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         Cloud Servers:
New Risk Considerations
        Overview.....................................................................................2
        Cloud Servers Attract e-Criminals...........................................2
        Servers Have More Exposure in the Cloud.............................3
        Cloud Elasticity Multiplies Attackable Surface Area..............3
        The Boomerang Problem..........................................................4
        Managing New Cloud Risks.....................................................4
        About CloudPassage................................................................5




                                                                         Copyright © 2011, CloudPassage Inc.   1
Overview
The tremendous scalability, flexibility, and speed of Infrastructure-as-a-Service (IaaS) make it
one of the fastest-growing sectors of the cloud computing markets. IaaS providers combine
virtualization technologies with massive infrastructure to deliver bandwidth, storage, and CPU
power on-demand and with granular control over scale and costs. The potential benefits of
hosting applications and workloads on cloud servers are enormous, making cloud servers
the de facto norm for a rapidly growing set of use cases.

Security and compliance, however, remain major challenges to adoption of public cloud
infrastructure services. Usage agreements and documentation squarely make the user of
IaaS, not the provider, responsible for protecting servers, applications and data in the cloud –
essentially everything from the virtual machine OS upward in the stack.1

It is critical for organizations to understand the issues around securing IaaS environments
as they move toward the flexibility, scale, and power of cloud hosting. The first step to
understanding the issues is awareness of new exposures, threats, and risks. This white paper
from CloudPassage presents specific details on the most pertinent new risks associated with
adoption of cloud IaaS. It is based on real world learning, shared by companies we have
worked with, to achieve security and compliance in the cloud. Software companies moving
to SaaS business models, growing social media startups and long-established industry
bellwethers have contributed to this knowledge.



Cloud Servers Attract e-Criminals
Online fraud has grown into a sophisticated underground economy that requires infrastructure on a
massive scale. Phishing, password cracking, and denial of service attacks leverage botnets – illicit
networks built from huge numbers of compromised servers and personal computers.

Botnets consist of thousands of “zombies” – personal computers infected by malware – which carry out
commands on behalf of the botnet operator. These compromised computers can bombard web servers
with denial-of-service attacks, fire thousands of password attempts per hour, and participate in dozens
of other online cracking activities.

Fraudsters and e-criminals use command-and-control software to coordinate zombie attack execution.
Command-and-control most frequently operates from compromised servers, without the server
owner’s knowledge. Fraudsters demand a constant stream of freshly compromised servers to keep
botnets running. An entire underground business known as bot herding2 emerged to capitalize on this
illicit need.

Bot-herders make their living by building botnets to then sell or rent to other e-criminals. This practice
has evolved to the point of Fraud-as-a-Service, the sale of prebuilt botnets ondemand, for a few
hundred dollars a month.3 It takes bot herders’ time and resources to seek out and compromise vulner-
able servers. Economies of scale and cost-benefit apply to a bot herding business just as any other.


1
    For example, Amazon Web Services refers to this as the “shared responsibility model” in the AWS Overview of Security Processes.
2
    See http://en.wikipedia.org/wiki/Bot_herder
3
    The term “Fraud-as-a-Service” is attributed to RSA, the Security Division of EMC. See “RSA Online Fraud Report” (April 2008)




Copyright © 2011, CloudPassage Inc.	                                                                                                  2
Compromising an elastic cloud infrastructure environment can return a windfall versus hacking into a
traditional hardware server. If a bot-herder is able to place command-and-control software on a VM that
later is duplicated through cloning or cloud bursting, the botnet capacity will automatically grow.

For stakeholders in cloud hosting environments, the implication is a higher expectation of being targeted
for server takeovers, root-kitting and botnet command-and-control insertions.



Servers Have More Exposure in the Cloud
Servers hosted in public IaaS environments have more exposure to compromise than servers do within
the traditional data center, where layers of perimeter controls defend server weaknesses from exploit.
Cloud IaaS environments rarely offer the control over network topology required to implement perimeter
security strategies. As a result, vulnerabilities on each cloud server are more exposed to compromise
than those in a traditional data center.

In a typical private data center environment, security chokepoints and/or network demarcation zones
(DMZs) exist; firewalls, intrusion detection systems (IDS) and UTM devices easily inspect external
traffic from sources such as Internet connectivity. Typically, hardware acceleration within the data center
boosts performance and compensate for the processing demands required to inspect and control all
network traffic in and out of an organization. Because public IaaS environments rarely offer control over
hardware or topology, these control mechanisms are unavailable to enterprises hosting servers there.

Traditional perimeter security depends heavily on control over network factors like IP addressing, physical
topology and routing. Customers of cloud IaaS do not have this control; the cloud provider usually
dictates network addressing and routing. Server IP addresses are unpredictable, creating serious
complications in configuring security mechanisms. Public IaaS environments also typically segment
network traffic at the VM level, meaning the only traffic a server can see is its own. It is not possible
to use network-level IDS, IPS or wire-level UTM mechanisms in this environment. The performance
implications of each cloud server performing traffic inspection at the wire level are staggering, especially
given the lack of hardware control.

Even in a traditional data center with perimeter defenses in place, server-level security such as
hardening, secure application configuration, and patch management are important. In the cloud,
where front-line defenses are extremely limited, server-level security protection is critical. Cloud
servers are largely on their own to protect themselves; strong and highly automated host-based
controls are essential.



Cloud Elasticity Multiplies Attack Surfaces
Elasticity is a key differentiator distinguishing IaaS from other infrastructure hosting models. Servers
are no longer boxes mounted to racks bolted to the floor. With virtualization and cloud technologies,
servers are now files and metadata that can be instantly copied, migrated, and stored offline for later
reactivation – in other words, elastic.

This elasticity provides companies with the ability to cloudburst, expanding the number of servers and
available compute power within minutes. However, this significantly increases the risk of compromise.
The problem is quite simply that as a virtual server duplicates so do its vulnerabilities and exposures.
Given the speed with which servers can multiply, this issue increases the attackable surface area of a
cloud server farm dramatically within minutes.

Inactive machine images or snapshots are virtual machines that are saved for later reactivation or as a




Copyright © 2011, CloudPassage Inc.	                                                                       3
template for new servers. While this capability is clearly useful, offline server images do not get updates
regarding newly discovered vulnerability, policy changes, or modification to user accounts and access
rights. When a hibernated server is reactivated, there will be access privileges, software vulnerabilities,
and outdated configurations that expose it to immediate compromise.

When adopting a cloud-hosting model, system administrators and other stakeholders should be aware
of and account for these issues. One misconfigured server, either created recently or resurrected from
storage, could multiply during cloning and cloud-bursting operations to become the “Typhoid Mary” of
the cloud farm.



The Boomerang Problem
Organizations often turn to cloud hosting for application development Public cloud hosting reduces bar-
riers to application development, increasing speed to market for technology-related products. Special
infrastructure skills, network configuration and hardware setup time are minimal. This is an attractive
proposition, especially for business and technology managers frustrated with the perceived delays and
red tape associated with infrastructure setup.

Sometimes central information technology organizations sanction cloud-based development efforts; in
some instances, individually business units charge ahead independently. At some point, all successful
development projects go into production. Sometimes the application continues to run in the public cloud
environment. Often the application code comes back in-house with the cloud server in a ready-to-run
virtual machine image.

If cloud servers used for development are not secured properly, disastrous results often occur. These
servers are highly exposed, and often the dynamic nature of application development masks signs of
intrusion.

Compromise impact could include code theft or insertion of malicious functionality into the new
application. Any live data used for development purposes (a disturbingly frequent occurrence) could be
at risk and compromised with the server. If rootkits or other malware are dropped onto the cloud server,
that malware could come back to the enterprise data center.



Managing New Cloud Risks
Clearly there is new set of exposures and risks associated with hosting applications, data and workloads
in public IaaS environments. Perimeter-oriented methods of protection that have worked for years are
highly difficult or completely untenable in these environments. The dynamic nature of public and hybrid
cloud server farms further complicates matters.

The lack of options to protect servers in high-risk public clouds can be the deal-killer that stops
companies from embracing public IaaS and realizing the obvious benefits. There is a need to bridge
the gap between traditional perimeter-oriented data center security and security in dynamic cloud
environments.

Securing the server itself in an automated, portable, and elastic manner represents the most effective
approach to practical survivability in public and hybrid clouds. By implementing best practices in a
cloud-capable, elastic model, enterprises can create security for cloud-hosted applications and data
that meets or exceeds what traditional perimeter-centric models can deliver. n




Copyright © 2011, CloudPassage Inc.	                                                                          4
This paper is the first in a series of white papers from CloudPassage. This series will offer technical and
operational security considerations found valuable in developing real-world strategies for securing IaaS
hosting environments. In later white papers, CloudPassage will examine models, best practices, and
technology alternatives for achieving portable cloud server security.
Visit us at www.cloudpassage.com to learn more.



About CloudPassage
CloudPassage is a security SaaS company offering the industry’s first and only server security
and compliance solutions purpose-built for elastic cloud environments. The company addresses
the technical challenges of securing highly dynamic cloud hosting environments where consis-
tent physical location, network control and perimeter security are not guaranteed. The company’s
early product feature set includes high-accuracy server security configuration and vulnerability
management and centralized management of host-based firewalls. The innovative capabilities
of the Halo platform operate across infrastructure models and seamlessly handle cloud server
bursting, cloning, and migration. Headquartered in Menlo Park, California, CloudPassage is
backed by a number of well-known venture capital firms and angel investors.




Copyright © 2011, CloudPassage Inc.	                                                                          5

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Cloud servers-new-risk-considerations

  • 1. w h i t e pa p e r Cloud Servers: New Risk Considerations Overview.....................................................................................2 Cloud Servers Attract e-Criminals...........................................2 Servers Have More Exposure in the Cloud.............................3 Cloud Elasticity Multiplies Attackable Surface Area..............3 The Boomerang Problem..........................................................4 Managing New Cloud Risks.....................................................4 About CloudPassage................................................................5 Copyright © 2011, CloudPassage Inc. 1
  • 2. Overview The tremendous scalability, flexibility, and speed of Infrastructure-as-a-Service (IaaS) make it one of the fastest-growing sectors of the cloud computing markets. IaaS providers combine virtualization technologies with massive infrastructure to deliver bandwidth, storage, and CPU power on-demand and with granular control over scale and costs. The potential benefits of hosting applications and workloads on cloud servers are enormous, making cloud servers the de facto norm for a rapidly growing set of use cases. Security and compliance, however, remain major challenges to adoption of public cloud infrastructure services. Usage agreements and documentation squarely make the user of IaaS, not the provider, responsible for protecting servers, applications and data in the cloud – essentially everything from the virtual machine OS upward in the stack.1 It is critical for organizations to understand the issues around securing IaaS environments as they move toward the flexibility, scale, and power of cloud hosting. The first step to understanding the issues is awareness of new exposures, threats, and risks. This white paper from CloudPassage presents specific details on the most pertinent new risks associated with adoption of cloud IaaS. It is based on real world learning, shared by companies we have worked with, to achieve security and compliance in the cloud. Software companies moving to SaaS business models, growing social media startups and long-established industry bellwethers have contributed to this knowledge. Cloud Servers Attract e-Criminals Online fraud has grown into a sophisticated underground economy that requires infrastructure on a massive scale. Phishing, password cracking, and denial of service attacks leverage botnets – illicit networks built from huge numbers of compromised servers and personal computers. Botnets consist of thousands of “zombies” – personal computers infected by malware – which carry out commands on behalf of the botnet operator. These compromised computers can bombard web servers with denial-of-service attacks, fire thousands of password attempts per hour, and participate in dozens of other online cracking activities. Fraudsters and e-criminals use command-and-control software to coordinate zombie attack execution. Command-and-control most frequently operates from compromised servers, without the server owner’s knowledge. Fraudsters demand a constant stream of freshly compromised servers to keep botnets running. An entire underground business known as bot herding2 emerged to capitalize on this illicit need. Bot-herders make their living by building botnets to then sell or rent to other e-criminals. This practice has evolved to the point of Fraud-as-a-Service, the sale of prebuilt botnets ondemand, for a few hundred dollars a month.3 It takes bot herders’ time and resources to seek out and compromise vulner- able servers. Economies of scale and cost-benefit apply to a bot herding business just as any other. 1 For example, Amazon Web Services refers to this as the “shared responsibility model” in the AWS Overview of Security Processes. 2 See http://en.wikipedia.org/wiki/Bot_herder 3 The term “Fraud-as-a-Service” is attributed to RSA, the Security Division of EMC. See “RSA Online Fraud Report” (April 2008) Copyright © 2011, CloudPassage Inc. 2
  • 3. Compromising an elastic cloud infrastructure environment can return a windfall versus hacking into a traditional hardware server. If a bot-herder is able to place command-and-control software on a VM that later is duplicated through cloning or cloud bursting, the botnet capacity will automatically grow. For stakeholders in cloud hosting environments, the implication is a higher expectation of being targeted for server takeovers, root-kitting and botnet command-and-control insertions. Servers Have More Exposure in the Cloud Servers hosted in public IaaS environments have more exposure to compromise than servers do within the traditional data center, where layers of perimeter controls defend server weaknesses from exploit. Cloud IaaS environments rarely offer the control over network topology required to implement perimeter security strategies. As a result, vulnerabilities on each cloud server are more exposed to compromise than those in a traditional data center. In a typical private data center environment, security chokepoints and/or network demarcation zones (DMZs) exist; firewalls, intrusion detection systems (IDS) and UTM devices easily inspect external traffic from sources such as Internet connectivity. Typically, hardware acceleration within the data center boosts performance and compensate for the processing demands required to inspect and control all network traffic in and out of an organization. Because public IaaS environments rarely offer control over hardware or topology, these control mechanisms are unavailable to enterprises hosting servers there. Traditional perimeter security depends heavily on control over network factors like IP addressing, physical topology and routing. Customers of cloud IaaS do not have this control; the cloud provider usually dictates network addressing and routing. Server IP addresses are unpredictable, creating serious complications in configuring security mechanisms. Public IaaS environments also typically segment network traffic at the VM level, meaning the only traffic a server can see is its own. It is not possible to use network-level IDS, IPS or wire-level UTM mechanisms in this environment. The performance implications of each cloud server performing traffic inspection at the wire level are staggering, especially given the lack of hardware control. Even in a traditional data center with perimeter defenses in place, server-level security such as hardening, secure application configuration, and patch management are important. In the cloud, where front-line defenses are extremely limited, server-level security protection is critical. Cloud servers are largely on their own to protect themselves; strong and highly automated host-based controls are essential. Cloud Elasticity Multiplies Attack Surfaces Elasticity is a key differentiator distinguishing IaaS from other infrastructure hosting models. Servers are no longer boxes mounted to racks bolted to the floor. With virtualization and cloud technologies, servers are now files and metadata that can be instantly copied, migrated, and stored offline for later reactivation – in other words, elastic. This elasticity provides companies with the ability to cloudburst, expanding the number of servers and available compute power within minutes. However, this significantly increases the risk of compromise. The problem is quite simply that as a virtual server duplicates so do its vulnerabilities and exposures. Given the speed with which servers can multiply, this issue increases the attackable surface area of a cloud server farm dramatically within minutes. Inactive machine images or snapshots are virtual machines that are saved for later reactivation or as a Copyright © 2011, CloudPassage Inc. 3
  • 4. template for new servers. While this capability is clearly useful, offline server images do not get updates regarding newly discovered vulnerability, policy changes, or modification to user accounts and access rights. When a hibernated server is reactivated, there will be access privileges, software vulnerabilities, and outdated configurations that expose it to immediate compromise. When adopting a cloud-hosting model, system administrators and other stakeholders should be aware of and account for these issues. One misconfigured server, either created recently or resurrected from storage, could multiply during cloning and cloud-bursting operations to become the “Typhoid Mary” of the cloud farm. The Boomerang Problem Organizations often turn to cloud hosting for application development Public cloud hosting reduces bar- riers to application development, increasing speed to market for technology-related products. Special infrastructure skills, network configuration and hardware setup time are minimal. This is an attractive proposition, especially for business and technology managers frustrated with the perceived delays and red tape associated with infrastructure setup. Sometimes central information technology organizations sanction cloud-based development efforts; in some instances, individually business units charge ahead independently. At some point, all successful development projects go into production. Sometimes the application continues to run in the public cloud environment. Often the application code comes back in-house with the cloud server in a ready-to-run virtual machine image. If cloud servers used for development are not secured properly, disastrous results often occur. These servers are highly exposed, and often the dynamic nature of application development masks signs of intrusion. Compromise impact could include code theft or insertion of malicious functionality into the new application. Any live data used for development purposes (a disturbingly frequent occurrence) could be at risk and compromised with the server. If rootkits or other malware are dropped onto the cloud server, that malware could come back to the enterprise data center. Managing New Cloud Risks Clearly there is new set of exposures and risks associated with hosting applications, data and workloads in public IaaS environments. Perimeter-oriented methods of protection that have worked for years are highly difficult or completely untenable in these environments. The dynamic nature of public and hybrid cloud server farms further complicates matters. The lack of options to protect servers in high-risk public clouds can be the deal-killer that stops companies from embracing public IaaS and realizing the obvious benefits. There is a need to bridge the gap between traditional perimeter-oriented data center security and security in dynamic cloud environments. Securing the server itself in an automated, portable, and elastic manner represents the most effective approach to practical survivability in public and hybrid clouds. By implementing best practices in a cloud-capable, elastic model, enterprises can create security for cloud-hosted applications and data that meets or exceeds what traditional perimeter-centric models can deliver. n Copyright © 2011, CloudPassage Inc. 4
  • 5. This paper is the first in a series of white papers from CloudPassage. This series will offer technical and operational security considerations found valuable in developing real-world strategies for securing IaaS hosting environments. In later white papers, CloudPassage will examine models, best practices, and technology alternatives for achieving portable cloud server security. Visit us at www.cloudpassage.com to learn more. About CloudPassage CloudPassage is a security SaaS company offering the industry’s first and only server security and compliance solutions purpose-built for elastic cloud environments. The company addresses the technical challenges of securing highly dynamic cloud hosting environments where consis- tent physical location, network control and perimeter security are not guaranteed. The company’s early product feature set includes high-accuracy server security configuration and vulnerability management and centralized management of host-based firewalls. The innovative capabilities of the Halo platform operate across infrastructure models and seamlessly handle cloud server bursting, cloning, and migration. Headquartered in Menlo Park, California, CloudPassage is backed by a number of well-known venture capital firms and angel investors. Copyright © 2011, CloudPassage Inc. 5