Dr. Christoph Ungerer & Dr. Lili Liu, Macroeconomics & Fiscal Management (MFM) Global Practice, Governance Global Practice, Equitable Growth, World Bank.
Presentation at Ministry of Finance, P.R. China-World Bank Summit on Subnational Debt Management and Restructuring, Nanning, Guangxi Province, P.R. China. October 22, 2015.
2024: The FAR, Federal Acquisition Regulations - Part 27
Fiscal Rules and Debt Restructuring: The European Union Experience - Country Cases for Ireland and Greece
1. Fiscal Rules and Debt Restructuring
The European Union Experience
Country Cases for Ireland and Greece
Dr Christoph Ungerer & Dr Lili Liu
Macroeconomics & Fiscal Management (MFM) Global Practice,
Governance Global Practice,
Equitable Growth, Finance and Institutions (EFI) Vice-Presidency
2. Country Context and Initial Regulatory Framework
• European Union (EU) as “country” made up of 28 Member States (MS)
• Analogy especially applicable to Eurozone (vs EU)
• Much more decentralized than an actual country (EU budget 1% of GDP)
• EU fiscal framework
• Maastricht Treaty
• Rules-based approach: Stability and Growth Pact (SGP) in the 2000s
– Key metrics: budget deficit under 3% of GDP & debt below 60% of GDP
• Regular monitoring through EC
• No bail-out clause
• No formal sovereign insolvency procedure
• EU sovereign debt crisis offers valuable lessons
• EU has struggled controlling MS budgets for years
• Eurozone sovereign debt crisis as example of severe fiscal adjustment programs
• Importance of fiscal-banking nexus
• Reform of EU fiscal framework and banking union as response to the crisis
• This presentation focusses on the Greek and Ireland fiscal adjustment programs
3. Fiscal Vulnerabilities build up in the 2000s and lead to Crisis
• Very limited market discipline
• EU no-bail out commitment not credible
• Loose monetary conditions
• Undifferentiated bank capital risk weights
• SGP implementation issues
• Quality of statistics
• Macroeconomic and financial bubble hides fiscal weakness
• Difficulty enforcing excessive deficit procedure (EDP)
0
2
4
6
8
10
12
14
2000 2002 2004 2006 2008 2010
Long term (10Yr) interest rate (%)
Germany Greece Ireland
Source: ECB Data Warehouse
Source: IMF World Economic Outlook (April 2015)
-35
-30
-25
-20
-15
-10
-5
0
5
10
-12
-10
-8
-6
-4
-2
0
2006 2007 2008 2009 2010
General Government Primary Balance
relative to GDP (%)
Greece (LHS) Ireland (RHS)
5. Program Timeline
Budget deficit statistics
revised; Start of 1st
Program
(financial assistance:
120bn EUR or
~60% of GDP)
2nd debt restructuring, incl.
- Debt buy-back
- Rescheduling
=> Lowers 2020 debt /GDP
by ~16pp
Start of Program
(financial assistance:
85bn EUR
or ~60% of GDP)
Ireland:
Greece:
End of
program
Property bubble
bursts; creation of
bad bank; 1st bank
capital injections and
nationalization
(46bn EUR or ~30%
of GDP)
Bank recapitalization
(envelope:
~25% of GDP)
Ireland returns to
market
2009 20142011 2012 20132010 2015
PCAR 2011 stress
test results
(needs: 24bn EUR
or ~15% of GDP)
1st debt restructuring
(Private sector
haircut 53.5% on
197bn EUR of debt)
2nd Program
(additional
130bn EUR or
~60% of GDP)
3rd Program
(additional
86bn EUR)
Key take-aways:
• Close link between fiscal
and financial imbalances
• Program costs can quickly
become very large
• Contrast between smooth
Irish program and stop-go
of Greek program
6. Sharp fiscal adjustment… … some progress on structural reforms…
... signs of macroeconomic recovery … … but cost of adjustment remains heavy
Program Outcomes until end-2014…
-10
-5
0
5
10
2005 2006 2007 2008 2009 2010 2011 2012 2013 2014
Real GDP Growth (%)
Greece Ireland
0
5
10
15
20
25
30
35
40
Greece Ireland
Days to start a business
2006 2015
0
5
10
15
20
25
30
2005 2006 2007 2008 2009 2010 2011 2012 2013 2014
Unemployment rate (%)
Greece Ireland
Source: IMF World Economic Outlook (April 2015)
Source: IMF World Economic Outlook (April 2015)
Source: WB Doing Business Report (2015)
Source: IMF World Economic Outlook (April 2015)
-20
-15
-10
-5
0
5
2006 2007 2008 2009 2010 2011 2012 2013 2014
Structural GG balance (% pot. output)
Greece Ireland
7. Debt Dynamics over the Crisis
0
20
40
60
80
100
120
140
160
180
200
2007 2008 2009 2010 2011 2012 2013 2014
Public Debt relative to GDP (%)
Greece Ireland European Union
Key drivers of debt
dynamics:
• GDP base
• Fiscal stance
• Interest payments
• Debt restructuring
• Banking support
• Arrears clearance
• Privatizations
Greek debt restructuring, incl.
- PSI haircut
- Debt buy-back
- Rescheduling
Source: IMF World Economic Outlook (April 2015)
Besides current debt level, key considerations are long-term debt dynamics and
short-term financing needs
8. … but new Greek Government in early 2015 has led to
Renegotiation of the Greek Program and new Uncertainty
0
5
10
15
20
25
30
35
2008 2009 2010 2011 2012 2013 2014 2015
Long term (10Yr) interest rate (%)
Germany Greece Ireland
New Syriza-led
government and
renegotiation of
3rd programSource: ECB Data Warehouse
9. Differences between the Greek and Irish Programs
Differences Metric Ireland Greece
Type of crisis Banking crisis Fiscal crisis
Size of fiscal adjustment Adj. struct. balance (% GDP; max to 2014) 10pp 20pp
Openness of economy Export as % GDP (2014) 112% 33%
Flexibility of economy WB Doing Business Ranking (2015) 13 61
Decisive implementation Program renegotiations 0 2
Political stability Number of prime ministers (2009-pres.) 2 7
Timing of banking recap. Year since start of program -1 to +1 +2
Depth of conditionality Length of IMF MEFP (Pages, 1st Review) 14 46 (2nd Prog)
Sources: IMF World Economic Outlook (April 2015); EC AMECO Database; WB Doing Business Report (2015); IMF ex-post evaluation of the EEF arrangement with Ireland (2013);
“The Second Economic Adjustment Programme for Greece – First Review December 2012”, European Commission (2012); “First and Second Reviews Under the Extended
Arrangement and Request for Rephasing of the Arrangement”, IMF Staff Report (2011)
10. Since Crisis: Reform of the EU Fiscal Framework
• Strengthened fiscal rules, including:
• Explicit and gradual system of fines for countries under Excessive Deficit Procedure (EDP)
• Medium-term objective (MTO) for structural balance refined, automatic correction mechanism and transposition into national
legislation
• Expenditure benchmark
• Independent fiscal council
• Enhanced comprehensive monitoring of fiscal and macroeconomic imbalances
• Macroeconomic Imbalances Procedure & European Semester
• Enhanced monitoring of statistics, particularly in program countries
• Procedure to support MS in crisis
• European Stability Mechanism (ESM)
• Banking Union
• Single Supervisory Mechanism (SSM)
• Single Resolution Mechanism (SSR)
11. Final Thoughts
• EU case study highlights pitfalls of ex-ante fiscal monitoring. Key lessons:
• Fiscal rules must “bite”
• Fiscal rules are only as good as the underlying statistics
• Think beyond fiscal headline measures: macroeconomic and financial imbalances can quickly spill over
• But can fiscal rules be enforced top-down without market discipline? See US & Canada
• Greece and Ireland as prominent examples of adjustment programs. Key lessons:
• Need credible and clear upfront design of adjustment program: importance of stability and clear way out of the crisis
• Government needs to take program ownership and develop implementation capacity
• Federation needs to establish procedures to deal with crisis and firewall to avoid contagion
• But of course the Greek and Irish experiences are also products of the specific economic and
political context in the EU