Which a large fraction of total income is captured by the richest 10% On average, 10% of the richest households concentrate 35% of total revenues. In countries it is observed a dispersion around this value. While in Uruguay and Venezuela the top decil’s share is less than 28 % of total resources, in Brazil and Colombia this exceeds 40%. On the other end, the stratum comprised by 40% of lower income households captures on average 15% of total revenue, reaching the lowest values ​​in Honduras , Dominican Republic and Bolivia , where it does not exceed 11 % This is key: this level of inequality requires strengthening taxes based on the principle of ability to pay.
  6. Inequality of income and wealth in selected economies, in the early 2000s Another dimension of inequality to be considered for their possible relationship with the tax system, is the distribution of wealth, which is distributed significantly more concentrated than income, as shown in this Figure. Both the high degree of inequality of wealth as its high concentration in the higher levels, make it necessary to re-discuss the taxation of income and wealth. Note that from the 6 countries with most unequal distribution of wealth, 3 are from AL (Arg, Mex, Bra) According to Oxfam ( xx) the 85 richest people in the world have the same amount of wealth than the poorest half of the world population . Piketty page 3 . As stated Piketty and Zucman (2013 ) the reappearance of a high wealth-income ratio should be accompanied by the analysis of capital taxation issues. As wealth is always very concentrated , high beta ratio implies that inequality of wealth and potentially inequality of inherited wealth probably play an important role in explaining total inequality in the near future, more than it played in the past. This evolution could reinforce the need to strengthen the progressive taxation on capital and inheritances So, this high level of inequality and high concentration makes us worry about having more and better indicators of inequality. What are the problems of traditional measurements ?
  7. Fuentes de información: Principal limitación de las encuestas de hogares: problemas para capturar los ingresos altos. ` Puede ser por un problema de truncamiento (menor presencia de hogares más ricos) o sub-declaración (especialmente en los ingresos del capital). Errores/omisiones CEPAL: ajuste del ingreso de las encuestas de hogares al ingreso de SCN (Altimir, 1987). Dos etapas: imputación de faltantes y ajuste por fuentes, con tratamiento diferencial del capital. Ajuste cuestionado y en revisión. A partir de la consideración de los altos ingresos y la utilización de los registros impositivos…………. Que nos dicen los estudios existentes?...........
  8. Estudio para Colombia de Alvaredo y Londoño (2013): 1% superior de la distribución del ingreso capta el 20% del total del ingreso, superior a los países en desarrollo y desarrollados con información comparable Altos ingresos provienen fundamentalmente de rentas y del capital La corrección del índice de Gini de encuestas considerando los altos ingresos hace que el nivel de desigualdad sea superior y la caída experimentada desde 2006 menos pronunciada. Como se ve en el gráfico. Cual es el rol de la PF para mejorar estos niveles de desigualdad?.....................
  9. A pesar que los países de América Latina están entre los más desiguales del mundo, la política fiscal juega un papel limitado a la hora de mejorar la distribución del ingreso. Como era de esperar, la efectividad de la política fiscal en la reducción de la desigualdad es diferente entre países. Por un lado, se destacan Argentina, Brasil y Uruguay donde los impuestos sobre la renta personal, las contribuciones a la seguridad social y las transferencias públicas en efectivo (incluidas las jubilaciones y pensiones) reducen, en conjunto, la desigualdad (medida por el coeficiente de Gini) en torno a un 13% en promedio. Otros países donde la reducción de la desigualdad supera al promedio de la región son Chile, Costa Rica y México, especialmente por la incidencia de las transferencias y subsidios directos, como el programa Oportunidades en México, Chile Solidario o el programa Avancemos en Costa Rica. En estos dos últimos también tienen un efecto igualador los programas de pensiones y jubilaciones públicas mientras que en México se destaca el impacto de los impuestos directos. En el otro extremo se sitúan Colombia, El Salvador, Paraguay y República Dominicana que presentan un leve impacto de las transferencias públicas en efectivo y de los impuestos directos sobre la distribución del ingreso, ya que el índice de Gini disminuye menos de 2% luego de la acción fiscal. Además, con la excepción de El Salvador, estos países se encuentran entre los de mayor desigualdad de ingresos de mercado y justamente en ellos la política fiscal debería tener un rol redistributivo más activo. En cambio, los países de la OECD con una distribución más desigual de los ingresos de mercado tienden a redistribuir más (véase Joumard y otros, 2012). En ese sentido, Brasil, Chile y Argentina presentan una alta desigualdad antes de la acción fiscal que en parte es corregida vía pensiones y jubilaciones públicas, programas de transferencias e impuestos directos. Dejenme desagregar el efecto de la política fiscal en pensiones, transferencias e impuestos………….
  10. Por último, para obtener una primera aproximación de la incidencia de la acción fiscal, en este gráfico se muestra el efecto combinado del ISR personal y las transferencias directas. Los resultados sugieren que la política fiscal beneficia a los grupos de ingresos más bajos de la población, principalmente a través de las jubilaciones y pensiones públicas y de otras transferencias directas en efectivo, ya que el efecto vía impuesto a la renta y contribuciones a la seguridad social es más acotado. Más allá de las diferencias entre países, en mayor o menor medida, en todos los casos las transferencias públicas en efectivo (como los programas de transferencias condicionadas u otros) y el impuesto sobre la renta personal disminuyen la desigualdad en la distribución del ingreso (gráfico 7). En general, los sistemas de pensiones públicas también contribuyen a una distribución más igualitaria, excepto en tres países donde la desigualdad aumenta como consecuencia de las pensiones (Colombia, El Salvador y Paraguay) . En promedio, un 63% de la reducción del coeficiente de Gini de los ingresos de mercado proviene de las transferencias públicas en efectivo (incluidas las pensiones) y el resto de la disminución corresponde al efecto del impuesto sobre la renta y el pago de las contribuciones a la seguridad social. Este resultado, donde las transferencias públicas tienen un mayor rol redistributivo que los impuestos directos, es consistente con los hallazgos de otros estudios regionales tanto en América Latina como en los países de la OECD (Goñi et al 2011, Lustig et al 2013, Joumard, Pisu y Bloch 2012 y Barreix et al 2009).
  11. Con el fin de evaluar la progresividad o regresividad del tributo, se calcula el índice de Kakwani, donde un valor positivo indica progresividad mientras que si el indicador es negativo el impuesto es regresivo. De acuerdo con este indicador los impuestos que gravan la renta personal son claramente progresivos en todos los países. Adicionalmente el IRP grava a casi exckusivamente al último decil…….
  12. Además la recaudación del impuesto está fuertemente concentrada en los estratos más altos de ingresos. En prácticamente todos los países, el 90% o más del impuesto es soportado por el 20% de ingresos más elevados mientras que el grupo de hogares pertenecientes al 40% de ingresos inferiores no aporta a la recaudación del tributo o lo hace en una fracción muy pequeña.
  13. Entonces…. Si bien el diseño del impuesto a la renta personal es progresivo en todos los países, su impacto redistributivo es muy limitado como consecuencia de sus bajos niveles de recaudación.
  14. Sin embargo, se observa que la tasa efectiva que pagan los individuos pertenecientes al 10% de la población de mayores ingresos apenas alcanza un valor promedio del 5,2%, con países donde el estrato de mayores ingresos paga solo entre 1% y 3% de su ingreso bruto y otros donde aporta alrededor del 10%. Según el indicador de Reynolds Smolensky, el índice de Gini se reduce en promedio 0,01 puntos (o 2%) por la acción de este impuesto, con ciertas diferencias entre los países (Cuadro 8). Por ejemplo, en México la distribución del ingreso (medida por el índice de Gini) mejora un 5% gracias al impacto de los impuestos que gravan la renta personal que se ve reforzado por el efecto del subsidio al empleo. Otros países que se destacan por un mayor efecto redistributivo son Argentina y Uruguay con una mejora de la equidad vertical del orden del 3% y 4%, respectivamente. Estos tres países están entre los de mayor recaudación del impuesto a la renta personal con relación a su PIB. En el extremo opuesto se encuentran Ecuador, Honduras, Paraguay y Venezuela con una reducción del coeficiente de Gini cercana al 1% y con niveles de recaudación por debajo del promedio de la región. Como un resumen, cuales son las causas de tan baja influencia de la politica tributaria en la redistribucion del ingreso……
  15. No voy a profundizar en estos puntos, que hemos tratado en varios papers previos Solo mostrarles la poca importancia de los impuestos patrimoniales en la región. Hegemonia del Imp a las transacciones financieras Por ultimo, dejenme mostrarles unos resultados de una serie de simulaciones de reformas que estamos llevando adelante en la CEPAL……
  16. Its important to note that all the scenarios are based on the scenario of IRPF without tax expenditures.
  17. 20