1. Evidences of involvement of
Russia’s special forces into
developments in Eastern Ukraine
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2. Record of talks of a subversive group of the Main intelligence directorate of the
Russian General Staff (Sloviansk, 13 April, 2014). Main elements –
acknowledgement of arrival of the group from Russia, its composition both of
Russian servicemen and Ukrainian citizens, taking responsibility for an ambush
against Ukraine’s antiterrorist unit, coordination of further activities in Eastern
Ukraine with Moscow and Crimea.
Evidence 1 Radio talks intercepted among special forces
military units
3. A lieutenant colonel of the RF Armed Forces presents himself before the personnel
of a police office in Gorlivka, 14 April, 2014, confessing illegal crossing of border and
instructing Ukraine’s police officers about further actions as a part of opposing
strategy to current Ukraine’s authorities.
Evidence 2 Personal confession by a coordinator of Ukrainian separatist of his
relation to the RF Armed Forces
4. An officer of the RF Armed Forces, a commander of a group of 26 Ukrainian separatists
(Sloviansk, 13 April 2014) confirms his arrival from Crimea with aim to support subversive
activities in Eastern Ukraine
Personal confession by a coordinator of Ukrainian separatist of his relation
to the RF Armed ForcesEvidence 3
5. Disclosed agents of Russia’s special forcesEvidence 4
Serviceman of the
Main intelligence
directorate of the
Russian General
Staff , Russia’s
citizen, Bannykh
Roman Sergiovych, a
coordinator of
separatists in
Donetsk region
Career staff
employee of the RF
Federal Security
Service, citizen of
Russia, V.Makarov
Citizen of Russia,
Mariia Koleda,
performed a task
aimed at escalating
situation in Kherson
(Ukrainian city)
6. Disclosed agents of Russia’s special forcesEvidence 4
Russia’s Citizen
V.Negriienko was a
member of a group
tasked to organize anti-
state activities in
Donetsk
Leader of so called
„People’s militia of
Donbass” Pavlo
Gubareev, was
proclaimed as a “people’s
governor of Donetsk
region” at the meeting on
1 March 2014
Leader of the organization “Youth
Guards”, a member of Lugansk
regional council, Arsen Klinchaev
Leader of the “Lugansk’s Guards”
Oleksandr Kharytonov
Leader of the “People’s Militia of
Donbass” Mykhailo Chumachenko
7. A representative of the “People’s Militia of Donbass” armed with АК-100 rifles – a
model used exclusively by Russian army and special-ops (defining features of АК-
100 rifles: muffler, tactical light, special type of gunsight and butt).
Evidence 5 Unique Russian ammunition used by “People’s Militia of Donbass”
8. Representatives of the “People’s Militia of Donbass” who
participated in assaults against regional police offices in
Sloviansk and Kramatorsk
Separatists wore combat
boots made by the Russian
enterprise “Butex”. A great
number of these combat
boots (model “Mangust”)
was bought by Russia’s
security agencies in the
past.
Evidence 6 Unique Russian uniform used by “People’s Militia of Donbass”
9. Evidence 7 Uniform and ammunition used by Russia’s special forces and self-
defense in Eastern Ukraine are identical
For comparison: ammunition of a combatant of Russia’s special
forces (on the left) and a representative of “People’s Militia of
Donbass” (on the right), Sloviansk, 13 April, 2014
10. Kramatorsk, 13 April, 2014. One of the combatants uses a word “porebrik” (curb)
that is typical only for certain regions of Russia, in particular St. Petersburg.
Furthermore, this combatant has clear Russian accent.
Доказ 8 Russian accent and using of phrases by so called self-defense that are
not typical for locals
11. “Self-defense” in Sloviansk, 13 April, 2014, (atop) and in Krasnii Lyman, 13 April, 2014, (adown)
wears identical uniform and ammunition that are the kind of equipment carried out by regular
military units not by paramilitaries like as “people’s militia”
Evidence 9 Using of identical uniform and ammunition
12. Behavior of the representatives of the “People’s militia of Donbass”
(Kramatorsk, 13 April 2014) is consistent with special tactical training
of the RF special forces (way of targeting of buildings, control over
territory, individual actions of each combatant, coordinated acting of
military unit).
Evidence 10 Special training of participants of assault
13. Self-proclaimed major of Sloviansk V.Ponomariov confirms that he
acts according to external orders, talking over phone with his
“supervisors” (Sloviansk, 13 April 2014).
Evidence 11 Confession by separatist of dependence of his actions
14. Financing separatists groups via Russian banks in Ukraine
The Security Service of Ukraine has established that separatist
groups operating in Eastern Ukraine are being financed by using
funds of a Russian bank (Sberbank, according to the Prosecutor
General’s Office).
A criminal proceeding was initiated against mentioned bank (para 3
of Article 285-5 of Criminal Code of Ukraine) due to the fact of
financing of terrorist groups that are operating in Eastern Ukraine
under pro-Russian separatist slogans. It was established that
participants of such groups received 200-500 USD on their bank
cards on daily basis.
By doing so, the bank violated provisions of the law of Ukraine On
Preventing Money Laundering or Financing Terrorism.
15. Expert’s opinion. Phil Breedlove, NATO, Supreme Allied Commander, Europe
• The pro-Russian "activists” in eastern Ukraine exhibit tell-tale military training and
equipment and work together in a way that is consistent with troops who are part
of a long-standing unit, not spontaneously stood up from a local militia.
• The weapon handling discipline and professional behavior of these forces is
consistent with a trained military force. Rifle muzzles are pointed down, fingers
not on triggers, but rather laid across trigger mechanisms.
• Coordinated use of tear gas and stun grenades against targeted buildings indicates
a level of training that exceeds a recently formed militia.
• Video of these forces at checkpoints shows they are attentive, on their feet,
focused on their security tasks, and under control of an apparent leader. This
contrasts with typical militia or mob checkpoints, where it’s common to see
people sitting, smoking, and so forth.
• The way these forces target government buildings, hit them in coordinated strikes
and quickly secure the surrounding area with roadblocks and barricades is similar
to what we have seen in Crimea. Again, indicative of a professional military force,
acting under direction and leadership, not a spontaneous militia.
• Finally, the weapons and equipment they carry are primarily Russian army issue.
This is not the kind of equipment that civilians would be likely to be able to get
their hands on in large numbers.
16. Similar elements of tactic used in different eastern Ukrainian towns
• simultaneous and professionally coordinated takeover of
government administration buildings and security headquarters in
multiple locations in eastern Ukraine (Donetsk, Slavyansk, Krasnyi
Liman, Kramatorsk, Chervonoarmiysk, and Druzhkovka);
• seizure of weapons in the targeted buildings, forced removal of
local officials;
• rapid establishment of roadblocks and barricades;
• attacks against communications towers;
• deployment of well-organized forces;
• usage of local population, mostly women and children, to create
human shield in front of seized buildings
17. Unpopularity of separatists movements in eastern Ukraine
• a large majority of Donetsk residents (65.7 percent) want to live in a
united Ukraine and reject unification with Russia, according to public
opinion polls conducted at the end of March by the Donetsk-based
Institute of Social Research and Policy Analysis.
• pro-Russian demonstrations in eastern Ukraine have been modest in size,
especially compared with Maidan protests in these same cities in
December.
• a small number of separatists have seized several government buildings in
eastern cities like Donetsk, Luhansk, and Slovyansk, but they have failed
to attract any significant popular support.
• these incidents were reported by international actors including OSCE to
be very localized.
• a “People’s Republic of Donetsk” was declared by the small number of
separatists occupying the regional administration building.