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OCCUPATIONAL SAFETY AND
HEALTH (KAS3501)
Semester II 2014/2015
Group 10
Presentation date : 8 April 2015
NAME UK NUMBER
MUHAMMAD ARRAZI B. MUHSIN UK29548
NURUL ASWANIS BT. AHMAD UK29528
FATMA SYAHIRAH BT. MOHAMMAD UK29532
SITI NURWANI BT. BADRULHISHAM UK29533
NOR ATIERA NABILA BT. ISMAIL UK29522
WHAT IS FAULT
TREE ANALYSIS
(FTA)?
• Is a systematic method of System Analysis
• Examines System from Top Down
• Provides graphical symbols for ease of
understanding
• Incorporates mathematical tools to focus on
critical areas
HISTORY
• FTA was first used by Bell Telephone
Laboratories in connection with the
safety analysis of the Minuteman
missile launch control system in 1962
• Technique improved by Boeing
Company
• Extensively used and extended
during the Reactor safety study (WASH
1400)
Fault Tree Analysis: a Systematic
and
Stylized Deductive Process
 An undesired event is defined
 The event is resolved into its immediate causes
 This resolution of events continues until basic causes are
identified
 A logical diagram called a fault tree is constructed
showing the logical event relationships
WHY FTA IS
CARRIED OUT?
• FTA is a deductive analysis approach for resolving
an undesired event into its causes
• FTA is a backward looking analysis, looking
backward at the causes of a given event
• Specific stepwise logic is used in the process
• Specific logic symbols are used to illustrate the
event relationships
• A logic diagram is constructed showing the event
relationships.
ELEMENT OF
FAULT TREE
ANALYSIS (FTA)
• To exhaustively identify the causes of a failure
• To identify weaknesses in a system
• To assess a proposed design for its reliability or
safety
• To identify effects of human errors
• To prioritize contributors to failure
• To identify effective upgrades to a system
• To quantify the failure probability and contributors
• To optimize tests and maintenances
ROLE OF FTA IN
SYSTEM ANALYSIS
• FTA is used to resolve the causes of system failure
• FTA is used to quantify system failure probability
• FTA is used to evaluate potential upgrades to a system
• FTA is used to optimize resources in assuring system
Safety
• FTA is used to resolve causes of an incident
• FTA is used to model system failures in risk
assessments
FAULT TREE
• FTA produces a Fault Tree
• The fault tree is the logical model of the relationship of the
undesired event to more basic events.
• The top event of the fault tree is the undesired event.
• The middle events are intermediate events.
• The bottom of the fault tree is the causal basic events or
primary events.
• The logical relationships of the events are shown by
logical symbols or gates.
BASIC FAULT TREE STRUCTURE
CONSIDERATION BEFORE DRAWING A FT
Define
Top event
Existing event
Unallowed
event (not
under
consideration)
Physical
bounds of
process
Equipment
configuration
Level of
resolution
CONSIDERATION BEFORE
DRAWING A FT
Requirement Description
1. Defining top event • Eg. Damage due to over pressure
• AVOID vague event such as ‘Explosion
of Reactor’
2. Defining the existing event • What conditions are sure to be present
when top event occurs?
• Eg. ‘High pressure process’
3. Defining unallowed events that are
unlikely or are not considered at the
present
• E.g. Wiring failures, lightning strike,
tornadoes, hurricanes etc.
4. Defining physical bounds of the process • What components are to be considered
in the fault tree?
5. Defining equipment configuration. • What valves are open or closed?
• What are the liquid level?
• Is this normal operation state?
6. Defining the level of resolution • Will the analysis consider just a valve or
will it be necessary to consider the valve
components?
THE FOUR NECESSARY STEPS TO
BEGIN A FAULT TREE
1. Define the undesired event to be analyzed (the focus
of the FTA)
2. Define the boundary of the system (the scope of the
FTA)
3. Define the basic causal events to be considered (the
resolution of the FTA)
4. Define the initial state of the system
ILLUSTRATION OF THE STEPS OF
A FTA
BASIC EVENTS OF A FAULT
TREE
BASIC GATES OF A FAULT TREE
DRAWING A FAULT TREE
1. Place top event at the top of the
page (in a rectangle box and label as
top event)
2. Determine the events that contribute
to the top event.
3. Determine whether these events are
intermediate or basic.
4. If the events are related in parallel,
they must be connected by an AND
gate
5. If these events are related in series,
they must be connected by an OR
gate
6. Focus to one of the immediate events
7. Determine the events that contribute to
this immediate event.
8. Repeat 3-6 for all the intermediate events.
9. Continue developing the fault tree to
expand any intermediate events until all
branches have been terminated by basic,
undeveloped or external events.
FLAT TIRE Top Event
OR
Tire
Failure Road Debris
Worn Tire
Defective
Tire
A fault tree describing the various events contributing to a flat tire
OR
BENEFITS OF CONSTRUCTING A
FAULT TREE
 The fault tree explicitly shows all the different
relationships that are necessary to result in the top event
 In constructing the fault tree, a thorough understanding is
obtained of the logic and basic causes leading to the top
event
 The fault tree is a tangible record of the systematic analysis
of the logic and basic causes leading to the top event
 The fault tree provides a framework for thorough
qualitative and quantitative evaluation of the top event
MINIMAL CUT SETS
Minimal cut set gives the various sets of
events that could lead to the top event.
Useful for determining the various failure
modes in which a top event could occur.
The failure probabilities are likely to be
different among the minimal cut sets.
The higher failure probabilities sets are
examined carefully to determine for
requirement for additional safety systems.
The minimal cut sets are determined using
procedure by Fussell and Vesely (see next
example) or Boolean Rules
PUMP FAIL
PUMP A
FAILS
PUMP B FAILS
Failure of
Power
Supply
Pump A
Mechanica
l Failure
Failure of
Power
Supply
Pump B
Mechanica
l Failure
M
W
M Z
Example problem: Minimal Cut Set
TOP
EVENT
Example
D E
A B
C D E C
Boolean Algebra & Minimal Cut
Set
Boolean Rules
Indempotent Law
A+A=A
A.A=A
Absorption Law
A+A.B=A
A.(A+B)=A
Therefore, minimal cut sets are A.C, A.D.E, B.C and B.D.E.
 
 
 
 
 
)()()()(
)(
)(
)()(
)()(
)())()(()(
EDBCBEDACA
EDCBA
EDEDCBA
EDCDECCCBA
EDCDEDCCECBA
EDCEDCBA






ADVANTAGE OF
FAULT TREE
• User could select the top event to be specific to the failure
of interest.
• The minimal cut sets provide enormous inside into the
various failure modes for top event to occur.
• Minimal cut sets with a product of 4 or more
independent failure will increase the reliability of the
system.
• Provide a qualitative and quantitative reliability analysis.
• Software are available to construct fault tree, to
determine cut sets and to calculate the failure
probabilities.
DISADVANTAGE OF
FAULT TREE
• Can be enormous (thousands gate and intermediate
events)
• Not necessarily all failure modes are considered.
• Need experienced engineers
• Assume hardware not to fail partially (such the possibility
of valve leak is not considered).
• Assume failure of one component does not put stress on
the other components (that could change component
failure probabilities).
• External events not correctly treated.
APPLICATION
 Used in the field of safety engineering and reliability
engineering to determine the probability of a safety accident
or particular system level failure.
 Aerospace engineering.
REFERENCES
 “Fault Tree Handbook with Aerospace Applications’, Version
1.1, NASA Publication, August 2002.
 http://www.conceptdraw.com/examples/fta

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Fault Tree Analysis

  • 1. OCCUPATIONAL SAFETY AND HEALTH (KAS3501) Semester II 2014/2015 Group 10 Presentation date : 8 April 2015 NAME UK NUMBER MUHAMMAD ARRAZI B. MUHSIN UK29548 NURUL ASWANIS BT. AHMAD UK29528 FATMA SYAHIRAH BT. MOHAMMAD UK29532 SITI NURWANI BT. BADRULHISHAM UK29533 NOR ATIERA NABILA BT. ISMAIL UK29522
  • 2. WHAT IS FAULT TREE ANALYSIS (FTA)?
  • 3. • Is a systematic method of System Analysis • Examines System from Top Down • Provides graphical symbols for ease of understanding • Incorporates mathematical tools to focus on critical areas
  • 5. • FTA was first used by Bell Telephone Laboratories in connection with the safety analysis of the Minuteman missile launch control system in 1962 • Technique improved by Boeing Company • Extensively used and extended during the Reactor safety study (WASH 1400)
  • 6. Fault Tree Analysis: a Systematic and Stylized Deductive Process  An undesired event is defined  The event is resolved into its immediate causes  This resolution of events continues until basic causes are identified  A logical diagram called a fault tree is constructed showing the logical event relationships
  • 8. • FTA is a deductive analysis approach for resolving an undesired event into its causes • FTA is a backward looking analysis, looking backward at the causes of a given event • Specific stepwise logic is used in the process • Specific logic symbols are used to illustrate the event relationships • A logic diagram is constructed showing the event relationships.
  • 9.
  • 11. • To exhaustively identify the causes of a failure • To identify weaknesses in a system • To assess a proposed design for its reliability or safety • To identify effects of human errors • To prioritize contributors to failure • To identify effective upgrades to a system • To quantify the failure probability and contributors • To optimize tests and maintenances
  • 12. ROLE OF FTA IN SYSTEM ANALYSIS
  • 13. • FTA is used to resolve the causes of system failure • FTA is used to quantify system failure probability • FTA is used to evaluate potential upgrades to a system • FTA is used to optimize resources in assuring system Safety • FTA is used to resolve causes of an incident • FTA is used to model system failures in risk assessments
  • 15. • FTA produces a Fault Tree • The fault tree is the logical model of the relationship of the undesired event to more basic events. • The top event of the fault tree is the undesired event. • The middle events are intermediate events. • The bottom of the fault tree is the causal basic events or primary events. • The logical relationships of the events are shown by logical symbols or gates.
  • 16. BASIC FAULT TREE STRUCTURE
  • 17. CONSIDERATION BEFORE DRAWING A FT Define Top event Existing event Unallowed event (not under consideration) Physical bounds of process Equipment configuration Level of resolution
  • 18. CONSIDERATION BEFORE DRAWING A FT Requirement Description 1. Defining top event • Eg. Damage due to over pressure • AVOID vague event such as ‘Explosion of Reactor’ 2. Defining the existing event • What conditions are sure to be present when top event occurs? • Eg. ‘High pressure process’ 3. Defining unallowed events that are unlikely or are not considered at the present • E.g. Wiring failures, lightning strike, tornadoes, hurricanes etc. 4. Defining physical bounds of the process • What components are to be considered in the fault tree? 5. Defining equipment configuration. • What valves are open or closed? • What are the liquid level? • Is this normal operation state? 6. Defining the level of resolution • Will the analysis consider just a valve or will it be necessary to consider the valve components?
  • 19. THE FOUR NECESSARY STEPS TO BEGIN A FAULT TREE 1. Define the undesired event to be analyzed (the focus of the FTA) 2. Define the boundary of the system (the scope of the FTA) 3. Define the basic causal events to be considered (the resolution of the FTA) 4. Define the initial state of the system
  • 20. ILLUSTRATION OF THE STEPS OF A FTA
  • 21. BASIC EVENTS OF A FAULT TREE
  • 22. BASIC GATES OF A FAULT TREE
  • 23. DRAWING A FAULT TREE 1. Place top event at the top of the page (in a rectangle box and label as top event) 2. Determine the events that contribute to the top event. 3. Determine whether these events are intermediate or basic. 4. If the events are related in parallel, they must be connected by an AND gate 5. If these events are related in series, they must be connected by an OR gate 6. Focus to one of the immediate events 7. Determine the events that contribute to this immediate event. 8. Repeat 3-6 for all the intermediate events. 9. Continue developing the fault tree to expand any intermediate events until all branches have been terminated by basic, undeveloped or external events.
  • 24. FLAT TIRE Top Event OR Tire Failure Road Debris Worn Tire Defective Tire A fault tree describing the various events contributing to a flat tire OR
  • 25. BENEFITS OF CONSTRUCTING A FAULT TREE  The fault tree explicitly shows all the different relationships that are necessary to result in the top event  In constructing the fault tree, a thorough understanding is obtained of the logic and basic causes leading to the top event  The fault tree is a tangible record of the systematic analysis of the logic and basic causes leading to the top event  The fault tree provides a framework for thorough qualitative and quantitative evaluation of the top event
  • 26. MINIMAL CUT SETS Minimal cut set gives the various sets of events that could lead to the top event. Useful for determining the various failure modes in which a top event could occur. The failure probabilities are likely to be different among the minimal cut sets. The higher failure probabilities sets are examined carefully to determine for requirement for additional safety systems. The minimal cut sets are determined using procedure by Fussell and Vesely (see next example) or Boolean Rules
  • 27. PUMP FAIL PUMP A FAILS PUMP B FAILS Failure of Power Supply Pump A Mechanica l Failure Failure of Power Supply Pump B Mechanica l Failure M W M Z Example problem: Minimal Cut Set
  • 29. Boolean Algebra & Minimal Cut Set Boolean Rules Indempotent Law A+A=A A.A=A Absorption Law A+A.B=A A.(A+B)=A
  • 30. Therefore, minimal cut sets are A.C, A.D.E, B.C and B.D.E.           )()()()( )( )( )()( )()( )())()(()( EDBCBEDACA EDCBA EDEDCBA EDCDECCCBA EDCDEDCCECBA EDCEDCBA      
  • 32. • User could select the top event to be specific to the failure of interest. • The minimal cut sets provide enormous inside into the various failure modes for top event to occur. • Minimal cut sets with a product of 4 or more independent failure will increase the reliability of the system. • Provide a qualitative and quantitative reliability analysis. • Software are available to construct fault tree, to determine cut sets and to calculate the failure probabilities.
  • 34. • Can be enormous (thousands gate and intermediate events) • Not necessarily all failure modes are considered. • Need experienced engineers • Assume hardware not to fail partially (such the possibility of valve leak is not considered). • Assume failure of one component does not put stress on the other components (that could change component failure probabilities). • External events not correctly treated.
  • 35. APPLICATION  Used in the field of safety engineering and reliability engineering to determine the probability of a safety accident or particular system level failure.  Aerospace engineering.
  • 36. REFERENCES  “Fault Tree Handbook with Aerospace Applications’, Version 1.1, NASA Publication, August 2002.  http://www.conceptdraw.com/examples/fta