PSA - Caratteristiche del Fenomeno Incendio - Bontempi

1
PSA:
CARATTERISTICHE
FENOMENO INCENDIO
Prof. Ing. Franco Bontempi
Ing. Chiara Crosti
Facolta’ di Ingegneria Civile e Industriale
Universita’ degli Studi di Roma “La Sapienza”
www.francobontempi.
org
3/22/2011 1
PROGETTAZIONE STRUTTURALE
ANTINCENDIO

2
INCENDIO
• Incendio = combustione autoalimentata ed
incontrollata di materiali combustibili.
• Carattere estensivo (diffusione nello spazio):
1. wildfire
2. urbanfire
3. all’esterno di un edificio
4. all’interno di un interno
• Carattere intensivo (andamento nel tempo).
• Natura accidentale.
www.francobontempi.
org
3/22/2011 2
ANTINCENDIO

3
CARATTERE ESTENSIVO
Diffusione nello spazio
www.francobontempi.
org
3/22/2011 3
ANTINCENDIO

4
1. WILDFIRE
www.francobontempi.
org
3/22/2011 4
ANTINCENDIO

5
www.francobontempi.
org
3/22/2011 5
ANTINCENDIO

6
www.francobontempi.
org
3/22/2011 6
ANTINCENDIO

7
www.francobontempi.
org
3/22/2011 7
ANTINCENDIO

8
www.francobontempi.
org
3/22/2011 8
ANTINCENDIO

9
www.francobontempi.
org
3/22/2011 9
ANTINCENDIO

10
www.francobontempi.
org
3/22/2011 10
ANTINCENDIO

11
www.francobontempi.
org
3/22/2011 11
ANTINCENDIO

12
www.francobontempi.
org
3/22/2011 12
ANTINCENDIO

13
www.francobontempi.
org
3/22/2011 13
ANTINCENDIO

14
www.francobontempi.
org
3/22/2011 14
ANTINCENDIO

15
www.francobontempi.
org
3/22/2011 15
ANTINCENDIO

16
2. URBANFIRE
www.francobontempi.
org
3/22/2011 16
ANTINCENDIO

17
www.francobontempi.
org
3/22/2011 17
ANTINCENDIO

18
The Great Fire of London Sunday, 2 September
to Wednesday, 5 September 1666.
www.francobontempi.
org
3/22/2011 18
ANTINCENDIO

19
The Great Fire of the City of New York,
16 December 1835
www.francobontempi.
org
3/22/2011 19
ANTINCENDIO

20
The Great Fire of Chicago, October 7-10, 1871
www.francobontempi.
org
3/22/2011 20
ANTINCENDIO

21
www.francobontempi.
org
3/22/2011 21
ANTINCENDIO

22
www.francobontempi.
org
3/22/2011 22
ANTINCENDIO

23
www.francobontempi.
org
3/22/2011 23
ANTINCENDIO

24
www.francobontempi.
org
3/22/2011 24
ANTINCENDIO

25
www.francobontempi.
org
3/22/2011 25
ANTINCENDIO

26
www.francobontempi.
org
3/22/2011 26
ANTINCENDIO

3/10/20143/22/2011
ANTINCENDIO
27
www.francobontempi.
org

28
3. ALL’ESTERNO DI UN EDIFICIO
www.francobontempi.
org
3/22/2011 28
ANTINCENDIO

29
www.francobontempi.
org
3/22/2011 29
ANTINCENDIO

30
www.francobontempi.
org
3/22/2011 30
ANTINCENDIO

31
www.francobontempi.
org
3/22/2011 31
ANTINCENDIO

32
www.francobontempi.
org
3/22/2011 32
ANTINCENDIO

33
www.francobontempi.
org
3/22/2011 33
ANTINCENDIO

34
www.francobontempi.
org
3/22/2011 34
ANTINCENDIO

35
www.francobontempi.
org
3/22/2011 35
ANTINCENDIO

36
www.francobontempi.
org
3/22/2011 36
ANTINCENDIO

37
www.francobontempi.
org
3/22/2011 37
ANTINCENDIO

38
www.francobontempi.
org
3/22/2011 38
ANTINCENDIO

39
4. ALL’INTERNO DI UN EDIFICIO
www.francobontempi.
org
3/22/2011 39
ANTINCENDIO

40
www.francobontempi.
org
3/22/2011 40
ANTINCENDIO

41
www.francobontempi.
org
3/22/2011 41
ANTINCENDIO

42
www.francobontempi.
org
3/22/2011 42
ANTINCENDIO

43
www.francobontempi.
org
3/22/2011 43
ANTINCENDIO

44
www.francobontempi.
org
3/22/2011 44
ANTINCENDIO

45
www.francobontempi.
org
3/22/2011 45
ANTINCENDIO

46
www.francobontempi.
org
3/22/2011 46
ANTINCENDIO

47
www.francobontempi.
org
3/22/2011 47
ANTINCENDIO

48
NUMERICAL
MODELING
www.francobontempi.
org
3/22/2011 48
ANTINCENDIO

49
CARATTERE INTENSIVO
Andamento temporale
www.francobontempi.
org
3/22/2011 49
ANTINCENDIO

50
ISO 13387: Example of Design Fire
www.francobontempi.
org
3/22/2011 50
ANTINCENDIO

51
www.francobontempi.
orgEVOLUZIONE NEL TEMPO DELLA
POTENZA TERMICA
3/22/2011 51
ANTINCENDIO

52
Summary of periods of typical fire development
Incipient
period
Growth period Burning period Decay period
Fire
Behavior
Heating
of fuel
Fuel controlled burning Ventilation controlled
burning
Fuel controlled
burning
Human
behavior
Prevent
ignition
Extinguish by hand,
escape
Death
Detection Smoke
detectors
Smoke detectors, heat
detectors
External smoke and flame
Active
control
Prevent
ignition
Extinguish by sprinklers
or fire fighters; control
of smoke
Control by fire-fighters
Passive
control
- Select materials with
resistance to flame
spread
Provide fire resistance;
contain fire, prevent collapse
T
timeBuchanan, 2002
www.francobontempi.
org
3/22/2011 52
ANTINCENDIO

53
flashover
STRATEGIE
ATTIVE
(approccio
sistemico)
STRATEGIE
PASSIVE
(approccio
strutturale)
Tempo t
TemperaturaT(t)
andamento di T(t) a
seguito del successo
delle strategie attive
flashover
STRATEGIE
ATTIVE
(approccio
sistemico)
STRATEGIE
PASSIVE
(approccio
strutturale)
Tempo t
TemperaturaT(t)
andamento di T(t) a
seguito del successo
delle strategie attive
FIRE MODEL
HEAT TRANSFER
MODEL
STRUCTURAL
MODEL
Fire thermal exposure
Thermal gradients
Load capacity
Curva naturale d’incendio
www.francobontempi.
org
3/22/2011 53
ANTINCENDIO

54
F
L
A
S
H
O
V
E
R
passive
 Create fire
compartments
 Prevent damage
in the elements
 Prevent loss of
functionality in
the building
active
 Detection measures
(smoke, heat, flame
detectors)
 Suppression
measures (sprinklers,
fire extinguisher,
standpipes, firemen)
 Smoke and heat
evacuation system
prevention protection robustness
 Limit ignition
sources
 Limit hazardous
human behavior
 Emergency
procedure and
evacuation
 Prevent the
propagation
of collapse,
once local
damages
occurred (e.g.
redundancy)
Fire Safety Strategies
www.francobontempi.
org
3/22/2011 54
ANTINCENDIO

55
Fire Safety Strategies
active
protection
passive
protection
no failures
doesn’t
trigger
Y
N
Y
N
spreads
extinguishes
damages
Y
N
robustness
no collapse
collapse
Y
N
triggers
prevention
1 42 3
www.francobontempi.
org
3/22/2011 55
ANTINCENDIO

56
CARATTERE ACCIDENTALE
Evento
www.francobontempi.
org
3/22/2011 56
ANTINCENDIO

57
DOI:10.3267/HE2008
Situazioni HPLC
High Probability Low Consequences
www.francobontempi.
org
3/22/2011 57
ANTINCENDIO

58
LPHC events www.francobontempi.
org
3/22/2011 58
ANTINCENDIO

59
HPLC
High probability
Low Consequences
LPHC
Low Probability
High
Consequences
release of energy SMALL LARGE
numbers of breakdown SMALL LARGE
people involved FEW MANY
nonlinearity WEAK STRONG
interactions WEAK STRONG
uncertainty WEAK STRONG
decomposability HIGH LOW
course predictability HIGH LOW
HPLC – LPHC EVENTS www.francobontempi.
org
3/22/2011 59
ANTINCENDIO

60
Perrow
LINEAR interactions NONLINEAR
LOOSEcouplingsTIGHT
www.francobontempi.
org
3/22/2011 60
ANTINCENDIO

61
LOW
AMBIGUITY
UNCERTAINTY
HIGH
TIGHT
COUPLING
INTERACTIONS
CONNECTIONS
LOOSE
NON LINEAR
BEHAVIOR
LINEAR
LOW
AMBIGUITY
UNCERTAINTY
HIGH
TIGHT
COUPLING
INTERACTIONS
CONNECTIONS
LOOSE
NON LINEAR
BEHAVIOR
LINEAR
Complexity

62
3300183 183777 627
+77.00 m
+383.00 +383.00
+54.00
+118.00
+52.00 +63.00
3300183 183777 627
+77.00 m
+383.00 +383.00
+54.00
+118.00
+52.00 +63.00
CONTROL DEVICES
SOIL BEHAVIOR
MATERIAL NONLINEARITY
SOIL/STRUCTURE INTERFACE CONTACT
HANGERS
TOWERS
MAIN CABLES
GEOMETRIC NONLINEARITY
Nonlinearity www.francobontempi.
org

63
3300183 183777 627
+77.00 m
+383.00 +383.00
+54.00
+118.00
+52.00 +63.00
3300183 183777 627
+77.00 m
+383.00 +383.00
+54.00
+118.00
+52.00 +63.00
STRUCTURAL MODEL
LOADING SYSTEM
GEOMETRY AND MATERIAL
Uncertainty www.francobontempi.
org

64
3300183 183777 627
+77.00 m
+383.00 +383.00
+54.00
+118.00
+52.00 +63.00
3300183 183777 627
+77.00 m
+383.00 +383.00
+54.00
+118.00
+52.00 +63.00
TRAFFIC – STRUCTURE
WIND - STRUCTURE
SOIL - STRUCTURE
Interactions
GLOBAL/LOCAL STRUCTURAL BEHAVIOUR
www.francobontempi.
org

65
DOI:10.3267/HE2008 Approcci di analisi
HPLC
Eventi Frequenti con
Conseguenze Limitate
LPHC
Eventi Rari con
Conseguenze Elevate
Complessità:
Aspetti non lineari e
Meccanismi di interazioni
Impostazione
del problema:
Deterministico
Stocastico
ANALISI
QUALITATIVA
DETERMINISTICA
ANALISI
QUANTITATIVA
PROBABILISTICA
ANALISI
PRAGMATICA
CON SCENARI
www.francobontempi.
org
3/22/2011 65
ANTINCENDIO

66
Scenari (D.M. 14 settembre 2005)
66
Il Progettista, a seguito della classificazione e della caratterizzazione delle azioni,
deve individuare le possibili situazioni contingenti in cui le azioni possono
cimentare l’opera stessa. A tal fine, è definito:
 lo scenario: un insieme organizzato e realistico di situazioni in cui l’opera
potrà trovarsi durante la vita utile di progetto;
 lo scenario di carico: un insieme organizzato e realistico di azioni che
cimentano la struttura;
 lo scenario di contingenza: l’identificazione di uno stato plausibile e
coerente per l’opera, in cui un insieme di azioni (scenario di carico) è
applicato su una configurazione strutturale.
Per ciascuno stato limite considerato devono essere individuati scenari di carico
(ovvero insiemi organizzati e coerenti nello spazio e nel tempo di azioni) che
rappresentino le combinazioni delle azioni realisticamente possibili e
verosimilmente più restrittive.
www.francobontempi.
org
3/22/2011 66
ANTINCENDIO

67
Overview of scenario analysis
Determine geometry,
construction and
use of the building
Establish maximum likely
fuel loads
Estimate maximum likely
number of occupants
and their locations
Assume certain fire protection
features
Carry out fire engineering
analysis
Acceptable
performance
Accept
design
Modify fire
protection
features
Establish
performance
requirements
No Yes
Buchanan,2002www.francobontempi.
org
3/22/2011 67
ANTINCENDIO

68
ISO 13387: Example of Event Tree
www.francobontempi.
org
3/22/2011 68
ANTINCENDIO

69
CONTROLLING FIRE SPREAD
• The larger a fire, the greater its destructive
potential.
• The control of fire movement, or fire spread, is
discussed in four categories:
1. within the room of origin;
2. to other rooms on the same level;
3. to other storey of the same building;
4. to other buildings.
www.francobontempi.
org
3/22/2011 69
ANTINCENDIO

70
ISO 13387: Examples of Fire Spread Routes
www.francobontempi.
org
3/22/2011 70
ANTINCENDIO

71
Fire spread within the room of origin
• Fire spread within the room of origin depends largely on
heat release rate of the initially burning object.
• Vertical and horizontal fire spread will be greatly
increased if the room is lined with combustible materials
susceptible to rapid flame spread on the walls and
especially on the ceilings.
• The properties of interest are ignitability, flame spread
and the amount of smoke produced; these are often
called early fire hazard properties or reaction to fire
properties; these properties can be improved with the
use of special paints or pressure treatment.
www.francobontempi.
org
3/22/2011 71
ANTINCENDIO

72
Fire spread to adjacent rooms (1)
• Spread of fire and smoke to adjacent rooms is a major
contributor to fire deaths. Fire and smoke movement depends
vey much on the geometry of the building. If doors are open,
they can provide a path for smoke and toxic combustion
products to travel from the upper layer of the fire room into the
next room or corridor.
• Keeping doors closed is essential to preventing fire spread from
room to room. Doors through fire barrier must be able to
maintain the containment function of the barrier through which
they pass, whether for smoke control or fire resistance.
• Door closing devices which operate automatically when a fire is
detected are very effective for greatly increasing fire safety.
www.francobontempi.
org
3/22/2011 72
ANTINCENDIO

73
Fire spread to adjacent rooms (2)
• Concealed spaces are one of the most dangerous paths for the
spread f fire and smoke. Concealed cavities are a particular
problem in old buildings, especially if a number of new ceilings
or partitions have been added over the years.
• Fire can also spread to adjacent rooms by penetrating the
surrounding walls. Fire resisting walls must extend through
suspended ceilings to the floor or roof above so that the fire
does not spread by traveling through concealed space above
the wall.
• The wall can be extended above the roof line to form a parapet,
or the roof can be fire-rated for some distance either side of the
top of the wall.
www.francobontempi.
org
3/22/2011 73
ANTINCENDIO

74
Fire spread to others storey (1)
• Vertical shafts and stairways must be fire-stopped or separated
from the occupied space at each level to avoid producing a path
for spread of fire and smoke from floor to floor. A particularly
dangerous situation can arise if there are interconnected
horizontal and vertical concealed spaces, within the building or
on the façade.
• This is particularly important of curtain-wall construction where
the exterior panels are not part of the structure. Careful
detailing and installation is necessary to ensure that the entire
gap is sealed, especially at corners and junctions, to eliminate
any possible path for fire spread.
• Gaps such as these between structural and non-structural
elements are often filed with non-rigid fire-stopping materials
to allow for seismic or thermal movement.
www.francobontempi.
org
3/22/2011 74
ANTINCENDIO

75
Fire spread to others storey (2)
• Vertical fire spread can also occur outside the building
envelope, via combustible cladding materials or exterior
windows.
• Vertical spread of fire from window is a major hazard in multi-
story buildings. This hazard can be partly controlled by keeping
windows small and well separated, and by using horizontal
aprons which project above windows openings.
• Flames from small narrow windows tend to project further
away from the wall of the building than flames from long wide
windows, leading to lower probability of storey fire spread.
www.francobontempi.
org
3/22/2011 75
ANTINCENDIO

76
Fire spread to other buildings
• Fire can spread from a burning building to adjacent buildings by
flame contact, by radiation from windows, or by flaming brands.
• Fire spread can be prevented by providing a fire-resisting barrier
or by providing sufficient separation distances. If there are
openings in the external wall, the probability of fire spread
depends greatly on the distances between the buildings and the
size of the openings. It depends also on relative buildings
heights.
• Collapse of exterior walls can be a major hazard for fire-fighters
and bystanders, and can lead to further spread of fire to
adjacent buildings.
• Fire spread by flame contact is only possible if the buildings are
quite close together, whereas fire spread by radiation can occur
over many meters. Fire can also travel large distances between
buildings if combustible vegetation is present.
www.francobontempi.
org
3/22/2011 76
ANTINCENDIO

77
IMPOSTAZIONE DELLA SICUREZZA
Rischio
www.francobontempi.
org
3/22/2011 77
ANTINCENDIO

78
RISK CONCERNwww.francobontempi.org
RISK
RISCHIO
HAZARD
PERICOLO
EXPOSURE
ESPOSIZIONE
VULNERABILITY
VULNERABLITA'
CONSEQUENCES
CONSEGUENZE
ENVIRONMENT
AMBIENTE
(sidewalk
marciapiede)
SYSTEM
SISTEMA
(walking person
pedone)
(hole
tombino)
(path
percorso)
(distraction
distrazione)
June 2011 78www.francobontempi.org
cause
causa
effect
effetto

79
Risk treatment
Option 1 :
RISK
AVOIDANCE
Option 2 :
RISK
REDUCTION
Option 3 :
RISK
TRANSFER
Option 4 :
RISK
ACCEPTANCE
START
STOP
No
No
No
Yes
Yes
Yes
No
100 %
50 %
50 %
30 %
20 %
25 %
5 %
www.francobontempi.
org
3/22/2011 79
ANTINCENDIO

80
Option 1 – Risk avoidance, which usually means not proceeding to
continue with the system; this is not always a feasible
option, but may be the only course of action if the
hazard or their probability of occurrence or both are
particularly serious;
Option 2 – Risk reduction, either through (a) reducing the
probability of occurrence of some events, or (b) through
reduction in the severity of the consequences, such as
downsizing the system, or (c) putting in place control
measures;
Option 3 – Risk transfer, where insurance or other financial
mechanisms can be put in place to share or completely
transfer the financial risk to other parties; this is not a
feasible option where the primary consequences are not
financial;
Option 4 – Risk acceptance, even when it exceeds the criteria, but
perhaps only for a limited time until other measures can
be taken.
www.francobontempi.
org
3/22/2011 80
ANTINCENDIO

81
Risk Analysis, Assessment,
Management (IEC 1995)
Luur,2002
www.francobontempi.
org
3/22/2011 81
ANTINCENDIO

82
Quantitative Risk Analysis
Luur,2002
www.francobontempi.
org
3/22/2011 82
ANTINCENDIO

83
Risk-based decision making
DEFINE CONTEXT
(social, individual,
political, organizational,
technological)
DEFINE SYSTEM
(the system is usually decomposed into a
number of smaller subsystems and/or
components)
HAZARD SCENARIO ANALYSIS
(what can go wrong?
how can it happen?
waht controls exist?)
ESTIMATE
PROBABILITIES
(of occurrences)
ESTIMATE
CONSEQUENCES
(magnitude)
DEFINE
RISK SCENARIOS
RISK ASSESSMENT
(compare risks
against criteria)
RISK TREATMENT
option 1 - avoidance
option 2 - reduction
option 3 - transfer
option 4 - acceptance
SENSITIVITY
ANALYSIS
MONITOR
AND
REVIEW
Stewart&Melchers,1997www.francobontempi.
org
3/22/2011 83
ANTINCENDIO

84
RISK CONCERNS
DEFINE CONTEXT
technological)
RSK ANALYSIS
(for the system are defined organization,
scenarios, and consequences of
occurences)
RISK ASSESSMENT
(compare risks
against criteria)
RISK TREATMENT
option 3 - transfer
MONITOR
AND
REVIEW
RISK
MANAGEMENT
RISK
ANALYSIS
RISK
ASSESSMENT
www.francobontempi.
org
3/22/2011 84
ANTINCENDIO

85
RISK CONCERNS
DEFINE CONTEXT
technological)
RSK ANALYSIS
occurences)
RISK ASSESSMENT
(compare risks
against criteria)
RISK TREATMENT
option 3 - transfer
MONITOR
AND
REVIEW
RISK
MANAGEMENT
RISK
ANALYSIS
RISK
ASSESSMENT
www.francobontempi.
org
3/22/2011 85
ANTINCENDIO

86
RISK CONCERNS
DEFINE CONTEXT
technological)
RSK ANALYSIS
occurences)
RISK ASSESSMENT
(compare risks
against criteria)
RISK TREATMENT
option 3 - transfer
MONITOR
AND
REVIEW
RISK
MANAGEMENT
RISK
ANALYSIS
RISK
ASSESSMENT
www.francobontempi.
org
3/22/2011 86
ANTINCENDIO

87
RISK CONCERNS
DEFINE CONTEXT
technological)
RSK ANALYSIS
occurences)
RISK ASSESSMENT
(compare risks
against criteria)
RISK TREATMENT
option 3 - transfer
MONITOR
AND
REVIEW
RISK
MANAGEMENT
RISK
ANALYSIS
RISK
ASSESSMENT
www.francobontempi.
org
3/22/2011 87
ANTINCENDIO

88
RISK CONCERNS
DEFINE CONTEXT
technological)
RSK ANALYSIS
occurences)
RISK ASSESSMENT
(compare risks
against criteria)
RISK TREATMENT
option 3 - transfer
MONITOR
AND
REVIEW
RISK
MANAGEMENT
RISK
ANALYSIS
RISK
ASSESSMENT
www.francobontempi.
org
3/22/2011 88
ANTINCENDIO

89
RISK CONCERNS
DEFINE CONTEXT
technological)
RSK ANALYSIS
occurences)
RISK ASSESSMENT
(compare risks
against criteria)
RISK TREATMENT
option 3 - transfer
MONITOR
AND
REVIEW
RISK
MANAGEMENT
RISK
ANALYSIS
RISK
ASSESSMENT
www.francobontempi.
org
3/22/2011 89
ANTINCENDIO

90
RISK CONCERNS
DEFINE CONTEXT
technological)
RSK ANALYSIS
occurences)
RISK ASSESSMENT
(compare risks
against criteria)
RISK TREATMENT
option 3 - transfer
MONITOR
AND
REVIEW
RISK
MANAGEMENT
RISK
ANALYSIS
RISK
ASSESSMENT
www.francobontempi.
org
3/22/2011 90
ANTINCENDIO

91
RISK CONCERNS
DEFINE CONTEXT
technological)
RSK ANALYSIS
occurences)
RISK ASSESSMENT
(compare risks
against criteria)
RISK TREATMENT
option 3 - transfer
MONITOR
AND
REVIEW
RISK
MANAGEMENT
RISK
ANALYSIS
RISK
ASSESSMENT
www.francobontempi.
org
3/22/2011 91
ANTINCENDIO

92
www.francobontempi.
org
3/22/2011 92
ANTINCENDIO

93
Scenarios
DEFINE SYSTEM
(the system is usually decomposed into
a number of smaller subsystems and/or
components)
(what can go wrong?
how can it happen?
ESTIMATE
CONSEQUENCES
(magnitude)
ESTIMATE
PROBABILITIES
(of occurrences)
DEFINE
RISK SCENARIOS
SENSITIVITY
ANALYSIS
RISK
ANALYSIS
FIRE
EVENT
www.francobontempi.
org
3/22/2011 93
ANTINCENDIO

94
Simulations
DEFINE SYSTEM
(the system is usually decomposed into
a number of smaller subsystems and/or
components)
(what can go wrong?
how can it happen?
ESTIMATE
CONSEQUENCES
(magnitude)
ESTIMATE
PROBABILITIES
(of occurrences)
DEFINE
RISK SCENARIOS
SENSITIVITY
ANALYSIS
RISK
ANALYSIS
NUMERICAL
MODELING
www.francobontempi.
org
3/22/2011 94
ANTINCENDIO

95
Fire safety concepts tree (NFPA)
1
2
3
4
5
6
7
8
9
Buchanan,2002
Strategie per
la gestione
dell'incendio
1
Prevenzione
2
Gestione
dell'evento
3
Gestione
dell'incendio
4
Gestione delle
persone e
dei beni
15
Difesa sul posto
16
Spostamento
17
Disposibilità
delle vie
di fuga
18
Far avvenire
il deflusso
19
Controllo
della quantità
di
combustibile
5
Soppressione
dell'incendio
10
Controllo
dell'incendio
attraverso il
progetto
13
Automatica
11
Manuale
12
Controllo dei
materiali
presenti
6
Controllo
del movimento
dell'incendio
7
Resistenza e
stabilità
strutturale
14
Contenimento
9
Ventilazione
8
www.francobontempi.
org
3/22/2011 95
ANTINCENDIO

96
Fire safety concepts tree (NFPA)
Buchanan,2002
1
2
3
4
5
6
7
8
9
Strategie per
la gestione
dell'incendio
1
Prevenzione
2
Gestione
dell'evento
3
Gestione
dell'incendio
4
Gestione delle
persone e
dei beni
15
Difesa sul posto
16
Spostamento
17
Disposibilità
delle vie
di fuga
18
Far avvenire
il deflusso
19
Controllo
della quantità
di
combustibile
5
Soppressione
dell'incendio
10
Controllo
dell'incendio
attraverso il
progetto
13
Automatica
11
Manuale
12
Controllo dei
materiali
presenti
6
Controllo
del movimento
dell'incendio
7
Resistenza e
stabilità
strutturale
14
Contenimento
9
Ventilazione
8
www.francobontempi.
org
3/22/2011 96
ANTINCENDIO

97
FIRE SAFETY CONCEPTS TREE (NFPA)
Line 2
• La gestione dell’incendio non è necessaria se si previene l’ignizione.
• Può essere solo ridotta la probabilità che avvenga l’ignizione.
• Gli incendi dolosi è difficile da prevedere dal progettista
www.francobontempi.
org
3/22/2011 97
ANTINCENDIO

98
Line 4
Exposed persons and property can be managed by moving them from the building or
by defending them in place; in order for people to move, the fire must be detected,
the people must be notified, and there must be a suitable safe path for movement.
www.francobontempi.
org
3/22/2011 98
ANTINCENDIO

99
Line 6
• There are three options for managing a fire; in the first case the fuel source can be
controlled, by limiting the amount of fuel or the geometry; the second options is to
suppress the fire; the third is to control the fire by construction.
• Control fire by construction it is necessary to both control the movement of the fire
and provide the structural stability.
www.francobontempi.
org
3/22/2011 99
ANTINCENDIO

100
Line 9 - The two strategies for controlling fire movement are:
a) fire venting: venting can be by an active system of mechanically operated vents, or a passive
system that relies on the melting of plastic skylights; in either case, the increased ventilation
may increase the local severity of the fire, but fire spread within the building and the overall
thermal impact on the structure will be reduced;
b) containment of a fire to prevent spread is the principal tool of passive fire protection;
preventing fire growing to a large size is ne of the most important components of a fire safety
strategy; radiant spread of the fire to neighboring buildings must also be prevented, by limiting
the size of openings in exterior walls;
Smoke containment can also controlled by venting or containment; pressurizations and smoke
barriers can also used.
www.francobontempi.
org
3/22/2011 100
ANTINCENDIO

101
Fire safety concepts tree (NFPA) (1)
• Line 4 – exposed persons and property can be managed by
moving them from the building or by defending them in place;
in order for people to move, the fire must be detected, the
people must be notified, and there must be a suitable safe
path for movement.
• Line 6 – there are three options for managing a fire; in the
first case the fuel source ca be controlled, by limiting the
amount of fuel or the geometry; the second options is to
suppress the fire; the third is to control the fire by
construction.
• Control fire by construction it is necessary to both control the
movement of the fire and provide the structural stability.
Buchanan,2002
www.francobontempi.
org
3/22/2011 101
ANTINCENDIO

102
Fire safety concepts tree (NFPA) (2)
• Line 9 - the two strategies for controlling fire movement are:
a) fire venting: venting can be by an active system of
mechanically operated vents, or a passive system that relies
on the meltig of plastic skylights; in either case, the increased
ventilation may increase the local severity of the fire, but fire
spread within the building and the overall thermal impact on
the structure will be reduced;
b) containment of a fire to prevent spread is the principal tool
of passive fire protection; preventing fire growing to a large
size is ne of the most important components of a fire safety
strategy; radiant spread of the fire to nighbouring buildings
must also be prevented, by limiting the size of openings in
exterior walls;
Smoke containment can also controlled by venting or
containment; pressurizations and smoke barriers can also
used.
Buchanan,2002
www.francobontempi.
org
3/22/2011 102
ANTINCENDIO

103
Design Process - ISO 13387
A. Design constraints and possibilities
(blue),
B. Action definition and development
(red),
C. Passive system and active response
(yellow),
D. Safety and performance
(purple).
1033/22/2011
www.francobontempi.
org
ANTINCENDIO

104
SS0a
PRESCRIBED
DESIGN
PARAMETERS
SS0b
ESTIMATED
DESIGN
PARAMETERS
SS1
initiation and
development
of fire and
fire efluent
SS2
movement of
fire effluent
SS3
structural response
and fire spread
beyond enclosure
of origin
SS4
detection,
activitation and
suppression
SS5
life safety:
occupant behavior,
location and
condition
SS6
property
loss
SS7
business
interruption
SS8
contamination
of
environment
SS9
destruction
of
heritage
(0)
DESIGN
CONSTRAINTS
AND
POSSIBILITIES
(1+2)
ACTION
DEFINITION
AND
DEVELOPMENT
(3+4)
SYSTEM
PASSIVE
AND ACTIVE
RESPONSE
BUSOFINFORMATION
RESULTS
DESIGN
ACTION
RESPONSE
SAFETY&PERFORMANCE
www.francobontempi.
org
3/22/2011 104
ANTINCENDIO

105
STRUCTURAL
CONCEPTION
STRUCTURAL
TOPOLOGY
&
GEOMETRY
threats
No
Yes
threats
STRUCTURAL
MATERIAL
& PARTS
No
Yespassive
structural
characteristics
threats
FIRE DETECTION
& SUPPRESSION
No
Yes
active
structural
characteristics
threats
ORGANIZATION &
FIREFIGHTERS
No
Yes
threats
MAINTENANCE
& USE
No
Yes
threats
No
alive
structural
characteristics
Yes
STRUCTURAL
SYSTEM
CHARACTERISTICS
STRUCTURAL
SYSTEM
WEAKNESS
www.francobontempi.
org
3/22/2011 105
ANTINCENDIO

106
STRUCTURAL
CONCEPTION
STRUCTURAL
TOPOLOGY
&
GEOMETRY
threats
No
Yes
threats
STRUCTURAL
MATERIAL
& PARTS
No
Yespassive
structural
characteristics
threats
No
Yes
STRUCTURAL
CONCEPTION
STRUCTURAL
TOPOLOGY
&
GEOMETRY
threats
No
Yes
threats
STRUCTURAL
MATERIAL
& PARTS
No
Yespassive
structural
characteristics
threats
FIRE DETECTION
& SUPPRESSION
No
Yes
active
structural
characteristics
threats
ORGANIZATION &
FIREFIGHTERS
No
Yes
threats
MAINTENANCE
& USE
No
Yes
threats
No
alive
structural
characteristics
Yes
www.francobontempi.
org
3/22/2011 106
ANTINCENDIO

107
FIRE DETECTION
& SUPPRESSION
No
active
structural
characteristics
threats
ORGANIZATION &
FIREFIGHTERS
No
Yes
threats
MAINTENANCE
& USE
No
Yes
threats
No
alive
structural
characteristics
Yes
STRUCTURAL
CONCEPTION
STRUCTURAL
TOPOLOGY
&
GEOMETRY
threats
No
Yes
threats
STRUCTURAL
MATERIAL
& PARTS
No
Yespassive
structural
characteristics
threats
FIRE DETECTION
& SUPPRESSION
No
Yes
active
structural
characteristics
threats
ORGANIZATION &
FIREFIGHTERS
No
Yes
threats
MAINTENANCE
& USE
No
Yes
threats
No
alive
structural
characteristics
Yes
www.francobontempi.
org
3/22/2011 107
ANTINCENDIO

108
STRUCTURAL
CONCEPTION
STRUCTURAL
TOPOLOGY
&
GEOMETRY
STRUCTURAL
MATERIAL
& PARTS
FIRE DETECTION
& SUPPRESSION
ORGANIZATION &
FIREFIGHTERS
MAINTENANCE
& USE
CRISIS
www.francobontempi.
org
3/22/2011 108
ANTINCENDIO

109
HAZARD
IN-DEPTH
DEFENCE
HOLES DUE TO
ACTIVE ERRORS
HOLES DUE TO
HIDDEN ERRORS
FAILURE PATH www.francobontempi.
org
3/22/2011 109
ANTINCENDIO

110
Causes of system failure
100%
Time
%offailure
Unknown phenomena
Known phenomena
Research level Design code level
past present future
A
BB B
C
Humanerrors
www.francobontempi.
org
3/22/2011 110
ANTINCENDIO

112
StroNGER S.r.l.
Research Spin-off for Structures of the Next Generation
Energy Harvesting and Resilience
Rome – Athens – Milan – Nice Cote Azur
Sede operativa: Via Giacomo Peroni 442-444, Tecnopolo Tiburtino,
00131 Roma (ITALY) – info@stronger2012.com

PSA - Caratteristiche del Fenomeno Incendio - Bontempi

Recommandé

Recommandé

Contenu connexe

En vedette

En vedette (20)

Plus de Franco Bontempi Org Didattica

Plus de Franco Bontempi Org Didattica (20)

Dernier

Dernier (20)

PSA - Caratteristiche del Fenomeno Incendio - Bontempi