1.
WEB SITE INSECURITY
How your CMS site will get hacked and how to
prevent it

2.
WEB SECURITY
➤ Common threats to web security with real world case studies of
compromised sites,
➤ A 'dissection' of a typical common exploit tool and how it operates,
➤ Simple approaches to mitigating common threats/vulnerabilities,
➤ Defence in depth – an overview of the various components of web security,
➤ Drupal specific measures that standard penetration testing often does not
account for.
➤ An overview of how to benefit from:
➤ Security monitoring and log analysis
➤ Intrusion Detection Systems & Firewalls
➤ Security headers and Content Security Policies (CSP).

3.
GEORGE BOOBYER
Drupal: iAugur
george@blue-bag.com
twitter: @iBluebag
WWW.BLUE-BAG.COM
Established in 2000

4.
WHY IS THE WEB INSECURE?
➤ Security is perceived to be complex or someone else's domain,
➤ The web is a playground of the well-meaning/naïve and
the ill-disposed or malevolent,
➤ It is also a place of automated exploitation,
➤ Web software / infrastructure is often insecure by default,
➤ Often our goals (budgets) end at site launch,
➤ We don’t often look after sites once live - we check the visible
content and cross our fingers it is safe.
➤ Security is not hard and any effort will be rewarded

5.
INVEST IN SECURITY
➤ What is at risk?
➤ Loss of business
➤ Reputation (you / your client)
➤ Sensitive data
➤ Personal data - enumeration
➤ SEO ranking
➤ Blacklisting
➤ Ransom
➤ Model your costs:
➤ Spend 37% of your expected losses on security
Diminishing returns (Gordon–Loeb model)
➤ Automate - Ansible - Immutable Infrastructure

6.
➤ Defacers
➤ SEO Spam - content injection
➤ Data Breaches
➤ Hactivists
➤ Recruiters (Botnet orchestration)
➤ Ransomware botnets
➤ Layer 7 Attacks - DDOS
➤ Unintentional - Application level
vulnerabilities
HACKERS - WHO ARE THEY?

7.
DEFACERS

8.
DEFACERS

9.
DEFACERS

10.
DEFACERS

11.
DEFACERS

12.
DEFACERS

13.
CONTENT INJECTION
<script> location.href='http://www.fashionheel-us.com/';</script>
Body overwritten with redirect

14.
CONTENT INJECTION - USER AGENT SPECIFIC
User-Agent:Googlebot/2.1 (+http://www.googlebot.com/bot.html)

15.
DATA BREACHES

16.
DATA BREACHES
@TROYHUNT

17.
HACKIVISTS
Hacking team vs Phineas
Albanian hitman
http://pastebin.com/raw/0SNSvyjJ

18.
BOTNET RECRUITS
"Investigation of the attack uncovered
49,657 unique IPs which hosted Mirai-
infected devices. As previously reported,
these were mostly CCTV cameras—a
popular choice of DDoS botnet herders.
Other victimized devices included DVRs
and routers."
https://www.incapsula.com/blog/malware-analysis-mirai-ddos-botnet.html

19.
BOTNET RECRUITS
[FREE] World's Largest Net:Mirai Botnet, Client, Echo Loader, CNC source code release - Anna-senpai - 09-30-2016 11:50 AM
Preface
Greetz everybody,
When I first go in DDoS industry, I wasn't planning on staying in it long. I made my money, there's lots of eyes looking at IOT now, so it's time to GTFO. However, I
know every skid and their mama, it's their wet dream to have something besides qbot.
So today, I have an amazing release for you. With Mirai, I usually pull max 380k bots from telnet alone. However, after the Kreb DDoS, ISPs been slowly shutting down
and cleaning up their act. Today, max pull is about 300k bots, and dropping.
So, I am your senpai, and I will treat you real nice, my hf-chan.
And to everyone that thought they were doing anything by hitting my CNC, I had good laughs, this bot uses domain for CNC. It takes 60 seconds for all bots to
reconnect, lol
Also, shoutout to this blog post by malwaremustdie
http://blog.malwaremustdie.org/2016/08/mmd-0056-2016-linuxmirai-just.html
https://web.archive.org/web/20160930230210/http://blog.malwaremustdie.org/2016/08/mmd-0056-2016-linuxmirai-just.html <- backup in case low quality reverse engineer
unixfreaxjp decides to edit his posts lol
Had a lot of respect for you, thought you were good reverser, but you really just completely and totally failed in reversing this binary. "We still have better kung
fu than you kiddos" don't make me laugh please, you made so many mistakes and even confused some different binaries with my. LOL
Let me give you some slaps back -
1) port 48101 is not for back connect, it is for control to prevent multiple instances of bot running together
2) /dev/watchdog and /dev/misc are not for "making the delay", it for preventing system from hanging. This one is low-hanging fruit, so sad that you are extremely
dumb
3) You failed and thought FAKE_CNC_ADDR and FAKE_CNC_PORT was real CNC, lol "And doing the backdoor to connect via HTTP on 65.222.202.53". you got tripped up by
signal flow ;) try harder skiddo
4) Your skeleton tool sucks ass, it thought the attack decoder was "sinden style", but it does not even use a text-based protocol? CNC and bot communicate over
binary protocol
5) you say 'chroot("/") so predictable like torlus' but you don't understand, some others kill based on cwd. It shows how out-of-the-loop you are with real malware.
Go back to skidland
http://pastebin.com/raw/mevDFPg6

20.
EXPLOITING THE EXPLOITABLE

21.
OPEN ACCESS

22.
OPEN ACCESS
It's a hydroelectric control system!

23.
VAST RESOURCE OF VULNERABLE DEVICES
https://press.avast.com/avast-exposes-internet-of-things-attack-risk-in-barcelona-home-of-mobile-world-congress-2017

24.
HACKERS: THEY HAVE IT EASY
➤ Insecure Servers & open
ports
➤ Default settings and
passwords
➤ Open configuration files
➤ Browsable folders
➤ Out of date CMS (insecure
plugins)
➤ SQL Injection
➤ Phishing / Social
Engineering
➤ Leverage other breaches /
password reuse
➤ Search Engines / Exploit
databases & resources
➤ Botnets / Proxies

25.
OUT OF DATE SOFTWARE
➤ Out of date CMS core
➤ Vulnerable plugins / modules
https://www.drupal.org/security-advisory-policy

26.
MISCONFIGURATIONS: SAVED COPIES OF SENSITIVE FILES

27.
MISCONFIGURATIONS: SAVED COPIES OF SENSITIVE FILES
navigable / readable config files

28.
MISCONFIGURATIONS: VISIBLE SENSITIVE FILES

29.
ANYTHING BUT COSMETIC: TAKING CONTROL

30.
ANYTHING BUT COSMETIC: TAKING CONTROL

31.
ANYTHING BUT COSMETIC: TAKING CONTROL

32.
ANYTHING BUT COSMETIC: TAKING CONTROL

33.
UPLOAD A SHELL
function drupal_bootstrap($phase = NULL, $new_phase = TRUE) { ….
case DRUPAL_BOOTSTRAP_SESSION:
require_once DRUPAL_ROOT . '/' . variable_get('session_inc', 'includes/session.inc');
drupal_session_initialize();
break;
In the session_inc variable include a malicious file from the /tmp/ folder:
https://blog.sucuri.net/2016/05/finding-conditional-drupal-database-spam.html

34.
HACKERS: HOW THEY FEED - LOW HANGING FRUIT
➤ Internet of things: shodan.io

35.
HACKERS: HOW THEY FEED - LOW HANGING FRUIT
inurl:CHANGELOG.txt intext:drupal intext:"SA-CORE" -intext:7.32 -
site:github.com -site:drupal.org
➤ Internet of things: shodan.io
➤ Google Dorks

36.
HACKERS: HOW THEY FEED - LOW HANGING FRUIT
➤ Internet of things: shodan.io
➤ Google Dorks
➤ Exploit-db

37.
HACKERS: HOW THEY FEED - LOW HANGING FRUIT
➤ Internet of things: shodan.io
➤ Google Dorks
➤ Exploit-db
➤ Show off: zone-h

38.
HACKERS: HOW THEY FEED - LOW HANGING FRUIT
➤ Internet of things: shodan.io
➤ Google Dorks
➤ Exploit-db
➤ Show off: zone-h
➤ Trawlers / chancers

39.
THE GREPS OF WRATH
A story of one failed exploit

40.
ROUTINE LOG/EVENT ANALYSIS
➤ Ideally ship and aggregate logs
➤ Routine analysis of logs for 40x and 5xx
➤ Review requests by status code
➤ Routine analysis of big hitters
➤ Routine analysis of hits by status code
# get a list of 404s by ip and target
grep "HTTP/1.1" 404" access.log | awk '{print $1 " " $8 } ' | sort | uniq -c | sort -n
# get the pages that cause 500
grep "HTTP/1.1" 500" access.log | awk '{print $8 } ' | sort | uniq -c | sort -n
# list CMS hackers
grep -E -i -w 'wp-(admin|content|includes|login)' access.log.1 | awk '{print $1 " " $8}' | sort | uniq -c | sort -nr

41.
INVESTIGATE A SPECIFIC EVENT
➤ Get the big hitters from the past hour or so
➤ Get the requests for specific IPs
#Get big hitters along with their agent string
zcat pound.log.1.gz | awk -v OFS='t' '{print $7, substr($0, index($0,$18))}' | sort | uniq -c | sort -nk1
# top 50 hitters with counts (ignore static assets)
tail -100000 access.log|egrep -i -v "jpg|png|js|css" | awk '{print $2}'|sort | uniq -c | sort -nk1 | tail -50
# hits per hour
awk -F: '{print $2}' access_log | sort | uniq -c
# hits per hour by an ip
grep -w {ipaddress} logfile | awk -F: '{print $2}' | sort | uniq -c
# hits for a period
awk '$5>"[20/Sep/2015:16:00:" && $5<"[20/Sep/2015:18:23:"' access.log | less
# hit count by ip for a period
awk '$5>"[20/Sep/2015:16:00:" && $5<"[20/Sep/2015:18:23:"' access.log | awk '{print $2}'|sort | uniq -c | sort -nk1

42.
CMS EXPLOIT - SMELLING A RAT
➤ Routine analysis shows a pattern
/vmskdl44rededd
/N0Wccvvd333.php
/N0Wccvvd333.php
/N0WaY/N0WaY1bb2/N0WaY123.php
/N0WaY/N0WaY1bb2/N0WaY123.php
/wp-login.php
/wp-config.php
/configuration.php
/administrator
/user
/CHANGELOG.txt
/?q=admin/views/ajax/autocomplete/user/N0t3xstgg12394

43.
RESEARCH AND PROTECTION
➤ In the case of a specific exploit - do some research
➤ In our example we have an exploit:
➤ That is coming from multiple ips
➤ Appears to follows a typical pattern
➤ Characteristics are the same on unrelated servers
Look for non existent file:
N0WaY/N0WaY1bb2/N0WaY123.php
see how the site reacts...
Determine CMS
CMS Specific exploit attempts
wp-login
wp-admin
joomla.xml
CHANGELOG.txt
def DruCore(self):
if LooseVersion("7") <= LooseVersion(str(self.DruVersion)) <= LooseVersion("7.31"):
msg = "Drupal Vulnerable to SA-CORE-2014-005"; report.high(msg)

44.
SEARCH FOR KEY CHARACTERISTICS
➤ Github
➤ Exploit Databases
➤ Penetration test tools
CMSMap

45.
CAUGHT RAT: CMS MAP
➤ Tests for CMS
➤ Tests for CMS version
➤ Multiple exploits
➤ Updates from Exploit DB
➤ Upload shell
➤ Call back to host
➤ Protect vulnerabilities
➤ Update regularly
➤ Block signature
➤ Ban known baddies
2.92.230.173
5.165.47.132
37.15.2.6
46.119.108.124
46.219.247.129
62.183.85.176
77.52.98.181
77.122.3.232
79.172.7.23
82.149.151.12
91.202.27.239
95.139.232.62
95.28.120.251
95.70.43.209
95.167.1.250
109.87.102.147
109.184.1.245
176.69.113.104
178.67.152.248
195.230.129.226
Disclaimer
Usage of CMSmap for attacking targets without prior mutual consent is
illegal. It is the end user's responsibility to obey all applicable local, state
and federal laws. Developers assume NO liability and are NOT responsible
for any misuse or damage caused by this program.

46.
PROTECTION MEASURES
➤ Control Leakage
➤ Restrict access to files
➤ Layered Defence

47.
INFORMATION LEAKAGE != OBFUSCATION
Cons:
➤ Security through
obscurity is pointless
➤ There are many ways
that you can determine
the CMS and its version
https://www.drupal.org/node/766404

48.
Pros:
➤ A layered defence has this
as a component
➤ Many exploits are reliant
on simple version
determination for version
specific exploits
➤ Simple process to place
effective hurdle in the
path of script kiddies
➤ A component of defence only
INFORMATION LEAKAGE != OBFUSCATION
Cons:
➤ Security through
obscurity is pointless
➤ There are many ways
that you can determine
the CMS and its version
https://www.drupal.org/node/766404

49.
SECURITY MISCONCEPTIONS
➤ Port reassignment
Use port 2020, 2222 etc in place of 22
Bad Idea!
➤ Waste of time: port scanners (nmap) will find it
➤ False sense of security: Better spend time doing real security
RSA keys, IP restriction, AllowGroups, no Root login
IDS or other activity pattern matching.
➤ Poor Security:
Ports below 1024 are privileged ports
Above 1024 are not - easy to mimic ssh and listen.
➤ Non standard - Other security measures won’t guard it.

50.
DEFENCE LEVEL 1 - PORT LEVEL CONTROL
Know what ports you have open, what is listening on them and who can access.
On the server:
0.0.0.0:9080 LISTEN 1804/varnishd
127.0.0.1:25 LISTEN 2583/exim4
144.76.185.80:443 LISTEN 1037/pound
0.0.0.0:2812 LISTEN 1007/monit
127.0.0.1:6082 LISTEN 1799/varnishd
0.0.0.0:3306 LISTEN 1727/mysqld
127.0.0.1:11211 LISTEN 849/memcached
127.0.0.1:6379 LISTEN 946/redis-server 12
0.0.0.0:10000 LISTEN 2644/perl
144.76.185.80:80 LISTEN 1037/pound
0.0.0.0:22 LISTEN 851/sshd
0 :::9080 LISTEN 1804/varnishd
0 ::1:25 LISTEN 2583/exim4
0 :::8443 LISTEN 1779/apache2
0 :::8080 LISTEN 1779/apache2
0 :::22 LISTEN 851/sshd
$netstat -nlp | grep tcp
From outside:
$nmap xxx.xxx.xxx.xxx
Not shown: 990 filtered ports
PORT STATE SERVICE
80/tcp open http
443/tcp open https
554/tcp open tsp
7070/tcp open realserver
8080/tcp open http-proxy
8443/tcp open https-alt
9080/tcp open glrpc
10000/tcp open snet-sensor-mgmt
Red: IP / MAC restricted
Grey: Router proxies

51.
DEFENCE LEVEL 1 - FIREWALL BLOCK LISTS
The IP 195.154.47.128 has just
been banned by Fail2Ban after
3 attempts against ssh.
Firewall
195.154.47.12
CVE-2016-2118 (a.k.a. BADLOCK)
SSH Brute force
Block
Blocklist
Drop
Firewall
IPSET
IPSET
Any Port
1
2
3
4
5
Log
Report to blocklist
Source/share lists
of bad ips
Block on first visit
Initial
Server
Anyother
Server
Compromised Zombie
Exclude whitelist

52.
DEFENCE LEVEL 2 - HARDEN SOFTWARE
➤ Configure
➤ mod_negotiation
-Multiviews
➤ mod_indexes
-Indexes
➤ Modules To Disable
➤ mod_status
➤ mod_userdir
➤ mod_info
➤ PHP
➤ enable_dl = Off
➤ allow_url_fopen = Off
➤ register_globals = Off
➤ disable_functions = openlog
➤ open_basedir = /var/www/
➤ upload_tmp_dir = /var/www/tmp
$ curl -Ikis "http://localhost/dump" -H "Accept: Accio/dumps"
HTTP/1.1 406 Not Acceptable
Date: Mon, 27 Feb 2017 17:40:36 GMT
Server: Apache/2.4.25 (Unix) PHP/5.6.29
Alternates:
{"dump.sql" 1 {type application/x-sql} {length 104857600}},
{"dump.txt" 1 {type text/plain} {length 104857600}}
Vary: negotiate,accept
TCN: list
Content-Type: text/html; charset=iso-8859-1

53.
DEFENCE LEVEL 2 - FILE PROTECTION MEASURES
All public folders (files)
php_flag engine off
All private files:
php_flag engine off
Require all denied
All public folders (document root)
AllowOverride None
Options -Indexes +SymLinksIfOwnerMatch -MultiViews
Deny access to txt files and php files other than specific ones:
<FilesMatch "([^(xxrobots|robots)].*.txt|[^(index|channel)].*.php)$">
Require all denied
Require ip {your-static-ip}
Require ip 127.0.0.1
Require valid-user
Require group {your secure group}

54.
Deny access to hidden (DVCS) files:
<IfModule mod_rewrite.c>
RewriteEngine On
RewriteCond %{REQUEST_URI} "!(^|/).well-known/([^./]+./?)+$" [NC]
RewriteCond %{SCRIPT_FILENAME} -d [OR]
RewriteCond %{SCRIPT_FILENAME} -f
RewriteRule "(^|/)." - [F]
</IfModule>
Deny access to files by type:
<FilesMatch ".(engine|inc|info|install|make|module|profile|test|po|
sh|.*sql|theme|tpl(.php)?|xtmpl)(~|.sw[op]|.bak|.orig|.save)?$|
^(..*|Entries.*|Repository|Root|Tag|Template)$|^#.*#$|.php(~|
.sw[op]|.bak|.orig.save)$">
Require all denied
DEFENCE LEVEL 2 - FILE PROTECTION MEASURES

55.
DEFENCE LEVEL 2 - CONTROL ACCESS
➤ Can't access TXT or PHP
➤ Restrict all sensitive file
types - whether you use
them or not
➤ Restrict PHP to specific
folders
/vmskdl44rededd
/N0Wccvvd333.php
/N0Wccvvd333.php
/N0WaY/N0WaY1bb2/N0WaY123.php
/N0WaY/N0WaY1bb2/N0WaY123.php
/wp-login.php
/wp-config.php
/configuration.php
/administrator
/user
/CHANGELOG.txt
/?q=admin/views/ajax/autocomplete/user/N0t3xstgg12394

56.
DEFENCE LEVEL 3 - ANALYSE ACCESS PATTERNS
➤ Analyse activity patterns
➤ Protect admin paths
➤ Clearly here our rat is
sniffing for copies of
settings.php
➤ Often it is database
dumps.
➤ Don't dump on
production!

57.
DEFENCE LEVEL 3 - ANALYSE ACCESS PATTERNS
➤ Analyse activity patterns
➤ Protect admin paths
➤ Clearly here our rat is
sniffing for copies of
settings.php
➤ Often it is database
dumps.
➤ Don't dump on
production!
# Examples of real attempts to access sensitive files and backups
/sites/default/settings
/sites/default/settings.php~
/sites/default/settings.php.txt
/sites/default/settings.php.old
/sites/default/settings.php_old
/sites/default/settings.php-old
/sites/default/settings.php.save
/sites/default/settings.php.swp
/sites/default/settings.php.swo
/sites/default/settings.php_bak
/sites/default/settings.php-bak
/sites/default/settings.php.original
/sites/default/settings.php.orig
/sites/default/settings.php.bak
/sites/default/settings.save
/sites/default/settings.old
/sites/default/settings.bak
/sites/default/settings.orig
/sites/default/settings.original
/sites/default/settings.txt

58.
DEFENCE LEVEL 3 - ANALYSE ACCESS PATTERNS
➤ Analyse activity patterns
➤ Protect admin paths
➤ Clearly here our rat is
sniffing for copies of
settings.php
➤ Often it is database
dumps.
➤ Don't dump on
production!
# Examples of real attempts to access sensitive files and backups
/sites/default/settings
/sites/default/settings.php~
/sites/default/settings.php.txt
/sites/default/settings.php.old
/sites/default/settings.php_old
/sites/default/settings.php-old
/sites/default/settings.php.save
/sites/default/settings.php.swp
/sites/default/settings.php.swo
/sites/default/settings.php_bak
/sites/default/settings.php-bak
/sites/default/settings.php.original
/sites/default/settings.php.orig
/sites/default/settings.php.bak
/sites/default/settings.save
/sites/default/settings.old
/sites/default/settings.bak
/sites/default/settings.orig
/sites/default/settings.original
/sites/default/settings.txt
All of the following had UA of
"Mozilla/5.0 (compatible; Googlebot/2.1; +http://www.google.com/bot.html)"
"GET /backup.zip
"GET /backup.rar
"GET /backup.tar.gz
"GET /backup.sql
"GET /backup.sql.gz
"GET /backup
"GET /public_html.tar.gz
"GET /public_html.tar.bz2
"GET /public_html.zip
"GET /public_html.rar
"GET /dump.sql
"GET /dump.sql.gz
"GET /dump.sql.bz2
"GET /dump.sql.zip
"GET /dump.zip
"GET /dump
"GET /mysqldump
"GET /mysqldump.sql
"GET /pma
"GET /phpmyadmin
"GET /myadmin

59.
DEFENCE LEVEL 4 - REACTIVE
➤ mod_evasive
➤ mod_security
➤ Fail2ban
➤ Logwatch
➤ ELK
➤ IPTABLES / IPSET
[Definition]
# Option: failregex
# Notes.: regex to match the N0WaY settings.bak attack.
# Values: TEXT
# Test : fail2ban-regex /var/log/apache2/access.log /etc/fail2ban/filter.d/
apache-cmsnoway.conf '^<HOST> .*(/admin/reports/dblog).*$'
failregex = ^<HOST> .* "GET .*(/N0WaY/N0WaY1bb2/
N0WaY123.php|settings.(php.)?(php~|sw(p|o)|txt|swo|php(-old|-
bak|_bak)|php_old|bak|old|save|orig(inal)?)|wp-config.php).*
# Option: ignoreregex
# Notes.: regex to ignore. If this regex matches, the line is ignored.
# Values: TEXT
ignoreregex = '^<HOST> .*(/admin/reports/dblog).*$'

60.
DEFENCE LEVEL 5 - INTRUSION DETECTION SYSTEM
➤ Host based Intrusion detection system
➤ log analysis
➤ file integrity checking,
➤ policy monitoring,
➤ rootkit detection,
➤ real-time alerting and
➤ active response
OSSEC HIDS Notification.
2017 Jan 19 13:57:11
Received From: server-005-023->syscheck
Rule: 550 fired (level 7) -> "Integrity checksum changed."
Portion of the log(s):
Integrity checksum changed for: '/var/www/www.somesite.com/live/htdocs/sites/
default/settings.php'
Permissions changed from 'r--r-----' to 'rw-r-----'
--END OF NOTIFICATION
http://ossec.github.io/

61.
CMS - NOWAY - DEFENCE IN DEPTH
Settings.php.bak
File extension denied
Access pattern blocked
Origin IP blocked
File permissions 0444
disallow php/bak
Fail2ban / HIDS
IPSET
M
o
n
i
t
o
r
Best protection - File is not there in the first place!!

62.
ATTACK SURFACES
Coffee shop wifi
XSS
CSRF
Frames
Clickjacking
SSL stripping

63.
SPHERES OF PROTECTION
mod_security
mod_evasive
Apache
Network / FW
WAF
TLS 'At Large' Security
3rd Parties
Browser:
WAN Network
Secure Headers
XSS/CSRF Protection
Info. Disclosure
HTTPS

64.
NOTHING IS PERFECT

65.
SECURITY IN THE BROWSER
➤ HTTPS
➤ Cross-site scripting - XSS
➤ Cross-site request forgery - CSRF
➤ Click jacking - Frames
➤ Secure Cookies
https://pokeinthe.io
https://scotthelme.co.uk/
Adoption in Alexa
top million websites

66.
CHECK LIST FOR WEB SECURITY
https://wiki.mozilla.org/Security/Guidelines/Web_Security

67.
➤ X-Content-Type-Options: nosniff
Guards against "drive-by download attacks" by preventing
IE & Chrome from MIME-sniffing a response away from
the declared content-type.
➤ X-Frame-Options: DENY
Provides Clickjacking protection
➤ X-Xss-Protection: 1; mode=block
Configures the XSS audit facilities in IE & Chrome
➤ Strict-Transport-Security: max-age=31536000;
includeSubDomains; preload
Informs the UA that all communications should be treated
as HTTPS. Prevents MiTM & SSL-stripping attacks
SECURITY IN THE BROWSER
beware the consequences!

68.
SECURE COOKIES FOIL CSRF
➤ Set Cookie as:
➤ HTTP only
➤ Secure
➤ SameSite
Header edit Set-Cookie ^(.*)$ $1;HttpOnly;SameSite=lax;
Apache Configuration:
ini_set('session.cookie_httponly', 1);
if (isset($_SERVER['HTTPS']) && $_SERVER['HTTPS'] == 'on') {
ini_set('session.cookie_secure', 1);
}
Drupal Configuration:
In Drupal 8 httpOnly and Secure are set by default

69.
SECURE HEADERS
➤ Subresource Integrity
Provide SHA hash of inline or CDN scripts.
➤ Public-Key-Pins
By specifying the fingerprint of certain cryptographic
identities, you can force the UA to only accept those identities
going forwards.
➤ Content-Security-Policy:
Provides details about the sources of resources the browser
can trust. e.g. Images, scripts, CSS, frames (both ancestors &
children)
See https://securityheaders.io

70.
CONTENT SECURITY POLICY
Connect Source
Media Source
Object Source
Form Action
Upgrade Insecure
Requests
Block All Mixed
Content
Sandbox
Reflected XSS
Base URI
Manifest Source
Plugin Types
Referrer
How to test:
Default Source
Script Source
Style Source
Image Source
Font Source
Child Source
Frame Ancestors
Report Only
Report URI
Others:
Typical elements:
Audit!

71.
CONTENT SECURITY POLICY
Content-Security-Policy:
default-src 'self';
img-src * data:;
style-src 'self' 'unsafe-inline' *.googleapis.com f.fontdeck.com;
font-src 'self' *.gstatic.com;
script-src 'self' 'unsafe-inline' 'unsafe-eval' *.google-
analytics.com *.googleapis.com *.jquery.com *.google.com
google.com *.newrelic.com *.nr-data.net connect.facebook.net;
connect-src 'self';
frame-ancestors 'self' *.facebook.com;
frame-src 'self' *.facebook.com;
report-uri https://xyz.report-uri.io/r/default/csp/enforce
https://report-uri.io/account/reports/csp/

72.
CONTENT SECURITY POLICY
Policy contraventions are reported by the browser :
https://report-uri.io/account/reports/csp/

73.
CONTENT SECURITY POLICY
Mozilla CSP Policy directives
https://developer.mozilla.org/en/docs/Web/Security/CSP/CSP_policy_directives
Drupal Modules
https://www.drupal.org/project/seckit
CSP Builders

74.
MOST COMMON REASONS YOU GET HACKED
➤ Don't have a security policy / budget
➤ Software outdated
➤ Relying on default setup (config and passwords)
➤ In sufficient access controls
➤ Password reuse
➤ Phishing and human error
➤ No IDS / Firewall / CSP etc
➤ No Monitoring and evaluation
➤ No response prepared

75.
➤ Regularly review
➤ Audit attack surfaces
➤ Test defences
➤ Structured defences
➤ Avoid complacency
➤ Rebuild regularly
➤ Security Research
➤ Event monitoring
SO - WHAT DO WE DO ABOUT ALL THIS!

76.
FINAL THOUGHTS - ANY SECURITY IS BETTER THAN NONE
Bake your principles into practices - Ansible - immutable infrastructure
➤ Security is a department - not a one off -
Push for a budget!
➤ Define areas of responsibility with hosting
➤ Prepare response
➤ Learn your attack surface, test on Tor
➤ Monitor & test regularly
➤ Follow some Opsec people:
@Scott_Helme, @troyhunt, @ivanristic,
@briankrebs @aprilmpls
➤ Letsencrypt - HTTPS.
➤ Work together (bad ips, honeypot, block list) - don't hit back